H I 

!$ i 
lis I 

+5/ 



imMimmi 
















0» • • • . *^v \ •>• 

1 •" «^< » • 









v<J^^ 






^oV" 









<J>^ * o » o ' A^ 



< o 




^- °o 







•I o 








^^ 












-^^0^ 





•n^o^ 




.^^\ 



^oV" 



^°v 




















FROM 



Manassas to Appomattox 



MEMOIES OF THE CIVIL WAE IN 
AMERICA 



/ 



BY 



JAMES LONGSTREET, 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CONFEDERATE ARMY 



ILLUSTRATED WITH PLATES, MAPS, PORTRAITS, AND ENGRAVINGS 
SPECIALLY PREPARED FOR THIS WORK 




PHILADELPHIA 

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 
1896 









^ 



Copyright, 1895, 

BY 

J. B. LippiNcoTT Company. 



AU. liiglUs reserved. 



Electhotyped and Printed by J. B. Lippincott Company, Philaoeiphia, U.S.A. 



THIS WORK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED 

TO THE 

OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE FIRST CORPS OF THE ARMY 
OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA 

TO THE LIVING AND THE DEAD 

Hn fmcmoris of 

THEIR BRAVE DEEDS, THEIR TOILS, THEIR TRIBULATIONS, 
AND THEIR TRIUMPHS 





^^^Ip-^^— ^^^-^^y^;^^^-<H 





PREFACE. 



Immediately after the surrender of the Confederate 
armies engaged in the war between the States, General 
Lee undertook to write of the campaigns of the Army of 
Northern Virginia while under his command, and asked 
such assistance as I could give in supplying reports, de- 
spatches, and letters of his, the originals of which had been 
lost or destroyed. Under the impression that they could 
not be put to better use, such as were then in hand were 
packed and sent him. He gave up the work, and after a 
few years his death made it impossible that the world 
should ever receive the complete story of the Confederate 
campaigns in Virginia from the noble mind that pro- 
jected and controlled them. 

Possibly, had I not expected our commander to write 
the history of those campaigns, I should have written it 
myself a decade or so earlier than I have done. But, 
personally, I am not sorry that I write of the war thirty 
years after its close, instead of ten or twenty. 

While I am so constituted, temperamentally, that I 
could view then almost exactly as I do now the great 
struggle in which I bore a part, I do not know that others, 
in any considerable number, might have so regarded it at 
the earlier periods to which I refer. 

I believe that now, more fully than then, the public is 
ready to receive, in the spirit in which it is written, the 
i story which I present. 

I It is not my purpose to philosophize upon the war, but 
,jl cannot refrain from expressing my profound thankful- 



VI PEEFACE. 

ness that Providence has spared me to such time as I can 
see the asperities of the great conflict softened, its passions 
entering upon the sleep of oblivion, only its nobler — if 
less immediate — results springing into virile and vast life. 
I believe there is to-day, because of the war, a broader and 
deeper patriotism in all Americans ; that patriotism throbs 
the heart and pulses the being as ardently of the South 
Carolinian as of the Massachusetts Puritan ; that the Lib- 
erty Bell, even now, as I write, on its Southern pilgrimage, 
will be as reverently received and as devotedly loved in 
Atlanta and Charleston as in Philadelphia and Boston. 
And to stimulate and evolve this noble sentiment all the 
more, what we need is the resumj)tion of fraternity, the 
hearty restoration and cordial cultivation of neighborly, 
brotherly relations, faith in Jehovah, and respect for 
each other ; and God grant that the haj)py vision that de- 
lighted the soul of the sweet singer of Israel may rest 
like a benediction upon the North and the South, upon 
the Blue and the Gray. 

The spirit in which this work has been conceived, and 
in which I have conscientiously labored to carry it out, is 
one of sincerity and fairness. As an actor in, and an eye- 
witness of, the events of 1861-65, I have endeavored to 
perform my humble share of duty in passing the mate- 
rials of history to those who may give them place in the 
records of the nation, — not of the South nor of the North, 
— but in the history of the United Nation. It is with 
such magnified view of the responsibility of saying the 
truth that I have written. 

I yield to no one as a champion of the Southern soldier 
wherever he may have fought and in whatever army, and 
I do not think I shall be charged more now than in 
war-time with *' underestimating the enemy." Honor to 
all ! If I speak with some particularity of the First 
Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, it must be 
ascribed in part to the affection of a commander, and ii 



PREFACE. 



Vll 



part to my desire to relieve its brave officers and men m 
the ranks from unjust aspersions. After General Lees 
death, various writers on the Southern cause combined with 
one accord to hold the First Corps and its commander 
responsible for all adversity that befell the army.^ i 
beinp; under the political ban, and the political passions 
and prejudices of the times running high, they had no 
difficulty in spreading their misrepresentations South and 
North until some people, through their mere reiteration, 
came to accept them as facts. I simply present the facts 
concerning the First Corps in all fulness and fairness, 
attested by indisputable authorities, that the public may 
iudge between it and its detractors. 

In the accounts of battles and movements, the official 
War Records supply in a measure the place of lost papers 
and afford a great mass of most trustworthy statistics, i 
am under obligations to General E. ^' ^^^^^f''; ^Z' 
eral G M Sorrel, Colonel Osman Latrobe, ColonelJ. W. 
Fairfax, Colonel T. J. Goree, Colonel Erasmus Taylor, 
and Colonel J. C. Haskell for many interesting sugges- 

^To Major George B. Davis and Mr. L. J. Perry, of the 
War Records office, I am under obligations for invaluable 
assistance; as also to Mr. Alfred Matthews, of Philadel- 
phia, for material aid in revising the manuscript of these 

memoirs. ^ . 

The Author. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. 

PAGE 

Birth — Ancestry — School-Boy Days — Appointment as Cadet at tlie 
United States Military Academy — Graduates of Historic Classes 
— Assignment as Brevet Lieutenant — Gay Life of Garrison at 
Jefferson Barracks — Lieutenant Grant's Courtship — Annexation 
of Texas — Army of Observation — Army of Occupation — Camp 
Life in Texas— March to the Rio Grande— Mexican War .... 13 

CHAPTER IL 

FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS. 

The War-Cloud — The Journey Northward— Appointed Brigadier- 
General — Report to General Beauregard— Assigned to Com- 
mand at the Scene of the First Conflict— Personnel of the 
Confronting Forces — Description of the Field of Manassas, or 
Bull Run — Beauregard and McDowell of the same West Point 
Class — Battle of Blackburn's Ford —Early's Mistake — Under 
Fire of Friend and Foe 29 

CHAPTER IIL 

BATTLE OP MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN. 

Commanders on both Sides generally Veterans of the Mexican 
War — General Irvin McDowell's Preconceived Plan — Johnston 
reinforces Beauregard and approves his Plans — General Bernard 
E. Bee — Analysis of the Fight— Superb Work of the Federal 
Artillery — Christening of "Stonewall Jackson" — McDowell's 
Gallant Effort to recover Lost Power — Before he was shorn 
of his Artillery he Avas the Samson of the Field — The Rout — 
Criticism of McDowell — Tyler's Reconnoissance— Ability of the 
Commanding Generals tested 42 

CHAPTER IV. 

THE CONFEDERATES HOVERING AROUND WASHINGTON. 

An Early War-Time Amenity — The Author invited to dine with 
the Enemy — " Stove-pipe Batteries" — J. E. B. Stuart, the Fa- 
mous Cavalryman — His Bold Dash on the Federals at Lewins- 
ville — Major-General G. W. Smith associated with Johnston 
and Beauregard in a Council — Longstreet promoted Major- 
General— Fierce Struggle at Ball's Bluff— Dranesville a Success 



X CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

for the Union Arms — McClellan given the Sobriquet of "The 
Young Napoleon" 59 

CHAPTER V. 

ROUND ABOUT RICHMOND. 

The Defences of the Confederate Capital — Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia at Centreville — Aggressive Action — Council with the 
President and Secretary of War — Mr. Davis's High Opinion of 
McClellan — Operations on the Peninsula — Engagements about 
Yorktown and Williamsburg— Severe Toil added to the Soldiers' 
Usual Labors by a Saturated Soil 64 

CHAPTER VI. 

THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 

The Attack on Fort Magruder — Hancock occupies Two Redoubts — 
The Slaughter in Early's Brigade — The Fifth North Carolina 
Regiment and Twenty-Fourth Virginia mercilessly exposed — 
A Hard-Fought Engagement — A Confederate Victory — Mc- 
Clellan not on the Field the Greater Part of the Day — Han- 
cock called "The Superb" by McClellan — Johnston pays High 
Tribute to Longstreet 72 

CHAPTER VII. 

SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 

A New Line of Defence — Positions of the Confronting Armies — 
Fitz-John Porter — Terrific Storm on the Eve of Battle— Gen- 
eral Johnston's Orders to Longstreet, Smith, and Huger— Lack 
of Co-operation on the Confederate Side, and Ensuing Confu- 
sion — Fatalities among Confederate Officers- Kearny's Action 
— Serious Wounding of General Johnston at the Close of the 
Battle — Summary and Analysis of Losses 81 

CHAPTER VIIL 

SEQUELS OF SEVEN PINES. 

The Forces under Command of G. W. Smith after Johnston was 
wounded— The Battle of the 1st— Longstreet requests Reinforce- 
ments and a Diversion — Council held — McLaws alone sustains 
Lopgstreet's Opposition to retiring— Severe Fighting— Pickett's 
Brave Stand— General Lee assigned to Command— He orders 
the withdrawal of the Army— Criticism of General Smith— Con- 
federates should not have lost the Battle— Keyes's Corroboration 103 

CHAPTER IX. 

ROBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND. 

The Great General's Assignment not at first assuring to the Army- 
Able as an Engineer but limited as to Field Service— He makes 



CONTENTS. XI 

PAGE 

the Acquaintance of his Lieutenants — Calls a Council— Gains 
Confidence by saying Nothing — "A Little Humor now and 
then" — Lee Plans a Simultaneous Attack on MeClellan's Front 
and Rear — J. E. B, Stuart's Daring Reconnoissance around the 
Union Army 112 

CHAPTER X. 

FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY. 

Retreat — Lee's Bold Initiative — Lee and his Lieutenants planning 
Battle — The Confederates' Loss at Mechanicsville — Gaines's 
Mill— A. P. Hill's Fight — Longstreet's Reserve Division put 
in— MeClellan's Change of Base— Savage Station— Longstreet 
engages MeClellan's Main Force at Frayser's Farm (or Glen- 
dale)— President Davis on the Field — Testimony of Federal 
Generals — Fierce Bayonet Charges — "Greek meets Greek" — 
Capture of General McCall— MeClellan's Masterly Retreat . . 120 

CHAPTER XL 

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 

Last Stand in the Great Retreat — Strength of MeClellan's Position 
— The Confederates make Poor Use of their Artillery — A Mis- 
take and Defeat for Lee's Army — The Campaign as a Whole a 
Great Success, but it should have been far greater — MeClellan's 
Retreat showed him well equipped in the Science of War — Re- 
view of the Campaign- Jackson's and Magruder's Misunder- 
standing — Moral Effect of the Gunboats on the James River — 
"There should be a Gunboat in Every Family" 141 

CHAPTER XI L 

HALLECK AND POPE IN FEDERAL COMMAND. 

Centres of Activity gravitate towards Orange and Culpeper Coun- 
ties — Pope's Unsoldierly Preliminary Orders — Jackson's and 
Pope's Encounter at Cedar Mountain — Confidence in and Es- 
teem for General Lee— The Confederate Commander's Plans 
for cutting ofT Pope miscarry — Capture of Captain Fitzhugh 
with Important Orders — Longstreet puts General Toombs 
under Arrest— General Pope withdraws 153 

CHAPTER XIIL 

MAKING READY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN. 

General Lee modifies his Order of March — Continuous Skirmish- 
ing—Cavalry Commander Stuart gets into General Pope's 
Head-quarters and captures his Personal Equipment — His 
Uniform Coat and Hat shown along the Confederate Lines — 
Jackson's Superb Flank Movement — Confederates capture 
Trains, Supplies, Munitions, and Prisoners — Hooker and 



Xll COjSTTENTS. 

PAGE 

Evvell at Bristoe Station — Jackson first on the Old Field of Bull 
Run — Longstreet's Command joins passing Thoroughfare Gap 
— Pope practically throws Responsibility for Aggressive Action 
on McDowell— Preliminary Fighting— General Pope surprised 
by Jackson— Pope's Orders to Fitz-John Porter 163 

CHAPTER XIV. 

SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS (BULL RUN). 

Battle opened by the Federals on Jackson's Right, followed by 
Kearny — Longstreet's Reconnoissance — Stuart, the Cavalry 
Leader, sleeps on the Field of Battle — Pope thought at the 
Close of the 29th that the Confederates were retreating— Second 
Day — Fitz-John Porter struck in Flank — Longstreet takes a 
Hand in the Fight late in the Day — Lee under Fire — The 
Federal Retreat to Centreville — That Point turned — Pope again 
dislodged — " Stonewall" Jackson's Appearance and Peculiari- 
ties — Killing of " Fighting Phil" Kearny — Losses — Review of 
the Campaign 180 

CHAPTER XV. 

THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 

General Lee continues Aggressive Work — From Foraged Fields of 
Virginia into a Bounteous Land— Longstreet objected to the 
Movement on Harper's Ferry — Lee thinks the Occasion Timely 
for Proposal of Peace and Independence — Confederates sing- 
ing through the Streets of Fredericktown — McClellan's Move- 
ments — Cautious Marches — Lee's Lost Order handed to the 
Federal Chief at Frederick 199 

CHAPTER XVL 

"THE LOST order"— SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 

How the Federals found the Despatch — With every Advantage 
McClellan "made haste slowly" — Lee turns back to meet 
him at South Mountain— Longstreet preferred that the Stand 
should be made at Sharpsburg — The Battle at the Pass — Many 
killed — General Garland of the Confederate and General Reno 
of the Union Side — A Future President among the Wounded — 
Estimate of Forces engaged 212 

CHAPTER XVIL 

PRELIMINARIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE. 

Confederates retreat from South Mountain — Federals follow and 
harass them — Franklin and Cobb at Crampton's Pass — A Spir- 
ited Action — Fighting around Harper's Ferry— Its Capitula- 
tion—The Confederates take Eleven Thousand Prisoners — 
Jackson rejoins Lee — Description of the Field of Autietam — 



CONTENTS. 

McClellan posts his Corps— Lee's Lines advantageously place 
— Hooker's Advance on the Eve of Battle should have bee 
resisted 

CHAPTER XVIIL 

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. * 

Bloodiest Single Day of the War — Coniparisou of Casualties- - 
Hooker opens the Fight against Jackson's Centre — Many Ofl - 
cers among the Fallen early in the Day — McLaws and Walk( i 
in time to meet Sumner's Advance under Sedgwick — Aroun 
Dunker Chapel— Richardson's Splendid Advance against tl • 
Confederate Centre the Signal of the Bursting of another Stori 
— Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's Troops stood before it — Fa 
of General G. B. Anderson — General Richardson mortal] 
wounded — Aggressive Spirit of his Command broken — Woi - 
derful Cannon-shot — General D. H. Hill's Third Horse kille \ 
under him 

CHAPTER XIX. 

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM (CONTINUED). 

Closing Events of the Great Struggle — Burnside crosses the Brids 
he made famous — Toombs made Gallant Defence, but was ou 
numbered and dislodged — The Confederate Brigades from Ha 
per's Ferry under A. P. Hill in Time for the Final Crisis- 
Burnside's Advance arrested by them — The Battle again; 
Burnside "appeared to spring from the Earth" — "Lee's o] I 
War Horse" — The Killing of a Kinsman at the Bridge serious] • 
affects General D. R. Jones — Tlie Sharp Fight at Shepherd - 
town — Confederates retreat — Casualties of the Battle — Confe* 
erate Losses in the Campaign — Neither McClellan's Plan n< ■ 
Execution was strong 

CHAPTER XX. 

REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 

Confederate Expectations — General Lee's Salutatory to the Peop ^ 
of Maryland — The " Lost Despatch" — McClellan's Movemen •; 
— Turn in the Tide of War — A Miracle great as the throwin ; 
down of the Walls of Jericho — In Contempt of the Enemy tt 
Confederate Army was dispersed — Harper's Ferry a "Mai 
Trap" — It diverted the Army from the Main Issue — Lee an I 
McClellan compared and contrasted — Tribute to the Confer 
erate Private Soldier 

CHAPTER XXL 

REORGANIZATION AND REST FOR BOTH ARMIES. 

The Confederates appoint Seven Lieutenant-Generals — The Arm 
of Northern Virginia organized in Corps — General McClella 



'V CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

relieved, and General Burnside appointed Commander of the 
Army of the Potomac— A Lift for the South— McClellan was 
growing— Burnside's "Three Grand Divisions" — The Campaign 
of the Rappahannock — Getting Ready for Fredericksburg — 
Longstreet occupies Fredericksburg — The Town called to sur- 
render by General Sumner — Exodus of the Inhabitants under 
a Threat to shell the Town 290 

CHAPTER XXII. 

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 

Description of the Field — Marye's Heights — Position of the Troops 
of Longstreet's Command — General Jackson called down from 
Orange Court-House, and Preparations made for a Determined 
Stand— Signal Guns at Three o'Clock in the Morning announce 
the Long-Expected Battle — Burnside's Bridge-Builders thrice 
driven back from their Work — The Crossing finally made by 
Boats— Federals under Hot Fire enter Fredericksburg — How 
they obtained their Foothold on the West Bank of the Rappa- 
hannock — Gallant Officers and Men — Ninety-seven killed or 
wounded in the Space of Fifty Yards — General Burnside's Plan 
of Battle — Strength of the Contending Forces 297 

' CHAPTER XXIII. 

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG (CONTINUED). 

; Battle-fleld veiled by a Heavy Fog — Terrific Fighting of the 
13th of December — Forlorn Hope of the Federals — General 
Meade's Division of Franklin's Command makes the First 
Advance — General French leads against tlie Confederate Left — 
Hancock follows— General Cobb killed — The Sunken Road and 
Stone Wall below Marye's Hill — Desperate Advances and De- 
termined Repulses — Humphreys's Heroic Assault — The Stone 
Wall "a Sheet of Flame" — General Jackson loses his Oppor- 
tunity to advance — The Charge of Meade's Divisions com- 
pared with that of Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble's Columns 
at Gettysburg — Forty Per Cent, killed in charging Lines here, 
and Sixty Per Cent, at Gettysburg— Total Losses — Peace to be 
declared because Gold had gone to 200 — Organization of the 
Army of Northern Virginia 306 

CHAPTER XXIV. 

PREPARING FOR THE SPRING OF '63. 

►urnside's Abortive Moves — The " Mud March"— General Hooker 
supersedes Burnside — The Confederates strengthen their Posi- 
tion for the Winter— Longstreet ordered to Petersburg — Secre- 
tary of War Seddon and the Author talk of General Grant and 
the Confederate Situation on the Mississippi and in the West — 
Longstreet makes a Radical Proposition for Confederate Con- 



CONTENTS. '^'^ 



PACK 



centration in Tennessee, thus to compel Grant to abandon 
Vicksburg-The Skilful Use of Interior Lines the Only Way of 
equalizing the Contest-Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee's Bril- 
liant Achievement-Criticism-Death of "Stonewall" Jackson 
-The Resolve to march Northward-The Army reorganized 
in Three Corps-Evvell and A. P. Hill appointed Lieutenant- 
Generals 



322 



CHAPTER XXV. 

INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA. 

Plan of the Confederate March North-General Lee hoped to draw 
Troops from the South and develop Important Results North 
of the Potomac-He wanted Beauregard sent to support the 
Movement— The Authorities in Richmond failed to compre- 
hend-The Value of the "Interior Lines" not appreciated— 
Spirited Cavalry Fight at Brandy Station between Stuart's and 
Pleasonton's Commands-Engagement of Ewell and Milroy at 
Winchester— The Question of Authority for the Cavalry Move- 
inents-Lieutenant-Colonel Fremantle of the Coldstream 
Guards, British Army, as a Guest and Observer-The Confed- 
erate Advance reaches Pennsylvania Soil-General Lee issues 
Orders for a March on Harrisburg-Municipal Authorities of 
York and Gettysburg surrender to General John B. Gordon . . 334 

CHAPTER XXVL 

GETTYSBURG— FIRST DAY. 

Information of Federal Force and Positions brought by the Scout 
Harrison-General Lee declines to credit it-General Long- 
street suggests a Change of Direction in Conformance with 
the Revelation-General Meade had succeeded Hooker m Com- 
mand Five Days before Battle-Positions on the Eve of the First 
Day-Confederate Cavalry " not in sight"-" The Eyes of the 
Army" sadly needed-A Description of the Famous Battle- 
field-Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill engage the Federals- 
Death of General John F. Reynolds-The Fight on Seminary 
Rido-e-Geueral Hancock in Federal Command on the Field- 
Concerning the Absent Cavalry and Information given by the 
Scout-Conditions at the Close of the First Day's Fight . ... 346 

CHAPTER XXVIL 

GETTYSBURG— SECOND DAY. 

The Confederate Commander reviews the Field and decides on 
Plan of Battle— Positions on the Morning of July 2— Night 
March of the Federal Sixth Corps— It was excelled by Law's 
Brio-ade of Confederates-The Battle was opened after Mid- 
day-General Hood appeals for Permission to turn the Federal 
Left— Failure to make the Flanking Movement by the Confed- 



XVI CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

erate Right was a Serious Mistake— Hood, in his usual Gallant 
Style, led his Troops forward among the Rocks— Desperate 
Charges against an Earnest Adversary — Hood wounded — Gen- 
eral Law succeeds him in command of the Division — "Little 
Rouud Top" an Important Point— " The Citadel of the Field" 
— It was a Fight of Seventeen Thousand Confederates against 
twice their Number — Quiet along the Lines of other Confeder- 
ate Commands — " A Man on the Left who didn't care to make 
the Battle win" — Evidence against the Alleged Order for 
*' Battle at Sunrise" — The " Order" to Ewell was Discretionary 
— Lee had lost his Balance 362 

CHAPTER XXVII L 

GETTYSBURG — THIRD DAY. 

The Stroke of Arms that shook the Continent — Longstreet opposed 
the Attack as planned and made— The Confederate Column of 
Assault — It was weak in Numbers but strong in Spirit — Tre- 
mendous Artillery Combat begins the Day's Fighting— Charge 
of Generals Pickett, Trimble, and Pettigrew — Armistead falls 
by the Side of the Federal Guns — The Federal Cavalry Charge 
of General Farnsworth — The Commander falls with Five Mor- 
tal Wounds — Could the Assaulting Column have been safely 
augmented from Longstreet's Right? — Testimony as to that 
Point — Where rested the Responsibility for Disaster? — Criti- 
cism of the Battle as a Whole — Cemetery Hill stronger than 
Marye's Hill at Fredericksburg — Controverted Points— Casual- 
ties of the Three Days' Fight — Organization of the Forces 
engaged 385 

CHAPTER XXIX. 

THE WAVE ROLLS BACK. 

Confederates retreat from Gettysburg — The Federals pursue — Cross- 
ing the Potomac under Difficulties — Kilpatrick's Cavalry Dash 
on Pettigrew's Command — General Lee thought to rest his 
Army in the Valley of Virginia, but Meade followed too fast — 
Engagements that hai-assed the Retreat— General Lee wished 
to be relieved of Command, but President Davis would not 
consent to the Appointment of Joseph E. Johnston or General 
Beauregard 426 

CHAPTER XXX. 

LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA. 

The Author reverts to the Perils and Opportunities in the West — 
Proposes to the Secretary of War to reinforce against Rosecrans 
from the Army of Northern Virginia — Makes Plan known to 
General Lee — The Move finally effected— Difficulties of Trans- 
portation — A Roundabout Route— General Longstreet nar- 



CONTENTS. XVll 

PAGE 

rowly escapes capture when seeking Bragg's Head-quarters — 
General Birngg assigns Longstreet to Command of tlie Left — 
Instructions for tlie Battle of Chickamauga — The Armies in 
Position — Federals in Command of Generals Rosecrans, Critten- 
den, McCook, and George H. Thomas 433 

CHAPTER XXXI. 

■ BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA, 

Tactical Features— The Battle opened by Direct Attack on the 
Federals in the Early Morning of September 20 — Repeated 
and Determined Front Assaults— Brigadiers Helm killed, and 
Adams wounded — The Union Commands lay behind Defences 
— Hood's Brigades surged through the Forest against the 
Covered Infantry and Artillery — Hood wounded — Longstreet 
suggests a Plan for Progressive Action — Halting Tactics at 
High*ride of Success — The Confederate Left fought a Separate 
Battle — General Thomas retreats— First Confederate Victory 
in the West, and one of the Bloodiest Battles of the War — 
Forces engaged — Losses 445 

CHAPTER XXXIL 

FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 

Longstreet diflfers with General Bragg as to Movements of Pur- 
suit — The Confederates on Lookout Mountain — Federals gain 
Comfortable Positions around it — Superior Officers of Bragg's 
Command call for his Removal— Bragg seeks Scapegoats— Pres- 
ident Davis visits the Army — Tests the Temper of the Officers 
towards Bragg — He offers the Command to Longstreet — He 
declines — His Reasons — General Bragg ignores Signal-Service 
Reports and is surprised — General Joe Hooker's Advance — 
Night Attack on Lookout Mountain — Colonel Brattou's Clever 
Work — Review of the Western Movement and Combination 
— It should have been effected in May instead of September 
— Inference as to Results had the First Proposition been 
promptly acted upon 461 

CHAPTER XXXIIL 

THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

General Bragg's Infatuation — General Grant in Command of the 
Federal Forces — Longstreet ordered into East Tennessee — His 
Plans for the Campaign — Poorly supported by his Superior — 
Foraging for Daily Rations — General Burnside's Forces — Ad- 
vance upon Knoxville — Afltairs at Lenoir's and Campbell's 
Stations — Engagement near Knoxville an Artillery Combat — 
Reprehensible Conduct of Officers — Allegement that One was 
actuated by Jealousy — Federals retire behind their Works — 
n Laying the Confederate Lines about Knoxville 480 



\ 



XVlll CONTENTS. 

CHAPTEE XXXIV. 

BESIEGING KNOXVILLE. 

PAGE 

Closing on the Enemy's Lines— A Gallant Dash — The Federal Po- 
sitions — Fort Loudon, later called Fort Sanders — Assault of the 
Fort carefully planned — General McLaws advises Delay — The 
Order reiterated and emphasized — Gallant Effort by the Bri- 
gades of Generals WofFord, Humphreys, and Bryan at the 
Appointed Time — A Recall ordered, because carrying the 
Works was reported impossible— General Longstreet is ordered 
by the President to General Bragg's Relief— Losses during the 
Assault and the Campaign 497 

CHAPTER XXXV. 

CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST. 

Impracticability of joining Genera' Bragg — Wintering in East Ten- 
nessee — General Longstreet given Discretionary Authority over 
the Department by President Davis— Short Rations — Minor 
Movements of Hide-and-Seek in the Mountains — Longstreet's 
Position was of Strategic Importance — That Fact fully appre- 
ciated by President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton, and Generals 
Halleck and Grant — " Drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee 
and keep him out" — Generals Robertson and McLaws — The 
Charges against them and Action taken— Honorable Mention 
for Courage and Endurance — The Army finally fares sumptu- 
ously on the Fat Lands of the French Broad 509 

CHAPTER XXXVL 

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 

Longstreet again considers Relief from Service — General Grant at 
Knoxville — Shoeless Soldiers leave Bloody Trails on Frozen 
Roads — A Confederate Advance— Affair at Dandridge — Fed- 
erals retreat — Succession of Small Engagements— General 
Grant urges General Foster's Army to the Offensive- General 
Foster relieved— General Schofleld in Command of Federals — 
General Grant's Orders— General Halleck's Estimate of East 
Tennessee as a Strategic Field — Affair of Cavalry — Advance 
towards Knoxville — Longstreet's Command called back to De- 
fensive for Want of Cavalry 524 

CHAPTER XXXVIL 

LAST DAYS IN TENNESSEE. 

Longstreet's Army at Bull's Gap — U. S. Grant made Lieutenant- 
General — Richmond Authorities awake to the Gravity of the 
Situation — Longstreet's Proposition for Campaign — Approved 
by General Lee — Richmond Authorities fail to adopt it — General 



CONTENTS. XIX 

PAGE 

Bragg's Plan — A Memorable and Unpleasant Council at the 
Capital — Orders from President Davis — The Case of General 
Law — Longstreet ordered to the Army of Northern Virginia — 
Resolutions of Thanks from Confederate Congress 542 

CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 

Campaign of 1864 — General Grant in the Field — Strength of the 
Armies — Their Positions— Description of the Wilderness — The 
Battle opened— A Brisk Day's Fighting — Longstreet's Com- 
mand faces Hancock's on the Morning of the Second Day — 
An Effective Flank Movement- General Wadsworth mortally 
wounded— General Jenkins falls under Fire of Friends, and 
Longstreet is seriously wounded — Carried from the Field on a 
Litter — Tribute to General Jenkins — Criticism and Contro- 
versy 551 

CHAPTER XXXIX. 

AGAIN IN FRONT OF RICHMOND. 

Longstreet absent on Leave, nursing his Wounds — Hears of the 
Death of Cavalry Leader J. E. B. Stuart— Returns to Virginia — 
Assigned to Command on the North Side of James River — Af- 
fair on the Williamsburg Road — Lee's Apprehension of Grant's 
March into Richmond — Closing Scenes of the Campaign of 
1864 about the Confederate Capital — General Benjamin F. But- 
ler's Move against Fort Fisher— Remote Effects on the Situa- 
tion in Virginia 572 

CHAPTER XL. 

TALK OF PEACE. 

Second Federal Move against Fort Fisher and Wilmington Harbor 
— Confederate Disaffection — Act of Congress appointing a Su- 
preme Commander of the Armies — Montgomery Blair's Peace 
Conference — Longstreet has a Meeting w^itli General Ord, Com- 
mander of the Army of the James — Military Convention pro- 
posed — Correspondence between General Grant and General 
Lee — Longstreet's Suggestions for Measures in the Critical 
Juncture near the Close of the War 582 

CHAPTER XLL 

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 

Various Affairs of the Closing Campaign — The Massing of Grant's 
Forces— Sortie against Fort Steadman — Captured but quickly 
retaken — General Grant's Move around the Confederate Right 
— General Lee anticipates with Aggressive Work — Sheridan 



XX CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

makes Battle with his Whole Force at Five Forks — Desperate 
Situation of the Confederates — Disparity of Numbers — Splendid 
Stand and Battle of Generals Pickett and Ransom — Colonel 
Pegrana mortally wounded — W. H. F. Lee, the " Noble Son of 
a Noble Sire" — Corse's Division — Pickett's Generalship — Cas- 
ualties 590 

CHAPTER XLIL 

PETERSBURG. 

The Fierce Concerted Assault by the Federals — Death of A. P. 
Hill — General Lee announces to Richmond Authorities that he 
must retreat — Reception of the News by President Davis at 
Church Service — Federals take Forts Gregg and Whitworth — 
The Retreat harassed by Continuous Fighting — Longstreet 
■ saves High Bridge, a Vital Point — Ewell and Others compelled 
to surrender — General Mahone's Account of Interesting Scenes 
— Magnitude of the Disaster— " Is the Army dissolving?" — 
General Reed mortally wounded — Panic occurs, but Order is 
restored — General Gregg and Part of his Cavali'y Command 
captured by Rosser and Mumford G03 

CHAPTER XLIIL 

APPOMATTOX. 

Some of General Lee's Officers say to him that "Further Resist- 
ance is Hopeless" — Longstreet does not approve — General 
Grant calls for Surrender — " Not yet" — The Confederate Chief- 
tain asks Terms— His Response to his Officers as represented 
by General Pendleton — Correspondence of Generals Lee and 
Grant— Morning of April 9— General Lee rides to meet the 
Federal Commander, while Longstreet forms the Last Line of 
Battle — Longstreet endeavors to recall his Chief, hearing of a 
Break where the Confederate Troops could pass— Custer de- 
mands Surrender of Longstreet— Reminded of Irregularity, 
and that he was " in the Enemy's Lines" — Meeting with Gen- 
eral Grant— Capitulation— Last Scenes 618 

CHAPTER XLIV. 

POST-BELLUM PENDANT. 

Old Friends and their Kindness— General Grant— His Character- 
istic Letter of Introduction to President Johnson— In Business 
in New Orleans— Political Unfriendliness— Cause of Criticism 
of Military Career— Appointed Surveyor of Customs — The Old 
Nurse 632 

APPENDIX. 
Letters of General Robert E. Lee and General Longstreet 639 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



PAGE 

General James Longstreet (1895) Frontispiece 

Colonel John B. Kichardson 37 

Colonel T. J. Goree 47 

General J. E. B. Stuart 60 

General E. E. Lee 112 

General Thomas J. Jackson 166 

Battle at Thoroughfare Gap 174 

Defeat of the Federal Troops by Longstreet's Corps (Second Manassas) . , 188 

General Lafaj^ette McLaws 231 

Colonel John W. Fairfax 250 

The Battle of Antietam (Burnside's Bridge) 263 

General James Longstreet (1862) 290 

The Battle of Fredericksburg (from the Battery on Lee's Hill) 308 

Colonel Osmun Latrobe 316 

Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Lj^on Fremantle 343 

The Confederate Scout Harrison 346 

Gettysburg (Second Day's Battle) 374 

General E. P. Alexander 388 

General George E. Pickett 392 

William Blake 408 

Ketreat from Gettysburg (Accident during the Night-Crossing of the 

Potomac on a Pontoon Bridge) 430 

Colonel E. J. Moses 451 

Battle of Chickamauga (Confederates Flanking the Union Forces) .... 454 

The Assault on Fort Sanders, Knoxville 506 

General G. M. Sorrel 518 

The Wounding of General Longstreet (Battle of the Wilderness) .... 564 

Colonel Erasmus Taylor 572 

General Charles W. Field 577 

The Last Line of Battle (Appomattox) 624 

Fac-simile of Letter from General E. E. Lee' 638 



XX 



LIST OF MAPS. 



' PAGE 

First Battle of Bull Eun . 42 

Battle of Seven Pines 96 

Battle of Mechanicsville 124 

Battle of Malvern Hill 142 

Battle of Slaughter Mountain 156 

Second Battle of Bull Run (Opening) 186 

Second Battle of Bull Run (Nightfell) 196 

Battle of Sharpsburg .' 242 

Battle of Fredericksburg 298 

Strategic Map of the Theatre of War, May, 1863 328 

Battle of Gettysburg , ... 362 

Position of Confederate First Corps, Gettysburg, Third Day 399 

Battle of Chickamauga 446 

Confederates around Chattanooga 462 

Siege of Knoxville 498 

Battle of the Wilderness 556 

Battle of Five Forks 601 



n 



I FROM 

MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. 

Birth — Ancestry— School-Boy Days — Appointment as Cadet at the 
United States Military Academy— Graduates of Historic Classes — 
Assignment as Brevet Lieutenant — Gay Life of Garrison at Jefferson 
Barracks — Lieutenant Grant's Courtship — Annexation of Texas — 
Army of Observation — Army of Occupation — Camp Life in Texas — 
March to the Rio Grande— Mexican War. 

( I WAS born in Edgefield District, South Carolina, on 
the 8th of January, 1821. On the paternal side the 
jfamily was from New Jersey ; on my mother's side, from 
Maryland. My earliest recollections were of the Georgia 
side of Savannah River, and my school-days were passed 
Ithere, but the appointment to West Point Academy was 
pom North Alabama. My father, James Longstreet, the 
oldest child of William Longstreet and Hannah Fitzran- 
dolph, was born in New Jersey. Other children of the 
Imarriage, Rebecca, Gilbert, Augustus B., and William, 
iWere born in Augusta, Georgia, the adopted home. 
Richard Longstreet, who came to America in 1657 and 
settled in Monmouth County, New Jersey, was the pro- 
genitor of the name on this continent. It is difficult to 
etermine whether the name sprang from France, Ger- 
any, or Holland. On the maternal side. Grandfather 
arshall Dent was first cousin of John Marshall, of the 
Supreme Court. That branch claimed to trace their line 

13 



xy 



14 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

back to the Conqueror. Marshall Dent marrie i a Mn- 
grucler, when they migrated to Augusta, Georgia, ^'y ■ - ■ 
married the eldest daughter, Mary Ann. 

Grandfather William Longstreet first applied 
a motive power, in 1787, to a small boat on the S 
River at Augusta, and spent all of his privat 
upon that idea, asked aid of his friends in Aug 
elsewhere, had no encouragement, but, on the ( • 
ridicule of his proposition to move a boat w ^ 
pulling or other external power, and especially dju uio}' 
ridicule the thought of expensive steam-boiler- • » ^>f' 
made of iron. To obviate costly outlay for this 
built boilers of heavy oak timbers and strong iroj; >>ands. 
but the Augusta marines were incredulous, as the ' > 
ing from the city papers of the times will indicate 

"Can you row the boat ashore, 

Billy boy, Billy boy ; 
Can you row the boat ashore, 

Gentle Billy ? 
Can you row the boat ashore, 
Without paddle or an oar, 

Billyboy?" 

Full of confidence, the inventor thought to a] 

the governor, and his letter is still preserved in tj 

archives : 

"Augusta, Georgia, September i , J790. 

"Sir, — I make no doubt but you have often heard of n 
boat, and as often heard it laughed at, but in this I h. 
shared the fate of other projectors, for it has uniformly l>een lb- 
custom of every country to ridicule the greatest invent!* js 'uiri' 
they had proved their utility. In not reducing my s(l firie t 
active use it has been unfortunate for me, I confess, and 
the people in general ; but, until very lately, I did not tl v,k r-:., 
artists or material could be had in the place sufficient. I yv;-e'rr, 
necessity, that grand mother of invention, has furnished •<_ \ '; 
an idea of perfecting my plan almost entirely of wooden ]a<)lei ml, 
and by such workmen as may be had here ; and, from a thorougli 
confidence of its success, I have presumed to ask your a; - i ' 



THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. It 

and patronage. Should it succeed agreeably to my expectations, 
I hope I shall discover that sense of duty which such favors 
always merit ; and should it not succeed, your reward must lay 
with other unlucky adventures. 

'^For me to mention all of the advantages arising from such 
a machine would be tedious, and, indeed, quite unnecessary. 
Therefore I have taken the liberty to state, in this plain and 
humble manner, my wish and opinion, which I hope you will ex- 
cuse, and I shall remain, either with or without your approbation, 
''Your Excellency's most obedient and humble servant, 

"Wm. Longsteeet. 

''Governor Telfair." 

He failed to secure the necessary aid, and the discovery 
passed into the possession of certain New Yorkers, who 
found the means for practicable application, and now 
steam is the goddess that enlightens the world. 

My father was a planter. From my early boyhood he 
conceived that he would send me to West Point for army 
service, but in my twelfth year he passed away during 
the cholera epidemic at Augusta. Mother moved to North 
Alabama with her children, whence in my sixteenth year 
I made application through a kinsman, Congressman 
Reuben Chapman, for apjDointment as cadet, received the 
coveted favor, and entered with the class that was admitted 
in 1838. 

As cadet I had more interest in the school of the soldier, 
horsemanship, sword exercise, and the outside game of 
foot-ball than in the academic courses. The studies were 
successfully passed, however, until the third year, when I 
failed in mechanics. When I came to the problem of the 
pulleys, it seemed to my mind that a soldier could not find 
use for such appliances, and the pulleys were passed by. 
At the January examination I was called to the blackboard 
and given the problem of the pulleys. The drawing from 
memory of recitation of classmates was good enough, but 
the demonstration failed to satisfy the sages of the Aca- 
demic Board. It was the custom, however, to give those 



.6 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

who failed in the general examination a second hearing, 
after all of the classes were examined. This gave me two 
days to " cram" mechanics, and particularly on pulleys. 
But the professors were too wily to introduce them a second 
time, and took me through a searching examination of the 
six months' course. The bridge was safely passed, how- 
ever, and mechanics left behind. At the June examina- 
tion, the end of the academic year, I was called to demon- 
strate the pulleys. The professor thought that I had for- 
gotten my old friend the enemy, but I smiled, for he had 
become dear to me, — in waking hours and in dreams, — and 
the cadet passed easily enough for a maximum mark. 

The cadets had their small joys and sometimes little 
troubles. On one occasion a cadet officer reported me for 
disobedience of orders. As the rejjort was not true, I 
denied it and sent up witnesses of the occasion. Dick 
Garnett, who fell in the assault of the 3d, at Gettysburg, 
was one witness, and Cadet Baker, so handsome and lova- 
ble that he was called Betsy, was the other. Upon over- 
looking the records I found the rejDort still there, and 
went to ask the superintendent if other evidence was 
necessary to show that the report was not true. He was 
satisfied of that, but said that the officer complained that I 
smiled contemptuously. As that could only be rated as 
a single demerit, I asked the benefit of the smile ; but 
the report stands to this day, Disobedienc^e of orders and 
three demerits. The cadet had his revenge, however, for 
the superintendent was afterwards known as The Punster. 

There were sixty-two graduating members of the class 
of 1842, my number being sixty. I was assigned to the 
Fourth United States Infantry as brevet lieutenant, and 
found my comj)any with seven others of the regiment at 
Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, in the autumn of 1842. 

Of the class graduating the year that we entered were 
G. T. Beauregard and Irvin McDowell, who, twenty-threo 
years later, commanded the hostile armies on the plains 



THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. 17 

of Manassas, in Virginia. Braxton Bragg and W. J. 
Hardee were of the same class. 

The head man of the next class (1839) was I. I. Ste- 
vens, who resigned from the army, and, after being the 
first governor of Washington Territory, returned to mili- 
tary service, and fell on the sanguinary field of Chantilly 
on the 1st of September, 1862. Next on the class roll 
was Henry Wager Halleck, who was commander-in-chief 
of the United States armies from July, 1862, to March, 
1864. W. T. Sherman and George H. Thomas, of the 
Union army, and B. S. Ewell, of the Confederate army, 
were of the same class (1840). The class of 1841 had 
the largest list of officers killed in action. Irons, Ayers, 
Ernst, Gantt, Morris, and Burbank were killed in the 
Mexican War. N. Lyon, K. S. Garnett, J. F. Reynolds, 
R. B. Garnett, A. W. Whipple, J. M. Jones, I. B. Richard- 
son, and J. P. Garesche fell on the fields of the late war. 

Of the class of 1842 few were killed in action, but 
several rose to distinguished positions, — Newton, Eustis, 
Rosecrans, Lovell, Van Dorn, Pope, Sykes, G. W. Smith, 
M. L. Smith, R. H. Anderson, L. McLaws, D. H. Hill, 
A. P. Stewart, B. S. Alexander, N. J. T. Dana, and 
others. 

But the class next after us (1843) was destined to fur- 
nish the man who was to eclipse all, — to rise to the rank 
of general, an office made by Congress to honor his ser- 
vices ; who became President of the United States, and 
for a second term ; who received the salutations of all 
the powers of the world in his travels as a private citizen 
around the earth ; of noble, generous heart, a lovable 
character, a valued friend, — Ulysses S. Grant. 

I was fortunate in the assignment to Jefferson Barracks, 
for in those days the young officers were usually sent off" 
among the Indians or as near the borders as they could 
'find habitable places. In the autumn of 1842 I reported 
to the company commander, Captain Bradford R. Alden, 



l8 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

a most exemplary man, who proved a lasting, valued 
friend. Eight companies of the Third Infantry were 
added to the garrison during the spring of 1843, which 
made garrison life and society gay for the young people 
and interesting for the older classes. All of the troops 
were recently from service in the swamps and Everglades 
of Florida, well prepared to enjoy the change from the 
war-dance of the braves to the hospitable city of St. 
Louis ; and the graceful step of its charming belles be- 
came a joy forever. 

Of the class of 1843, Ulysses S. Grant joined the 
Fourth Regiment as brevet lieutenant, and I had the 
pleasure to ride with him on our first visit to Mr. Fred- 
erick Dent's home, a few miles from the garrison, where 
we first met Miss Julia Dent, the charming woman who, 
five years later, became Mrs. Grant. Miss Dent was a 
frequent visitor at the garrison balls and hops, where 
Lieutenant Hoskins, who was something of a tease, would 
inquire of her if she could tell where he might find " the 
small lieutenant with the large epaulettes." 

In May, 1844, all of our pleasures were broken by orders 
sending both regiments to Louisiana, near Fort Jessup, 
where with other troo23s we were organized as " The Army 
of Observation," under General Zachary Taylor. 

In March, 1845, I was assigned as lieutenant in the 
Eighth Regiment, and joined my company at St. Augus- 
tine, Florida. The soldier's life of those days was not 
encouraging to those of active aspirations ; but influences 
were then at work that were beginning to brighten the 
horizon a little. The new republic of Texas was seeking 
annexation with the United States, which would endanger 
the peace between them and the republic of Mexico. 
Annexation of Texas became the supreme question of the 
canvass of 1844. James K. Polk was the nominee of the 
Democratic and annexation party, and Henry Clay was 
on the other side as the Whig nominee. Polk was elected, 



THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. 19 

and his party prepared to signalize its triumph by an- 
nexation as soon as it came into j^ower ; but in the last 
days of President Tyler's administration, through skilful 
management of Secretary of State John C. Calhoun, joint 
resolutions of annexation were passed by both houses of 
Congress, subject to concurrence of the Congress of the 
new republic. Strange as it may seem, the resolutions 
that added to the territory of the United States more than 
the New England and Middle States combined, and which 
eventually led to extension to the Pacific coast and hun- 
dreds of miles north, only passed the lower house by 
twenty-two majority, and the Senate by a majority of two. 

When the resolution was passed, the minister from 
Mexico to our government, General Almonte, demanded 
his passports, and diplomatic relations between the gov- 
ernments ceased. On July 4, 1845, the Texas Congress 
accepted and ratified the resolutions of annexation by 
unanimous vote, and Texas was a State of the Union. 

General Taylor's little army of observation was ordered 
to Corpus Christi, Texas, and became " The Army of 
Occupation." All other available forces were ordered to 
join him, including General Worth and his forces in 
Florida. At the time there were in the line of the army 
eight regiments of infantry, four of artillery, and two of 
dragoons, stationed along the northern frontier from Fort 
Kent in the northeast of Maine to the west end of Lake 
Superior, and along the western frontier from Fort 
Snelling to Fort Leavenworth, and southward to Fort 
Jessup in Louisiana. 

By the middle of October, 1846, three thousand eight 
hundred and sixty men of all arms had concentrated at 
Corpus Christi. Seven companies of the Second Dragoons 
had marched from Fort Jessup to San Patricio on the 
Nueces River, about twenty-eight miles up from Corpus 
Christi ; the other three companies were halted at San 
Antonio, Texas. Near our camps were extensive jDlains 



20 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

well adapted to military manoeuvres, which were put to 
prompt use for drill and professional instruction. There 
were many advantages too in the way of amusement, game 
on the wild prairies and fish in the broad gulf were plen- 
tiful, and there was the salt water for bathing. On one 
occasion during the winter a violent north wind forced 
the waters over the beach, in some places far enough to 
disturb our camps, and when they receded, quantities of 
fish were found in the little puddles left behind, and 
turtles more than enough to supply the army. 

The ofiicers built a theatre, depending upon their own 
efforts to reimburse them. As there was no one outside 
the army except two rancheros within a hundred miles, 
our dramatic company was organized from among the 
officers, who took both male and female characters. In 
farce and comedy we did well enough, and soon collected 
funds to pay for the building and incidental expenses. 
The house was filled every night. General Worth always 
encouraging us, General Taylor sometimes, and General 
Twiggs occasionally, we found ourselves in funds suffi- 
cient to send over to New Orleans for costumes, and con- 
cluded to try tragedy. The " Moor of Venice" was chosen. 
Lieutenant Theoderic Porter * to be the Moor, and Lieu- 
tenant U. S. Grant to be the daughter of Brabantio. 
But after rehearsal Porter protested that male heroines 
could not support the character nor give sentiment to the 
hero, so we sent over to New Orleans and secured Mrs. 
Hart, who was popular with the garrisons in Florida. 
Then all went Avell, and life through the winter was gay. 

Formal diplomatic relations between the republics were 
suspended, but quasi negotiations were continued, seek- 
ing a course by which war might be averted. The au- 
thorities of Mexico were not averse to the settlement 
according to the claims of Texas, — the Rio Grande fron- 

* Brother of the rear-admiral. 



THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. 21 

tier, — ^but the political affairs of the country were such 
that they could not agree. Excitement in the United 
States increased as the suspense continued. But the au- 
thorities, having confidence in their negotiations or wishing 
to precipitate matters, ordered General Taylor to march 
across to the Rio Grande at Matamoras in the spring of 
1846. The execution of the order precipitated war. 

The move from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande made 
necessary a change of base from St. Joseph's Island to 
Point Isabel and Brazos Santiago, near the mouth of the 
Rio Grande. Supplies were sent by sea, under charge of 
Major Munroe, with a siege train and field battery, and 
the army took up its march on the 9tli of March, 1846, 
the advance under General Twiggs, consisting of the dra- 
goons and Ringgold's field battery. The army was well 
instructed, under good discipline, and fully prepared for 
field work, the weather was fine, and the firm turf of the 
undulating prairies made the march easy. Wild horses 
and cattle, and deer and antelope, were often seen in the 
distance as they scampered away to hide themselves. On 
the 19th the head of the column approached Arroyo Colo- 
rado, one hundred and thirty miles from Corpus Christi. 
The arroyo was about three feet deep, of salt water. 
Mexican lancers were on the southern side, and gave 
notice that they had orders to resist our further advance. 
On the 21st the army was up and deployed along the 
high banks of the arroyo, the field batteries in position. 
General Worth was ordered to make the crossing, and rode 
at the head of the column. We looked with confidence 
for a fight and the flow of blood down the salt water before 
we could cross, but the Mexicans had no artillery, and 
could not expose their cavalry to the fire of our batteries ; 
they made their formal protest, however, that the crossing 
would be regarded as a declaration of war. 

On the 24th of March the column reached the road lead- 
ing from Point Isabel to Matamoras. General Taylor or- 



22 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

dered Worth to march the greater part of the army towards 
Matamoras and halt at the first good camping-ground, 
and rode towards Point Isabel to meet the detachment or- 
dered there under Major Munroe. He found them already 
landed, and the Mexicans fired their little hamlets and 
fled. After ordering construction of protection for his 
supjilies and defensive works for the troops, General Tay- 
lor returned to the army, and rode with General Worth 
towards the Rio Grande. As the army approached the 
river the Mexicans on the Matamoras side made some dis- 
play of forces, manned their works on that side, and jDre- 
pared to resist us, under the impression that we would 
cross at once. General AVortli was sent over, and was met 
by General La Vega, on the part of General Mejia, com- 
manding on that side. He was told that Mexico had not 
declared war, that the American consul was in the ex- 
ercise of his functions ; but AVorth's request to see the 
consul was refused, which was denounced as a belligerent 
act, and he cautioned General La Vega against jjassing 
Mexicans to the north side of the river. 

Camps were pitched in range of the Mexican works 
about Matamoras, grounds staked for constructing de- 
fensive works, and large details put out to work on them. 
The Mexican forces at this time were three thousand, and 
they were soon joined by two thousand more. 

Political affairs with them were confused. President 
Herrera was thought to favor the claims of Texas to the 
Rio Grande border. General Paredes made pronuncia- 
mento, overthrew the president's government, and had 
authority as war president. He sent General Ampudia 
to the frontier to take charge, but the appointment was 
not satisfactory on the border, and General Arista was 
assigned. There was discord over there between the au- 
thorities and the generals, while General Taylor was too 
far from his government to be bothered. His army was 
all that he could wish, except in numbers. 



THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. 23 

Marauding parties came over occasionally and made 
trouble about the ranches on the American side. One 
party killed Colonel Cross, our chief quartermaster, on 
the 10th of April. Scouting parties were sent out to look 
for the intruders. Lieutenant Theoderic Porter, in com- 
mand of one party, and one of his men were caught in 
ambush and killed. Captain Walker, of the Texan Ran- 
gers, while out on a scout lost his camp guard of five men, 
surprised and killed, and later Captains Thornton and 
Hardee, of the dragoons, were met at Rancho Carricitos 
by a large cavalry force and some infantry under Gen- 
eral Torrijon, who took captive or killed the entire party. 
Captains Thornton and Hardee and Lieutenant Kane 
were made prisoners. The other commissioned officer of 
the command, George T. Mason, of my class, refused to 
surrender ; being a superior swordsman, he tried to cut his 
way out, and was killed. This affair was taken as open 
war, and General Taylor called on the governors of Texas 
and Louisiana — under his authority from Washington — 
for volunteers of infantry and cavalry. 

The capture of Thornton and Hardee created great ex- 
citement with the people at home. Fanning's massacre 
and the Alamo at San Antonio were remembered, and it 
was reported of General Ampudia, who on a recent occa- 
sion had captured a general in Yucatan, that he boiled 
his head in oil. So it was thought he would give no 
quarter ; but in a day or two we heard from the officers 
that they received great kindness from their captors, and 
that General Ampudia had ordered that his government 
should allow them their full pay and every liberty con- 
sistent with their safe-keeping. They declined, however, 
to accept pay, and were held as the guests of Generals 
Arista and Ampudia. 

On the 1st of May our tents were struck, wagons parked, 
assembly sounded, and the troops were under arms at three 
A.M., marched at four o'clock, and bivouacked within ten 



24 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

miles of Point Isabel. No one was advised of the cause 
of movements, but all knew that our general understood 
his business. He had been informed that General Arista, 
with his movable forces, had marched to Rancho de Lon- 
goreno, some leagues below us on the river, intending to 
cross and cut us off from the base at Point Isabel. Major 
Jacob Brown was left in charge of the works opposite 
Matamoras with the Seventh Regiment of Infantry, 
Captain Sands's company of artillery, and Bragg's field 
battery. 

By some accident provision was not made complete for 
Arista to make prompt crossing of the river, and that 
gave General Taylor time to reach his base, reinforce it, 
and draw sufficient supplies. Advised of our move by 
General Mejia, at Matamoras, General Arista was thrown 
into doubt as to whether our move was intended for Mata- 
moras, and sent back part of his forces for its defence. 
Finding, however, that Taylor had gone to Point Isabel, 
Arista crossed the river and put his line athwart our 
return march at Palo Alto. To hasten Taylor's return, 
he ordered General Mejia, at Matamoras, to open his bat- 
teries on our troops at Fort Brown, and make serious 
demonstrations against them. 

General Taylor started on his return on the 7th of May. 
We had heard the artillery-fire upon comrades left at the 
forts, and were anxiously looking for the order. It was 
received with cheers, and a good march was made, but the 
night was awful. The mosquitoes seemed as thick as the 
blades of grass on the prairie, and swarmed and buzzed in 
clouds, and packs of half-famished wolves prowled and 
howled about us. There was no need for the sound of 
reveille. The wolves and mosquitoes, and perhaps some 
solemn thoughts, kept us on the qui vive. Arista's army 
was known to be in line of battle only a few miles off. 
About one o'clock we halted to fill the canteens, and 
marched to meet the enemy. The columns were deployed, 



THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. 25 

— Fifth Infantry on the right, Kinggokl's battery, Third 
Infantry, a two-gun battery of eighteen-pounders, the 
Fourth Infantry, battalion of artillery acting as infantry, 
Duncan's field battery and Eighth Infantry, Captains 
Charles May and Croghan Ker, with squadrons of 
dragoons, looking to the trains ; the Third and Fourth 
Infantry, the Third Brigade, under Colonel John Gar- 
land. That brigade, with the Fifth Regiment, the heavy 
guns, and Ringgold's, were of the right wing, General 
Twiggs commanding. Other forces of the left were under 
Colonel William G. Belknap, Eighth Infantry, and Dun- 
can's Battery. 

As the lines deployed. Lieutenant J. E. Blake, of the 
Topograj^hical Engineers, dashed forward alone, made 
a close inspection of the enemy's line with such light- 
ning speed that his work was accomplished before the 
enemy could comprehend his purpose, rode back and 
reported to the commanding general. He was one of the 
heroes of the day, but his laurels were enjoyed only a 
few hours. As he took his pistol off at night he threw 
it upon the ground, and an accidental exj^losion of one 
of the charges gave him a mortal wound. 

The line advanced until the puff of smoke from one 
of the enemy's guns rose, and the ball bounded over the 
prairie, passed over our heads, and wounded a teamster 
far in our rear. Our infantry was ordered down and 
our artillery into practice. It was an artillery combat 
more than a battle, and held until night. The Mexican 
cavalry made a charge against the Fifth Regiment, and 
finding our front of square too strong repeated on another 
front, but were repulsed. Presently the grass took fire, 
and the winds so far favored us as to sweep the smoke 
in the enemy's faces, and when it passed we found the 
Mexican line had been drawn back a little. May's 
squadron was sent there, and General Taylor advanced 
the right of his line, but night closed in before decisive 



26 . FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

work could be done. The armies were near enougli 
during the night to hear the moans of the wounded. 
Major Ringgokl was mortally wounded, also Captain John 
Page, of the Fourth Infantry, hut less than fifty of our 
troops were lost. 

Early the next morning a few of the Mexican troops 
could be seen, but when the sun rose to light the field it 
was found vacant. A careful reconnoissance revealed that 
the enemy was in retreat, and the dragoons reported them 
in march towards our comrades at Fort Brown. 

General Taylor remained on the field a few hours to 
have the killed and wounded of both sides cared for, but 
sent the dragoons, light infantry, and Ringgold's battery 
in pursuit, the latter under Lieutenant Randolph Ridgely. 
The light infantry was of two battalions, under Captain 
George A. McCall and Captain C. F. Smith. The route 
of march was through a dense chaparral on both sides of 
the road, the infantry finding their way as best they could 
through the chaparral, the dragoons and Texas Rangers 
moving on the road, and far off from our flanks, 
wherever they could find ways of passage. The company 
to which I was attached was of Smith's battalion, on the 
right of the road. After a considerable march the bat- 
talion came to the body of a young Mexican woman. She 
had ceased to breathe, but blood heat was still in her body, 
and her expression life-like. A profusion of black hair 
covered her shoulders and person, the only covering to 
her waist. This sad spectacle, so unlike our thoughts 
of battle, unnerved us a little, but the crush through the 
thorny bushes soon brought us back to thoughts of heavy 
work, and then came reports of several guns and of grape- 
shot flying over our heads and tearing through the wood. 
A reconnoissance found General Arista's army on the south 
bank of a stream, Resaca de la Palma, which at this 
season had dried into lagoons with intervening passes. 
The road crossed at a wide gap between two extensive 



THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR. 27 

lagoons. The most of the enemy's artillery was near the 
road, the infantry behind the lagoons, with improvised 
breast defences of pack-saddles and other articles that 
could be found to stop musket-balls. The lagoons were 
about a hundred feet wide and from two to three feet deep. 

The position was so strong that General Arista thought 
it would not be attacked. He left General La Vega in 
command at the road, and made his head-quarters some 
distance in rear, holding his cavalry in hand to look for 
any flank move, unpacked his mule-train, and turned the 
animals out to graze. General Taylor received reports of 
our adventures and reconnoissance when he rode up, de- 
ployed his army for battle, and ordered it forward. In 
the dense chaj^arral it was not possible to hold the regi- 
ments to their lines, and in places the companies were 
obliged to break files to get along. All of the enemy's 
artillery opened, and soon his musketry. The lines closed 
in to short work, even to bayonet work at places. Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Mcintosh had a bayonet thrust through 
his mouth and neck.* Lieutenant R. M. Cochran, Fourth 
Regiment, and T. L. Chadbourne, of the Eighth, were 
killed ; C. R. Gates and C. D. Jordan, of the Eighth, were 
severely wounded. The latter, a classmate, was over- 
powered and about to be slaughtered when rescued by 
Lieutenant George Lincoln, of the Eighth, who slew with 
his sword one of the assailants. 

Finding the enemy's strong fight, in defence, by his 
artillery. General Taylor ordered Captain May to charge 
and capture the principal battery. The squadron was 
of his own and S. P. Graham's troops. The road was 
only wide enough to form the dragoons in column of 
fours. When in the act of springing to their work, 
Ridgely called, *' Hold on, Charlie, till I draw their fire," 
and loosed his six guns upon the battery at the road. 

* He had a similar wound iu the war of 1812. 



28 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The return was prompt, but General Taylor, not noting 
the cause of delay, repeated the order. Kidgely's work, 
however, was done, and May's spurs pressing his horses 
had them on the lea]) before the order reached his ears. 
In a minute he was at the guns sabring the gunners, and 
wheeling right and left got possession of the batteries. 
General La Vega was found at one of his batteries trying 
to defend it with his sword against one of May's dragoons, 
but was forced to get in between the wheels of his guns 
to avoid the horse's heels as they pressed him, when his 
rank was recognized and he was called to surrender. 

As May made his dash the infantry on our right was 
wading the lagoon. A j)ause was made to dip our cups 
for water, which gave a moment for other thoughts ; mine 
went back to her whom I had left behind. I drew her 
daguerreotype from my breast-pocket, had a glint of her 
charming smile, and with quickened spirit mounted the 
bank in time to send some of the mixed infantry troops 
to relieve May of his charge of the captive knight. 

As a dragoon and soldier May was splendid. He stood 
six feet four without boots, wore his beard full and flow- 
ing, his dark-brown locks falling well over his shoulders. 
His appearance as he sat on his black horse Tom, his 
heavy sabre over General La Vega, was grand and pictu- 
resque. He was amiable of disposition, lovable and genial 
in character. 

Not so grand of stature, or beard, or flowing locks, Kan- 
dolph Ridgely was as accomplished a soldier and as 
charming a companion, — a fitting counterpart in spirit 
and dash. 

I have gone thus far into the Mexican War for the 
opportunity to mention two valued friends, whose memory 
returning refreshes itself. Many gallant, courageous 
deeds have since been witnessed, but none more interesting 
than Kidgely's call for the privilege to draw upon himself 
the fire that was waiting for May. 



CHAPTER 11. 

FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS. 

The War-Cloud — The Journey Northward— Appointed Brigadier-Gen- 
eral—Report to General Beauregard — Assigned to Command at the 
Scene of the First Conflict — Personnel of the Confronting Forces — 
Description of the Field of Manassas, or Bull Run— Beauregard and 
McDowell of the same West Point Class — Battle of Blackburn's 
Ford— Early's Mistake— Under Fire of Friend and Foe. 

I WAS stationed at Albuquerque, New Mexico, as pay- 
master in the United States army when the war-cloud 
appeared in the East. Officers of the Northern and 
Southern States were anxious to see the portending storm 
pass by or disperse, and on many occasions we, too, were 
assured, by those who claimed to look into the future, that 
the statesman would yet show himself equal to the occa- 
sion, and restore confidence among the people. Our mails 
were due semi-monthly, but during winter seasons we 
were glad to have them once a month, and occasionally 
had to be content with once in six weeks. When mail- 
day came the officers usually assembled on the flat roof of 
the quartermaster's office to look for the dust that in that 
arid climate announced the coming mail-wagon when five 
or ten miles away ; but affairs continued to grow gloomy, 
and eventually came information of the attack upon and 
capture of Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces, which 
put down speculation and drew the long-dreaded line. 

A number of officers of the post called to persuade me 
to remain in the Union service. Captain Gibbs, of the 
Mounted Rifles, was the principal talker, and after a long 
but pleasant discussion, I asked him what course he would 
pursue if his State should pass ordinances of secession 
and call him to its defence. He confessed that he would 
obey the call. 

29 

/ 

./ 



'^0 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

It was a sad day when we took leave of lifetime com- 
rades and gave up a service of twenty years. Neither 
Union officers nor their families made efforts to conceal 
feelings of deepest regret. When we drove out from the 
post, a number of officers rode with us, which only made 
the last farewell more trying. 

Passing Fort Craig, on the opposite side of the E,io 
Grande, we pitched our camp for the night. A sergeant 
of the Mounted Rifle Regiment came over to see me, and 
stated that he was from Virginia, and thought that he 
could go with us to his native State, and at the same time 
asked that several other soldiers who wished to return to 
their States might go as my escort. I explained that 
private soldiers could not go without authority from the 
War Department ; that it was different with commissioned 
officers, in that the latter could resign their commissions, 
and when the resignations were accepted they were inde- 
pendent of military authority, and could, as other citizens, 
take such action as they might choose, but that he and his 
comrades had enlisted for a sj)ecified term of years, and 
by their oaths were bound to the term of enlistment ; that 
I could not entertain the proposition. 

We stayed overnight at Fort Fillmore, in pleasant 
meeting with old comrades, saddened by the reflection 
that it was the last, and a prelude to occurrences that 
must compel the ignoring of former friendships with the 
acceptance of opj)Osing service. 

Speaking of the impending struggle, I was asked as to 
the length of the war, and said, " At least three years, and 
if it holds for five you may begin to look for a dictator," 
at which Lieutenant Ryan, of the Seventh Infantry, 
said, "If we are to have a dictator, I hope that you may 
be the man." 

My mind was relieved by information that my resigna- 
tion was accepted, to take effect on the 1st of June. In 
our travel next day we crossed the line into the State of 



FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS. 31 

Texas. From the gloomy forebodings of old friends, it 
seemed at El Paso that we had entered into a different 
world. All was enthusiasm and excitement, and songs of 
" Dixie and the South" were borne upon the balmy air. 
But the Texas girl did not ascend to a state of incan- 
descent charm until the sound of the first notes of " The ' 
Bonny Blue Flag" reached her ear. Then her feet rose 
in gleeful springs, her limbs danced, her hands patted, 
her eyes glowed, her lips moved, though she did not care 
to speak, or listen to any one. She seemed lifted in the 
air, thrilled and afloat, holding to the " Single Star" in 
joyful hope of Southern rights. 

Friends at El Paso persuaded me to leave my family with 
them to go by a train that was to start in a few days for San 
Antonio, and to take the faster route by stage for myself. 

Our travelling companions were two young men, return- 
ing to their Northern homes. The ride of our party of 
four (including the driver) through the Indian country 
was attended with some risk, and required vigilance, to be 
assured against surprise. The constant watchfulness and 
possible danger over a five-hundred-miles travel drew us 
near together, and in closer communion as to our identity 
and future movements, and suggested to the young men 
that it would be best to put themselves under my care, 
trusting that I would see them safely through the Confed- 
erate lines. They were of the laboring class, and had 
gone South to find employment. They were advised to 
be careful, and talk but little when among strangers. 
Nothing occurred to cause apprehension until we reached 
Richmond, Texas, where, at supper, I asked for a glass of 
milk, and was told there was none. 

" What !" said one of my companions, " haven't the 
keows come up ?" 

Signal was telegraphed under the table to be on guard. 
The nom de plume of the Texas bovine escaped attention, 
and it passed as an enjoyable lapsus linguce. 



i 



32 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

At Galveston we took a small inland sailing-craft, but 
were a little apprehensive, as United States ships were 
reported cruising outside in search of all vessels not flying 
the Stars and Stripes, Our vessel, however, was only- 
boarded once, and that by a large Spanish mackerel that 
made a misleap, fell amidships, and served our little com- 
pany with a pleasant dinner. Aboard this little vessel I 
first met T. J. Goree, an intelligent, clever Texan, who 
afterwards joined me at Richmond, and served in faithful 
duty as my aide-de-camp from Bull Run to Appomattox 
Court-House. 

At New Orleans, my companions found safe-conduct to 
their Northern lines, and I journeyed on to Richmond. 
Relatives along the route, who heard of my approach, met 
me at the stations, though none suggested a stop over- 
night, or for the next train, but after affectionate saluta- 
tions waved me on to join " Jeff Davis, for Dixie and for 
Southern rights." 

At every station old men, women, and children assem- 
bled, clapping hands and waving handkerchiefs to cheer 
the passengers on to Richmond. On crossing the Vir- 
ginia line, the feeling seemed to culminate. The windows 
and doors of every farm-house and hamlet were occupied, 
and from them came hearty salutations that cheered us 
on to Richmond. The spirit electrified the air, and the 
laborers of the fields, white and black, stopped their 
ploughs to lift their hats and wave us on to speedy travel. 
At stations where meals were served, the proprietors, in 
response to offers to settle, said, " Meals for those going 
on to join Jeff Davis are paid." 

On the 29th of June, 1861, I reported at the War 
Department at Richmond, and asked to be assigned for 
service in the pay department, in which I had recently 
served (for when I left the line service, under apjDointment 
as paymaster, I had given up all aspirations of military 
honor, and thought to settle down into more peaceful 



FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS. 33 

pursuits). On the 1st of July I received notice of my 
appointment as brigadier-general, with orders to report at 
Manassas Junction, to General Beauregard. 

I reported on the 2d, and was assigned to command 
of the First, Eleventh, and Seventeenth Regiments of 
Virginia Volunteers, to be organized as a brigade. The 

regiments were commanded resj)ectively by Colonels 

Moore, Samuel Garland, and M. D. Corse, all active, 
energetic, and intelligent officers, anxious to acquire skill 
in the new service in which they found themselves. Lieu- 
tenant Frank Armstead was assigned to duty at brigade 
head-quarters, as acting assistant adjutant-general, and 
Lieutenant Peyton T. Manning as aide-de-camp. Dr. 
J. S. D. Cullen, surgeon of the First Virginia Kegiment, 
became medical director. The regiments were stationed 
at Manassas Junction. 

On the 6th they were marched out, formed as a brigade, 
and put through the first lessons in evolutions of the line, 
and from that day to McDowell's advance had other 
opportunities to learn more of the drill and of each 
other. General Beauregard had previously settled upon 
the stream of Bull Bun as his defensive-aggressive line, 
and assigned his forces accordingly. A brigade under 
Brigadier-General B. S. Ewell was posted at Union Mills 
Ford, on the right of the Confederate lines ; one under 
Brigadier-General D. B. Jones at McLean's Ford ; Briga- 
dier-General Bonham's brigade was placed on outpost 
duty at Fairfax Court-House with orders to retire, at the 
enemy's approach, to Mitchell's Ford, and Brigadier- 
General P. St. George Cocke was to hold the fords be- 
tween Mitchell's and the Stone Bridge, the latter point to 
be defended by a regiment and a battalion of infantry, 
and a battery, under Brigadier-General N. G. Evans. 

Between Mitchell's and McLean's Fords, and about 
half a mile from each, is Blackburn's Ford. The guard 
at that point was assigned to my command, — the Fourth 



34 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Brigade, — which was ordered to be ready, at a moment's 
warning, to march to position, and prepare for battle. In 
the mean time I was to study the ground and familiarize 
myself with the surroundings and avenues of approach 
and retreat. Bull Bun rises from the foot-hills of the 
Blue Ridge and flows southeast through deeps and shal- 
lows into the Potomac, about forty miles south of Alex- 
andria. The swell of the tide-waters up to Union Mills 
gives it the depth and volume of water of a river. Black- 
burn's Ford is in a great bend of the river, the north 
bank holding the concave of the turn. On the convex 
side was a strip of alluvial soil about seventy feet wide, 
covered by large forest-trees and some tangled under- 
growth. Outside and extending some three hundred 
yards from the edge of the woodland was an arable field 
upon a pretty ascending plain, beyond which was a second 
growth of pine and oak. On the north bank stood a 
bluff of fifteen feet, overhanging the south side and 
ascending towards the heights of Centreville. Below 
Blackburn's Ford the bluff extended, in more or less 
ragged features, far down to the southeast. Just above 
my position the bluff graded down in even decline to 
Mitchell's Ford, the position assigned for Bonham's bri- 
gade, the latter being on the concave of the river, six 
hundred yards retired from my left and at the crossing of 
the direct road between Centreville and Manassas Junc- 
tion. At the Junction well-constructed battery epaule- 
ments were prepared for defence. 

The bluff of the north bank was first designated as my 
most suitable ground, and I was ordered to open the front, 
lay out and construct trenches, to be concealed by green 
pine-boughs. The regiments were from Bichmond, Lynch- 
burg, and Alexandria, — more familiar with the amenities 
of city life than with the axe, pick, spade, or shovel. 
They managed, however, to bring down as many as half 
a dozen spreading second-growth pines in the course of 



FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS. 35 

two days' work, when General Beauregard concluded that 
the advanced position of the brigade would mar his gen- 
eral plan, and ordered the line to be taken along the 
river bank of the south side, under the woodland, and 
close under the bluff, a j)osition only a^^provable as tem- 
porary under accepted rules of warfare, but this proved 
a favorable exception between the raw forces of the con- 
tending armies. In addition to the two brigades on 
my right, the Sixth Brigade, under Colonel Jubal A. 
Early, was posted (with artillery) near the fords. As 
proximate but separate commands, stood General Theo. 
Holmes, thirty miles off to the right, with a brigade, a 
battery, and cavalry, at and about Acquia Creek, and 
General J. E. Johnston, sixty miles away, over the Blue 
Ridge Mountains. Holmes's should have been an out- 
post, but he had ranked Beauregard in the old service, 
and as a point of etiquette was given a se23arate command. 
Johnston's command should have been an outlying con- 
tingent, but he had been assigned to the Shenandoah 
Valley when, because threatened with immediate inva- 
sion, it was of first importance. Beauregard was subse- 
quently assigned to Manassas Junction, which, under later 
developments, became the strategic point. As Johnston 
was his senior, another delicate question arose, that was 
not solved until the tramp of McDowell's army was heard 
on the Warrenton Turnpike. 

The armies preparing for the first grand conflict were 
commanded by West Point graduates, both of the class of 
1838, — Beauregard and McDowell. The latter had been 
assigned to command of the Federal forces at Washing- 
ton, south of the Potomac, in the latter part of May, 1861. 
The former had assumed command of the Confederates at 
Manassas Junction about the 1st of June. 

McDowell marched on the afternoon of the 16th of 
July at the head of an army of five divisions of infantry, 
supplemented by nine field batteries of the regular service, 



f 



36 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

one of volunteers, besides two guns operating separately, 
and seven companies of regular cavalry. In his in- 
fantry columns were eight companies of regulars and a 
battalion of marines, an aggregate of thirty-five thousand 
men. 

Beauregard stood behind Bull Bun with seven brigades, 
including Holmes, who joined on the 19th, twenty-nine 
guns, fourteen hundred cavalry, — an aggregate of twenty- 
one thousand nine hundred men, all volunteers. To this 
should be added, for the battle of the 21st, reinforcements 
aggregating eight thousand five hundred men, under Gen- 
eral Johnston, making the sum of the aggregate, thirty 
thousand four hundred. 

The line behind Bull Bun was the best between Wash- 
ington and the Bapidan for strategy, tactics, and army 
supplies. 

General Beauregard gave minute instructions to his 
brigade commanders of his position and general plan, 
which in itself was admirable. Bonham was to retire 
from Fairfax Court-House, as the enemy advanced, and 
take his place behind Mitchell's Ford on the Centreville 
and Manassas Junction road. It was proposed that he 
should engage his rear-guard so as to try to bring on the 
battle against him, as he approached his crossing of Bull 
Bun, when the brigades along the Bun on his right 
should cross, wheel to the left and attack on the enemy's 
left and rear. 

We had occasional glimpses behind the lines about 
Washington, through parties who managed to evade the 
eyes of guards and sentinels, which told of McDowell's 
work since May, and heard on the 10th of July that he 
was ready to march. Most of us knew him and of his 
attainments, as well as of those of Beauregard, to the 
credit of the latter, so that on that point we were quite 
satisfied. But the backing of an organized government, 
and an army led by the foremost American war-chief, that 




(k,^<Ui;Jl, 



Captain Washington Artillery of New Orleans; whose battery fired the first gun at 
July, 1861, and claims the last gnn at Appomattox. 



FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS. 37 

consummate strategist, tactician, and organizer, General 
Scott, together with the splendid equipment of the field 
batteries, and the presence of the force of regulars of 
infantry, gave serious apprehension. 

On the 16th of July notice came that the advance of 
McDowell's army was under definite orders for the next 
day. My brigade was at once ordered into position at 
Blackburn's Ford, and all others were ordered on the alert. 
Cocke's detachments were recalled from the fords between 
Mitchell's and Stone Bridge, and Evans was left to hold the 
bridge. Bonham withdrew from Fairfax Court-House as 
McDowell advanced. He retired behind the Kun at 
Mitchell's Ford, his vedettes following after exchanging 
shots with the enemy's advance on the 18th. Early that 
morning a section of the Washington Artillery was posted 
on a rear line behind Blackburn's Ford, and trailed across 
towards the left, so as to flank fire against the direct 
advance upon Bonham at Mitchell's Ford. 

At eight o'clock a.m. on the 18th, McDowell's army 
concentrated about Centreville, his immediate objective 
beinoj Manassas Junction. From Centreville the Warren- 
ton Turnpike bears off a little south of west, crossing Bull 
Eun at Stone Bridge (four miles). The Manassas Junc- 
tion road due south crosses at Mitchell's Ford (three 
miles). Other farm roads turned to the fords above and 
below Mitchell's. His orders to General Tyler, command- 
ing the advance division, were to look well to the roads 
on the direct route to Manassas Junction and via the Stone 
Bridge, to impress an advance upon the former, but to 
have care not to bring on a general engagement. At the 
same time he rode towards his left to know of the feasi- 
bility of a turning move around the Confederates' right. 
There were three moves by which it was supposed he could 
destroy the Confederates, — first, by turning their right ; 
second, by direct and forcible march to the Junction ; 
third, by turning their left. McDowell's orders to his 



38 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

leading divisions indicated that he had settled down to a 
choice as to the two opposite flanking moves ; but to jus- 
tify either he must first test the feasibility of the direct 
route. The ride to his left disclosed rough ground, rocky 
heights cut by streamlets, and covered by heavy forest 
tangle, as formidable to military manoeuvres of raw troops 
as armed battlements. According to preconceived plans, 
this eliminated the question of the flanking move by the 
Confederate right. 

Under the instructions, as General Tyler construed 
them, he followed the Confederates to the heights of Cen- 
treville, overlooking the valley of Bull Run, with a 
squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry. 
From the heights to the Run, a mile away, the field was 
open, and partially disclosed the Confederate position on 
his right. On the left the view was limited by a sparse 
growth of spreading pines. On the right was Mitchell's 
Ford, on the left Blackburn's. To have a better knowl- 
edge of the latter, he called up a brigade of infantry under 
General Richardson, Ayres's battery of six field-guns, and 
two twenty-pound rifle guns under Benjamin. The artil- 
lery was brought into action by the twenty-230und rifle 
guns, the first shot aimed at the section of the Washing- 
ton Artillery six-pounders in rear of Blackburn's Ford, 
showing superior marksmanship, the ball striking close 
beside the guns, and throwing the dust over the caissons 
and gunners. 

It was noticed that the enemy was far beyond our 
range, his position commanding, as well as his metal, so I 
ordered the guns withdrawn to a place of safety, till a 
fairer opportunity was offered them. The guns were lim- 
bered and off" before a second shot reached them. Artillery 
practice of thirty minutes was followed by an advance of 
infantry. The march was made quite up to the bluff over- 
looking the ford, when both sides opened fire. 

The first pouring-down volleys were most startling to 



FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS. 39 

the new troops. Part of my line broke and started at a 
run. To stop the alarm I rode with sabre in hand for the 
leading files, determined to give them all that was in the 
sword and my horse's heels, or stop the break. They 
seemed to see as much danger in their rear as in front, and 
soon turned and marched back to their places, to the evi- 
dent sur23rise of the enemy. Heavy firing was renewed 
in ten or fifteen minutes, when the Federals retired. 
After about twenty minutes a second advance was made to 
the top of the bluff, when another rousing fusillade fol- 
lowed, and continued about as long as the first, with like 
result. I reinforced the front line with part of my reserve, 
and, thinking to follow up my next success, called for one 
of the regiments of the reserve brigade. 

Colonel Hays, of the Seventh Louisiana Regiment, was 
sent, but was not in time for the next attack. He was in 
position for the fourth, and did his share in that fight. 
After the fourth repulse I ordered the advance, and called 
for the balance of the reserve brigade. The Fourth Bri- 
gade, in their drills in evolution, had not progressed as far 
as the passage of defiles. The pass at the ford was narrow, 
unused, and boggy. The lagoons above and below were 
deep, so that the crossing was intricate and slow. Colonel 
Early came in with his other regiments, formed his line 
behind my front, and was asked to hurry his troops to the 
front line, lest the next attack should catch him behind 
us, when his raw men would be sure to fire on the line in 
front of them. He failed to comprehend, however, and 
delayed till the next attack, when his men promptly re- 
turned fire at anything and everything before them. I 
thought to stop the fire by riding in front of his line, but 
found it necessary to dismount and lie under it till the 
loads were discharged. With the Federals on the bluff 
pouring down their fire, and Early's tremendous fire in 
our rear, soldiers and officers became mixed and a little 
confused. Part of my men got across the Run and partially 



40 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

up the bluff of the enemy's side ; a body of the Union sol- 
diers were met at the crest, where shots were exchanged, 
but passing the Run, encountering the enemy in front, and 
receiving fire from our friends in rear were not reassuring, 
even in handling veterans. The recall was ordered as the 
few of the enemy's most advanced parties joined issue 
with Captain Marye of my advance. Federal j)risoners 
were brought in with marks of burnt powder on their 
faces, and Captain Marye and some of his men of the 
Seventeenth, who brought them in, had their faces and 
clothing soiled by like marks. At the first moment of 
this confusion it seemed that a vigorous pressure by the 
enemy would force us back to the farther edge of the open 
field, and, to reach that stronger ground, preparations 
were considered, but with the aid of Colonels Garland and 
Corse order was restored, the Federals were driven off, and 
the troops better distributed. This was the last effort on 
the part of the infantry, and was followed by the Federal 
batteries throwing shot and shell through the trees above 
our heads. As we were under the bluff, the fire was not 
annoying, except occasionally when some of the branches 
of the trees were torn off and dropped among us. One 
shot passed far over, and dropped in the house in which 
General Beauregard was about to sit dowQ to his dinner. 
The interruption so annoyed him that he sent us four six- 
pound and three rifle guns of the Washington Artillery, 
under Captain Eshleman, to return fire and avenge the 
loss of his dinner. The guns had good cover under the 
bluff, by pushing them as close up as would admit of 
effective fire over it ; but under tactical formation the 
limbers and caissons were so far in rear as to bring them 
under destructive fire. The men, thinking it unsoldier- 
like to flinch, or complain of their exposure, worked away 
very courageously till the limbers and caissons were 
ordered forward, on the right and left of the guns, to safer 
cover. The combat lasted about an hour, when the Fed- 



FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS. 4 

erals withdrew to their ground about Centreville, to the 
delight of the Confederates. After this lively affair the 
re23ort came of a threatened advance off to our right. 
General Beauregard recalled Early's command to its posi- 
tion in that quarter. He was ordered to march to the 
right, under the bluff, so that his men could not come 
within range of the batteries, but he chose to march back 
on the road leading directly to the rear, when the dust of 
his columns drew fire of a battery, and several damaging 
shots were thrown among his troops. The Confederate 
losses were sixty-eight ; Federal, eighty-three. The effect 
of this little affair was encouraging to the Confederates, 
and as damaging to the Federals. By the double action 
of success and failure the Confederate infantry felt them- 
selves christened veterans. The Washington Artillery 
was equally proud of its even combat against the famed 
batteries of United States regulars. 

McDowell was disposed to ignore this fight as unwar- 
ranted under his instructions, and not a necessary adjunct 
of his plans. His course and that of the officers about 
him reduced the aggressive spirit of the division com- 
mander to its minimum, and had some influence upon the 
troops of the division. For battle at this time McDowell 
had 37,300''' n^en and forty-nine guns. Beauregard had 
20,500 f men and twenty-nine guns. 

* Rebellion Record, vol. ii. p. 309. Less two regiments and one 
cavalry troop. 

t General Beauregard claims that he was not so strong, but estimates 
seem to warrant the number given. 



J' 



CHAPTER III. 

BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN. 

Commanders on both Sides generally Veterans of the Mexican War — 
General Irvin McDowell's Preconceived Plan — Johnston reinforces 
Beauregard and approves his Plans — General Bernard E. Bee — Anal- 
ysis of the Fight — Superb Work of the Federal Artillery — Christening 
of "Stonewall Jackson" — McDowell's Gallant Effort to recover Lost 
Power— Before he was shorn of his Artillery he was the Samson of 
the Field — The Rout— Criticism of McDowell — Tyler's Reconnoissance 
— Ability of the Commanding Generals tested. 

Before treating of future operations, I should note the 
situation of the Confederate contingents in the Shenandoah 
Valley and at Acquia Creek. The latter was ordered up 
to reinforce Beauregard as soon as the advance from Wash- 
ington took definite shape, and arrived as a supporting 
brigade to his right on the 19th of July. At the same time 
orders were sent authorizing Johnston's withdrawal from 
the Valley, to join with Beauregard for the approaching 
conflict. The use of these contingents was duly consid- 
ered by both sides some days before the campaign was put 
on foot. 

Opposing Johnston in the Valley was General Robert 
Patterson, of Philadelphia, a veteran of the war of 1812 
and of the Mexican War, especially distinguished in the 
latter by the prestige of the former service. Johnston 
was a veteran of the Mexican War, who had won distinc- 
tion by progressive service and was well equipped in the 
science of war. Beauregard and McDowell were also 
veterans of the Mexican War, of staff service, and dis- 
tinguished for intelligent action and attainments, both 
remarkable for physical as well as mental power. 

Between Johnston and Beauregard the Blue Ridge 
stretched out from the Potomac southwest far below the 

42 



BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN. 43 

southern line of Virginia, cut occasionally by narrow 
passes, quite defensible by small bodies of infantry and 
artillery. Patterson was ordered to hold Johnston in the 
Valley, while McDowell should direct his strength against 
Beauregard. McDowell seems to have accepted that order 
as not only possible, but sure of success, while the Con- 
federates viewed the question from the other side, in a 
reverse light, and, as will presently apj^ear, with better 
judgment. 

So far as it is possible to project a battle before reaching 
the field, it seems that McDowell had concluded upon the 
move finally made before setting out on his march from 
Washington. It was to give him an open field, with 
superior numbers and appointments, and when successful 
was to give him the approach to the base line of his ad- 
versary with fine prospects of cutting off retreat. His 
ride to view the approaches of the Confederate right on 
the morning of the 18tli was made to confirm his precon- 
ceived plan. The reconnoissance made by Tyler on the 
same morning reinforced his judgment, so that the stra- 
tegic part of the campaign was concluded on that morn- 
ing, except as to the means to be adopted to secrete or 
mislead in his movement as long as possible, leaving, 
we may say, the result to tactical operations. But tactics 
is time, and more decisive of results than strategy when 
wisely adjusted. 

Johnston was sixty miles away from Beauregard, but 
the delay of three days, for McDowell's march via Sudley 
Springs, so reduced the distance in time and space as to 
make the consolidation easy under well-organized trans- 
portation facilities. Holmes's brigade and six-gun battery 
were posted in rear of Swell's brigade. 

General McDowell's order for battle on the 21st of 
July was issued on the afternoon of the 20th, directing his 
First Division to march by the Warrenton Turnpike, and 
make a diversion against the crossing of Bull Run at the 



44 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Stone Bridge, while the Second and Third Divisions, fol- 
lowing on the turnpike, were to file to the right, along 
the farm road, about half-way between Centreville and 
the bridge, cross Bull Bun at Sudley Springs, and bear 
down against the Confederate rear and left ; the First 
Division, under Tyler, to march at two o'clock in the 
morning, to be closely followed by the others under Hun- 
ter and Heintzelman ; the turning divisions, after crossing, 
to march down, clear the bridge, and lift Tyler over the 
Run, bringing the three into compact battle order. 

General Johnston came in from the Shenandoah Valley 
on the 20th with the brigades of Bee, Bartow, and Jack- 
son. The brigades were assigned by Beauregard, the 
former two in reserve near the right of Blackburn's Ford, 
the latter near its left. 

Beauregard's order for battle, approved by General 
Johnston, was issued at five a.m. on the 21st, — the brigades 
at Union Mills Ford to cross and march by the road lead- 
ing towards Centreville, and in rear of the Federal re- 
serve at that point ; the brigades at McLean's Ford to 
follow the move of those on their right, and march on a 
converging road towards Centreville ; those at and near 
Blackburn's to march in co-operative action with the 
brigades on the right ; the reserve brigades and troops at 
Mitchell's Ford to be used as emergency called, but in the 
absence of special orders to seek the most active point of 
battle. 

This order was only preliminary, coupled with the con- 
dition that the troops were to be held ready to move, but 
to wait for the special order for action. The brigade at 
Blackburn's Ford had been reinforced by the Fifth North 
Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments, under 
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones and Colonel Kemper. I crossed 
the Run under the five o'clock order, adjusted the regi- 
ments to position for favorable action, and gave instruc- 
tions for their movements on the opening of the battle. 



BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN. 45 

While waiting for the order to attack, a clever recon- 
noissance was made by Colonels Terry and Lubbock, 
Texans, on the brigade staff, which disclosed the march of 
the heavy columns of the Federals towards our left. 
Their re^^ort was sent promptly to head-quarters, and after 
a short delay the brigade was ordered back to its position 
behind the Run. 

Tyler's division moved early on the 21st towards the 
Stone Bridge. The march was not rapid, but timely. 
His first shells went tearing through the elements over 
the heads of the Confederates before six o'clock. The 
Second and Third Divisions followed his column till its 
rear cleared the road leading up to the ford at Sudley 
Springs, when they filed off on that route. McDowell 
was with them, and saw them file off on their course, and 
followed their march. His Fifth Division and Richard- 
son's brigade of the First were left in reserve at Centre- 
ville, and the Fourth Division was left in a position rear- 
ward of them. The march of the columns over the single 
track of the farm road leading uj) to Sudley Sjorings was 
not only fatiguing, but so prolonged the diversion of 
Tyler's division at the bridge as to expose its real intent, 
and cause his adversary to look elsewhere for the impor- 
tant work. Viewing the zone of operations as far as cov- 
ered by the eye, Evans discovered a column of dust rising 
above the forest in the vicinity of Sudley Springs. This, 
with the busy delay of Tyler in front of the bridge, ex- 
posed the plans, and told of another quarter for the ap- 
j^roaching battle ; when Evans, leaving four companies of 
infantry and two pieces of artillery to defend the bridge, 
moved with the rest of his command to meet the ap- 
j)roaching columns off his left. Bearing in mind his care 
of the bridge, it was necessary to occupy grounds north 
of the pike. The position chosen was the plateau near 
the Matthews House, about a thousand yards north of the 
pike, and about the same distance from Bull Run, com- 



46 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

manding the road by which the turning divisions of the 
enemy were to approach. His artillery (two six-pound 
guns) was posted to his right and left, somewhat retired. 
Meanwhile, Tyler's batteries maintained their position at 
and below the Stone Bridge, as did those near the lower 
fords. McDowell's column crossed at Sudley's Ford at 
nine o'clock, and approached Evans a few minutes before 
ten. The leading division under Hunter, finding Evans's 
command across its route, advanced the Second Rhode 
Island Kegiment and battery of six guns of Burnside's 
brigade to open the way. Evans's infantry and artillery 
met the advance, and after a severe fight drove it back * 
to the line of woodland, when Burnside, reinforced by his 
other three regiments, with them advanced eight guns. 
This attack was much more formidable, and pressed an 
hour or more before our forces retired to the woodland. 
The fight, though slackened, continued, while the brigade 
under Porter advanced to Burnside's support. 

Waiting some time to witness the opening of his aggres- 
sive fight towards Centreville, Beauregard found at last 
that his battle order had miscarried. While yet in doubt 
as to the cause of delay, his attention was drawn to the 
fight opened by McDowell against Evans. This affair, 
increasing in volume, drew him away from his original 
point and object of observation. He reconsidered the 
order to attack at Centreville, and rode for the field just 
opening to severe work. The brigades of Bee and Bar- 
tow, — commanded by Bee, — and Jackson's, had been 
drawn towards the left, the former two near Cocke's posi- 
tion, and Jackson from the right to the left of Mitchell's 
Ford. They were to await orders, but were instructed, 
and intrusted, in the absence of orders, to seek the place 
where the fight was thickest. About twelve o'clock that 
splendid soldier, Bernard E. Bee, under orders to find the 

* lu that attack the division commander, Colonel David Hunter, 
was wounded. 




Captain and Aide-de-Camp. 



4 



BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN. 47 

point of danger, construed it as calling him to Evans's 
support, and marched, without other notice than the noise 
of increasing battle, with his own and Bartow's brigades 
and Imboden's battery. The move against the enemy's 
reserve at Centreville suspended, Colonels Terry and Lub- 
bock, volunteer aides, crossed the Run to make another 
reconnoissance of the positions about Centreville. Ca23- 
tain Goree, of Texas, and Caj^tain Sorrel, of Georgia, 
had also joined the brigade staff. As Bee approached 
Evans he formed line ujDon the plateau at the Henry 
House, suggesting to Evans to withdraw to that as a better 
field than the advance ground held by the latter ; but in 
deference to Evans's care for the bridge, which involved 
care for the turnpike. Bee yielded, and ordered his troops 
to join Evans's advance. Imboden's artillery, however, 
failed to respond, remaining on the Henry plateau ; 
leaving Bee and Evans with two six-pounder smooth- 
bore guns to combat the enemy's formidable batteries of 
eight to twelve guns of superior metal, as well as the ac- 
cumulating sujDerior infantry forces, Imboden's battery 
making a show of practice with six-pounders at great 
range. The infantry crossed Young's Branch under 
severe fire, and were posted on the line of Evans's battle. 
Burnside was reinforced by Porter's brigade, and after- 
wards by a part of Heintzelman's division. Bicketts's 
battery, and subsequently the battery under Grifi&n, 
pressed their fight with renewed vigor. The batteries, 
particularly active and aggressive, poured incessant fire 
upon the Confederate ranks, who had no artillery to en- 
gage against them except Imboden's, far off to the rear, 
and the section of Latham's howitzers. The efforts of the 
Federal infantry were cleverly met and resisted, but the 
havoc of those splendid batteries was too severe, par- 
ticularly Grifiin's, that had an oblique fire upon the 
Confederates. It was the fire of this battery that first 
disturbed our ranks on their left, and the increasing 



48 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

pounding of that and Ricketts's eventually unsettled the 
line. At this juncture two brigades of Tyler's division, 
with General W. T. Sherman and General Keyes, crossed 
the Run at a ford some distance above the bridge and 
approached the Confederate right, making more unsettled 
their position. At the same time the attacking artillery 
and infantry followed up their opportunity in admirable 
style, pushed the Confederates back, and pursued down to 
the valley of Young's Branch. 

At one P.M., Colonels Terry and Lubbock returned 
from their reconnoissance of the ground in front of Cen- 
treville, with a diagram showing points of the Union lines 
and troops there posted. I sent it up to head-quarters, 
suggesting that the brigades at the lower fords be j)ut 
across the Run, and advance against the reserves as de- 
signed by the order of the morning. Colonel Terry re- 
turned with the suggestion approved, and we communi- 
cated the same to the brigades at McLean's and Union 
Mills Fords, commanded by officers of senior dates to 
myself. The brigades were prepared, however, for concert 
of action. Bee, Bartow, and Evans made valorous efforts, 
while withdrawing from their struggle on the Matthews 
plateau, to maintain the integrity of their lines, and with 
some success, when General Wade Hampton came with 
his brigade to their aid, checked the progress of pursuit, 
and helped to lift their broken ranks to the plateau at 
the Henry House. The fight assumed proportions which 
called for the care of both General Johnston and General 
Beauregard, who, with the movements of their right too 
late to relieve the pressure of the left, found it necessary 
to draw their forces to the point at which the battle had 
been forced by the enemy. At the same time the reserve 
brigades of their right were called to the left. General 
Thomas J. Jackson also moved to that quarter, and 
reached the rear crest of the plateau at the Henry House 
while yet Bee, Bartow, Evans, and Hampton were climb- 



BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN. 49 

ing to the forward crest. Quick to note a proper ground, 
Jackson deployed on the crest at the height, leaving the 
open of the plateau in front. He was in time to secure the 
Imboden battery before it got off the field, and put it into 
action. Stanard's battery, Pendleton's, and Pelham's, 
and part of the Washington Artillery were up in time to 
aid Jackson in his new formation and relieve our dis- 
comfited troops rallying on his flank. As they rose on 
the forward crest. Bee saw, on the farther side, Jackson's 
line, serene as if in repose, affording a haven so promising 
of cover that he gave the christening of " Stonewall" for 
the immortal Jackson. 

" There," said he, " is Jackson, standing like a stone 
wall." 

General Johnston and General Beauregard reached the 
field, and busied themselves in getting the troops together 
and in lines of defence. Other reinforcements were or- 
dered from the right, including the reserve brigades at 
McLean's and Union Mills Fords, and a number of bat- 
teries. Bee and Evans reformed their lines upon Jack- 
son's. After permitting Burnside's brigade to retire for 
rest, McDowell pushed his battle by his strong artillery 
arm, advancing against and turning the Confederate left, 
only giving some little time to select positions for his bat- 
teries to plunge more effective fire into the Confederate 
ranks. This time, so necessary for McDowell's renewal, 
was as important to the Confederates in getting their 
reinforcements of infantry and artillery in position, and 
proved of even greater value in lengthening out the fight, 
so as to give Kirby Smith and Elzey, just off the train 
from the Shenandoah Valley, time to appear at the last 
moment. 

After arranging the new position of the troops about 
Jackson, General Johnston rode back to the Lewis House, 
where he could better comprehend the entire field, leaving 
Beauregard in charge of the troops engaged on his left. 



50 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

McDowell gave especial care to preparing his batteries 
for renewal against the Confederate left. He massed 
K-icketts's and Griffin's batteries, and made their practice 
grand. So well executed was it that the Confederate left 
was again in peril, and, seeing reinforcements approaching 
towards their rear. General Johnston sent orders to the 
brigades at the lower fords revoking authority given them 
to advance against Centreville, and ordering their return 
to the south side, and the brigade at Union Mills was 
ordered to reinforce the Confederate left. The brigade at 
Blackburn's Ford received the recall order in ample time, 
but that at McLean's, — Jones's, — being a little farther 
away, became partially engaged before the recall reached 
it. The brigades resumed their former position, however, 
without serious trouble. 

With this order came a message to me, saying that the 
Federals were pressing severely on our left, and to the 
limit of its tension, that reinforcements were in sight, 
approaching their right, which might prove too heavy for 
our brave men, and force us back, for which emergency 
our brigades should be held ready to cover retreat. These 
anxious moments were soon relieved by the approach of 
General Kirby Smith's command, that had been mistaken 
as reinforcements for the enemy. General Smith was 
wounded, but was succeeded in command by the gallant 
Elzey, who by a well-timed attack approached the rear of 
the massed batteries. At the same time a brave charge on 
the part of Beauregard, in co-operation with this fortunate 
attack of Smith and Elzey, captured the greater part of 
the batteries and turned some of the guns upon the brave 
men who had handled them so well. 

McDowell made a gallant effort to recover his lost 
power, riding with his troops and urging them to brave 
efforts, but our convex line, that he was just now pressing 
back upon itself, was changed. Though attenuated, it 
had become concave by reinforcement, and in elliptical 



BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN. 51 

curve was delivering a concentrated fire upon its adver- 
sary. Before the loss of his artillery he was the Samson 
of the field ; now he was not only shorn of his power, but 
some of his mighty strength was transferred to his adver- 
sary, leaving him in desperate plight and exposed to blows 
increasing in force and effectiveness. Although his re- 
newed efforts were brave, his men seemed to have given 
confidence over to despair. Still a show of battle was 
made until General Johnston directed the brigades of 
Holmes and Early to good positions for attack, when fight 
was abandoned and flight ensued. 

The regulars under Sykes maintained order, and with 
the regular cavalry covered the confused retreat. The 
Confederates in the field and apj)roaching at the moment 
were ordered in pursuit. At the same time another order 
was sent the brigades at the lower fords, explaining that 
the reinforcements, supposed to be Federals, proved to be 
Confederates, and that the former were not only forced 
back, but were then in full retreat, directing our brigades 
to cross again and strike the retreating line on the turn- 
pike. All of D. R. Jones's brigade that had crossed at 
McLean's Ford under the former order had not yet 
returned to its position under the order to that effect, and 
Ewell had gone from Union Mills Ford to the battle 
on the extreme left, so that neither of them came in posi- 
tion ready to take part in the pursuit. Those at Mitchell's 
and Blackburn's Fords advanced, the former, under Gen- 
eral Bonham, with orders to strike at Cub Run, the latter 
at Centreville. Finding some obstruction to his march, 
General Bonham kept the Centreville road, and joined 
the brigade from Blackburn's, taking the lead as the 
ranking officer. 

Through the abandoned camps of the Federals we found 
their pots and kettles over the fire, with food cooking; 
quarters of beef hanging on the trees, and wagons by the 
roadside loaded, some with bread and general provisions, 



52 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

others with ammunition. When within artillery range 
of the retreating column passing through Centreville, the 
infantry was deployed on the sides of the road, under 
cover of the forest, so as to give room for the batteries 
ordered into action in the open, Bonham's brigade on the 
left, the other on the right. 

As the guns were about to open, there came a message 
that the enemy, instead of being in precipitate retreat, 
was marching around to .attack the Confederate right. 
With this report came orders, or reports of orders, for the 
brigades to return to their positions behind the Run. I 
denounced the report as absurd, claimed to know a retreat, 
such as was before me, and ordered that the batteries open 
fire, when Major Whiting, of General Johnston's staff, 
rising in his stirrups, said, — 

" In the name of General Johnston, I order that the 
batteries shall not open." 

I inquired, " Did General Johnston send you to com- 
municate that order ?" 

Whiting replied, " No ; but I take the responsibility to 
give it." 

I claimed the privilege of responsibility under the cir- 
cumstances, and when in the act of renewing the order to 
fire, General Bonham rode to my side and asked that the 
batteries should not open. As the ranking officer present, 
this settled the question. By that time, too, it was near 
night. Colonel G. W. Lay, of Johnston's staff", supported 
my views, notwithstanding the protest of Major Whiting. 

Soon there came an order for the brigades to withdraw 
and return to their positions behind the Bun. General 
Bonham marched his brigade back, but, thinking that 
there was a mistake somewhere, I remained in position 
until the order was renewed, about ten o'clock. My bri- 
gade crossed and recrossed the Run six times during the 
day and night. 

It was afterwards found that some excitable person, see- 



BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OK BULL RUN. 53 

ing Jones's brigade recrossing the Kun, from its advance, 
under previous orders, took them for Federal troops cross- 
ing at McLean's Ford, and, rushing to head-quarters at the 
Junction, reported that the Federals were crossing below 
and preparing for attack against our right. And upon 
this report one of the staff-officers sent orders, in the 
names of the Confederate chiefs, revoking the orders for 
pursuit. 

From the effective service of the two guns of Latham's 
battery, at short range, against the odds brought against 
them, the inference seems fair that the Imboden battery, 
had it moved under Bee's orders, could have so strength- 
ened the position on the Matthews plateau as to hold it and 
give time for them to retire and meet General Jackson on 
the Henry plateau. Glorious Victory spread her generous 
wings alike over heroes and delinquents. 

The losses of the Confederates in all arms were 1982. 
Federal losses in all arms, 3333* officers and soldiers, 
twenty-five cannon. f 

On the 22d the cavalry troop of Captain Whitehead 
was sent forward with Colonel Terry, volunteer aide, on a 
ride of observation. They picked up a number of pris- 
oners, and Colonel Terry cut the lanyards of the Federal 
flag over the court-house at Fairfax by a shot from his 
six-shooter, and sent the bunting to head-quarters. 

The plan of the Union campaign was that their army in 
the Valley of the Shenandoah, under General Patterson, 
should stand so surely against the Confederates in that 
field, under General Johnston, as to prevent the with- 
drawal of the latter through the Blue Ridge, which goes 
to show that the concentration was considered, and thought 
possible, and that McDowell was, therefore, under some 
pressure to act in time to gain his battle before Johnston 
could have time for his swoop from the mountains. At 

* Rebellion Record, vol. ii. pp. 351, 387, 405, 426. 
t Ibid., 328. 



54 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Centreville on the 18th, McDowell was within five miles 
of his immediate objective, — Manassas Junction, — by the 
route of Tyler's reconnoissance. The Sudley Ford route 
involved a march of twenty miles and drew him nearer 
the reach of Johnston's forces. So, if Tyler's recon- 
noissance proved the route by Blackburn's Ford practica- 
ble, it was imperative on McDowell to adopt it. If it was 
proved impracticable, the route by Sudley's Ford was 
necessary and justified the delay. But it has been claimed 
that the Union commander did not intend to have the 
reconnoissance, and that he could have made his move a 
success by that route if he had adopted it ; which, if true, 
would put him in a more awkw^ard position than his defeat. 
He was right in his conclusion that the Confederates were 
prepared for him on that route, but it would have been a 
grave error to leave the shorter, more direct line for the 
circuitous route without first so testing the former as to 
know if it were practicable, knowing as he did that the 
Confederate left was in the air, because of leaven looked 
for from over the Blue Ridge. After the trial of General 
Tyler on the 18th, and finding the route closed against him, 
he should have given credit to the division commander 
and his troops for their courageous work, but instead 
he disparaged their efforts and j^ut them under criticism. 
The experiment and subsequent events go to show that 
the route was not practicable except for seasoned troops. 

McDowell's first mistake was his display, and march 
for a grand military j^icnic. The leading proverb im- 
pressed upon the minds of young soldiers of the line by 
old commanders is, " Never despise your enemy." So 
important a part of the soldier's creed is it, that it is 
enjoined upon subalterns pursuing marauding parties of 
half a dozen of the aborigines. His over-confidence led 
him to treat with levity the reconnoissance of General 
Tyler on the 18th, as not called for under his orders, nor 
necessary to justify his plans, although they involved a 



BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN. 55 

delay of three days, and a circuitous march around the 
Confederate left. Then, he put upon his division com- 
mander the odium of error and uncalled-for exposure of 
the troops. This broke the confidence between them, and 
worked more or less evil through the ranks in the after- 
part of the campaign. Had he recognized the importance 
of the service, and encouraged the conduct of the division 
commander, he would have drawn the hearts of his officers 
and soldiers towards him, and toned up the war spirit and 
morale of his men. Tyler was right in principle, in the 
construction of duty, under the orders, and in his more 
comprehensive view of the military zodiac. In no other 
way than by testing the strength along the direct route 
could McDowell justify delay, when time was power, 
and a long march with raw troops in July weather was 
pending. 

The delay gave Beauregard greater confidence in his 
preconceived plan, and brought out his wder of the 21st 
for advance towards McDowell's reserve at Centreville, 
but this miscarried, and turned to advantage for the plans 
of the latter. 

Had a prompt, energetic general been in command 
when, on the 20th, his order of battle was settled upon, 
the division under Tyler would have been deployed in 
front of Stone Bridge, as soon after nightfall as darkness 
could veil the march, and the divisions under Hunter and 
Heintzelman following would have been stretched along 
the lateral road in bivouac, so as to be prepared to cross 
Sudley's Ford and put in a good day's work on the mor- 
row. Had General Tyler's action of the 18th received 
proper recognition, he would have been confident instead 
of doubting in his service. McDowell's army posted as 
it should have been, a march at daylight would have 
brought the columns to the Henry House before seven 
o'clock, dislodged Evans, busied by Tyler's display at the 
bridge, without a chance to fight, and brought the three 



i^- 



56 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

divisions, reunited in gallant style, along the turnpike 
with little burning of powder. Thus prepared and organ- 
ized, the compact battle-order of twenty thousand men 
would have been a fearful array against Beauregard's 
fragmentary left, and by the events as they passed, would 
have assured McDowell of victory hours before Kirby 
Smith and Elzey, of the Army of the Shenandoah, came 
upon the field. 

Beauregard's mistake was in failing to ride promptly 
after his five-o'clock order, and handling his columns 
while in action. As events actually occurred, he would 
have been in overwhelming numbers against McDowell's 
reserve and supply depot. His adversary so taken by 
surprise, his raw troops would not have been difficult to 
conquer. 

As the experience of both commanders was limited to 
staff service, it is not surprising that they failed to appre- 
ciate the importance of prompt and vigorous manoeuvre 
in the hour of battle. Beauregard gave indications of 
a comprehensive military mind and reserve powers that 
might, with experience and thorough encouragement 
from the superior authorities, have developed him into 
eminence as a field-marshal. His adversary seemed un- 
toward, not adapted to military organization or combina- 
tions. Most of his men got back to Washington under 
the sheltering wings of the small bands of regulars. 

The mistake of supposing Kirby Smith's and Elzey's 
approaching troops to be Union reinforcements for Mc- 
Dowell's right was caused by the resemblance, at a dis- 
tance, of the original Confederate flag to the colors of 
Federal regiments. This mishap caused the Confederates 
to cast about for a new ensign, brought out our battle-flag, 
led to its adoption by General Beauregard, and afterwards 
by higher authority as the union shield of the Confederate 
national flag. 

The supplies of subsistence, ammunition, and forage 



BATTLE *OF MANASSAS, OB, BULL BUN. 57 

passed as we marched through the enemy's camps towards 
Centreville seemed amj)le to carry the Confederate army 
on to Washington. Had the fight been continued to that 
point, the troops, in their high hopes, would have marched 
in terrible effectiveness against the demoralized Federals. 
Gaining confidence and vigor in their march, they could 
well have reached the cajDital with the ranks of McDow- 
ell's men. The brigade at Blackburn's Ford (five regi- 
ments), those at McLean's and Mitchell's Fords, all quite 
fresh, could have been reinforced by all the cavalry and 
most of the artillery, comparatively fresh, and later by 
the brigades of Holmes, Ewell, and Early. This favor- 
able aspect for fruitful results was all sacrificed through 
the assumed authority of staff'-ofiicers who, upon false re- 
ports, gave countermand to the orders of their chiefs. 

On the 21st a regiment and battery were discharged 
from the Union army, reducing its aggregate to about 
34,000. The Confederates had 31,860. McDowell crossed 
Bull Run with 18,500 of his men, and engaged in battle 
18,053 Confederates. 

There seem to be no data from which the precise 
figures can be had. These estimates, though not strictly 
accurate, are justified by returns so far as they have been 
officially rendered. 

The CoNFEDEEATE Abmy in this battle was organized 
as follows : 

Army of the Potomac (afterwards First Corps), under Brig.- 
Gen. G. T. Beauregard: — Infantry: First Brigade, under Brig.-Gen. 
M. S. Bonham, 11th N. C, 2d, 3d, 7th, and 8th S. C. ; Seeond Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. R. S. Ewell, 5th and 6th Ala., 6th La. ; Third Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones, 17th and 18th Miss., 5th 8. C. ; Fourth Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. James Longstreet, 5th N. C, Ist, 11th, and 17th Va. ; Fifth 
Brigade, Col. P. St. George Cocke, 1st La. Battn., 8th Va. (seven com- 
panies), 18th, 19th, 28th, and 49th Va. (latter, three companies) ; Sixth 
Brigade, Col. J. A. Early, 13th Miss., 4th S. C, 7th and 24th Va. ; 
Troops not brigaded: 7th and 8th La., Hampton Legion, S. C, 30th 
Va. (cav.), Harrison's Battn. (cav.) ; Independent companies: 10th 
Cav., Washington (La.) Cav.; Artillery: Kemper's, Latham's, Lou- 
doun, and Shield's batteries, Camp Pickens companies. 



58 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Akmy of the Shenandoah (Johnston's division), Brig.-Gen. 
Joseph E. Johnston :—I^irst Brigade, Col. T. J. Jackson, 2d, 4th, 5th, 
and 27th Va., Pendleton's Batt. ; Second Brigade, Col. F. S. Bartow, 
7th, 8th, and 9th Ga., Duncan's and Pope's Ky. Battns., Alburti's Batt. ; 
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Barnard E. Bee, 4th Ala., 2d and 11th Miss., 
1st Tenn., Imboden's Batt.; Fourth Brigade, Col. A. Elzey, 1st Md. 
Battn., 3d Tenn., 10th and 13th Va., Grane's Batt.; Not brigaded: 
1st Va. Cav., 33d Va. Inf. 

The Federal Aemy, commanded by Brigadier-General 
Irvin McDowell, was organized as follows : 

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler -.—First Brigade, Col. E. 
D. Keyes, 2d Me., 1st, 2d, and 3d Conn. ; Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
R. C. Schenck, 2d N. Y., 1st and 2d Ohio, Batt. E, 2d U. S. Art. ; Third 
Brigade, Col. W. T. Sherman, 13th, 69th, and 79th N. Y., 2d Wis., 
Batt. E, 3d U. S. Art, ; Fourth Brigade, Col. I. B. Richardson, 1st 
Mass., 12th N. Y., 2d and 3d Mich., Batt. G, 1st U. S. Art., Batt. M, 
2d U. S. Art. 

Second Division, (1) Col. David Hunter (wounded) ; (2) Col. Andrew 
Porter : — First Brigade, Col. Andrew Porter, 8th (militia), 14th, and 
27th N. Y., Battn. U. S. Inf., Battn. U. S. Marines, Battn. U. S. Cav., 
Batt. D, 5th U. S. Art. ; Second Brigade, Col. A. E. Burnside, 2d N. H., 
1st and 2d R. I., 71st N. Y. 

Third Division, Col. S. P. Heintzelman (wounded) :— First Brigade, 
Col. W. B. Franklin, 5th and 11th Mass., 1st Minn., Batt. I, 1st U. S. 
Art. ; Second Brigade, Col. O. B. Wilcox (wounded and captured), 11th 
N. Y. (Fire Zouaves), 38th N. Y., 1st and 4th Mich., Batt. D, 2d U. S. 
Art. ; Third Brigade, Col. O. O. Howard, 3d, 4th, and 5th Me., 2d Vt. 

Fourth (Reserve) Division,* Brig.-Gen. Theodore Runyou, 1st, 
2d, 3d, and 4tli N. J. (three months), 1st, 2d, and 3d N. J., 4ist N. Y. 
(three years). 

Fifth Division, Col. Dixon S. Miles -.—First Brigade,^ Col. Louis 
Blenker, 8th N. Y. (Vols.), 29th and 39th N. Y., 27th Penn., Batt. A, 
2d U. S. Art., Rookwood's N. Y. Batt. ; Second Brigade, Col. Thomas 
A. Davies, 16th, 18th, 31st, and 32d N. Y., Batt. G, 2d U. S. Art. 

* Not engaged. 

t In reserve at Centreville and not iu battle proper. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE CONFEDERATES HOVERING AROUND WASHINGTON. 

An Early War-Time Amenity— The Author invited to dine with the 
Enemy — "Stove-pipe Batteries" — J. E. B. Stuart, the Famous Cav- 
alryman — His Bold Dash on the Federals at Lewinsville — Major- 
General G. W. Smith associated with Johnston and Beauregard in a 
Council— Longstreet promoted Major-General— Fierce Struggle at 
Ball's Bluff— Dranesville a Success for the Union Arms— McClellan 
given the Sobriquet of " The Young Napoleon." 

After General McDowell reached Washington my 
brigade was thrown forward, first to Centreville, then to 
Fairfax Court-House, and later still to Falls Church and 
Miinson's and Mason's Hills ; the cavalry, under Colonel 
J. E. B. Stuart, constituting j)art of the command. 

We were provokingly near Washington, with orders 
not to attempt to advance even to Alexandria. Well- 
chosen and fortified positions, with seldiers to man them, 
soon guarded all approaches to the capital. We had fre- 
quent little brushes with parties pushed out to reconnoitre. 
Nevertheless, we were neither so busy nor so hostile as to 
prevent the reception of a cordial invitation to a dinner- 
party on the other side, to be given to me at the head- 
quarters of General Richardson. He was disappointed 
when I refused to accept this amenity, and advised him to 
be more careful lest the politicians should have him ar- 
rested for giving aid and comfort to the enemy. He was 
my singularly devoted friend and admirer before the war, 
and had not ceased to be conscious of old-time ties. 

The service at Falls Church, Munson's and Mason's 
Hills was first by my brigade of infantry, a battery, and 
Stuart's cavalry. During that service the infantry and 
batteries were relieved every few days, but the cavalry 
was kept at the front with me. As the authorities allowed 

59 



60 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

me but one battery, and that was needed from time to 
time to strike out at anything and everything that came 
outside the fortified lines, we collected a number of old 
wagon-wheels and mounted on them stove-pipes of differ- 
ent calibre, till we had formidable-looking batteries, some 
large enough of calibre to threaten Alexandria, and even 
the National Capitol and Executive Mansion. It is need- 
less to add that Munson's Hill was so safe as not to disturb 
our profound slumbers. This was before the Federals 
began to realize all of their advantages by floating balloons 
above our heads. 

One of the most conspicuous and successful of our 
affairs occurred on the 11th of September. A brigade of 
the enemy's infantry, with eight pieces of artillery 'and a 
detachment of cavalry, escorting a reconnoitring party, 
advanced to Lewinsville. If they had secured and forti- 
fied a position there they would have greatly annoyed us. 
Colonel Stuart, who from the start had manifested those 
qualities of daring courage, tempered by sagacity, which 
so admirably fitted him for outpost service, had his pickets 
so far to the front that he was promptly informed of the 
presence of the enemy. He was ordered, with about 
eight hundred infantry, a section of Rosser's battery, and 
Captain Patrick's troop of cavalry, to give battle, and so 
adroitly approached the enemy as to surprise him, and by 
a bold dash drove him off in confusion, with some loss. 

We had a number of small affairs which served to sea- 
son the troops and teach the importance of discipline and 
vigilance. It was while at Falls Church that Major- 
General G. W. Smith reported for duty with the Army 
of Northern Virginia, and was associated with General 
Johnston and General Beauregard, the three forming a 
council for the general direction of the operations of the 
army. General McClellan had by this time been ap- 
pointed to superior command on the Federal side. 

Despairing of receiving reinforcement to enable him to 




GENERAL J. E. B. STUART 



CONFEDERATES HOVERING AROUND WASHINGTON. 61 

assume the offensive, General Johnston regarded it as 
hazardous to hold longer the advanced post of Munson's 
and Mason's Hills, drew the troops back to and near Fair- 
fax Court-House, and later, about the 19th of October, 
still farther to Centreville, and prepared for winter quar- 
ters by strengthening his positions and constructing huts, 
the line extending to Union Mills on the right. These 
points were regarded as stronger in themselves and less 
liable to be turned than the positions at and in advance 
of Fairfax Court-House. We expected that McClellan 
would advance against us, but were not disturbed. I was 
promoted major-general, which relieved me of the out- 
post service, to which Colonel Stuart was assigned. 

The autumn and early winter were not permitted to 
pass without some stirring incidents in our front. Soon 
after the battle of July 21, Colonel Eppa Hunton was 
ordered to reoccupy Leesburg with his regiment, the 
Eighth Virginia. Later, the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, 
and Eighteenth Mississippi Regiments were sent to the 
same vicinity, and with the regiment already there and a 
battery constituted the Seventh Brigade, Brigadier-General 
N. G. Evans commanding. To cover a reconnoissance 
and an expedition to gather supplies made by General 
McCall's division to Dranesville, General McClellan or- 
dered General C. P. Stone, commanding at Poolesville, 
Maryland, to make a demonstration in force against Lees- 
burg, and, if practicable, to dislodge the Confederates at 
that place. Early in the morning of the 21st of October 
four of General Stone's regiments crossed the Potomac at 
Edwards's Ferry, and about the same time five other regi- 
ments, under the immediate command of Colonel Baker, 
late United States Senator from Oregon, crossed the river 
above at Ball's Bluff. Leaving Colonel Barksdale with 
his Thirteenth Mississippi, with six pieces of artillery as 
a reserve, to hold in check the force that had crossed 
at Edwards's Ferry, Evans with his main force assailed 



62 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the force under Colonel Baker, and after a long and fierce 
struggle, under a heavy fire of batteries on both sides of 
the river, drove them down the bluff* to the river, many 
surrendering, others plunging into the river to recross, 
overcrowding and sinking the boats that had brought them 
over ; some drowning in the Potomac. 

Two months later, December 20, there was an affair at 
Dranesville which for us was by no means so satisfactory 
as Evans's at Leesburg and Ball's Bluff". It was known 
that food for men and horses could be found in the 
vicinity of Dranesville. All of the available wagons of 
the army were sent to gather and bring it in, and Colo- 
nel Stuart, with one hundred and fifty of his cavalry, 
the Sumter Flying Artillery (Captain A. S. Cutts), and 
four regiments of infantry detailed from different brigades, 
was charged with the command of the foraging party. 
The infantry regiments were the Eleventh Virginia, Colo- 
nel Samuel Garland ; Tenth Alabama, Colonel Forney ; 
Sixth South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Secrest; and 
First Kentucky, Colonel Thomas Taylor ; the cavalry, 
Kansom's and Bradford's. 

General McCall, commanding the nearest Union di- 
vision, happened just then to want those supplies, or, as 
seems more probable, had information through a spy of 
Stuart's expedition. 

He took measures to gather the supplies, or surprise 
and perhaps capture or destroy Stuart's party. However 
that may be, when Stuart reached the vicinity of Dranes- 
ville he found himself in the jiresence of General Ord, 
who had under him his own brigade of five regiments of 
infantry, Easton's battery, two twenty-four-pound how- 
itzers and two twelve-pound guns, and two squadrons of 
cavalry. Finding that he was anticipated, and that his 
only way of saving the train was to order it back to 
Centreville in all haste, Stuart decided to attack, in 
order to give it time to get to a place of safety, and 



CONFEDERATES HOVERING AROUND WASHINGTON. 6o5 

despatched a detachment of cavalry on the turnpike to- 
wards Leesburg to warn the wagons to hasten back to 
Centreville, the cavalry to march between them and the 
enemy. He ordered his artillery and infantry to hasten to 
the front, and as soon as they came up assailed the enemy 
vigorously, continuing the engagement until he judged 
that his wagon-train had passed beyond danger ; then 
he extricated his infantry and artillery from the contest, 
with a much heavier loss than he had inflicted on the 
enemy, leaving the killed and some of the wounded. It 
was the first success that had attended the Union arms in 
that quarter, and was magnified and enjoyed on that side. 
This action advanced McClellan considerably in popular 
estimation and led to the bestowal upon him, by some 
enthusiast, of the sobriquet " the Young Napoleon." 

During the autumn and early winter the weather had 
been unusually fine. The roads and fields in that section 
were generally firm and in fine condition for marching 
and manoeuvring armies. With the beginning of the 
new year winter set in with rain and snow, alternate 
freezing and thawing, until the roads and fields became 
seas of red mud. 

As no effort of general advance was made during the 
season of firm roads, we had little apprehension of trouble 
after the winter rains came to make them too heavy for 
artillery service. 



CHAPTER V. 

ROUND ABOUT KICHMOND. 

The Defences of the Confederate Capital — Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia at Centrevi lie— Aggressive Action— Council with the Pj-esident 
and Secretary of War— Mr. Davis's High Opinion of McClellan — 
Operations on the Peninsula — Engagements about Yorktown and 
Williamsburg— Severe Toil added to the Soldiers' Usual Labors by 
a Saturated Soil. 

Apropos of the attack upon Richmond, apprehended 
in the winter of 1861-62, it should be borne in mind that 
there were four routes supposed to be practicable for the 
advance of the enemy : 

1. The original route by Manassas Junction and the 
Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 

2. By crossing the Potomac near Potomac Creek, thence 
by Fredericksburg to Richmond. 

3. By land, — the shortest, — to go down the Potomac to 
the Lower Rappahannock, landing at or near Urbana, and 
thence march for the Confederate capital. 

4. By transports to Fortress Monroe, thence by the 
Peninsula, between the James and York Rivers. 

General McClellan 's long delay to march against Gen- 
eral Johnston, when he was so near and accessible at Cen- 
treville, indicated that he had no serious thought of 
advancing by tliat route. To prepare to meet him on 
either of the other routes, a line behind the Rapidan was 
the chosen position. 

General Beauregard had been relieved of duty in Vir- 
ginia and ordered West with General A. S. Johnston. 

The withdrawal from Centreville was delayed some 
weeks, waiting for roads that could be travelled, but was 
started on the 9th of March, 1862, and on the 11th the 
trooj)s were south of the Rappahannock. 

64 



ROUND ABOUT RICHMOND. 65 

General Whiting's command from Occoquan joined 
General Holmes at Fredericksburg. Generals Ewell and 
Early crossed by the railroad bridge and took positions 
near it. General G. W. Smith's division and mine 
marched by the turnpike to near Culpeper Court-House. 
General Stuart, with the cavalry, remained on Bull Run 
until the 10th, then withdrew to Warrenton Junction. 

During the last week of March our scouts on the Poto- 
mac reported a large number of steamers, loaded with 
troops, carrying, it was estimated, about one hundred and 
forty thousand men, passing down and out of the Poto- 
mac, destined, it was supposed, for Fortress Monroe, or 
possibly for the coast of North Carolina. We were not 
left long in doubt. By the 4th of April, McClellan had 
concentrated three corps d^armee between Fortress Monroe 
and Newport News, on the James River. The Confed- 
erate left crossed the Rapidan, and from Orange Court- 
House made connection with the troops on the Rappahan- 
nock at Fredericksburg. About the 1st of April, Generals 
Johnston and G. W. Smith were called to Richmond for 
conference with the War Department, leaving me in com- 
mand. On the 3d I wrote General Jackson, in the Shen- 
andoah Valley, proposing to join him with sufficient rein- 
forcements to strike the Federal force in front of him a 
sudden, severe blow, and thus compel a change in the 
movements of McClellan's army. I explained that the 
responsibility of the move could not be taken unless I 
was with the detachment to give it vigor and action to 
meet my views, or give time to get back behind the Rap- 
idan in case the authorities discovered the move and 
ordered its recall. 

I had been left in command on the Rapidan, but was 
not authorized to assume command of the Valley district. 
As the commander of the district did not care to have an 
officer there of higher rank, the subject was discontinued. 

General Johnston, assigned to the Department of the 



66 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX, 

Peninsula and Norfolk, made an inspection of his new 
lines, and on his return recommended that they should be 
abandoned. Meanwhile, his army had been ordered to 
Kichmond. He was invited to meet the President to 
discuss military affairs, and asked General G. W. Smith 
and myself to go with him. The Secretary of War and 
General R. E. Lee were with the President when we met. 

It was the first time that I had been called to such august 
presence, to deliberate on momentous matters, so I had 
nothing to say till called on. The views intended to be 
offered were prefaced by saying that I knew General 
McClellan ; that he was a military engineer, and would 
move his army by careful measurement and preparation ; 
that he would not be ready to advance before the 1st of 
May. The President interrupted, and spoke of McClel- 
lan's high attainments and capacity in a style indicating 
that he did not care to hear any one talk who did not 
have the same ajDi^reciation of our great adversary. 
McClellan had been a special favorite with Mr. Davis 
when he was Secretary of War in the Pierce administra- 
tion, and he seemed to take such reflections upon his 
favorites as somewhat personal. From the hasty inter- 
ruption I concluded that my opinion had only been asked 
through polite recognition of my presence, not that it was 
wanted, and said no more. My intention was to suggest 
that we leave Magruder to look after McClellan, and 
march, as proposed to Jackson a few days before, through 
the Valley of Virginia, cross the Potomac, threaten Wash- 
ington, and call McClellan to his own capital. 

At the time of McClellan's landing on the peninsula, 
the Confederate army on that line was commanded by 
Major-General J. Bankhead Magruder, and consisted of 
eleven thousand men of all arms. The defensive line 
was pitched behind the Warwick River, a sluggish stream 
that rises about a mile south of Yorktown, and flows 
south to its confluence with James River. The Warwick 



ROUND ABOUT RICHMOND. 67 

was dammed at difiFerent points, thus flooding the inter- 
vening low lands as far as Lee's Mills, where the river 
spreads into marsh lands. The dams were defended by 
batteries and rifle-trenches. The left rested at Yorktown, 
which was fortified by continuous earthworks, strong 
water and land batteries, and rifle-trenches reaching to 
the right, connecting with those behind the Warwick. 
Yorktown is on the right bank of York River, which 
narrows at that point, with Gloucester Point on the 
opposite bank. This point was also fortified, and held 
by a strong garrison. On the south side of the James, 
General Huger held Norfolk, near its mouth, fortified 
and garrisoned by about ten thousand men, while the 
James River floated the Confederate vessels " Virginia" 
("Merrimac"), ''Yorktown," "Jamestown," and "Tea- 
ser." 

McClellan's army, embarked from Alexandria and 
moved by transports to the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, 
as first collected, numbered one hundred and eight thou- 
sand of all arms, including the garrison at Fortress 
Monroe. 

Magruder was speedily reinforced by a detachment 
from Huger's army, and afterwards by Early's brigade 
of Johnston's army, and after a few days by the balance 
of Johnston's army, the divisions of G. W. Smith, D. 
H. Hill, and Longstreet, with Stuart's cavalry. General 
Johnston in command. 

General McClellan advanced towards the Confederate 
line and made some efforts at the dams, but it was gen- 
erally understood that his plan was to break the position 
by regular apj^roaches. After allowing due time for the 
completion of his battering arrangements, Johnston aban- 
doned his line the night of May 3 and marched back 
towards Richmond, ordering a corresponding move by the 
troops at Norfolk ; but the Confederate authorities inter- 
fered in favor of Norfolk, giving that garrison time to 



68 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

withdraw its army supplies. The divisions of G. W. 
Smith and D. H. Hill were ordered by the Yorktown 
and Williamsburg road, Magruder's and Longstreet's by 
the Hampton and Lee's Mill road, Stuart's cavalry to 
cover both routes. 

Anticipating this move as the possible result of opera- 
tions against his lower line. General Magruder had con- 
structed a series of earthworks about two miles in front 
of Williamsburg. The main work, Fort Magruder, was 
a bastion. On either side redoubts were thrown up reach- 
ing out towards the James and York E-ivers. The penin- 
sula is about eight miles wide at that point. College 
Creek on the right flows into James River, and Queen's 
Creek on the left into the York, both giving some de- 
fensive strength, except at mill-dams, which were passable 
by vehicles. The redoubts on the left of Fort Magruder 
commanded the dam in Queen's Creek at Sanders's Pond, 
but the dam in College Creek was beyond protection from 
the redoubts. 

The four redoubts on the right of Fort Magruder had 
commanding positions of the fort. 

Finding the entire line of intrenchments at Yorktown 
empty on the morning of May 4, McClellan ordered pur- 
suit by his cavalry under its chief. General Stoneman, 
with four batteries of horse artillery, supported by 
Hooker's division on the Yorktown road and W. F. 
Smith's on the Hampton road. 

They were followed on the Hampton road by Gen- 
eral Heintzelman (Kearny's division), Third Corps, and 
Couch's and Casey's divisions of Keyes's (Fourth) Corps, 
Sumner's (Second) Corps on the Yorktown road. Near- 
ing Williamsburg, the roads converge and come together 
in range of field batteries at Fort Magruder. About 
eight miles out from Yorktown, on the Hampton road, 
Stuart, hearing of severe cavalry fight by the part of his 
command on the Yorktown road, thought to ride across 



ROUND ABOUT RICHMOND. 69 

to the enemy's rear and confuse his operations, but pres- 
ently found a part of the enemy's cavalry and a battery 
under General Emory marching in his rear by a cross- 
road from the Yorktown road. He formed and charged 
in column of fours, gaining temporary success, but fell 
upon the enemy's battery, and found Benson prompt in 
getting into action, and in turn, with dismounted trooi3ers, 
drove him back, cutting his line of retreat and forcing 
him off to the beach road along the James Kiver. The 
march of Emory's cavalry across to the Hamj^ton road 
misled Hooker's division to the same march, and that di- 
vision, crowding the highway, caused Smith's division to 
diverge by a cross-road, which led it over into the York- 
town road. These misleadings delayed the advance on 
both roads. Emory followed Stuart until the latter in 
turn came upon strong grounds, where pursuit became 
isolated and hazardous. 

The removal of the Confederate cavalry from the 
Hampton road left Hooker's march free of molestation. 
But not advised of the opportunity, he took the precau- 
tions usual on such occasions. His early approach, how- 
ever, hurried the movements of the Confederate cavalry 
on the Yorktown road, and let the enemy in upon us on 
that road before we were advised of his approach. 

General Johnston rode near the rear of his army to 
receive despatches from his cavalry commander. General 
Stuart wrote and sent them, but his couriers found the 
enemy's cavalry in the way and returned to him. The 
cavalry fight on the Yorktown road was also damaging to 
the Confederates, and not reported to the commanding 
general. 

About four P.M., General Cook's cavalry and the horse 
artillery under Gibson debouched from the woodlands on 
the Yorktown road and began to examine the open ground 
in front of the Confederate field-works. General Johns- 
ton, who was at the rear, hurried Semmes's brigade of 



70 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

McLaws's division into the nearest redoubts, and ordered 
McLaws to call back another brigade. Kershaw was 
ordered, and Manly's battery. The battery had to go at 
a run to be sure of their cover in the redoubts. Another 
battery was ordered by McLaws, who rode and took com- 
mand. When Kershaw got to the fort, part of his men 
were deployed in the wood beyond, to his left. 

Meanwhile, the Federal cavalry was advancing, Gib- 
son's horse artillery and Manly's Confederate battery were 
in severe combat, the latter having the benefit of gun- 
proof parapets. Observing the approach of cavalry near 
his left, McLaws ordered two of Manly's guns into Fort 
Magruder, which, with the assistance of Kershaw's infan- 
try, drove off that column. Some cavalry, riding near the 
left redoubt with little concern, were first taken for Con- 
federates, but the next moment were identified as Federals, 
when the artillery was turned upon them, and, with the 
Confederate cavalry, pushed them quite away. When the 
left redoubt, commanding the dam at Sanders's Pond, was 
occupied by a part of Kershaw's men, McCarthy's battery 
came into action, and, with the assistance of others, gave 
Gibson's battery, in the open, serious trouble. McLaws 
ordered an advance of part of Semmes's brigade, led by 
Colonel Cummings. This, with the severe artillery fire 
from the redoubts and guns afield, cleared the open, leav- 
ing one of Gibson's guns in the mud, which was secured 
by McCarthy's men as a trophy of the day's work. Ten 
horses had been sent back to haul the piece off, but the 
mud was too heavy for them. Stuart, with the troopers 
of his immediate following and his section of horse artil- 
lery, crossed College Creek near James River, and came 
in after the action at the redoubts. Emory abandoned 
the pursuit as not feasible, and bivouacked on the route. 
Cavalry rencounters of the day were reported, in which 
both sides claimed success. Stuart reported Lieutenant- 
Colonel Wickham and four men wounded. Of the other 



ROUND ABOUT RICHMOND. 71 

side, Cooke reported thirty-five killed, wounded, and miss- 
ing. Gibson reported one officer and four men wounded, 
and one gun abandoned. Emory reported two killed and 
four wounded, and Sanders one officer wounded. But 
most of the Federal losses were in the encounters at the 
redoubts with the artillery and infantry. 

The enemy's cavalry reported the redoubt on the Con- 
federate left unoccuj^ied, and Hancock's brigade (Smith's 
division) was ordered forward to take it, but the woods 
through which he marched were tangled and swampy, and 
delayed him until night brought him to bivouac. Mean- 
while, the Confederates who drove the cavalry from its 
reconnoissance had occupied the redoubt. 

The corps commanders Sumner, Heintzelman, and 
Keyes and the cavalry leader Stoneman were together 
that night in conference. The highways, over flats but 
little above tide- water, were saturated by the spring rains, 
cut into deep ruts by the haul of heavy trains, and pud- 
dled by the tramp of infantry and cavalry. The wood 
and fallow lands were bogs, with occasional quicksands, 
adding severest labor to the usual toils of battle. So no 
plans were formed, further than to feel the way forward 
when there was light to see. 

The enemy got some of our men who were worn out 
by the fatigue of the siege and the heavy march of the 
night and day. 



CHAPTEK VI. 

THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 

The Attack on Fort Magruder — Hancock occupies two Redoubts — The 
Slaughter in Early's Brigade — The Fifth North Carolina Regiment 
and Twenty-Fourth Virginia mercilessly exposed — A Hard-Fought 
Engagement— A Confederate Victory — McClellan not on the Field 
the Greater Part of the Day — Hancock called "The Superb" by 
McClellan — Johnston pays High Tribute to Longstreet. 

Before quitting his trenches at Yorktown, Johnston 
anticipated a move of part of McClellan 's army by trans- 
ports to the head of York River, to cut his line of march 
towards Kichmond, and conceived it important to have a 
strong force at that point in time to meet and check the 
move. To that end he ordered Magruder to march at two 
A.M. on the 5th of May with D. R. Jones's and McLaws's 
divisions, to be followed by the divisions of G. W. Smith 
and D. H. Hill ; Longstreet's division to cover the move- 
ment of his trains and defend Stuart's cavalry in case of 
severe pressure. Late in the afternoon of the 4th I was 
ordered to send a brigade to the redoubts to relieve 
McLaws's division. The brigades being small, I sent two, 
R. H. Anderson's and Pryor's, with Macon's battery, 
under Lieutenant Clopton, two guns under Captain Gar- 
rett, and two under Captain McCarthy, to report to Gen- 
eral Anderson, the senior brigadier. At the time it was 
thought that the army would be on the march by daylight 
in the morning, and that the rear-guard would closely 
follow ; but after nightfall a down-pour of rain came, 
flooding thoroughfares and by-ways, woodlands and fields, 
so that parts of our trains were stalled on the ground, 
where they stood during the night. It was dark when 
Anderson joined McLaws, who had drawn his men to- 
gether in readiness to join the advance march. Antici- 

72 



THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 73 

pating an early march himself, Anderson occupied Fort 
Magruder and advanced his pickets so as to cover with 
their fire the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton 
roads. Heavy clouds and darkness settling down upon 
him, he made no effort at a critical survey of the sur- 
roundings ; while the steady rain through the night gave 
signs of serious delay in the movements of the army, but 
he little thought that by the delay he could be called 
into battle. In the morning when time grew heavier he 
was advised to call in the brigades near him, in case he 
should need them, and instructions were sent them to 
answer his call. 

At daylight he occupied the redoubts on the right of 
Fort Magruder, and two of those on the left. Two others 
farther on the left were not seen through the rain, and no 
one had been left to tell him of them or of the grounds. 
The field in his front and far off on his right was open. 
That in the immediate front had been opened by felling 
trees. On his left were woodland and the swampy creek. 
General Hooker's division of the Third Corps came to the 
open on the Hampton road at seven a.m. of the 5th, and 
engaged by regiments, — the First Massachusetts on his 
left, preceded by a battalion of skirmishers ; the Second 
New Hampshire on the right, in the same order ; Han- 
cock's brigade of W. F. Smith's division of the Fourth 
Corps threatening on the Yorktown road ; supjjorted by 
part of Davidson's brigade and artillery. After the ad- 
vance of his infantry in the slashes, General Hooker, with 
the Eleventh Massachusetts and Thirty-sixth Pennsyl- 
vania Regiments of Grover's brigade, cleared the way for 
communication with the troops on the Yorktown road, 
and ordered Webber's six-gun battery into action towards 
the front of the fallen timber. As it burst from the wood 
our infantry and every gun in reach opened upon it a fire 
so destructive that it was unmanned before it came into 
practice. Volunteers to man the battery were called, and 



74 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

with the assistance of men of Osborn's battery the guns 
were ojDened. Bramhall's battery was advanced and put 
into action on the right of Webber's, when the two jDOured 
an unceasing fire against our troops about the fort and 
redoubts. It was not very destructive, however, and they 
thought to reserve their ammunition. 

The Fifth New Jersey Regiment, of Patterson's brigade, 
was added to the guard of the batteries, and the Sixth, 
Seventh, and Eighth were deployed on the left in the 
woodland. Anderson called up Wilcox's brigade, and 
ordered it to his right, reinforced it by the men of Pryor's 
brigade not needed at the forts, and presently called for 
the brigades of A. P. Hill and Pickett, to further support 
his right. 

From the swelling noise of battle I concluded that it 
would be well to ride to the front, and ordered the remain- 
ing brigade (Colston's) and the batteries of Dearing and 
Stribling to follow. Stuart sent his horse artillery under 
Pelham into the action on the open field. 

Viewing the ground on the left, I thought it not so well 
protected as Anderson conceived, and sent to D. H. Hill, 
who was but little advanced on his march, for one of his 
brigades. Early's was sent, to whose brigade were tem- 
porarily attached the Florida regiment and a Mississippi 
battalion. Anderson had left the fort, and was busy 
handling the brigades engaged in the woods on the right. 
Colston's was put in with the other brigades under Ander- 
son, who afterwards called for another regiment. The 
Florida regiment and the Mississippi battalion were sent. 
Early, with his brigade, was posted on the field in rear of 
our left. 

When it became evident that the fight was for the day, 
D. H. Hill was asked to return with the balance of his 
division. Meanwhile, Hooker was bracing the fight on 
his left. Emory reported to him with his cavalry and 
light battery, but as his fight was in the wood, Emory was 



THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 75 

asked to reconnoitre on his extreme left. The fight grow- 
ing in the wood, Grover drew off part of his brigade to 
reinforce against it. The Seventy-second and Seventeenth 
New York Kegiments of Taylor's brigade were also sent ; 
then the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth New York 
Regiments of the same brigade ; but the Confederates 
gained ground gradually. They were, however, getting 
short of ammunition. While holding their line, some of 
the regiments were permitted to retire a little to fill their 
cartridge-boxes from those of the fallen of the enemy and 
of their comrades. This move was misconstrued into an 
order to withdraw, and the line fell back a little. But the 
mistake was rectified, and the ground that had been 
abandoned was recovered. 

Hooker ordered the Eleventh Massachusetts and 
Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Regiments to the support of 
the batteries, and the Second New Hampshire Regiment 
to his left. Anderson, drawing his troops together near 
the batteries, made a concentrated move upon them, and 
cleared them of the gunners, securing four of Webber's 
guns and forty horses. Just then he was reinforced by 
Colston's brigade, the Florida regiment, and the Missis- 
sippi battalion. General Stuart taking it that the enemy 
was badly broken and in retreat, rode up with his cavalry, 
insisting upon a charge and pursuit. As he did not 
recognize authority except of the commander-in-chief, he 
was only cautioned that the break was only of the enemy's 
front, that he would find reinforcements coming up, and 
this he began to realize by the clearer ring of their muskets. 
He speedily encountered them, but in time to get away 
before meeting serious trouble. About three o'clock 
Kearny's division arrived, and only a few minutes later 
D. H. Hill's, of the Confederates. On the approach of 
Kearny's leading brigades, one regiment was detached 
from Berry's to reinforce Emory's Cavalry detachment on 
their left. The other regiments were deployed, the Fifth 



76 FKOM IvIANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Michigan on the left of the road, the Thirty-seventh New 
York on its left, along the road, one company of the New 
York regiment from left to rear. Six companies of the 
Michigan regiment were broken off to the rear of its right 
aj reserve, leaving its forward battalion partly across the 
road, while that in rear had two companies on the right 
and two on the left of the road. Two regiments of Bir- 
ney's brigade were deployed, the Thirty-eighth on the 
right of, and the Fortieth across, the road, to relieve some 
of Hooker's regiments. Then Peck's brigade of Couch's 
division came, and was put in on the right, the One Hun- 
dred and Second Pennsylvania and the Fifty-fifth New 
York on the left, the Sixty-second New York in the wood, 
the Ninety-third Pennsylvania on the left, and after a 
little the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania. 

Before the reinforcements arrived for Hooker's relief, 
Anderson had established his advance line of skirmishers, 
so as to cover with their fire Webber's guns that were 
abandoned. The Federal reinforcing columns drove back 
his advance line, when, in turn, he reinforced, recovered 
the ground, and met General Peck, who led the last rein- 
forcing brigade. This advance was so firm that General 
Peck found it necessary to put in his last regiment, the 
Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania, but neither our force nor our 
condition of march could warrant further aggressive work 
of our right. General Couch, left in command on the 
Federal left, posted his troops for the night, — General 
Devens with the Seventh Massachusetts Regiment and 
Second Rhode Island, General Palmer with two, and 
General Keim with three other regiments, supporting 
General Peck. General Peck's ammunition being ex- 
hausted, his brigade was relieved by six of the new regi- 
ments, and reported that " Every preparation was made to 
resist a night attack." * On the Confederate side. General 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 521. 



THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 

Anderson reported his position safe to hold until the ti 
to withdraw for the march. About noon, General Han- 
cock, in command of his own and Davidson's brigades in 
front of our left, started with three of his own regiiL^ents 
and two of Davidson's and the six-gun battery under 
Lieutenant Carson in search of the unoccupied redoubts 
in that quarter. He approached by the dam at Sanders's 
Pond, passed the dam, and occupied one of the redoubts, 
leaving three companies to guard a road crossing on the 
right of his line of march. He put three companies of 
infantry in the redoubt and advanced his regiments and 
battery to the field in front. He then found another 
redoubt not occupied, and posted three other companies in 
it. He was reinforced by a four-gun battery under Cap- 
tain Wheeler, which he posted in rear of his line of battle 
and awaited developments. When the last engagement 
on our right had calmed down to exchange of desultory 
shots, D. H. Hill's division was waiting to know if Ander- 
son would need further support. Meanwhile, some of his 
officers had made a reconnoissance in front of his ground, 
and reported a route by which favorable attack could be 
made upon the Federals at the redoubt under Hancock. 

General Johnston had arrived at my head-quarters, near 
Fort Magruder, when General Hill sent to report the 
reconnoissance, and to ask that he be allowed to make a 
move against Hancock, by Early's brigade. General 
Johnston received the message, and referred the officer to 
me. I ordered that the move should not be made, ex- 
plaining that we were only fighting for time to draw off 
our trains, that aggressive battle was necessary on our 
right in order to keep the enemy back in the woodland 
from the open, where, by his superior artillery and num- 
bers, he might de23loy beyond our limits, and turn us out 
of position ; that on our left there was no cause for ajDpre- 
hension of such action, and we could not risk being drawn 
into serious delay by starting new work so late in the 



FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

.y. Very soon General Hill rode over to report of the 
opportunity : that he thought he could get through before 
night, and would not be likely to involve delay of our 
night march. General Johnston referred him to me. I 
said, — 

" The brigade you propose to use is not in safe hands. If you 
will go with it, and see that the troops are properly handled, you 
can make the attack, but don't involve us so as to delay the 
march after night." 

In a letter from General Hill, after the war, he wrote 
of the fight by this brigade, — 

''I cannot think of it, till this day, without horror. The 
slaughter of the Fifth North Carolina Regiment was one of the 
most awful things I ever saw, and it was caused by a blunder. 
At your request, I think, I followed Early's brigade, following 
the right wing." 

General Hill was in advance of the brigade with the 
Fifth and Twenty-third North Carolina Regiments, Gen- 
eral Early in rear with the Twenty-fourth and Thirty- 
eighth Virginia Regiments. General Hill ordered the 
advance regiments to halt after crossing a streamlet and 
get under cover of the wood till the brigade could form ; 
but General Early, not waiting for orders or the brigade, 
rode to the front of the Twenty-fourth Virginia, and 
with it made the attack. The gallant McRae, of the 
Fifth North Carolina, seeing the Twenty-fourth Virginia 
hotly engaged, dashed forward, nolens volens, to its relief. 
The other regiments, seeing the confusion of movements 
and of orders, failed to go forward. Part of my troops, 
on Early's right, seeing that a fight was open on that part 
of the field, started without orders to go to his relief, but 
found the fight lost before they were engaged. After the 
brigade was collected on its first position, General Johns- 
ton rode to his head-quarters. At dark the Confederates 



THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 79 

were withdrawn and took up the line of march, the divi- 
sion of D. H. Hill taking the rear of the column, E-ains's 
brigade the rear of the division. On his march. General 
Rains found, in a broken-down ammunition-wagon, several 
loaded shells, four of them with sensitive fuse primers, 
which he placed near some fallen trees, cut down as ob- 
structions. He afterwards heard that some of them were 
tramped upon by the Federal cavalry and exploded. 

The pursuit was not active, hardly annoying. The 
roads were cut into deep mud by the trains, and the side- 
ways by troops far out on either side, making jDuddles 
ankle-deep in all directions, so that the march was slow 
and trying, but giving almost absolute safe-conduct against 
pursuit, and our men were allowed to spread their ranks 
in search of ground strong enough to bear them. 

My estimate, made on the field, of the troops engaged 
was. Confederate, 9000 ; Union, 12,000. The casualties 
of the engagement were, Confederate, 1565 aggregate ; * 
Federal, 2288 aggregate.f 

General McClellan was at Yorktown during the greater 
part of the day to see Franklin's, Sedgwick's, and Rich- 
ardson's divisions aboard the transports for his proposed 
flanking and rear move up York River, but upon re- 
ceiving reports that the engagement at Williamsburg was 
growing serious and not satisfactory, he rode to the battle, 
and called the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson to 
follow him. 

The object of the battle was to gain time to haul our 
trains to places of safety. The effect, besides, was to call 
two of the divisions from their flanking move to support 
the battle, and this so crippled that expedition that it 
gave us no serious trouble. The trophies of the battle 
were with the Confederates, and they claim the honor to 
inscribe Williamsburg upon their battle-flags. 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 568. 
t Ibid. p. 450. 



80 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The success of General Hancock in holding his position 
in and about the forts with five regiments and two bat- 
teries against the assault of the Fifth North Carolina and 
Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments was given heroic j^ro- 
portions by his chief, who christened him " The Superb," 
to relieve, it is supposed, by the picturesque figure on his 
right, the discomfiture of his left. But, reading between 
the lines, the highest compliment was for the two Con- 
federate regiments. 

In his official account, General Johnston said, — 

'^ The action gradually increased in magnitude until about three 
o'clock, when General Longstreet, commanding the rear, re- 
quested that a part of Major-General Hill's troops might be sent to 
his aid. Upon this I rode upon the field, but found myself com- 
pelled to be a spectator, for General Longstreet' s clear head and 
brave heart left no apology for interference." 

Franklin's division was taken by transports to the 
mouth of Pamunkey River, and was supported by the 
navy. On the 7th a brigade of Sedgwick's division joined 
Franklin. On the same day, Johnston's army was col- 
lected near Barhamville. General Whiting, with Hood's 
brigade and part of Hampton's, engaged the advance of 
Franklin's command and forced it back. This cleared 
our route of march towards Richmond, Smith's and Ma- 
gruder's divisions by the road to New Kent Court-House, 
Hill's and Lougstreet's nearer the Chickahominy. 

General McClellan's plans were laid according to strict 
rules of strategy, but he was not quick or forcible in 
handling his troops. 



CHAPTER VII. 

SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 

A New Line of Defence— Positions of tlie Confronting Armies— Fitz- 
John Porter — Terrific Storm on the Eve of Battle — General John- 
ston's Orders to Longstreet, Smitli, and Huger— Lack of Co-operation 
on tlie Confederate Side, and Ensuing Confusion — Fatalities among 
Confederate Officers — Kearny's Action — Serious Wounding of Gen- 
eral Johnston at the Close of the Battle — Summary and Analysis of 
Losses. 

On the 9th of May the Confederate army was halted, 
its right near Long Bridge of the Chickahominy Kiver ; 
its left and cavalry extending towards the Pamunkey 
through New Kent Court-House. On the 11th the com- 
mander of the Confederate ram " Virginia" (" Merrimac"), 
finding the water of James River not sufficient to float her 
to the works near Richmond, scuttled and sank the ship 
where she lay. 

On the 15th the Federal navy attacked our works at 
Chapin's and Drury's Bluffs, but found them too strong 
for water batteries. That attack suggested to General 
Johnston that he move nearer Richmond to be in position 
to lend the batteries assistance in case of need. He crossed 
the Chickahominy, his right wing at Long Bridge, his left 
by Bottom's Bridge, and took position from Drury's Bluff 
on his right, to the Mechanicsville turnpike, with his in- 
fantry, the cavalry extending on the left and front to the 
lower RapjDahannock and Fredericksburg. The right 
wing, D. H. Hill's and Longstreet's divisions, under 
Longstreet, from James River to White Oak Swamp ; the 
left under G. W. Smith. Smith's division and Magruder's 
command from White Oak Swamp, extending thence to 
the Mechanicsville pike, with Jackson a hundred miles 
away in the Shenandoah Valley. 

6 81 



82 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

After careful study of the works and armaments at 
Drury's Bluff, I ventured the suggestion that we recross 
the Chickahominy at Mechanicsville and stand behind 
Beaver Dam Creek, prepared against McClellan's right 
when he should be ready to march towards Kichmond, 
and call him to relieve his flank before crossing the river. 

Although the country between McClellan's landing on 
the Pamunkey to the Chickahominy was free of all ob- 
stacles on the 15th of May, the head of his advance did 
not reach the banks of the latter river till the 21st. On 
the 16th he established his permanent depot at the White 
House, on the Pamunkey, and organized two provisional 
army corps, — the Fifth, of Fitz-John Porter's division, 
and Sykes's, under command of Porter ; the Sixth, of 
Franklin's and W. F. Smith's divisions, under Franklin. 
On the 26tli the York Kiver Railroad as far as the bridge 
across the Chickahominy was repaired and in use. This, 
with other bridges, was speedily repaired, and new bridges 
ordered built at such points as should be found necessary 
to make free communication between the posts of the 
army. 

On the 24th parties were advanced on the Williamsburg 
road as far as Seven Pines, where a spirited affair occurred 
between General Naglee's forces and General Hatton's 
brigade, the latter withdrawing a mile and a half on the 
Williamsburg road. At the same time two other parties 
of Federals were sent up the left bank, one under General 
Davidson, of the cavalry, with artillery and infantry sup- 
ports, as far as Mechanicsville, where he encountered and 
dislodged a Confederate cavalry force under Colonel B. H. 
Robertson and occupied the position. The third party, 
under Colonel Woodbury, the Fourth Michigan Infantry 
and a squadron of the Second United States Cavalry, 
moved up to New Bridge, where the Fifth Louisiana, 
Colonel Hunt, of Semmes's brigade, was on picket. Find- 
ing the bridge well guarded, a party, conducted by Lieu- 



SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 83 

tenant Bowen, Topographical Engineers, marched up the 
river, concealing their movements, crossed to the west 
bank, and, passing down, surprised the Fifth Louisiana, 
threw it into disorder, and gained position on the west 
side. 

Pleased at these successes, General McClellan sent a 
sensational despatch to the President. His position thus 
masked, rested his right upon Beaver Dam Creek, a stream 
that flows from the height between the Chickahominy and 
Pamunkey Kivers south to its confluence with the former 
a few hundred yards below Mechanicsville Bridge. Its 
banks are scarped, about six feet high, and eight feet 
apart, making a strong natural ditch for defensive works. 

On commanding ground south of the creek admirably 
planned field-works were soon constructed, which made 
that flank unassailable. Two miles out from the river the 
creek loses its value as a defensive line. From Beaver 
Dam the line was extended down the river to New Bridge, 
where it crossed and reached its left out to White Oak 
Swamp, and there found as defensible guard as the right 
at Beaver Dam Creek. The swamp is about a quarter of 
a mile wide at the left, and down to the Chickahominy 
studded with heavy forest-trees, always wet and boggy, 
but readily forded by infantry, and at places by cavalry. 

Near the middle of the line, back from New Bridge, 
was Stoneman's cavalry. Fitz-John Porter's corps (Fifth) 
was posted at Beaver Dam Creek, Franklin's (Sixth) two 
miles lower down, Sumner's (Second) near the middle 
of the line, about three miles from the river. The Third 
and Fourth Corps were on the south side, Kearny's 
division of the Third at Savage Station of the York 
River Railroad, Hooker's division at White Oak Swamp 
Bridge, with entrenched lines. The Fourth Corps was 
posted on the Williamsburg road. Couch's division about 
a mile in advance of Hooker's, of the Third, at the 
junction of the Nine Miles road, entrenched, and field 



84 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

of abatis ; Casey's division of the Third half a mile in 
advance of Couch's, entrenched, and field of abatis. The 
point occupied by Couch's division is known as Seven 
Pines. His advanced picket-guard on the Nine Miles 
road was at Fair Oaks Station of the York River 
Railroad. 

The line, which was somewhat concave towards Rich- 
mond, was strengthened at vulnerable points by field- 
works. General Sumner was senior of the corps com- 
manders, and in command of the right wing ; General 
Heintzelman, the senior of the south side, was in com- 
mand of the left wing. The Chickahominy is a hundred 
feet wide as far up as Mechanicsville Bridge, but narrows 
above to forty and thirty. Along the line of McClellan's 
deployment its course was through lowlands of tangled 
woods that fringe its banks, the valley seldom more than a 
hundred yards wide. Artillery was posted to command 
all bridges and those ordered for construction. On 
the 26th, General McClellan ordered General Fitz-John 
Porter to organize a force to march against a Confederate 
outpost near Hanover Court-House. Porter took of Mo- 
rell's division three brigades, — Martindale's, Butterfield's, 
and McQuade's, — Berdan's Sharp-shooters and three bat- 
teries, two regiments of cavalry under General Emory, 
and Benson's horse battery ; Warren's brigade to march 
up the right bank of the Pamunkey in connection with 
operations projected for the fighting column. Porter was 
the most skilful tactician and strongest fighter in the Fed- 
eral army, thoroughly trained in his profession from boy- 
hood, and of some experience in field work. 

The Confederate outpost was commanded by Brigadier- 
General L. O'B. Branch, six regiments of infantry, one 
battery, under Captain Latham, and a cavalry regiment, 
under Colonel Robertson. General Branch was a briga- 
dier from civil life. The result of the affair was the dis- 
comfiture of General Branch, with the loss of one gun 



SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 85 

and about seven hundred prisoners. Losses in action, not 
including prisoners : Confederates, 265 ; Federals, 285. 

A. P. Hill was promoted to major-general, and assigned 
to command of a division at that outpost and stationed at 
Ashland. 

On the 27th, General Johnston received information 
that General McDowell's corps was at Fredericksburg, 
and on the march to reinforce McClellan's right at 
Mechanics ville. He prepared to attack McClellan before 
McDowell could reach him. To this end he withdrew 
Smith's division from the Williamsburg road, relieving it 
by the division of D. H. Hill ; withdrew Longstreet's 
division from its position, and A. P. Hill's from Ashland. 
The fightino; column was to be under General G. W. 
Smith, his next in rank, and General Whiting was as- 
signed command of Smith's division, — the column to 
consist of A. P. Hill's, Whiting's, and D. R. Jones's di- 
visions. The latter was posted between the Mechanics- 
ville pike and Meadow Bridge road. A. P. Hill was to 
march direct against McClellan's outpost at Mechanics- 
ville. Whiting to cross the river at Meadow Bridge, and 
D. B. Jones at Mechanicsville, thus completing the column 
of attack on the east side. 

I was to march by the Mechanicsville road to the vi- 
cinity of the bridge, and to strike down against the Fed- 
eral right, west of the river, the march to be made during 
the night ; D. H. Hill to post a brigade on his right on 
the Charles City road to guard the field to be left by his 
division, as well as the line left vacant by Longstreet's 
division. 

At nightfall the troops took up the march for their 
several assigned positions. Before dark General Johns- 
ton called a number of his officers together for instruc- 
tions, — viz., Smith, Magruder, Stuart, and Longstreet. 
When we were assembled. General Johnston announced 
later information : that McDowell's line of march had 



86 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

been changed, — that he was going north. Following the 
report of this information, General Smith proposed that 
the plan for battle should be given up, in view of the very 
strong ground at Beaver Dam Creek.* I urged that the 
plan laid against the concentrating columns was made 
stronger by the change of direction of McDowell's col- 
umn, and should suggest more prompt and vigorous pros- 
ecution. In this Magruder and Stuart joined me. The 
pros and cons were talked over till a late hour, when at 
last General Johnston, weary of it, walked aside to a sepa- 
rate seat. I took the opportunity to draw near him, and 
suggested that the Federal position behind Beaver Dam 
Creek, so seriously objected to by General Smith, could be 
turned by marching to and along the high ground be- 
tween the Chickahominy and Pamunkey Rivers ; that 
the position of the enemy when turned would be aban- 
doned without a severe struggle, and give a fair field for 
battle ; that we should not lose the opportunity to await 
another possible one. 

General Johnston replied that he was aware of all that, 
but found that he had selected the wrong officer for the 
work. This ended the talk, and I asked to be allowed to 
halt my columns as soon as possible. The other move- 
ments were arrested, except that of A. P. Hill's division, 
which was ordered to continue its march, cross the Chick- 
ahominy at Meadow Bridge, and take position between 
the Meadow Bridge road and the Brooke turnpike. The 
counter-order reinstated my command of the right wing, 
including D. H. Hill's division on the Williamsburg road 
and extending to the York Biver Railroad. Before 
leaving the conference, I announced that we would fight 
on the Williamsburg road if we had to find the enemy 
through bayous. 

The order to halt the columns found Smith's division 

* Smith's War Papers. 



SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 87 

between the Mechaiiicsville and Meadow Bridge roads, 
Longstreet's near the city at the Nine Miles road ; D. R. 
Jones had not moved. 

On the 29th and 30th, General D. H. Hill sent ont 
reconnoitring parties on the Williamsburg and Charles 
City roads. On the 30th he received a fair report of 
Casey's intrenched camp, and the probable strength and 
extent of the line of his skirmishers reaching out his 
left front to White Oak Swamp. On the 29th, General 
Johnston wrote General Whiting, commanding Smith's 
division, giving notice of a reconnoissance ordered by 
General Hill, cautioning the former that his division 
should be drawn towards the right, to be in better position 
for support of a battle of his right, and adding, — 

"Who knows but that in the course of the morning Long- 
street's scheme may accomplish itself? If we get into a fight 
here, you will have to hurry to help us." 

The report of General D. H. Hill's reconnoissance of 
the 30th was forwarded to head-quarters. I followed it, 
and found General Johnston ready to talk over plans for 
battle. General Huger had reported with three of his 
brigades, and was in camp near the outskirts of Richmond 
on Gillis Creek. The plan settled upon was that the 
attack should be made by General D. H. Hill's division 
on the Williamsburg road, supported by Longstreet's divi- 
sion. Huger's division, just out of garrison duty at Norfolk, 
was to march between Hill's right and the swamp against 
the enemy's line of skirmishers, and move abreast of the 
battle ; G. W. Smith's division, under Whiting, to march 
by the Gaines road to Old Tavern, and move abreast of 
the battle on its left. The field before Old Tavern was 
not carefully covered by the enemy's skirmishers north of 
Fair Oaks, nor by parties in observation. 

Experience during the discussion of the battle ordered 
for the 28th caused me to doubt of effective work from the 



88 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

troops ordered for the left flank, but the plan seemed so 
simple that it was thought impossible for any one to go 
dangerously wrong ; and General Johnston stated that he 
would be on that road, the better to receive from his troops 
along the crest of the Chickahominy information of move- 
ments of the enemy on the farther side of the river, and 
to look to the co-023eration of the troops on the Nine Miles 
road. 

To facilitate marches, Huger's division was to have the 
Charles City road to the head of White Oak Swamp, file 
across it and march down its northern margin ; D. H. Hill 
to have the Williamsburg road to the enemy's front ; 
Longstreet's division to march by the Nine Miles road 
and a lateral road leading across the rear of General Hill 
on the Williamsburg road ; G. W. Smith by the Gaines 
road to Old Tavern on the Nine Miles road. 

The tactical handling of the battle on the Williamsburg 
road was left to my care, as well as the general conduct 
of affairs south of the York River Railroad, the latter 
line being the left of the field to which I had been as- 
signed, the right wing. 

While yet affairs were under consideration, a terrific 
storm of vivid lightning, thunderbolts, and rain, as severe 
as ever known to any climate, burst upon us, and con- 
tinued through the night more or less severe. In the first 
lull I rode from General Johnston's to my head-quarters, 
and sent orders for early march. 

For a more comprehensive view of affairs as ordered, it 
may be well to explain that General Johnston ordered 
Smith's division by the Gaines road, so that, in case of 
delay of its march, McLaws's division, on that road and 
nearer the field of proposed action, could be brought in to 
the left of the battle, leaving the place of his division to 
be occupied by Smith's, when the latter reached McLaws's 
vacated line. There was, therefore, no reason why the 
orders for march should be misconstrued or misapplied. 



SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 89 

I was with General Johnston all of the time that he was 
engaged in planning and ordering the battle, heard every 
word and thought expressed by him of it, and received 
his verbal orders ; Generals Huger and Smith his written 
orders. 

General Johnston's order to General Smith was : 

'^ Head- QUARTERS Department of JSTorthern Virginia, 

''May 30, 9.15 p.m. 
''Major- General G. W. Smith: 

"General, — If nothing prevents, we will fall upon the enemy 
in front of Major- General Hill (who occupies the position on the 
Williamsburg road from which your troops moved to the neigh- 
borhood of Meadow Bridge) early in the morning, as early as 
practicable. The Chickahominy will be passable only at the 
bridge, a great advantage to us. Please be ready to move by the 
Gaines road, coming as early as possible to the point at which 
the road to New Bridge turns off. Should there be cause for 
haste, Major-General McLaws, on your api)roach, will be ordered 
to leave his ground for you, that he may reinforce General Long- 
street. 

"Most respectfully your obedient servant, 

"J. E. Johnston."* 

General Johnston's order for General Huger read : 

"Head-quarters Department of Northern Virginia, 

"May 30, 1862, 8.30 p.m. 
"Major-General Huger: 

"General, — The reports of Major-General D. H. Hill give 
me the impression that the enemy is in considerable strength in 
his front. It seems to me necessary that we should increase our 
force also ; for that object I wish to concentrate the troops of your 
division on the Charles City road, and to concentrate the troops 
of Major-General Hill on the Williamsburg road. To do this it 
will be necessary for you to move, as early in the morning as pos- 
sible, to relieve the brigade of General Hill's division now on the 
Charles City road. I have desired General Hill to send you a 
guide. The road is the second large one diverging to the right 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi, part iii. p. 563. 



90 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

from the Williamsburg road. The first turns o& near the toll- 
gate. On reaching your position on the Charles City road, learn 
at once the route to the main roads, to Richmond on your right 
and left, especially those to the left, and try to find guides. Be 
ready, if an action should begiu on your left, to fall upon the 
enemy's left flank. 

''Most respectfully your obedient servant, 

''J. E. Johnston. 
" P.S. — It is necessary to move very early." * 

The Nine Miles road takes the name from the distance 
by that road from Richmond to Seven Pines. The Wil- 
liamsburg road to the same point was sometimes called the 
Seven Miles road, because of the distance by that road to 
Seven Pines. 

As expressed and repeated in his orders, General John- 
ston's w^ish was to have the battle pitched as early as 
practicable. When his orders were issued, he was under 
the impression that I would be the ranking officer on 
the right of the York Railroad, and would give detailed 
instructions to govern the later operations of Huger's 
troops. 

Subsequent events seem to call for mention just here 
that General Smith, instead of moving the trooj^s by the 
route assigned them, marched back to the Nine Miles 
road near the city, rode to Johnston's head-quarters about 
six in the morning, and reported that he was with the di- 
vision, but not for the purpose of taking command from 
General Whiting;. As General Johnston did not care to 
order him back to his position as commander of the left 
wing, he set himself to work to make trouble, conijilained 
that my troops were on the Nine Miles road in the way of 
his march, and presently complained that they had left 
that road and were over on the Williamsburg road, and 
induced General Johnston to so far modify the j^lans as to 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 938. 



SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 

order three of my brigades down the Nine Miles roa 
the New Bridge fork. 

The order was sent by Lieutenant Washington, of 
Johnston's staff, who, unused to campaigning, failed to 
notice that he was not riding on my line of march, and 
rode into the enemy's lines. This accident gave the 
enemy the first warning of approaching danger ; it was 
misleading, however, as it caused General Keyes to look 
for the attack by the Nine Miles road. 

The storms had flooded the flat lands, and the waters as 
they fell seemed weary of the battle of the elements, and 
inclined to have a good rest on the soft bed of sand which 
let them gently down to the substratum of clay ; or it 
may have been the purpose of kind Providence to so in- 
termix the upper and lower strata as to interpose serious 
barriers to the passing of artillery, and thus break up the 
battle of men. 

My march by the Nine Miles and lateral roads leading 
across to the Williamsburg road was interrupted by the 
flooded grounds about the head of Gillis Creek. At the 
same time this creek was bank full, where it found a chan- 
nel for its flow into the James. The delay of an hour to 
construct a bridge was preferred to the encounter of more 
serious obstacles along the narrow lateral road, flooded by 
the storm. As we were earlier at the creek, it gave us 
precedence over Huger's division, which had to cross after 
us. The division was prepared with cooked rations, had 
wagons packed at six o'clock, and rested in the rear of 
General Hill's at nine a.m. 

Meanwhile, General G. W. Smith's division had 
marched by the Nine Miles road and was resting near 
the fork of the New Bridge road at Old Tavern. Upon 
meeting General Huger in the morning, I gave him a 
succinct account of General Johnston's plans and wishes ; 
after which he inquired as to the dates of our commissions, 
which revealed that he was the ranking officer, when I 



FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

jested that it was only necessary for him to take com- 
mand and execute the orders. This he declined. Then 
it was proposed that he should send two of his brigades 
across to join on the right of the column of attack, while he 
could remain with his other brigade, which was to relieve 
that of General Hill on the Charles City road. Though 
he expressed himself satisfied with this, his manner was 
eloquent of discontent. The better to harmonize, I pro- 
posed to reinforce his column by three of my brigades, to 
be sent under General Wilcox, to lead or follow his di- 
vision, as he might order. Under this arrangement it 
seemed that concert of action was assured. I gave es- 
pecial orders to General Wilcox to have care that the head 
of his column was abreast the battle when it opened, and 
rode forward to join General Hill, my other three bri- 
gades advancing along the Williamsburg road. 

Opposing and in the immediate front of General Hill 
was the division of General Casey, of the Fourth (Keyes's) 
Corps. The division stood in an intrenched camp across 
the Williamsburg road, wdth a pentagonal redoubt (un- 
finished) on the left of his line. Half a mile in rear of 
Casey's division w^as that of Couch, of the same corps, 
behind a second trenched line, at its junction of the 
Nine Miles road, part of Couch's extending along the 
latter road to Fair Oaks Station of the York River Rail- 
road, and intrenched ; farther forward he had a guarded 
picket station. Between Couch and Casey a skirt of 
wood stretched from the swamp on their left across the 
Williamsburg and Nine Miles roads and the railroad. 
Between the stretch of forest and Couch was an open ; 
spreading across the roads, and at Casey's front, was an- 
other open, though more limited, some abatis being 
arranged along their front lines. These were the only 
cleared fields on the south side of the railroad within two 
miles of Casey's picket line, our line of march and attack. 

General D. H. Hill stood ready for battle at an early 



SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 93 

hour, waiting for his brigade on the Charles City road. 
Under the delay to relieve that brigade by one of Huger's 
divisions, I sent orders to General Wilcox to pull off 
from column on that road and march for the position 
assigned him near the head of White Oak Swamp. 

The detailed instructions for battle were that the ad- 
vance should be made in columns of brigades two on each 
side the Williamsburg road, preceded by strong lines of 
skirmishers ; the advance, approaching an open or abatis 
or trench line, should reinforce the skirmish line to strong 
engagement, while the lines of battle turned those obsta- 
cles by flank or oblique march when the general advance 
should be resumed. As the wooded field was not conve- 
nient for artillery use, we only held the batteries of 
Bondurant and Carter ready for call. At eleven o'clock, 
weary of delay, General Hill asked to let loose his signal- 
gun and engage, but was ordered to wait for his absent 
brigade. 

The rej)orts of the hour of opening battle are more 
conflicting in this than in most battles, owing possibly to 
the fact that many are fixed by the beginning of the hot 
battle about the trenched camp, while others are based on 
the actual firing of the signal-guns. The weight of evi- 
dence seems conclusive of the former attack at one p.m., 
and this would place the firing of the signal-guns back to 
noon or a little after. As events occurred, however, the 
hour is not of especial interest, as it is shown that the bat- 
tle was in time for a finish before night if it had been 
promptly followed up. I will say, therefore, that General 
Hill's second appeal to open the signal-gun was made a 
little before noon, and that he stated in this aj)peal that 
his brigade from the Charles City road was approaching, 
and would be with him. He was then authorized to 
march, but to give instructions that the advance should be 
carefully conducted until all the troops were in place, to 
give full force to his battle. He had four brigades, and 



94 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

was ordered to advance in columns of brigades, two on 
each side of the road. Garland's and G. B. Anderson's 
brigades in columns, preceded by skirmishers, advanced 
on the left of the road at the sound of the guns, and en- 
gaged after a short march from the starting. As Rodes's 
brigade was not yet in position, some little time elapsed 
before the columns on the right moved, so that Garland's 
column encountered more than its share of early fight, 
but Rodes, supported by Rains's brigade, came promptly 
to his relief, which steadied the advance. The enemy's 
front was reinforced and arrested progress of our skir- 
mishers, but a way was found by which the enemy was 
turned out of position, and by and by the open before the 
intrenched camp was reached. In the redoubt was a six- 
gun battery, and on the right another section of two 
pieces. General Hill ordered Bondurant's battery to the 
open into action, and presently the battery of Captain 
Carter. 

Garland and G. B. Anderson had severe contention at 
one o'clock, but by pushing front and flank movements 
got to the enemy's strong line. R. H. Anderson's brigade 
was pushed up in support of their left, when a bold move 
gave us the section of artillery and that end of the line. 
At the same time Carter's battery was in close practice 
with five guns within four hundred yards of the redoubt, 
and the enemy was seriously disturbed ; but General Hill 
was disposed to wait a little for Huger, thought to be be- 
tween him and the swamp, to get farther in ; then, fearing 
that longer wait might be hazardous of his opportunity, 
he ordered Rains's brigade past the enemy's left, when 
Rodes seized the moment, rushed in, and gained the re- 
doubt and the battery. The officers at the battery made a 
brave effort to spike their guns, but were killed in the act. 
So Rodes, who had some artillerists acting as infantry, 
turned them with some effect upon the troops as they 
retired. 



SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 95 

When General Hill reported that he must use Kains's 
brigade to march around the redoubt, other orders were 
sent General Wilcox to leave General Huger's column and 
march to his j)Osition on the right of General Hill's battle, 
directing, in case there were serious obstacles to his march 
by the Charles City road, to march over to and down the 
Williamsburg road. A slip of paper was sent General 
Johnston reporting progress and asking co-operation on 
our left. 

The battle moved bravely on. R. H. Anderson's bri- 
gade was ordered to support its left at Fair Oaks, and 
Pickett's, on the railroad, was drawn near. Hill met 
Casey's troops rallying, and reinforcements with them 
coming to recover the lost ground, but they were forced 
back to the second intrenched line (Couch's), where severe 
fighting ensued, but the line was carried at two o'clock, 
cutting Couch with four regiments and two companies of 
infantry, and Brady's six-gun battery, off at Fair Oaks 
Station. Finding that he could not cut his way back to 
his command, Couch stood back from the railroad and 
presently opened his battery fire across our advancing 
lines. As he was standing directly in front of Smith's 
division, we thought that he would soon be attacked and 
driven off. Nevertheless, it was not prudent to leave that 
point on our flank unguarded until we found Smith's 
division in action. The force was shut off from our view 
by the thick pine wood, so that we could know nothing 
of its strength, and only knew of its position from its 
artillery fire. We could not attack it lest we should fall 
under the fire of the division in position for that attack. 
Anderson's other regiments, under the gallant Colonel M. 
Jenkins, were ordered into Hill's forward battle, as his 
troops were worn. Jenkins soon found himself in the 
van, and so swiftly led on that the discomfited troops 
found no opportunity to rally. Eeinforcements from the 
Third Corps came, but in the swampy wood Jenkins was 



96 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

prompt enough to strike their heads as their retreating 
comrades passed. Eight and left and front he applied 
his beautiful tactics and pushed his battle. 

General Kearny, finding that he could not arrest the 
march, put Berry's brigade off to the swamp to flank and 
strike it, and took part of Jamison's brigade to follow. 
They got into the swamp and followed it up to the open 
near the Couch intrenchment,* but Jenkins knew that 
there was some one there to meet them, and pushed his 
onward battle. General Hill ordered Kains's brigade to 
turn this new force, while Kodes attacked, but the latter's 
men were worn, and some of them were with the advance. 
Kemper's brigade was sent to support the forward battle, 
but General Hill directed it to his right against Berry, 
in front of Bains, and it seems that the heavy, swampy 
ground so obstructed operations on both sides as to limit 
their work to infantry fusillades until six o'clock. 

Our battle on the Williamsburg road was in a sack. 
We were strong enough to guard our flanks and push 
straight on, but the front was growing heavy. It was 
time for Wilcox's brigades under his last order, but 
nothing was heard of them. I asked General Stuart, who 
had joined me, if there were obstacles to Wilcox's march 
between the Charles City and Williamsburg roads. He 
reported that there was nothing more than swamp lands, 
hardly knee-deep. He was asked for a guide, who was 
sent with a courier bearing orders for them to remain 
with General Wilcox until he reported at my head- 
quarters. 

Again I reported the cramped condition of our work, 
owing to the artillery practice from beyond the railroad, 
and asked General Johnston to have the division that was 
with him drive that force away and loose our left. This 
note was ordered to be put into General Johnston's hands. 

* General Berry thought that he got up as far as the Casey camp, but 
mistook, Couch's opening for that of Casey. 



SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 97 

He gave peremptory commands to that effect, but the move- 
ments were so slow that he lost patience and rode with 
Hood's leading brigade, pulled it on, and ordered commu- 
nication opened with my left. 

At one o'clock. General McClellan, at his head-quarters 
beyond the river, six miles away, heard the noise of battle 
and ordered Sumner's (Second) corps under arms to await 
orders. General Sumner ordered the command under 
arms, marched the divisions to their separate bridges, and 
put the columns on the bridges, partly submerged, to hold 
them to their moorings, anxiously awaiting authority from 
his chief to march to the relief of his comrades. The 
bridge where Sedgwick's division stood was passable, but 
Richardson's was under water waist-deep, and the flooding 
river rising. Richardson waded one brigade through, but 
thought that he could save time by marching up to the 
Sedgwick bridge, which so delayed him that he did not 
reach the field until after night. 

As General Johnston rode with Hood's brigade, he saw 
the detachment under General Couch marching north to 
find at the Adams House the road to Grapevine Bridge, 
his open way of retreat. Directly he heard firing where 
Couch was marching, but thought that Smith's other bri- 
gades were equal to work that could open up there, and 
rode on, ordering Hood to find communication with my 
left. Smith's other brigades were : Whiting's, commanded 
by Colonel Law ; Hampton's, Pettigrew's, and Hatton's ; 
Whiting commanding the division. Smith commanding 
the left wing. Smith quotes Colonel Frobel, who was with 
him at the time, — viz. : 

''Whiting's brigade was gone; it had been ordered forward 
to charge the batteries which were firing upon us. The brigade 
was repulsed, and in a few minutes came streaming back through 
the little skirt of woods to the left of the Nine Miles road, near 
the crossing. There was only a part of a brigade in this charge. 
Pender soon rallied and reformed them on the edge of the woods. 

7 



98 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOJUATTOX. 

General Whiting sent an order to him to reconnoitre the batteries, 
and if he thought they could be taken, to try it again. Before 
he could do so, some one galloped up, shouting, 'Charge that 
battery !' The men hurried forward at double-quick, but were 
repulsed as before." * 

It seems that at that moment General Sumner reached 
the field. He reported : 

"On arriving on the field, I found General Couch, with four 
regiments and two companies of infantry and Brady's battery. 
These troops were drawn up in line near Adams's House, and 
there was a pause in the battle." 

He received his orders at 2.30 p.m. and marched with 
Sedgwick's division — three brigades — and Kirby's bat- 
tery, and reached the ground of Couch's work at 4.30. 
In less than an hour he had surveyed the ground and 
placed his troops to receive battle. 

General Smith attacked with Hampton's, Pettigrew's, 
and Hatton's brigades. It seems he made no use of artil- 
lery, though on the field right and left the opportunity 
was fair. The troops fought bravely, as did all Confed- 
erate soldiers. We heard the steady, rolling fire of mus- 
ketry and the boom o1? cannon that told of deadly work as 
far as the Williamsburg road, but it did not last. General 
Hatton was killed, General Pettigrew wounded and a pris- 
oner, and General Hampton wounded. General Smith 
was beaten. 

General Sumner reported : 

"I ordered the following regiments, Eighty-second New York, 
Thirty-fourth New York, Fifteenth Massachusetts, Twentieth 
Massachusetts, and Seventh Michigan, to move to the front and 
charge bayonets. There were two fences between us and the 
enemy, but our men gallantly rushed over them, and the enemy 
broke and fled, and this closed the battle of Saturday." f 

* Confederate War Papers, G. W. Smith. 
t Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 763. 



SEVEN PINES, OK FAIR OAKS. 99 

General Smith sent to call Hood's brigade from his 
right, and posted it, about dark, near Fair Oaks Station. 
At parting. General Hood said, " Our people over yonder 
are whipped." 

General Wilcox filed his three brigades into the Wil- 
liamsburg road, followed by two of Huger's division at 
five o'clock. He was reminded of his orders to be abreast 
of the battle, and that he was only four hours behind it ; 
but reported that while marching by the first order by the 
Charles City road, he received orders to try the Williams- 
burg road ; that, marching for that road, he was called by 
orders to follow a guide, who brought him back to the 
Charles City road. He confessed that his orders to march 
with the front of battle were plain and well understood, 
but his marches did not quite agree with the comprehen- 
sive view of his orders. 

Two of his regiments — the Eleventh Alabama, under 
Colonel Sydenham Moore, and the Nineteenth Mississippi, 
under Major Mullens — were ordered to join Kemj)er, turn 
the position of the enemy at that point, and capture or 
dislodge them. With the other regiments, General Wil- 
cox was ordered by the Williamsburg road to report to 
General Hill, Pryor's brigade to follow him, Colston's 
brigade to support the move under Colonel Moore. 

Armistead's and Mahone's brigades, of Huger's division, 
were sent to R. H. Anderson, who was ordered to put them 
in his position and move his other regiments to the front. 

Colonel Moore hurried his leading companies into the 
turning move against Berry's brigade before his regiment 
was up, and before the Mississippi regiment was in sup- 
porting distance, and fell mortally wounded. General 
Kearny, seeing the move and other troops marching to- 
wards it, ordered his troops out and in retreat through the 
swam]). He reported of it : 

"Although so critically placed, and despite the masses that 
gathered on and had passed us, checked the enemy in his intent 



100 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

of cutting off against the White Oak Swamp. This enabled the 
advanced regiments, arrested by orders and this contest in the 
rear, to return from their hitherto victorious career and retire by a 
remaining wood-path known to our scouts (the saw-mill road), 
until they once more arrived at and remained in the impregnable 
position we had left at noon at our own fortified division 
camp." * 

He states the hour as six p.m. 

Birney's brigade of Kearny's division was ordered 
along the north side of the railroad a little before night, 
and had several encounters with parts of R. H. Ander- 
son's brigade and some regiments of G. B. Anderson's. 
Jenkins, nothing daunted, pushed his brave battle forward 
until the shades of night settled about the wood, and 
flashes of dark-lanterns began to creep through the pines 
in search of wounded, friend and foe. 

At seven o'clock. General Johnston ordered his troops 
on the field to sleep on their lines, and be ready to renew 
operations in the morning, and ordered General Smith to 
call up other troops of the left wing. At half after seven 
he was hit by a rifle-ball, then a fragment of shell un- 
horsed him, and he was borne from the field, so severely 
wounded that he was for a considerable time incapacitated 
for duty. The command devolved temporarily upon 
General G. W. Smith. General Johnston was skilled in 
the art and science of war, gifted in his quick, pene- 
trating mind and soldierly bearing, genial and affectionate 
in nature, honorable and winning in person, and confiding 
in his love. He drew the hearts of those about him so 
close that his comrades felt that they could die for him. 
Until his recovery the Confederacy experienced a serious 
deprivation, and when that occurred he was no longer 
commander-in-chief, for General Lee was promptly called 
to the post of honor. 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 813. 



SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS. 101 

The brigades were so mixed up through the pines when 
the battle closed that there was some delay in getting the 
regiments to their proper commands, getting ujd supplies, 
and arranging for the morning. D. H. Hill's was put in 
good order and in bivouac near the Casey intrenchment ; 
those of Longstreet between the Williamsburg road and 
railroad. Wilcox's brigade took position on the right, in 
place of the detachment under Jenkins ; Pryor's brigade 
next on the left ; Kemper, Anderson, and Colston near 
the stage road (Williamsburg) . They made blazing fires 
of pine-knots to dry their clothing and blankets, and 
these lighted reinforcing Union troops to their lines be- 
hind the railroad. 

The brigades of Huger's division (Armistead's and 
Mahone's) were near the left. Pickett was ordered to 
report to General Hill at daylight, also the batteries of 
Maurin, Stribling, and Watson. It was past eleven 
o'clock when all things were made ready and the killed 
and wounded cared for ; then I rode to find the head- 
quarters of our new commander. 

SUMMARY OF FORCES AND LOSSES. 

Union troops engaged on the Williamsburg road, re- 
ported by General Heiutzelmau, commanding Casey's, 
Couch's, and Kearny's divisions 18,500 

Hooker's division was at hand, but no part of it engaged. 

Confederates engaged on the Williamsburg road, of D. H. 
Hill's division 8900 * 

Two brigades and two regiments of Longstreet's divi- 
sion 5700 

14,600 

Two lines of intrenchments were attacked and carried, six pieces of 
artillery and several thousand small-arms were captured, and the enemy 
was forced back to his third line of intrenchments by night, a mile and 
a half from the point of his opening. 



* Previous returns give him 11,000, but one of his brigades was 
absent. 



102 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Sedgwick's division is not separately accounted for, but 
an average of tlie divisions reported by General Heint- 
zelman will give him . 6080 

Estimate of Couch's command 2000 

Union force against General Smith 8080 

Smith's division, five brigades 10,500 

But Hood's brigade was not engaged 2,100 

Of Smith's division in action 8,400 

Union losses on the Williamsburg road 4563 

Confederate losses on the Williamsburg road 3515 

Union losses on the Nine Miles road 468 

Confederate losses on the Nine Miles road 1283 



CHAPTER VIII. 

SEQUELS OF SEVEN PINES. 

The Forces under Command of G. W. Smith after Johnston was wounded 
— The Battle of the 1st — Longstreet requests Reinforcements and a 
Diversion — Council held — McLaws alone sustains Longstreet's Oppo- 
sition to retiring— Severe Fighting — Piclvett's Brave Stand — General 
Lee assigned to Command — He orders the withdrawal of the Army 
— Criticism of General Smith — Confederates should not have lost the 
Battle— Keyes's Corroboration. 

Majok-General G. W. Smith was of the highest 
standing of the West Point classes, and, like others of the 
Engineers, had a big name to help him in the position to 
which he had been suddenly called by the incapacitation 
of the Confederate commander. 

I found his head-quarters at one o'clock in the morning, 
reported the work of the commands on the Williamsburg 
road on the 31st, and asked for part of the troops ordered 
up by General Johnston, that we might resume battle at 
daylight. He was disturbed by reports of pontoon 
bridges, said to be under construction for the use of other 
reinforcements to join the enemy from the east side, and 
was anxious lest the enemy might march his two corps on 
the east side by the upper river and occupy Richmond. 
But after a time these notions gave way, and he suggested 
that we could renew the battle on the Williamsburg road, 
provided we would send him one of our brigades to help 
hold his position and make the battle by a wheel on his 
right as a pivot. 

As the commands stood, Smith's division on our left 
was at right angles to the York River Railroad, facing 
east, his right near Fair Oaks Station. Besides his di- 
vision of ten thousand, he had Magruder's and other 
commands of fresh troops near him, — twenty thousand. 

103 



104 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

My left lay near Smith's right, the line extending parallel 
to the railroad for a mile, facing north ; thence it broke to 
the rear, and covered the ground from that point to the 
swamp, the return front facing the enemy's third in- 
trenched line. Smith's part of the field was open and fine 
for artillery practice. The field fronting on the railroad 
was so shut in by heavy pine forest and tangled swamp 
that we had no place for a single gun. D. H. Hill's 
division was in reserve near the Casey encampment. 

The enemy stood : Sedgwick's division in front of 
Smith ; Richardson's division in column of three brigades 
parallel to the railroad and behind it, prej^ared to attack 
my left; on Richardson's left was Birney's brigade be- 
hind the railroad, and under the enemy's third intrenched 
line were the balance of the Third and all of the Fourth 
Corps. So the plan to wheel on Smith's right as a pivot, 
my right stej^ping out on the wheel, would have left the 
Third and Fourth Corps to attack our rear as soon as we 
moved. 

Besides, it was evident that our new commander would 
do nothing, and we must look to accident for such aid as 
might be drawn to us during the battle. 

The plan proposed could only be considered under the 
hypothesis that Magruder would come in as the pivotal 
point, and, upon having the enemy's line fully exposed, 
would find the field fine for his batteries, and put them 
in practice without orders from his commander, and, 
breaking the enemy's line by an enfilade fire from his 
artillery, would come into battle and give it cohesive 
power. 

I left head-quarters at three o'clock, and after an hour's 
repose rode to the front to find General Hill. Wilcox's 
brigade was on my right on the return front. Pry or 's 
brigade on his left, and R. H. Anderson, Kemper, Col- 
ston, Armistead, and Mahone occupied the line between the 
Williamsburg road and the railroad. Pickett's brigade 



SEQUELS OF SEVEN PINES. 105 

was ordered to be with General Hill at daylight, and 
Maurin's, Stribling's, and Watson's batteries, of Pickett's 
brigade, to take jDosition on the right of Armistead's. 

I found General Hill before he had his breakfast, en- 
joying the comforts of Casey's camp. Pickett had passed 
and was in search of his position, which was soon disclosed 
by a fusillade from the front of Richardson's division. A 
party of " bummers" from Richmond had found their way 
into the camp at Fair Oaks, and were getting such things 
as they could Y>\it their hands on. They were taken in 
the gray of the morning for Confederate troops and fired 
upon. This made some confusion with our new troops, 
and part of them opened fire in the wrong direction, put- 
ting two or three bullets through General Hill's tent 
before he got out of it. Hood's brigade of Smith's di- 
vision, the pivotal point, came under this fire, and was 
immediately withdrawn. Hood reported his position 
good, but his orders were to retire. 

Our cavalry had established communication with head- 
quarters, and gave prompt notice of movements as they 
occurred. The pivot was moving to the rear, but battle 
on the Williamsburg road steadily advanced, with orders 
to develo]^ the enemy's battle front through its extent 
along the railroad ; not to make the fancied wheel, but to 
expose his line to the practice of our batteries on the Nine 
Miles road. 

Our infantry moved steadily, engaging French's brigade 
of Richardson's division, which was led by one of How- 
ard's regiments. French was supported by Howard's 
brigade, and Howard by Meagher's, and the firing ex- 
tended along my line as far as the return front of my 
right. But Magruder was not on the field to seize the 
oj^portunity for his artillery. He was nowhere near the 
battle, — had not been called. General Whiting, however, 
saw the oj^portunity so inviting, and reported to his 
commander at half after six o'clock, — 



106 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

'' I am going to try a diversion for Longstreet, and have found, 
as reported, a position for artillery. The enemy are in full view 
and in heavy masses. I have ordered up Lee with four pieces. 
The musketry firing in advance is tremendous." * 

General Smith had parties posted along the heights of 
the Chickahominy in close observation of the movements 
of the enemy's forces on the east bank. These parties re- 
ported from time to time that the enemy was moving his 
forces down the east bank and crossing them over to take 
part in the fight. The accounts proved false, but they 
continued to come to head-quarters, and were forwarded 
to my command on the Williamsburg road and gave us 
some concern. Failing to receive approval of his chief, 
General Whiting reported at nine o'clock, — 

''If I don't receive an answer in half an hour, I shall com- 
mence withdrawing my forces." f 

The answer he received was to throw back his right and 
take position a little nearer to the New Bridge fork of the 
Nine Miles road,J thus swinging the pivot farther back. 
General Smith complained that the enemy was getting 
into the interval between our lines, but j)Osition between 
two fires was not the place the enemy wanted ; he could 
not know that Smith wouldn't shoot. Under this long 
and severe infantry fight there was no point on my part 
of the field uj^on which we could post a single gun. Part 
of Armistead's new troops gave way, but the gallant brig- 
adier maintained his ground and soon collected his other 
regiments. Before this I had reported ready, and awaiting 
a guide, the brigade that was to be sent over to the Nine 
Miles road. At half after ten o'clock. General Smith 
sent word that he had heard nothing of the brigade ex- 
pected to come to his support, and renewed his reports 
of the enemy crossing over and concentrating against us 

* Smith's War Papers. t Ibid. % Ibid. 



SEQUELS OF SEVEN PINES. 107 

on the Williamsburg road. He repeated, too, his wish to 
have his cavalry keep close communication between the 
wings of the army. This close communication had been 
established early in the morning and was maintained 
through the day, and the reports of the enemy's crossing 
were all false, but our new commander seemed to forget. 
At the same time he wrote me, — 

"I have directed Whiting to take close defensive relations 
with Magruder. At any rate, that was absolutely necessary to 
enable a good defence to be made whilst you are pivoting on 
"Whiting's j)osition." * 

Whiting's position, instead of being pivotal, began its 
rearward move at the opening fire at daybreak, and con- 
tinued in that line of conduct until it reached a point of 
quiet. General Smith was informed that the brigade called 
for by him would not be sent over ; that his troops were 
doing nothing, while all of mine were in severe battle, 
except a single brigade, and the enemy was massing his 
fighting force against me ; that the grounds were so flooded 
that it was difficult to keep up our supply of ammunition ; 
that with the aid of his troops the battle would be ours. 

But just then he held a council with Generals McLaws 
and Whiting and Chief Engineer Stevens, and submitted 
the question, " Must the troops be withdrawn, or the 
attack continued ?" 

All voted in favor of the former except McLaws. In 
a letter, since written, he has said, — 

''I alone urged that you be reinforced and the attack con- 
tinued, and the question was reconsidered, and I was sent to 
learn your views." f 

Before General McLaws found me, I wrote General 
Smith, — 

* Smith's War Papers. t Ibid. 



108 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

"Can you reinforce me? The entire enemy seems to be op- 
posed to me. We cannot hold out unless we get help. If we can 
fight together, we can finish the work to-day, and Mac's time will 
be up. If I cannot get help, I fear that I must fall back." 

General McLaws reported of his ride to my lines, — 

''I went and found you with J. E. B. Stuart. You were in 
favor of resuming the assault, and wanted five thousand men." * 

Nothing was sent in reply to McLaws's report, but we 
soon learned that the left wing of the army was quiet 
and serene in defensive positions about the New Bridge 
fork of the Nine Miles road. 

At the first quiet of our battle, after the left wing quit 
the field, I ordered the brigades withdrawn to defensive 
position about the trenches at Seven Pines, but before the 
order reached the front the fight was renewed by Hooker's 
division upon Wilcox and Pryor, and reached out to our 
left near Fair Oaks. In the heat of this, General Wilcox 
received the order to retire, and in undue haste pulled his 
command out, assumed authority over Pryor, and ordered 
him off. Pickett, the true soldier, knowing that the order 
was not intended for such emergency, stood and resisted 
the attack. Colston was sent to his aid, and the attack 
was repulsed. Immediately after this repulse was a quiet 
advance upon Pickett's right. The commander asked, 
"What troops are these?" "Virginians!" "Don't 
fire !" he ordered ; " we will capture the last one of these 
Virginians." Just then the Virginians rose and opened 
a fearful fire that drove him back to his bushy cover, 
which ended the battle of Seven Pines. Pickett was 
withdrawn to position assigned for his brigade, our line of 
skirmishers remaining near the enemy's during the day 
and night. General Wilcox reported of his battle, when 

* Letter from General McLaws. 



SEQUELS OF SEVEN PINES. 109 

he j3ulled off from it, that he was doing as well as he 
could wish, but General Hooker reported, " Pursuit was 
hoi3eless." 

The failure of the enemy to push the opportunity made 
by the precipitate retreat of General Wilcox, and Pickett's 
successful resistance, told that there was nothing in the 
reports of troops coming over from the east side to take 
part in the battle, and we were convinced that the river 
was not passable. I made an appeal for ten thousand 
men, that we might renew our battle without regard to 
General Smith and those about him. It received no more 
consideration than the appeal made through General 
McLaws. 

Then General Lee, having been assigned to command, 
came upon the field after noon by the Nine Miles road, 
and, with General Smith, came over to the Williamsburg 
road. A similar proposition was made General Lee, but 
General Smith protested that the enemy was strongly for- 
tified. At the time the enemy's main battle front was 
behind the railroad, fronting against me but exposed to 
easy enfilade fire of batteries to be posted on his right 
flank on the Nine Miles road, while his front against me 
was covered by the railway embankment. It is needless 
to add that under the fire of batteries so posted his lines 
would have been broken to confusion in twenty minutes. 
General Holmes marched down the Williamsburg road 
and rested in wait for General Lee. Like General Huger, 
he held rank over me. General Lee ordered the troops 
back to their former lines. Those on the Williamsburg 
road were drawn back during the night, the rear-guard, 
Pickett's brigade, passing the Casey works at sunrise on 
the 2d unmolested. Part of Richardson's division mistook 
the camp at Fair Oaks for the Casey camp, and claimed 
to have recovered it on the afternoon of the 1st, but it was 
not until the morning of the 2d that the Casey camp was 
abandoned. 



110 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The Confederate losses in the two clays' fight were 
6134; the Union losses, 5031. 

It seems from Union accounts that all of our dead were 
not found and buried on the afternoon of the 1st. It is 
possible, as our battle was in the heavy forest and swamp 
tangles. 

General Smith has written a great deal about the battle 
of Seven Pines during the past twenty or thirty years, in 
efforts to show that the failure of success was due to want 
of conduct on the part of the forces on the Williamsburg 
road. He claims that he was only out as a party of obser- 
vation, to prevent reinforcement of the enemy from the 
east side of the river, and that he kept Sumner off of us. 
But he waited three hours after the enemy's ranks and 
lines had been broken, instead of moving with and finish- 
ing the battle, thus giving Sumner time to march from 
the east of the river, and strike him and beat him to dis- 
order, and change the lost battle to success. He shows 
that Hill's and Longstreet's divisions could have gained 
the battle unaided, — which may be true enough, but it 
would have been a fruitless success, for the enemy got 
forces over to protect those of the west side ; whereas, 
the stronger battle, ordered by the four divisions, could 
and would have made a complete success of it but for the 
balky conduct of the divisions ordered to guard the flanks. 
Instead of six hours' hard work to reach the enemy's third 
line, we could have captured it in the second hour and 
had the field cleaned up before Sumner crossed the river. 

General Keyes, the commander of the Fourth Corps, 
in his " Fifty Years' Observations," says, — 

''The left of my lines were all protected by the White Oak 
Swamp, but the right was on ground so favorable to the approach 
of the enemy, and so far from the Chickahominy, that if Johnston 
had attacked them an hour or two earlier than he did, I could 
have made but a feeble defence comparatively, and every man of 
us would have been killed, captured, or driven into the swamp or 
river before assistance could have reached us." 



SEQUELS OF SEVEN PINES. Ill 

General Smith lay in wait three hours after the enemy's 
positions were broken and carried, giving ample time for 
the march of the succoring forces. The hour of the at- 
tack was not so imj)ortant as prompt and vigorous work. 
If the battle had opened at sunrise, Smith would have 
made the same wait, and Sumner's march would have been 
in time to beat him. All elements of success were in the 
plan, but balky troops will mar the strongest plans. He 
tries to persuade himself that he intended to join our 
battle on the Williamsburg road, but there was no fight 
in his heart after his maladroit encounter with Sedgwick's 
division on the afternoon of the 31st. The opi^ortunity 
for enfilade fire of his artillery along the enemy's battle 
front, at the morning opening and all of the forenoon, 
was waiting him ; while reports of the enemy crossing 
the river, reinforcing against my single contest, were de- 
manding relief and aid. 

He reported sick on the 2d and left the army. When 
ready for duty he was assigned about Kichmond and the 
seaboard of North Carolina. He applied to be restored 
to command of his division in the field, but the authorities 
thought his services could be used better elsewhere. He 
resigned his commission in the Confederate service, went 
to Georgia, and joined Joe Brown's militia, where he found 
congenial service, better suited to his ideas of vigorous 
warfare. 



CHAPTER IX. 

EGBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND. 

The Great General's Assignment not at first assuring to the Army — 
Able as an Engineer but limited as to Field Service — He makes the 
Acquaintance of his Lieutenants — Calls a Council— Gains Confidence 
by saying Nothing — "A Little Humor now and then" — Lee plans a 
Simultaneous Attack on McClellan's Front and Rear — J. E. B. Stuart's 
Daring Reconnoissance around the Union Army. 

The assignment of General Lee to command the army 
of Northern Virginia was far from reconciling the troops 
to the loss of our beloved chief, Joseph E. Johnston, with 
whom the army had been closely connected since its earli- 
est active life. All hearts had learned to lean upon him 
with confidence, and to love him dearly. General Lee's 
experience in active field work was limited to his West 
Virginia campaign against General E-osecrans, which was 
not successful. His services on our coast defences were 
known as able, and those who knew him in Mexico as 
one of the principal engineers of General Scott's column, 
marching for the capture of the caj^ital of that great re- 
public, knew that as military engineer he was especially 
distinguished ; but officers of the line are not apt to look 
to the staff in choosing leaders of soldiers, either in tac- 
tics or strategy. There were, therefore, some misgivings 
as to the power and skill for field service of the new 
commander. The change was accepted, however, as a 
happy relief from the existing halting 23olicy of the late 
temporary commander. 

During the first week of his authority he called his 
general officers to meet him on the Nine Miles road for a 
general talk. This novelty was not reassuring, as experience 
had told that secrecy in war was an essential element of suc- 
cess ; that public discussion and secrecy were incompatible. 

112 



ROBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND. 113 

As he disclosed nothing, those of serious thought became 
hopeful, and followed his wise example. The brigadiers 
talked freely, but only of the parts of the line occupied 
by their brigades ; and the meeting finally took a playful 
turn. General Toombs's brigade was before some formi- 
dable works under construction by General Franklin. 
He suggested an elevation a few hundred yards in his rear, 
as a better defensive line and more comfortable ^Dosition 
for his men ; a very good military point. This seemed 
strange in General Toombs, however, as^ he was known to 
have frequent talks with his troops, comj^laining of West 
Point men holding the army from battle, digging and 
throwing up lines of sand instead of showing lines of 
battle, where all could have fair fight. 

Referring to his suggestion to retire and construct a 
new line. General D. H. Hill, who behind the austere 
presence of a major-general had a fund of dry humor, 
said, — 

''I think it may be better to advance General Toombs's brigade, 
till he can bring Franklin's working parties under the fire of his 
short-range arms, so that the working parties may be broken up." 

General Whiting, who was apprehensive of bayous and 
parallels, complained of sickness in his command, and 
asked a change of position from the unfair Fair Oaks. 
Though of brilliant, highly cultivated mind, the dark side 
of the picture was always more imposing with him. Sev- 
eral of the major-generals failed to join us till the confer- 
ence was about to disperse. All rode back to their camps 
little wiser than when they went, except that they found 
General Lee's object was to learn of the temper of those 
of his officers whom he did not know, and of the condi- 
tion and tone among their troops. He ordered his engi- 
neers over the line occupied by the army, to rearrange 
its defensive construction, and to put working parties on 
all points needing reinforcing. Whiting's division was 



114 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

broken up. Three of the brigades were ordered to A. P. 
Hill's division. He was j^ermitted to choose two brigades 
that were to constitute his own command. Besides his 
own, he selected Hood's brigade. With these two he was 
ordered by way of Lynchburg to report to General 
Jackson, in the Valley district. 

General Lee was seen almost daily riding over his lines, 
making suggestions to working parties and encouraging 
their efforts to put sand-banks between their persons and 
the enemy's batteries, and they were beginning to appre- 
ciate the value of such adjuncts. Above all, they soon 
began to look eagerly for his daily rides, his pleasing yet 
commanding j^resence, and the energy he displayed in 
speeding their labors. 

The day after the conference on the Nine Miles road, 
availing myself of General Lee's invitation to free inter- 
change of ideas, I rode over to his head-quarters, and 
renewed my suggestion of a move against General Mc- 
Clellan's right flank, which rested behind Beaver Dam 
Creek. The strength of the j)osition was explained, and 
mention made that, in consequence of that strong ground, 
a move somewhat similar, ordered by General Johnston 
for the 28th of May, was abandoned. At the same time 
he was assured that a march of an hour could turn the 
head of the creek and dislodge the force behind it. He 
received me pleasantly and gave a 23atient hearing to tlie 
suggestions, without indicating ap^^roval or disapproval. 
A few days after he wrote General Jackson : * 

"Head-quarters, near Eichmond, Va., 
''June 11, 1862. 
''Brigadier- General Thomas J. Jackson, 

^'■Commanding Valley District : 
"General, — Your recent successes have been the cause of the 
liveliest joy in this army as well as in the country. The admira- 
tion excited by your skill and boldness has been constantly 

* Bebellion Record, vol. xii. part iii. p. 910. 



ROBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND. 115 

mingled with solicitude for your situation. The practicability 
of reinforcing you has been the subject of earnest consideration. 
It has been determined to do so at the expense of weakening 
this army. Brigadier- General Lawton, with six regiments from 
Georgia, is on the way to you, and Brigadier-General Whiting, 
with eight veteran regiments, leaves here to-day. The object is 
to enable you to crush the forces opposed to you. Leave your 
enfeebled troops to watch the country and guard the passes cov- 
ered by your cavalry and artillery, and with your main body, 
including Ewell's division and Lawton' s and Whiting's com- 
mands, move rapidly to Ashland by rail or otherwise, as you 
may find most advantageous, and sweep down between the Chick- 
ahominy and Pamunkey, cutting up the enemy's communica- 
tions, etc., while this army attacks General McClellan in front. 
He will thus, I think, be forced to come out of his intrench - 
ments, where he is strongly posted on the Chickahominy, and 
apparently preparing to move by gradual approaches on Eich- 
mond. Keep me advised of your movements, and, if practicable, 
precede your troops, that we may confer and arrange for simul- 
taneous attack. 

'^I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, 

"E. E. Lee, GeneraV 

The brigades under Generals Lawton and Whiting 
were transported as above ordered. 

As indicated in his letter to General Jackson, General 
Lee's plan was a simultaneous attack on General McClel- 
lan's army front and rear. Following his instructions for 
General Jackson, on the same day he ordered his cavalry, 
under General Stuart, upon a forced reconnoissance around 
General McClellan's army to learn if the ground behind 
his army was open. 

These plans and the promjDtness with which they were 
conceived and put in operation ought to be a sufficient 
refutation of the silly report that the Confederacy had 
any idea of withdrawing from their capital, — a report 
which, notwithstanding its unreasonable nature, was given 
a degree of credence in some quarters.* 

* Of interest in this connection is a letter to the author from General 
-D. H. Hill : 



116 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Upon nearing Richmond, after leaving Yorktown, Gen- 
eral Johnston's first thought had been to stand on the 
table-lands between the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy 
Kivers, on the flank of McClellan's march for Rich- 
mond, and force him into battle. He selected ground 
with that view and posted his army, where it remained 
some eight days, giving general and engineer ofiicers 
opi^ortunity to ride over and learn the topographical 
features of the surroundings. A prominent point was 
Beaver Dam Creek, which was so noted by the officers. 
When Johnston proposed to recross the Chickahominy 
and make battle on the 28th of May, in anticipation of 
McDowell's approach, the strong ground at Beaver Dam 
Creek again came under discussion and was common talk 
between the generals, so that the position and its ap- 
proaches became a familiar subject. Then Stuart's famous 
ride had correlative relation to the same, and drew us to 
careful study of the grounds. 

For the execution of his orders General Stuart took 
twelve hundred cavalry and a section of Stuart's horse 
artillery. The command was composed of parts of the 
First, Fourth, and Ninth Virginia Cavalry. The Fourth, 

" Fayette viiiLE, Abk., February 4, 1879. 
'* General James Longstreet : 

" My dear General, — I never heard of the proposed abandonment 
of Richmond at the time General Lee took command. I liad charge 
of one of the four divisions with which the retreat from Yorktown was 
effected, and was called several times into General Lee's most important 
councils. I never heard any officer suggest such a course in these coun- 
cils or in private conversations. 

" I feel sure that General Johnston always intended to fight the in- 
vading force, and so far as I know no officer of rank entertained any 
other view. 

"I remember very well that some days before the council on the 
Nine Miles road (when yourself, A. P. Hill, and myself were present) 
that you suggested the plan of attacking McClellan's right flank, and 
that I expressed my preference for an attack on the other flank. This 
shows that there was no thought of retreat. 

" Very truly yours, 

"D.H.Hill." 



ROBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND. 117 

having no field officer on duty with it, was distributed for 
the expedition between the First, Colonel Fitzhugh Lee, 
and the Ninth, Colonel W. H. F. Lee commanding ; also 
two squadrons of the Jeff Davis Legion, Lieutenant- 
Colonel W. T. Martin commanding. The section of artil- 
lery was nnder First Lieutenant James Breathed. 

On the night of the 12th of June he gathered his 
squadrons beyond the Chickahominy, and the next day 
marched by the road west of the Richmond, Fredericks- 
burg, and Potomac Railroad towards Louisa Court-House, 
to produce the impression, should the march be discovered, 
that he was going to join General Jackson. After a 
march of fifteen miles, he bivouacktd in the pine forests 
of Hanover, near the South Anna Bridge, without light 
or sound of bugle, and, throwing aside the cares of the 
day and thoughts of the morrow, sunk to repose such as 
the soldier knows how to enjoy. An hour before daylight 
he was up in readiness to move as soon as the first light 
of morning revealed the line of march. Up to that mo- 
ment no one of the expedition, except the commander, 
knew the direction or the purpose of the march. He 
called his principal officers about him and told of the 
object of the ride, and imj)ressed the necessity for secrecy, 
prompt and intelligent attention to orders. At the mute 
signal the twelve hundred men swung into their saddles 
and took the road leading to the right and rear of Mc- 
Clellan's army. At Hanover Court-House a small force 
of the enemy's cavalry was discovered, but they retired 
towards their camp, out of the line of Stuart's ride. At 
Hawes's Shop a picket was driven off and several vedettes 
captured. They proved to be of the Fifth United States 
Cavalry, General Lee's old regiment. Between Hawes's 
Shop and Old Church the advance-guard, well to the 
front, reported the presence of the enemy, apparently in 
some force. The column pressed forward, expecting a 
fierce encounter of Southern volunteers with United States 



118 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

regulars, but the latter was a single troop and retreated 
beyond Totopotomy Creek to Old Church, where there 
was a camp of four companies of the Fifth Cavalry under 
Captain Koyal, which made a brave stand. Captain 
Latane led the first squadron, and Captain Koyal received 
the first shock, and furiously the combat went on, both 
leaders falling, Latane dead and Royal severely wounded. 
The enemy fied and scattered through the woods. A 
number of prisoners were taken, including several officers, 
and there were captured horses, arms, equipments, and 
four guidons. In the enemy's camj), near Old Church, 
several officers and privates were captured, a number of 
horses and arms taken, and the stores and tents were 
burned. Here it became a question whether to attempt 
to return by way of Hanover Court-House or to j^ress on 
and try to make a circuit around the entire army, and 
take the chance of fording or swimming the Chicka- 
hominy beyond the enemy's extreme left. Stuart decided 
that the bolder ride " was the quintessence of prudence." * 
Arriving opposite Garlick's, on the Pamunkey, — one of 
the enemy's supply stations, — a squadron was sent out and 
burned two transports with army stores and a number of 
wagons. Near Tunstall's Station a wagon-train was dis- 
covered guarded by five companies of cavalry, which 
manifested a determination to stand and defend it, but 
they abandoned it and rode away, leaving the train in 
possession of Stuart, who burned it, and, night coming on, 
the country was brilliantly lighted up by its flames. After 
resting a few hours at Talleysville, the ride was resumed, 
and the party reached the Chickahominy at Forges Bridge 
at daylight. The stream was not fordable, but, by exer- 
cise of great energy and industry, a rude foot-bridge was 
laid. That part of the command near it dismounted and 
walked over, swimming their horses. In a few hours the 

* Official account, Rebelliou Record, vol. xi. part i. p. 1036. 



ROBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND. 1^ 

bridge was made strong and the artillery and other mounts 
were passed safely over to the Richmond side, and resumed 
the march for their old camp-grounds. 

This was one of the most graceful and daring rides 
known to military history, and revealed valuable facts 
concerning the situation of the Union forces, their opera- 
tions, communications, etc. When congratulated upon 
his success. General Stuart replied, with a lurking twinkle 
in his eye, that he had left a general behind him. Asked 
as to the identity of the unfortunate person, he said, with 
his joyful laugh, " General Consternation." 



CHAPTER X. 

FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICK AHOMINY. 

Eetreat— Lee's Bold Initiative— Lee and his Lieutenants planning 
Battle— The Confederates' Loss at Mechanicsville— Gaines's Mill— A. 
P. Hill's Fight— Longstreet's Reserve Division put in— McClellan's 
Change of Base— Savage Station— Longstreet engages McClellan's 
Main Force at Frayser's Farm (or Glendale)— President Davis on the 
Field- Testimony of Federal Generals— Fierce Bayonet Charges— 
"Greek meets Greek"— Capture of General McCall— McClellan's 
Masterly Retreat. 

The day after Stuart's return I rode over to General 
Lee's head-quarters and suggested that General Jackson 
be withdrawn from the Valley to take position on our 
left, to march against McClellan's right, and was informed 
that the order for Jackson was sent when Whiting's di- 
vision was detached and sent to join him. 

Then it was that General Lee revealed the jilan indi- 
cated in his instructions of the 11th, for General Jackson 
to march down and attack McClellan's rear, while he 
made a simultaneous attack upon his front. The sugges- 
tion was offered that the enemy had probably destroyed 
the bridges and ferries on the Pamunkey along the line 
of his rear, which might leave Jackson in perilous condi- 
tion if the front attack should be delayed ; that that attack 
must be hazardous, as the enemy was in well-fortified 
positions with four army corjDS. After deliberation, he 
changed the jilan and accepted the suggestion in favor 
of combining his fighting columns on the north side of 
the Chickahominy in echelon march against McClellan's 
right fiank, leaving troops in the trenches in front of 
McClellan to defend in case of a move towards Kichmond. 

At the first mention of this march before this conference 
a change of base was spoken of by General D. H. Hill, 

120 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY. 121 

but witli our troops to be left in the trenches, so near the 
flank of such a move, and our columns afield, pressing 
close upon its rear, it was thought impracticable. General 
D. H. Hill, in view of the possibility, preferred that our 
attack should be made against the enemy's left by crossing 
White Oak Swamp below the enemy's left. 

Jackson was called in advance of his command to meet 
the Hills and myself at General Lee's head-quarters for 
conference on the execution. On the forenoon of the 23d 
of June we were advised of his approach, and called to 
head-quarters to meet him. He was there before us, having 
ridden fifty miles by relay of horses since midnight. We 
were together in a few minutes after his arrival, in Gen- 
eral Lee's private office. The general explained the plan 
briefly : Jackson to march from Ashland by heights be- 
tween the Chickahominy and Pamunkey, turning and 
dislodging the Federal right, thus clearing the way for 
the march of troops to move on his right ; A. P. Hill to 
cross the upper Chickahominy and march for Mechanics- 
ville, in echelon to Jackson ; the Mechanicsville Bridge 
being clear, D. H. Hill's division and mine to cross, the 
former to reinforce Jackson's column, the latter to file to 
the right and march down the river in right echelon to 
A. P. Hill's direct march through Mechanicsville to 
Gaines's Mill. 

General Lee then excused himself to attend to office 
business, asking that we talk the matter over for our 
better comprehension. 

Turning to Jackson, I said, — 

"You liave distance to overcome, and in all probability ob- 
stacles will be thrown in the way of your march by the enemy. 
As your move is the key of the campaign, you should appoint 
the hour at which the connection may be made co-operative." 

He promptly responded, — 
"The mornins: of the 25th." 



122 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

I expressed doubt of his meeting that hour, and sug- 
gested that it would be better to take a little more time, 
as the movements of our columns could be readily ad- 
justed to those of his. He then appointed the morning 
of the 26th. 

Upon his return, report was made General Lee that 
the officers understood, and would be prepared to execute 
the plans ; that General Jackson had apjDointed the morn- 
ing of the 26th, when he would lead the march. Verbal 
instructions were given, followed by written orders, em- 
bodying in minute detail the 2:>lan already given in general. 

The topographical features of the ground about Beaver 
Dam Creek have been given in a former cha23ter. Behind 
it battery epaulements had been skilfully laid and con- 
structed, as well as rifle-trenches. These were occupied 
by the troops of the Fifth Corj)s, commanded by General 
Fitz-John Porter. McCall's division had joined the Army 
of the Potomac, and was assigned as part of the Fifth 
Corps, with the divisions of Sykes and Morell. Two of 
McCall's brigades, J. F. Reynolds's and Seymour's, with 
thoroughly-equipped artillery, were especially charged 
with the defences, the Third Brigade, Meade's, in reserve, 
the other divisions in supporting distance. McCall's ad- 
vanced brigades had guards at the bridges as far as 
Meadow Bridge, and a strong outpost at Mechanicsville, 
under orders to retire when the strength of the enemy's 
advance was so developed as to warrant their doing so. 

Three batteries, two of six guns each and one of four, 
manned the epaulements at the opening of the fight. 

Before sunrise on the 26th of June the division of A. P. 
Hill was in position at Meadow Bridge ; his brigade, under 
General Branch, and Johnson's battery, seven miles above, 
at Brook Turnpike Bridge ; my division and that of D. 
H. Hill on the heights overlooking the Mechanicsville 
Bridge, — all awaiting the approach of the initial column. 
Not anticipating delay, the divisions had no special cause 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY. 123 

to conceal their presence, nor did the lay of the ground 
offer good cover. Morning came, and noon passed. 

A few minutes after ten a.m., General Branch received 
a note informing him that, at the hour of its writing. 
General Jackson's column was crossing the Central Rail- 
road. He assembled his command, crossed the Chicka- 
hominy, and marched down along the route designated for 
his column, without sending information to the division 
commander. Of his march he reported, — 

"Interruption by the enemy, but with no other effect than to 
retard without checking our march. 

"Near Crenshaw's the road on which the column commanded 
by Major-General Ewell" (of Jackson's) "was advancing and 
that on which I was advancing approach within one-fourth of a 
mile of each other. The heads of our columns reached this point 
simultaneously, and, after a short personal interview between 
General Ewell and myself, we proceeded on our respective routes. 

"After dislodging the enemy from several ambuscades with 
only a small loss to my command, I reached the Meadow Bridge 
road, when I learned from stragglers that Major-General Hill 
had crossed the Chickahominy, without opposition, with the re- 
mainder of the division and gone on to Mechanicsville, then dis- 
tant about one and a half miles. A courier from the general soon 
assured me of the correctness of the information, and, closing in 
my skirmishers, I made all haste to join him at Mechanicsville. 
The brigade reached the field almost an hour before sunset." * 

At three o'clock, General A. P. Hill, hearing nothing 
from Jackson or his brigade under Branch, decided to 
cross the river and make his move without reference to 
Jackson or Branch. He crossed and moved down against 
Mechanicsville, attacked by Field's brigade, Anderson and 
Archer on Field's left, Pender and Gregg on his right, 
and six field batteries (four guns each) . The outpost was 
driven in, and Hill prepared and attacked against the 
front at Beaver Dam Creek. Meanwhile the Mechanics- 
ville Bridge had been cleared, and, after a little delay re- 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 882. 



124 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

pairing breaks, D. H. Hill's and Longstreet's divisions 
crossed. 

A. P. Hill's battle soon became firm, but he waited a little 
for Jackson before giving it full force. Jackson came up, 
marched by the fight without giving attention, and went 
into camp at Hundley's Corner, half a mile in rear of the 
enemy's position of contention. A. P. Hill put his force 
in severe battle and was repulsed. As D. H. Hill ap- 
proached, he was called into the fray by the commanding- 
general, then by the President. He sent Ripley's brigade 
and five batteries, which made the battle strong and hot 
along the line. 

The most determined efforts were against the enemy's 
right, where General McCall, reinforced by Kern's battery 
and Grifiin's and Martindale's brigades (Morell's divis- 
ion), Edwards's battery, and the Third Regiment of 
Meade's brigade, beat off the repeated and formidable 
efforts of A. P. Hill, when he essayed a column against 
the crossing at Ellerson's Mill, which McCall reinforced 
by the Seventh Regiment of Meade's, Eastman's battery, 
and before night the Fourth Michigan, Twelfth New 
York, and Berdan's Sharp-shooters came in to reinforce 
the line and relieve regiments exhausted of ammunition. 
The battle was in close conflict till nine o'clock at night, 
when Hill was obliged to give over till morning. The 
Federal reinforcements were not all engaged, and some 
that were suffered but little ; none very severely. McCall 
rejolenished ammunition and prepared to renew the fight 
the next morning. 

The Federal loss in the engagement was 361 aggre- 
gate.* 

No especial account of the Confederate loss was made 
in separate report, but it could not have been less than 
two thousand, and may have reached three thousand. 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 38. 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICK AHOMINY. 125 

General D. H. Hill reported of his Forty-fourth Georgia 
Kegiment, the lieutenant-colonel, Estes (J. B.), wounded, 
and others, aggregating 334 killed and wounded. Of his 
First North Carolina Kegiment, Colonel Stokes, Major 
Skinner, six captains, and the adjutant killed, and 133 
privates killed and wounded. 

During the night General McClellan ordered his troops 
withdrawn. They retired at daylight on the 27th, leaving 
a line of skirmishers to cover their march. The skir- 
mishers were not seriously molested, the Confederates 
being satisfied that the direct assault had failed, and the 
flanking march non-aggressive. Early in the morning, 
D. H. Hill was ordered to march to the left to turn the 
position, and was on the Federal right before their lines 
were well out of their trenches. He came up with Jack- 
son and led the march of that column from Hundley's 
Corner. A. P. Hill marched by the direct route to 
Gaines's Mill, and Longstreet, in reserve, moved by the 
route nearer the river and Dr. Gaines's house. 

D. H. Hill marched by Bethesda Church to Old Cold 
Harbor. He understood the plan of campaign and 
promptly engaged the new position along the Chicka- 
hominy Heights, on the enemy's right, where he found 
a well-posted battery of ten guns near swamp lands 
commanding the only road of approach. He ordered 
Bondurant's battery into action, but the combat was 
unequal ; the latter was forced to retire, and General 
Jackson ordered the division back to selected ground 
parallel to a road over which he supposed that the Fed- 
erals would presently retreat. 

As my division was in reserve, it could only be used in 
the last extremity. So the driving could only be made by 
the division of A. P. Hill, while Jackson, with his own, 
Ewell's, D. H. Hill's, and Whiting's divisions, had more 
than half of our moving column, organized as our leading 
battle force, held in ambush for the enemy. 



126 FRCld MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The enemy was found strongly posted upon high ground 
over the Grapevine Bridge, forming a semicircle, his flanks 
near the river. A deep and steep chasm in front of his 
left divided the height upon which he stood from an open 
plateau over which he must be attacked, if at all, on his 
left. The side slope leading up to that position was covered 
by open forest, obstructed and defended by fallen trees. 
On the crest were felled trees, occasional sand-bags, piles 
of rails, and knapsacks. Behind these lines were the di- 
visions of Sykes and Morell, with bristling artillery for 
the first defence, Avith McCall's division of infantry and a 
tremendous array of artillery in reserve. Further strength 
was given to the position by a stream which cut in between 
the two heights with deep scarped banks. His right was 
covered to some extent by swamp lands and forest tangles 
almost as formidable as the approach towards his left. 
General Fitz-John Porter was the commander on the field. 

A. P. Hill came upon a detachment at Gaines's Mill, 
forced his way across the creek, and followed to the 
enemy's strong position, where he promptly engaged about 
the time of D. H. Hill's withdrawal. He found himself 
fighting not only strong numbers, but against a very strong 
defensive ground. As General D. H. Hill withdrew, Gen- 
eral Porter prepared to follow, but the fierce assaults of 
A. P. Hill told him that he must hold his concentration. 
It was a little after two p.m. when A. P. Hill put all of 
his force into action and pressed his battle with great zeal 
and courage, but he was alone. Jackson, finding the fire of 
the enemy steady and accumulating against A. P. Hill, 
ordered his troops forward into action. D. H. Hill en- 
gaged again at the swamp land, and found that he must 
capture the battery firing across his advance. With the 
aid of some of Elzey's brigade he succeeded in this, tem- 
porarily, but Sykes doubled on him, recovered it, and put 
it again into action. Parts of Ewell and Lawton, of 
Jackson's, came in on D. H. Hill's right. Meanwhile, 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY. 127 

A. P. Hill had fought to exhaustion, and found himself 
obliged to put his troops down to hold his line. The 
enemy putting in his reserves, spliced his thinned ranks 
with artillery and infantry, and fought a desj)erate and 
very gallant battle, calling for troops from across the 
river. 

My division came up near A. P. Hill's rear, being the 
reserve, and awaited orders. About five o'clock a messen- 
ger came from General Lee asking a diversion by part 
of my troops against the enemy's left to draw off troops 
from his right, so as to let our left in through his weak- 
ening lines. Three brigades were sent to open fire and 
threaten their left from the forest edge, with orders not to 
cross the open. These brigades engaged steadily, and 
parts of them essayed to pass the field in front as their 
blood grew hot, but were recalled, with orders repeated to 
engage steadily, only threatening assault. The army all 
the while engaged in efforts to find a point that could be 
forced. 

Finally, a little before sunset, General Lee sent to me 
to say that " all other efforts had failed, and unless I could 
do something, the day was lost." * Pickett's brigade and 
part of E,. H. Anderson's had been drawn up under the 
crest in rear of A. P. Hill's right, and Kemper's brigade 
was near, also under cover. Upon the receipt of the last 
message, Pickett and Anderson were ordered into action 
as assaulting columns, and Kemper called up. Just as 
the brigades advanced, General Whiting burst through 
the woods with his own and Hood's brigades, reported 
to me that he had lost sight of his commander. General 
Jackson, in the forest, and asked me to put him into 
battle. He was ordered to form for assault, and to follow 
on the left of Pickett's and Anderson's columns, then in 
motion, as the columns of direction. As my troops reached 

* From memory I will say that this message from General Lee was 
delivered by Captain A. P. Mason. 



128 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the crest under wliicli tliey had rested they came under 
the full blaze of the battle, but Pickett and Anderson 
were comparatively fresh, and dashed through the open 
and down the slope before the fire had time to thin their 
ranks. The steep descent of the hither sIojdc from its 
crest soon took them below the fire of the batteries, and 
A. P. Hill's severe fight had so thinned the enemy's in- 
fantry lines of men and ammunition that their fire grew 
weaker. Whiting's brigade, sore under its recent disas- 
trous effort in the battle of Seven Pines, drifted from my 
left towards the woodland, but Hood, with his Fourth 
Texas Regiment and Eighteenth Georgia, obliqued to the 
right behind that brigade and closed the interval towards 
Anderson's left, leaving his other regiments, the First and 
Fifth Texas, on Whiting's left. Hood clambered over the 
deep ravine with his two regiments and maintained j^osi- 
tion with the assaulting columns, while the balance of 
Whiting's division followed in close echelon. As the 
advanced lines of Pickett, Anderson, and Hood reached 
and crowned the stronghold of the enemy, Anderson and 
Pickett moved up in pursuit of the broken lines, and were 
almost in possession of their massed reserve artillery — 
had it under easy musketry range — when a dash of cav- 
alry admonished them that their ranks, while in order for 
following the infantry lines, were not in j^roper form to 
receive a charge of cavalry. They concentrated well 
enough to pour a repelling fire into the troopers, but the 
delay had made time for the retreating infantry to open 
the field for the reserve batteries, and, night growing 
apace, they returned to the line of their trophies and used 
the captured guns against their late owners. 

General Whiting asked for another brigade of Jackson's 
that had reported to me, and turned his forces against the 
enemy's line on our left. The divisions of Ewell and 
D. H. Hill advancing at the same time, the general break 
seemed almost simultaneous, and was claimed by all. 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICK AHOMINY. 129 

The messages from General Lee were so marked by 
their prompt and successful execution that, in reporting 
of the battle, it occurred to me that they could be better 
noted in his report than in mine, but he adopted the 
claim of a general and simultaneous break along the line. 

A letter from General Porter, written since the war, 
assures the writer that his guns had become so foul from 
steady j^rotracted fire that his men had difficulty in ram- 
ming their cartridges to the gun-chambers, and that in 
some instances it could only be accomplished by putting 
the rammers against trees and hammering them" down. 

The position was too strong to leave room to doubt that 
it was only the thinning fire, as the battle progressed, that 
made it assailable ; besides, the repulse of A. P. Hill's re- 
peated, desperate assaults forcibly testified to the fact. It 
was, nevertheless, a splendid charge, by peerless soldiers. 
When the cavalry came upon us our lines were just thin 
enough for a splendid charge upon artillery, but too thin 
to venture against a formidable cavalry. Five thousand 
prisoners were turned over to General Lee's j)rovost-guard, 
a number of batteries and many thousand small-arms to 
the Ordnance Department, by my command. The Con- 
federate commanders, except A. P. Hill, claimed credit for 
the first breach in General Porter's lines, but the solid 
ranks of jirisoners delivered to the general j)rovost-guard, 
and the several batteries captured and turned in to the Ord- 
nance Department, show the breach to have been made 
by the columns of Anderson, Pickett, and Hood's two 
regiments. The troops of the gallant A. P. Hill, that did 
as much and effective fighting as any, received little of 
the credit properly due them. It was their long and 
steady fight that thinned the Federal ranks and caused 
them to so foul their guns that they were out of order 
when the final struggle came. 

Early on the 28th my advance, reaching the river, 
found the bridges destroyed and the enemy concentrating 



130 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

on the other side. Under the impression that the enemy 
must reopen connection with his base on the Pamunkey, 
General Lee sent Stuart's cavalry and part of Jackson's 
command (Ewell's) to interpose on that line. They cut 
the line at Despatch Station, where Ewell's division was 
halted. Stuart, following down towards the depot on the 
Pamunkey till he approached the White House, cut off a 
large detachment of cavalry and horse artillery under 
General Stoneman that retreated down the Peninsula. 
At night Stuart rested his command, finding supplies of 
forage and provisions abandoned by the enemy. At the 
same time fires were seen along the line of supplies, and 
houses in flames. On the 29th he followed towards the 
depot, still in flames. 

^ ' The command was now entirely out of rations and the horses 
without forage. I had relied on the enemy at the White House 
to supply me with those essentials, and I was not disappointed, in 
spite of their efforts to destroy everything. Provisions and deli- 
cacies of every description lay in heaps, and men regaled them- 
selves on fruits of the tropics as well as the substantials of the 
land. Large quantities of forage were left also." * 

On the 28th, Major Meade and Lieutenant Johnson's 
engineers were sent from my head-quarters to learn of the 
enemy's operations or movements. Early on the 29th 
they made their way across the Chickahominy, into the 
grounds and works of the enemy just left vacant, and sent 
the first account of the enemy's move on his change of 
base. The conflagrations of the day before told of speedy 
change of position in some direction, but this was the first 
information we had from a reliable source. Their report 
was sent to General Lee. While planning and ordering 
pursuit, he received a similar report from General Magru- 
der, coupled with the statement that he was preparing to 
attack one of the enemy's forts. 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 517. Stuart. 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICK AHOMINY. 131 

General Jackson was ordered to follow on the enemy's 
rear with his column, including the division of D. H. Hill, 
crossing the river at Grapevine Bridge, Magruder to join 
pursuit along the direct line of retreat, Huger to strike at 
the enemy's flank ; meanwhile, Kansom's brigade had 
joined Huger 's division. My division was to cross with 
A. P. Hill's at New Bridge, march back near Bichmond, 
across to and down the Darbytown road to interpose be- 
tween the enemy and James Biver. Stuart was directed 
to operate against the enemy's left or rear, or front, as best 
he could. 

All the commands, being in waiting, marched at the 
first moment of their orders. 

Jackson was long delayed repairing Grapevine Bridge. 
He probably knew that the river was fordable at that 
season, but preferred to pass his men over dry-shod. 

General D. H. Hill, of that column, reported, — 

'' Scouts from Hood's brigade and the Third Alabama (Eodes's 
brigade) succeeded in crossing, and my pioneer corps under Cap- 
tain Smith, of the Engineers, repaired Grapevine Bridge on the 
29th, and we crossed over at three o'clock that night." * 

On the 28th the Seventh and Eighth Georgia Begi- 
ments were sent out a little before night to ascertain the 
probable movements of the enemy, and encountered part of 
W. F. Smith's division. Sixth Corps, meeting the Forty- 
ninth Pennsylvania and Thirty-third New York Begi- 
ments. Colonel Lamar and Lieutenant-Colonel Towers 
and Adjutant HarjDcr, of the Eighth Georgia Begiment, 
fell into the enemy's hands, and twenty-nine others of the 
Seventh and Eighth Begiments were taken prisoners. 
Just as this affair was well begun a recall of the regiments 
was ordered ; hence the number of casualties. About the 
same hour a cavalry affair at Despatch Station occurred 
which resulted to the credit of the Confederates. 

* Kebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 627. D. H. HilL 



132 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

At night General McClellan called his corps command- 
ers to head-quarters and announced his plan for change 
of base to the James Kiver. The Fourth Corps had been 
ordered to prepare the route of crossing at White Oak 
Swamp, and j)ass over to defend it. The Fifth and Slo- 
cum's division of the Sixth were to follow at night of the 
28th. The Second, Third, and Smith's division of the 
Sixth Corps were to defend the crossing against pursuit ; 
the Fourth, continuing its move, was to stand at Turkey 
Bridge, defending the apjDroach from Kichmond by the 
river road ; the Fifth to stand at Malvern Hill, with 
McCall's division across the Long Bridge road, and Slo- 
cum's across the Charles City road, defending the avenues 
of approach from Richmond. On the 29th, Magruder in 
pursuit came uj)on Sumner's (Second) corps at Allen's 
Farm, and, after a spirited affair, found Sumner too strong 
for him. After his success, Sumner retired to Savage 
Station, where he joined Franklin with his division under 
Smith. The Third Corps (Heintzelman's), under mis- 
conception of orders, or misleading of staff-officers, fol- 
lowed the marching corps across the swam23, leaving the 
Second and Smith's division of the Sixth as the only 
defending forces. At Savage Station, Magruder came 
upon them and again joined battle, but his force was 
not equal to the occasion. The commander of his left 
(D. R. Jones), realizing the importance of action and the 
necessity for additional troops, called upon General Jack- 
son to co-operate on his left, but Jackson reported that 
he had other important duties to perform. The affair, 
therefore, against odds was too strong for Magruder, so 
that he was forced back without important results for the 
Confederates, the Federals making safe passage of the 
crossing and gaining position to defend against pursuit in 
that quarter. 

On the 29th, General Holmes marched down the James 
Kiver road to New Market with part of Colonel Daniel's 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY. 133 

brigade and two batteries, and General J. G. Walker's 
brigade and two batteries, and was there reinforced by 
part of General Wise's brigade and two batteries, in co- 
operative jDOsition to my division and that of A. P. Hill, 
on the Darbytown and Long Bridge roads. 

On his night march along the Long Bridge road, Fitz- 
John Porter got on the wrong end and rubbed up against 
my outpost, but recognized his adversary in time to recover 
his route and avert a night collision. He posted McCall's 
division in front of Charles City cross-roads ; his divisions 
under Morell and Sykes at Malvern Hill, and Warren's 
brigade, near the Fourth Corps, on the river routes from 
Richmond. As the divisions of the Third Corj^s arrived 
they were posted, — Kearny between the Charles City 
and Long Bridge roads, on McCall's right; Hooker in 
front of the Quaker road, on McCall's left ; Sedgwick's 
division, Sumner's corps, behind McCall. 

Before noon of the 30th, Jackson's column encountered 
Franklin, defending the principal crossing of White Oak 
Swamp by the divisions of Richardson and W. F. Smith 
and Naglee's brigade. About the same time my command 
marched down the Long Bridge road and encountered the 
main force of McClellan's army posted at the Charles 
City cross-roads (Frayser's Farm, or Glendale). My 
division was deployed across the Long Bridge road in 
front of the divisions of McCall and Kearny, holding 
the division of A. P. Hill at rest in the rear, except the 
brigade under Branch, which was posted off to my right 
and rear to guard against Hooker's division, standing 
behind the Quaker road, in threatening position on my 
right flank. The ground along the front of McCall and 
Kearny was a dark forest, with occasional heavy tangles, 
as was the ground in front of Hooker. The front of 
Slocum, along the Charles City road, was something simi- 
lar, but offering some better opportunities for artillery 
practice and infantry tactics. 



134 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

As Jackson and Franklin engaged in artillery combat, 
my division advanced under desultory fire of skirmishers 
to close position for battle, awaiting nearer approach of 
Jackson and signal of approach of our troops on the 
Charles City road. In the wait the skirmish-lines were 
more or less active, and an occasional shot came from one 
of the Federal batteries. 

During the combat between Jackson and Franklin, 
Sedgwick's brigades under Dana and Sully were sent back 
to reinforce at the crossing, but upon the opening of the 
engagement at Frayser's Farm they were brought back 
on the double-quick. 

After a time reports of cannon fire came from the direc- 
tion of Charles City road,. signalling, as we su^^posed, the 
approach of Huger's column. To this I ordered one of 
our batteries to return salutation. The senior brigadier 
of the division, K. H. Anderson, was assigned to imme- 
diate supervision of my front line, leaving his brigade 
under Colonel M. Jenkins. While awaiting the nearer 
approach of Jackson or the swelling volume of Huger's 
fire, the President, Genet-al Lee, and General A. P. Hill, 
with their staffs and followers, rode forward near my line 
and joined me in a little clearing of about three acres, 
curtained by dense pine forests. All parties engaged in 
pleasant talk and anticipations of the result of a combina- 
tion supposed to be complete and prepared for concen- 
trating battle, — Jackson attacking in the rear, Huger on 
the right flank, A. P. Hill and myself standing in front. 
Very soon we were disturbed by a few shells tearing and 
screaming through the forests over our heads, and pres- 
ently one or two burst in our midst, wounding a courier 
and killing and wounding several horses. The little 
opening was speedily cleared of the distinguished group 
that graced its meagre soil, and it was left to more humble, 
active combatants. 

Near the battery from which the shots came was R. H. 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY. 135 

Anderson's brigade, in which Colonel Jenkins had a bat- 
talion of practised sharp-shooters. I sent orders for Jen- 
kins to silence the battery, under the impression that our 
wait was understood, and that the sharp-shooters would be 
pushed forward till they could pick off the gunners, thus 
ridding us of that annoyance ; but the gallant Jenkins, 
only too anxious for a dash at a battery, charged and 
captured it, thus precipitating battle. The troops right 
and left going in, in the same spirit, McCall's fire and the 
forest tangle thinned our ranks as the lines neared each 
other, and the battle staggered both sides, but, after a for- 
midable struggle, the Confederates won the ground, and 
E-andol's gallant battery. Sedgwick's division reinforced 
the front and crowded back the Confederate right, while 
Kearny's, reinforced by Slocum, pushed severely against 
my left, and then part of Hooker's division came against 
my right. Thus the aggressive battle became defensive, 
but we held most of the ground gained from McCall. 
In his official account. General Heintzelman said, — 

^'In less tlian an hour General McCall's division gave way. 
General Hooker, being on his left, by moving to the right re- 
pulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner and with great 
slaughter. General Sumner, who was with General Sedgwick, in 
McCall's rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry 
in driving back the enemy. They now renewed the attack with 
vigor on Kearny's left, and were again repulsed with heavy loss. 
The attack continued until some time after night. 

" This attack commenced at four p.m. and was pushed by heavy 
masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thomp- 
son's battery, directed with great skill, firing double charges, 
swept them back. The whole open space, two hundred paces 
wide, was filled with the enemy. Each repulse brought fresh 
troops. 

"Seeing that the enemy was giving way, I returned to the 
forks of the road, where I received a call from General Kearny 
for aid. Knowing that all of General Sedgwick's troops were 
unavailable, I was glad to avail myself of the kind offer of Gen- 
eral Slocum to send the New Jersey brigade of his division to 



136 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

General Kearny's aid. I rode out far enough on the Charles 
City road to see that we had nothing to fear from that direc- 
tion." * 

General McCall reported, — 

'^1 had ridden into the regiment to endeavor to check them, 
but with only i^artial success. It was my fortune to witness one 
of the fiercest bayonet charges that ever occurred on this con- 
tinent. Bayonet wounds, mortal and slight, were given and 
received. I saw skulls smashed by the butts of muskets, and 
every effort made by either party in this life-aud- death struggle 
proving indeed that here Greek had met Greek. The Seventh 
Regiment was at this time on the right of the Fourth, and was 
too closely engaged with a force also of great superiority in num- 
bers to lend any assistance to the gallant few of the Fourth who 
were struggling at their side. In fine, these few men, some sev- 
enty or eighty, were borne bodily off among the rebels, and when 
they reached a gap in the fence walked through it, while the 
enemy, intent on pursuing those in front of them, passed on 
without noticing them. 

"It was at this moment, on witnessing this scene, I keenly 
felt the want of reinforcements. I had not a single regiment left 
to send to the support of those so overpowered. There was no 
running, but my division, reduced by the furious battles to less 
than six thousand, had to contend with the divisions of Longstreet 
and A. P. Hill (considered two of the strongest and best among 
many of the Confederate army, numbering that day eighteen or 
twenty thousand men), and it was reluctantly compelled to give 
way before heavier force accumulated upon them. My right was, 
as I say, literally forced off the ground by the weight simply of 
the enemy's column." 

His account is incorrect in the estimate of numbers and 
the two divisions. Hill was not put in until a later hour, 
and encountered the troops of Kearny and Slocum. 
Hill's orders were to hold the line gained until Jackson 
and Huger approached, to warrant more aggressive battle. 

Magruder's march had been directed to succor Holmes. 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 100. Heintzelman. 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICK AHOMINY. 137 

In his official account, General Holmes wrote of parts of 
his cavalry and artillery, " whose conduct was shameful 
in the extreme." He reported his casualties : 

'^Daniel's brigade, 2 killed, 22 wounded; Walker's brigade, 
12 wounded ; artillery, 15 wounded. 

^^The strength of the enemy's position and their imposing 
numbers were such that to attempt an attack upon them with my 
small force, unsupported, would have been perfect madness ; for 
to have done tliis would have required a march of over three- 
quarters of a mile up a steep hill destitute of cover. I accord- 
ingly withdrew about nine p.m. to a position somewhat in advance 
of that occupied in the morning." * 

In his account of the fight. General Kearny wrote, — 

"At four P.M. the attack commenced on my line with a deter- 
mination and vigor, and in such masses, as I had never witnessed. 
Thompson's battery, directed with great skill, literally swept the 
slightly falling open space with the completest execution, and, 
mowing them down by ranks, would cause the survivors to mo- 
mentarily halt ; but, almost instantly after, increased masses 
came uj), and the wave bore on. . . . 

"In concluding my report of this battle, one of the most des- 
perate of the war, the one most fatal, if lost, I am proud to give 
my thanks and to include in the glory of my own division the 
First l^ew Jersey Brigade, General Taylor, who held McCall's 
deserted ground, and General Caldwell." f 

A. P. Hill's division was held at rest several hours 
after the battle was pitched (Branch's brigade on guard 
on my right retired, and Gregg's on my left). Under our 
plan, that Huger was to assault the Federal right and 
Jackson the rear, the battle joined ; Hill was to be put in 
fresh to crown it. As night approached without indications 
of attack from either of those columns, Hill was advanced 
to relieve the pressure against my worn troops. At the first 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 107. 
t Ibid., pp. 162-164. 



138 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

dash he again grasped and held Randol's battery, that 
had been the source of contention from the first onset. 
Fiekl's brigade pushed on through the enemy's line, and, 
supported by Pender's and Branch's, drove back rein- 
forcements coming to their succor from one of Sedgwick's 
brigades ; pushed Caldwell's off to Kearny's position, 
where, with the additional aid of j^art of Slocum's divi- 
sion, Kearny succeeded in recovering his own ground 
and in putting Caldwell's brigade into part of McCall's 
original right, leaving the Confederates holding part of 
McCall's first line, Field's brigade some little distance in 
advance of it. Archer and Branch, on Field's right, 
made strong that part of it. Gregg's brigade on the left 
made little progress beyond holding most of the ground 
taken by the first assault. The battle thus braced held 
its full and swelling volume on both sides. My right, 
thinned by the heavy fighting and tangled forest, found a 
way around the left of the contention, then gravitating 
towards its centre. In this effort Hooker's division came 
against its right flank. By change of front a clever fight 
was made, but Branch's brigade, ordered for service at 
that point, had been withdrawn by General Hill to sup- 
port his centre, so that Hooker pushed us off into closed 
ranks along our line in rear and back ; but his gallant on- 
set was checked and failed of progress. General Hooker 
claimed that he threw Longstreet over on Kearny, but 
General McCall said that by a little stretch of the hyper- 
bole he could have said that he threw Longstreet over the 
moon. To establish his centre. Hill sent in J. R. Ander- 
son's brigade astride the Long Bridge road, which held 
the battle till the near approach of night, when McCall, 
in his last desperate effort to reinforce and recover his lost 
ground, was caught in the dark of twilight and invited to 
ride to my head-quarters. Friends near him discovered 
his dilemma in time to avert their own capture, and ag- 
gressive battle ceased. The artillery combat, with occa- 



FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY. 139 

sional exchanges of shots, held till an hour after the beat 
of tattoo. 

It was the Forty-seventh Virginia Regiment that caught 
and invited General McCall to quarter with the Confed- 
erates. Although his gallant division had been forced 
from the fight, the brave head and heart of the general 
were not fallen till he found himself on his lonely ride. 
He was more tenacious of his battle than any one who 
came within my experience during the war, if I except 
D. H. Hill at Sharpsburg. 

In years gone by I had known him in pleasant army 
service, part of the time as a brevet lieutenant of his 
company. When the name was announced, and as he 
dismounted, I approached to offer my hand and such 
amenities as were admissible under the circumstances, but 
he drew up with haughty mien, which forbade nearer aj)- 
proach, so that the courtesies were concluded by the offer 
of staff-officers to escort him to the city of Kichmond. 

It was during this affair that General Holmes's division 
advanced against the Federals at Turkey Bridge with a 
six-gun field battery and engaged, and was met by the 
fire of thirty field guns and the gunboat batteries, which 
drove him to confusion, abandoning two guns. Earlier 
in the day, Magruder's column had been ordered by a 
long detour to support the fight at Frayser's Farm, but 
the trouble encountered by Holmes's division seemed 
serious, and caused the Confederate commander to divert 
Magruder's march to support that point, through which a 
resolute advance might endanger our rear at Frayser's 
Farm. After night Magruder was called to relieve the 
troops on the front of my line. His march during the 
day was delayed by his mistaken guide. 

The Confederates claimed as trophies of the battle ten 
pieces of artillery, some prisoners, and most of the field 
from which McCall's division had been dislodged. 
Holmes's division lost two guns in the affair at Turkey 



140 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Bridge, but other Confederates secured and afterwards 
made better use of them. 

During this eventful day the Federals were anxiously 
pushing their trains to cover on the river, and before noon 
of July 1 all, except those of ammunition necessary for 
immediate use, had safely passed the field selected for 
their Malvern Hill battle. 



CHAPTER XL 

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 

Last Stand in the Great Retreat — Strength of McClellan's Position — 
The Confederates make Poor Use of their Artillery — A Mistake and 
Defeat for Lee's Army — The Campaign as a Whole a Great Success, 
but it should have been far greater— McClellan's Retreat showed him 
well equipped in the Science of War — Review of the Campaign — 
Jackson's and Magruder's Misunderstanding — Moral Effect of the 
Gunboats on the James River — "There should be a Gunboat in Every 
Family." 

At Malvern Hill, hardly a league away from Frayser's, 
now left to silence save for the moans of the unfortunate 
fallen, and standing south of the line to Turkey Bridge, 
was Fitz-John Porter with the reserve artillery massed, 
supported by the divisions of Sykes and Morell on the left 
and Couch's on the right, from the Crew House to J. W. 
Binford's. The field had been carefully selected and as 
judiciously guarded by well-posted commands, holding 
the only way left which gave hope of successful passage 
to cover under the gunboats. During the night of the 
30th of June and early morn of the 1st of July this po- 
sition was reinforced by the retreating Federals, — first by 
the Second and Third Corps, McCall's division of the 
Fifth, and W. F. Smith's of the Sixth, and later by other 
troops. Among the trains moving for the river was one 
of ten siege guns under Colonel Tyler. These were 
dropped in Porter's rear and put in battery, giving them 
a sweep of the avenues of approach and extensive rake 
of the woodlands, and a great number of lighter batteries 
bristled upon the brow and down the slopes of the hill. 
On either flank the plateau was somewhat guarded by 
ravines and tangled marsh lands, while the front approach 
was over ascending slopes, so broken as to make advancing 
artillery combat slow and hazardous. 

141 



142 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Early on the 1st, the cohimns under Huger, Jackson, 
and Magruder met at the Charles City cross-roads, but the 
enemy had given up that position and marched away, 
leaving to them the abandoned forest land. The disap- 
pointment of the Confederate commander in the failure 
of combination ordered for the 30th was noted by those 
who were near him, while the composure with which it was 
borne indicated the grander elements of his character, and 
drew those who knew his plans and purposes closer to him. 

Jackson was ordered to follow on the direct line of 
the enemy's retreat ; Huger and Magruder marched to 
co-operate on his right ; Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's 
divisions were held in reserve. General Lee rode near 
Jackson's column to view the army on that front. Feel- 
ing unwell and much fatigued, he called me to temporary 
service near him. As he rode to the left, he ordered me, 
with the columns of Huger and Magruder, to make recon- 
noissance of the enemy's new position in that quarter, 
and to report of the feasibility of aggressive battle. 

I found some difference between General Lee's maps 
and General Magruder's guides, but my authority was 
only for a reconnoissance, and posting the divisions. An 
elevated point was found off the enemy's left front, as 
high as the plateau upon which his army stood, from 
which a fair view was had of his position and down along 
his front and the open as far as Jackson's field, the latter 
just filing in by his batteries on much lower but open 
ground. 

Profound silence rested upon the field. Jackson's bat- 
teries, yet a little beyond the point of range, marched to 
their places as quietly as if taking positions for review. 
Porter's field seemed as little concerned at the develop- 
ments along his flank and front, indicating that there was 
to be no waste of ammunition on that July day. His 
guns could not be counted, but blocking them off by bat- 
teries there seemed to be eighty on his front, besides the 





// '" ^-• 


» 


f.» ,(^ ^ 


J^// 


* «7;. 


s?/ 


'^'*; ^ «? 


•i 


./.; ■' '^ n 




":» iV .-,, 


^ 






BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 143 

siege battery in rear. His guns were all trailed to Jack- 
son's front, thus presenting a flank towards the high point 
upon which I stood. From the crest at this little ridge the 
ground dropped off sharply some eighteen inches or two feet 
to a lower terrace, forming a natural parapet and terre-plein 
for forty or sixty guns, massed. The spacious open along 
Jackson's front appeared to offer a field for play of a hun- 
dred or more guns, and although his lower ground was 
not inviting of combat even by a hundred guns, it was 
yet judged that advancing combat by eighty or a hundred 
guns, in combination with the forty-gun battery of posi- 
tion, might justify assault, and the tremendous game at 
issue called for adventure. 

I thought it probable that Porter's batteries, under the 
cross-fire of the Confederates thus posted on his left and 
front, could be thrown into disorder, and thus make way 
for combined assaults of the infantry. I so rejDorted, and 
General Lee ordered disposition accordingly, sending the 
pioneer corps out to cut a road for the right batteries of 
position. 

I suggested position to Magruder for his division, but 
he insisted that the Quaker road was not correctly located 
on General Lee's maps, so I left that part of the order to 
be looked after by General Lee's recognized staff. Gen- 
eral Chilton, chief of staff, was then sent by General Lee 
to assist General Magruder in posting the troops, and I 
was ordered back to locate the batteries. 

But eight guns came in proper time and were posted. 
These General Magruder proposed to supplement by thirty 
of his own under Colonel S. D. Lee, to be reinforced by 
the others as they came up. With this understanding I 
returned to head-quarters, made my report, and was per- 
mitted to go back to my command proper. 

The most convenient point for observing the effect of 
the artillery fire was occupied by General Armistead's 
brigade. That officer was designated by General Lee to 



144 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

give notice, if the combat was successful, by advancing 
his brigade, under the shouts of infantry charge, as the 
signal for general assault. 

The eight guns for the right battery were all that got 
into position on time, and Jackson failed to open fire by 
advancing all of the batteries along his front, so that the 
practice from those quarters was not forcibly executed. 
When the eight guns finally opened. Porter shifted his 
aim from his proper front, which Jackson failed to combat, 
and put in the fire of forty guns against the eight-gun bat- 
tery of our right. The gunboat batteries also came into 
that j^ractice, but it was found that they damaged friends 
almost as much as the enemy, and were ordered to discon- 
tinue. Jackson's cross-fire, feeble at best and at long 
range, was finally drawn off by other batteries far on the 
enemy's right, so that the eight guns were soon piled a 
heterogeneous mass of caissons, guns, limbers, and horses. 
Some other batteries got into action at the same point, 
eight or ten at a time, but suffered like disaster. 

So the plan for battle and order of the day were given 
over by the Confederate commander, who sent for me to 
ride with him over to his left in search of a route by which 
the enemy's right might be turned. This seemed feasible 
under the hasty reconnoissance, and he ordered the re- 
serves on that move. As we started on the march the 
noise of battle reached us and the march was arrested. 
Under the impression that his officers realized the failure 
and abandonment of his original j^lan, General Lee failed 
to issue orders specifically recalling the appointed battle. 

It seems that just as the troops marched to the left 
under the last order, information was received by some 
of the officers at the front that the enemy was getting 
away from us. 

To ascertain as to this matter, and anxious to atone for 
lost opportunities of the day before, part of the troops near 
our right moved forward, and soon encountered the enemy's 



I 



BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 145 

infantry, as well as the formidable artillery. This impact 
burst into the noise of battle, and was taken as the signal 
for assault under the original order of the day. From 
the right to the left, as far as and including D. H. Hill's 
division, the Confederates attacked in splendid style, 
making repeated brave charges, but they were as firmly 
met by the enemy, and their dead and wounded were 
mingled on the same lines. The Confederate ranks thin- 
ning rapidly, Magruder called on me for reinforcements, 
and Jackson was sent to reinforce D. H. Hill's left, but 
night closed in u]oon us before the reinforcements could 
get into action. 

As the order for battle had been given about noon, and 
had been abandoned some hours before the opening, upon 
receiving Magruder 's call, I supposed the conflict had 
been brought on by the enemy to force our right back 
and better clear the route of his retreat. I ordered A. 
P. Hill direct to Magruder, and my own division for 
sup23ort on our extreme right. The result of the battle 
was a repulse of the Confederates along the entire line 
and the sacrifice of several thousand brave ofiicers and 
men, though some of our troops held ground nearer the 
enemy than at the onset of the battle. During the night 
the enemy resumed his march for the river, leaving his 
dead, some of his wounded, and exhibiting other marks 
of the precipitate character of his retreat. 

Stuart's cavalry had been recalled from north of the 
Chickahominy on the 30th to join us on the south side, 
and reached Jackson's left Tuesday night after the battle. 

The morning of the 2d opened heavy and oppressive. 
The storm front of bursting cannon and bristling bayonets 
was changed to a wide sweep of heavy clouds that covered 
the dead that had grappled and fallen together on Malvern 
Hill. The enemy was gone, and reached his lodgement at 
Harrison's Landing on James River, the old seat of that 
family which has given our country two Presidents. Jack- 

10 



146 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

son stood on the direct route of the enemy's retreat, and 
was ordered to follow it ; Magruder's and Huger's com- 
mands to follow Jackson. General Lee rode with them. 
D. H. Hill's division was left to care for the wounded and 
dead of Malvern Hill. To obviate pressure upon a single 
track, the reserve divisions were ordered by Nance's Store, 
but the heavy clouds soon began to let down a pelting 
rain that became more severe and delayed all movements. 

The reports of Jackson and Stuart of the operations of 
the 3d are conflicting. The former claimed that he was 
near the landing on the morning of the 3d, and advanced 
his line of skirmishers. The latter reported that he found 
during the night of the 2d a fine position on Erlington 
Heights, from which the enemy could be shelled out of 
his new position by artillery ; that he occupied and held 
that position by a squadron and howitzer until driven 
from it by the enemy at two o'clock in the afternoon of 
the 3d ; that he reported of that position to Generals Lee 
and Jackson during the night of the 2d. Other accounts 
go with that of Stuart. It seems that the " foot cavalry" * 
and the reserve divisions met at the landing late in the 
afternoon of the 3d. The troops from the Valley district 
had not been engaged in the battles of the march except 
that of Gaines's Mill. 

At daylight of the 4th I rode to the front, and ordered 
General Jackson to drive in the enemy's skirmishers and 
prepare to attack. D. K. Jones's division of Magruder's 
command, coming up, was ordered on Jackson's left, A. P. 
Hill's on his right ; my own division to support Jackson's 
direct move for Erlington Heights. After pushing the 
skirmish line back, Jackson reported his troops not in con- 
dition for the work, and asked delay until the command- 
ing general was up. As General Lee was reported near, 
attack was delayed, and a note was sent asking him to 

* A name taken by the infantry from the Valley district on account 
of their swift secret marches. 



BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 147 

ride forward as soon as convenient. He rode up iii about 
half an hour, and, after mature deliberation, decided that 
the attack should not be made. He reinforced his cavalry 
and horse artillery by a number of his choicest field but- 
teries, and ordered General Stuart to use them against the 
enemy's transports on the lower James. This expedition 
did some damage, but the superior batteries of the gun- 
boats, convoys of the transports, enabled them to maintain 
safe-conduct along the line of supplies and reinforcements. 
On the 8th he withdrew his army to points more con- 
venient to supplies, and towards the open highway to 
Washington City. 

Passing in critical review the events of the campaign, 
they fail to disclose a flaw as it was projected by the Con- 
federate chief. It even opened up grander possibilities 
than came within his most hopeful anticipations at the 
period of projection. 

The Union commander left his Fifth Corps engaged at 
Beaver Dam Creek while Jackson's column marched by 
it as far as Hundley's Corner and went into camp. The 
object and instructions of Jackson's advanced echelon 
were to have him file in against any force that he might 
pass and attack it in flank and rear. If, instead of going 
into camp at Hundley's Corner on the afternoon of the 
26th of June, he had filed to his right behind the Fifth 
Corps, he would have had it surrounded by fifty thousand 
men beyond the reach of succor. 

He was troubled by conflicting orders. The general 
order for the campaign and verbal instructions were in- 
tended to supersede all others, but General Lee's letter of 
the 11th was not recalled, so he marched with the two 
orders in his pocket, which made not a little trouble. 

Before Jackson's army was called from the Valley, it 
was reinforced and organized for our working column. 
On the morning of the 27th of June it was further aug- 
mented by the division under D. H. Hill and Stuart's 



148 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

cavalry. His line of march during the day led him 
around Porter's position near Gaines's Mill to the enemy's 
right, the most favorable point for attack. He partially 
engaged by D. H. Hill's division, then withdrew it, and 
posted his troops in a position selected to catch the Fed- 
erals in their flight from A. P. Hill's division. Finally, 
when Porter's defence developed too much strength for 
A. P. Hill, he dej^loyed into line of battle from left to 
right, overspreading the enemy's entire front. 

On the morning of the 28th of June, General Lee 
thought to draw McClellan out from his works, force him 
to defend his base on the Pamunkey, and to so cripple 
him on his retreat as to warrant strong detachments 
from his army in the direction of Washington, and thus 
force him to defend his own capital. 

Before marching to the opening of the campaign, he 
ordered a detachment of cavalry to the south side of 
White Oak Swamp, under careful watch for the enemy's 
movements by vedettes, even as far as Chickahominy 
River, so that on the night of the 27tli he had a cordon 
of troops and vedettes extending completely around Mc- 
Clellan's army. Notwithstanding precautions so carefully 
laid, McClellan started to march for his new base on the 
night of the 27th, continued his preparations and move- 
ments through the day and night of the 28th, and the 
first reliable information of the move towards James 
River came from Major Meade and Lieutenant Johnson, 
engineers. The information, though coming from a 
source least looked for, was more than gratifying to Gen- 
eral Lee, for he thought the enemy had essayed a move 
not practicable ; that General McClellan's army was in 
his power and must be our prize, never to reach the new 
base. 

Just as he was mapping out orders of pursuit, a staff- 
ofiicer of General Magruder's came from the other side 
of the river to report the Federal army in retreat, and 



BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 149 

that General Magruder was preparing to assault the fort 
in his immediate front. General Lee said, — 

' ' My compliments to General Magruder, and ask him not to 
hurt my young friends, Major Meade and Lieutenant Johnson, 
who are occupying that fort." 

Uniformly military, but courteous in his bearing, it was 
very rare that he became facetious when on parade service, 
but anticipations that General McClellan was soon to be 
his prisoner excused the giving way to impulse born of 
this unexpected adventure. 

Within an hour his troops on the east side were on the 
march for their crossings of the Chickahominy. He then 
rode across, gave orders to General Magruder, rode with 
him some distance, and repeated the orders before leaving 
him. 

Following up the rear-guard. General Magruder came 
upon it in force at Savage Station. The Second Corps 
and Franklin's division under W. F. Smith of the Sixth, 
under General Sumner, were posted there to cover the 
retreat. Magruder planned battling with his own six 
brigades against their front, two brigades of Huger's di- 
vision to come on the enemy's left down the Williamsburg 
road, Jackson's twelve or fifteen brigades to attack their 
right. But when Magruder thought his arrangements 
complete, he received a message from General Huger 
" that his brigades would be withdrawn." * 

Then other information not anticipated came to him, — 
viz., that General Jones, commanding on Magruder's left, 
called for co-operation in that quarter. General Jackson 
sent word in reply that " he had other important duty to 
perform." 

Referring to Jackson's orders of the 29th, General Lee 
wrote General Magruder : 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part 11. p. 664. 



150 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

'' Head-quarters Department of Northern Virginia, 

"June 29, 1862. 
" Major- General J. B. Magruder, 

' ' Commanding Division : 
"General, — I regret much that you have made so little 
progress to-day in pursuit of the enemy. In order to reap the 
fruits of our victory the pursuit should be most vigorous. I must 
urge you, then, again to press on his rear rapidly and steadily. 
We must lose no time, or he will escape us entirely. 

" Very respectfully yours, etc., 

"R. E. Lee, 
^^ General. 
"P.S. — Since the order was written, I learn from Major Tay- 
lor that you are under the impression that General Jackson has 
been ordered not to support you. On the contrary, he has been 
directed to do so, and to j)ush the pursuit vigorously." * 

Sumner, besides his greater force, having some advan- 
tage from the earthworks previously constructed, repulsed 
Magruder's attack, and the affair of cross-purposes failed 
of effect. 

If Jackson could have joined against the right of 
Sumner with his brigades, the latter could have been 
dislodged, the Confederates passing the swamp with him, 
which would have marked the beginning of the end. The 
occasion was especially propitious, for Heintzelman's corps, 
that had been designated as part of the rear-guard with 
Sumner and Franklin, through some misconception had 
marched over the swamp, to camp near Charles City cross- 
roads, leaving easy work for Jackson and Magruder. 

When, on the forenoon of the 30th, Jackson found his 
way across the swamp blocked by Franklin, he had time 
to march to the head of and across it to the Charles City 
^road in season for the engagement contemplated at Fray- 
ser's Farm, the distance being about four miles. General 
Wright, of Huger's division, marched his brigade from 
the head of the swamp to Jackson's line at the bridge, 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xi. part ii. p. 687. 



BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 151 

and returned, making several halts and crossings to recon- 
noitre. 

But little remains to be said of the engagements at 
Frayser's Farm and Malvern Hill. The former was a 
halting failure of combination of forces ; the latter an 
accident resulting from the armies standing close abreast 
many hours. Malvern Hill left out, the two armies would 
have mingled their lines between that and Westover dur- 
ing the 3d and 4tli of July. 

The failure of concert of action by the Confederates 
should not discount the conduct of McClellan's masterly 
retreat. In the emergency he showed himself well 
equipped in the science of war, and prepared to cross 
swords with his able adversary. At the opening of the 
campaign he had in hand one hundred and five thousand 
men. General Lee's returns were not accurately made, 
but a fair estimate puts his numbers between eighty and 
eighty-five thousand. 

The losses of the campaign were, on the Union side, 
15,249 ; on the Confederate side, greater ; in the absence of 
complete returns, it is fair to say that they were from 18,000 
to 19,000. Up to the time of Malvern Hill the casualties 
were about equally divided between the two armies, but 
in that battle the Confederates lost not far from 5000 
men, and the Federals not more than one-third that 
number. 

Upon reaching the 'gunboats, General McClellan's 
power was about doubled. Although fire from the gun- 
boats was not very effective against a land battle, the 
moral effect of fighting batteries that could not be reached 
was most powerful. It was reported on the Confederate 
side that General McClellan, on boarding one of the 
boats, where he spent most of the day of battle, said, 
" There should be a gunboat in every family." 

Some critics say that McClellan should have taken 
Kichmond during the campaign. The great Napoleon 



152 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

would have done so after the disaster at Malvern Hill 
with his regularly organized army of veterans. They 
say, too, that Lee should have captured McClellan and 
his army. So thought General Lee, but some of his 
leaders were working at cross-purposes, and did not have 
that close attention that the times called for. 

We may now consider the probable result of the plan 
mapped out and ordered by General Lee in his letter 
of June 11th to General Jackson had it been followed, 
— i.e., Jackson to march down the right bank of the 
Pamunkey with his troops from the Valley district and 
attack McClellan's rear east of the Chickahominy, while 
Lee attacked from the Richmond side with his army. On 
the Kichmond side, McClellan had four army corj^s, well 
fortified, suj^ported by his powerful artillery. The battle 
of Gaines's Mill, where the troops from the Valley were 
reinforced by four of Lee's choice divisions and most of 
his cavalry, — more than doubling Jackson's column, — may 
be significant of the result of Jackson's attack on that 
side if it had been made as ordered. The battle of Mal- 
vern Hill, from an open field, may tell the result of an 
attack upon the four corps in their fortified position had 
the attack been made upon them from the Richmond front. 



CHAPTER XII. 

HALLECK AND POPE IN FEDERAL COMMAND. 

Centres of Activity gravitate towards Orange and Culpeper Counties — 
Pope's Unsoklierly Preliminary Orders — Jackson's and Pope's En- 
counter at Cedar Mountain— Confidence in and Esteem for General 
Lee — The Confederate Commander's Plans for cutting off Pope mis- 
carry — Capture of Captain Fitzhugh with Important Orders — Long- 
street puts General Toombs under Arrest— General Pope withdraws. 

The Federals had by this time organized the " Army 
of Virginia" from the independent forces in the State, — 
the First Corps under General Sigel, the Second under 
General Banks, the Third under General McDowell, com- 
manded by Major-General John Poj^e, brought from the 
West for that object and appointed June 26. This army 
reported July 31, 46,858 strong, for field service. 

On the 23d of July, General H. W. Halleck assumed 
command of the Federal armies as general-in-chief, by 
order of the President of July 11. 

The quiet of General McClellan's army at Harrison's 
Landing assured General Lee of his opj^ortunity for at- 
tention to the movements of the army under General Pope, 
working towards Pichmond by the Orange and Alexan- 
dria Railway. On the 13th of July he ordered General 
Jackson, with his own and Ewell's division, to Gordons- 
ville, to have a watch upon the Federal force operating in 
that quarter, promising reinforcements as soon as occasion 
should call for them. Stuart was at Hanover Court- 
House, in observation towards Fredericksburg, and Pob- 
ertson's cavalry was ordered to Jackson, to reinforce his 
cavalry under Colonel Munford. 

To engage attention pending these movements, General 
D. H. Hill, in command on the south side of the James, 

153 



154 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

was ordered to have all of his artillery on that side avail- 
able put in battery on the banks of the river against 
McClellan's camps on the north side and his transports 
on the water. 

General Pope immediately displayed bold front as a 
diversion, seeking to draw General Lee away from Mc- 
Clellan. 

So General Lee sent General A. P. Hill with his di- 
vision to reinforce Jackson, with orders to the latter to 
strike out for the enemy in his front. 

The threatening attitude of the Confederates at Gor- 
donsville caused a]3prehension at Washington, and induced 
the authorities to consider the withdrawal of McClellan's 
army to reinforce the army under Pope. 

Upon receipt of an intimation to that effect, General 
McClellan ordered a strong force under General Hooker 
to advance in threatening move against General Lee on 
the 4th of August. Hooker marched on the 5th, and 
occupied the ground of the battle of Malvern Hill. Gen- 
eral Lee ordered the divisions of McLaws, D. R. Jones, 
that under Rij^ley (D. H. Hill's), and my own to march 
against Hooker. It was night when our troops were 
posted, and before daylight of the next morning Hooker 
had marched back to his camp at Harrison's Landing. 

Just here, as a digression from following the operations 
of the armies of Lee and Pope, it should be remarked 
that the latter, by injudicious and unsoldierly attitude 
assumed at the outstart of his campaign, intensely in- 
censed the people of Virginia and the South generally, 
the Confederate army to a man, and probably to a con- 
siderable degree discomfited the most considerate and 
thoughtful of his own officers and the authorities behind 
him. The exigencies of war did not demand some of the 
harsh measures that he promulgated, — such, for instance, 
as his notorious " General Orders No. 11" and several 
other of his pronunciamentos : 



HALLECK AND POPE IN FEDERAL COMMAND. 155 

"Head-quarters Army OF Virginia, 
"Washington, July 23, 1862. 
"General Orders No. 11.* 

"Commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and detached 
commands will proceed immediately to arrest all disloyal male 
citizens within their lines or within their reach in rear of their 
respective stations. 

"Such as are willing to take the oath of allegiance to the 
United States, and will furnish sufficient security for its observ- 
ance, shall be permitted to remain at their homes and pursue in 
good faith their accustomed avocations. Those who refuse shall 
be conducted south beyond the extreme pickets of this army, and 
be notified that if found again anywhere within our lines, or at 
any point in rear, they will be considered spies, and subjected to 
the extreme rigor of military law. 

"If any person, having taken the oath of allegiance as above 
specified, be found to have violated it, he shall be shot, and his 
property seized and applied to the public use. 

" All communication with any person whatever living within 
the lines of the enemy is positively prohibited, except through 
the military authorities and in the manner specified by military 
law ; and any person concerned in writing or in carrying letters 
or messages in any other way will be considered and treated as a 
spy within the lines of the United States army. 

"By command of Major-General Pope. 

"Geo. D, Euggles, 
" Colonel, Assistant Adjutant- General, and Chief of Staff. ^^ 

This was a measure of unnecessary severity towards 
non-combatants, and had an unsalutary effect. When 
men volunteer to fight in their country's cause they should 
be credited with faith in its righteousness, and with expec- 
tations of meeting soldiers worthy of their mettle. Ap- 
peals to turn their strength against women and children 
and non-combatants are offensive to manhood, demoral- 
izing in influence, and more likely to aggravate and pro- 
long war spirit than to open ways of order and amity. 
Besides, such orders indicate a flaw in the armor of the 
author. 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 52. 



156 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

General Scott set an example worthy of eternal emula- 
tion. In his march through Mexico he was as strict in the 
requirement of order and protection for non-combatants 
as he could have been in marching through his own civil 
communities. The result was speedy peace, respect from 
all the people, admiration and affection from many. 

When A. P. Hill's division joined General Jackson at 
Gordonsville, General Pope's army was posted, — the First 
Corps (Sigel's) at Sperryville, the Second (Banks's) at 
CulpeiDcr Court-House, the Third (McDowell's), one di- 
vision near Culpeper Court-House, and one at Fredericks- 
burg — these two under Kicketts and King respectively; 
his cavalry under Buford, Bayard, and Hatch along the 
Papidan from the Blue Pidge to Fredericksburg. 

The point held by his left was thought essential by the 
Washington authorities as holding the way for reinforce- 
ments from McClellan's army on the James to join in 
the contemplated march by General Pope's route to Pich- 
mond. 

On the 2d of August, Jackson sent part of his cav- 
alry forward as far as Orange Court-House, under Colonel 
W. E. Jones, who encountered at that point a formidable 
cavalry guard of the enemy, when a spirited affair oc- 
curred, creditable alike to both sides. This was followed 
up, on the 8th, by the advance of Jackson's entire force, 
his own division under Winder leading, Ewell's and A. P. 
Hill's following. 

General Pope's outpost at Cedar Pun, held by cavalry 
and Crawford's brigade of infantry, had meantime been 
reinforced by the balance of the Second Corps under 
Banks, and Picketts's division put in supporting position 
of the advance post. 

On the 9th, Jackson advanced and found the enemy in 
strong position at Cedar Pun. His division under Ewell 
was posted on the northeast slope of Slaughter Mountain, 
his own division under Winder formed to the left. The 



BATTLE OF 

SLAUGHTER MOUNTAIN 

August 9th, 1862 

Federals ^^" Confederates ^^" 

"^randy Station 




HALLECK AND POPE IN FEDERAL COMMAND. 157 

engagement was pitched and soon became severe. While 
yet posting his troops, Winder was mortally struck by 
a fragment of shell. Banks, gaining confidence in his 
battle, moved forward to closer and severe fight and held 
it an hour, at points j^utting Jackson's troops in disorder. 
Jackson, reinforced by A. P. Hill's brigades, recovered 
his lost ground, advanced and renewed attack, drove the 
enemy back, engaged against reinforcements of Ricketts's 
division, continued the fight till near midnight, then reor- 
ganized for battle away from the immediate front of the 
enemy, where he awaited next day. During the evening 
of the 9th, Pope received his First Corps under Sigel and 
called up McDowell's division, under King, from Freder- 
icksburg. On the 10th both armies remained quiet. On 
the 11th a flag of truce was sent in asking for time to 
bury the dead, which Jackson granted, and extended to a 
late hour of the day. King's division coming up. Pope 
decided to engage again on the 12th, but Jackson, having 
information of the extent of reinforcements, decided to 
withdraw during the night. 

The loss was severe on both sides, — Jackson's, 1276, 
including his most promising brigadier. Winder ; Pope's, 
2381, including three brigadiers, two wounded and one 
taken prisoner. 

After drawing King's division to his field. General 
Pope had about thirty-six thousand present for service. 
Jackson's reports as to these forces were such that he ac- 
cepted the advice of prudence and retired to stronger 
ground on the right bank of the Rapidan. 

In the battle of the 9th the troops engaged were, ac- 
cording to official return of July 31,* — 

Second Corps (Banks's), artillery and infantry 14,567 

Ricketts's division, half of Third Corps, artillery and infantry . 9,287 

Total 23,854 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 53. 



158 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The absence of Lawton's brigade and one from Jack- 
son's division reduced liis force to something less than 
eighteen thousand. The troops engaged in battle, how- 
ever, were not far from equal, Jackson probably the 
stronger. 

That this was only a partial success — coming on the 
heels of the cruel orders of the Federal commander — was 
gratifying to the Confederates, and encouraging as well. 

Inaction of the Army of the Potomac gave General 
Lee opportunity for movement of his troops towards Wash- 
ington and the army under General Pope. On the 15th 
1 was ordered to Gordonsville by the Central Railroad 
with ten brigades. Two others under Hood at Hanover 
Junction were ordered to join me. 

Before despatching my corps, General Lee expressed 
his thought to advance the right column and cavalry by 
the lower fords of the Rapidan, the left by the fords 
above the railroad bridge, but left the question open, with 
orders to me to work on it. 

The brigades that moved with me were D. R. Jones's, 
Kemper's, Pickett's, Pryor's, Jenkins's, Featherston's, 
Wilcox's, Toombs's, Evans's, and Drayton's. Hood's 
and Whiting's joined us near Gordonsville, Hood com- 
manding the demi-division, — his own and Whiting's 
brigades. 

It may be well to write just here that experience during 
the seven days about Richmond established between Gen 
eral Lee and his first lieutenant relations of confidence 
and esteem, official and personal, which ripened into 
stronger ties as the mutations of war bore heavier upon 
us. He always invited the views of the latter in moves of 
strategy and general policy, not so much for the purpose of 
having his own views approved and confirmed as to get new 
light, or channels for new thought, and was more pleased 
when he found something that gave him new strength 
than with efforts to evade his questions by compliments. 



HALLECK AND POPE IN FEDERAL COMMAND. 159 

When oppressed by severe study, he sometimes sent for 
me to say that he had applied himself so closely to a 
matter that he found his ideas running around in a circle, 
and was in need of help to find a tangent. Our personal 
relations remained as sincere after the war until politics 
came between us in 1867. 

General Pope was industriously increasing his strength. 
The Ninth Corps, General Burnside, had been ordered to 
Fredericksburg via Acquia Creek, and a division under 
General Reno of eight thousand of that corps reported to 
the commander at Cul{)eper Court-House on the 14th. 
Besides reinforcements called to support him from General 
McClellan's army. Pope was authorized to call to his aid 
the greater part of the army in West Virginia under 
General Cox. 

After reaching Gordonsville and learning something 
of the position of the armies, and more of the features of 
the country, it occurred to me that a move against General 
Pope's right would give us vantage-ground for battle and 
pursuit, besides the inviting foot-hills of the Blue Bidge 
for strategy, and this preference was expressed to General 
Lee.* He joined us on the 15th, and the brigades, in- 
cluding those under Hood, were advanced to position for a 
general march. He thought it better to strike in between 
General Pope's left and the reinforcements that could 
join him from Fredericksburg than to adopt the proposi- 
tion to move his army by the upper fords of the Bapidan 
and strike down upon the enemy's right, and decided to 
throw his right wing forward by the Baccoon Ford, and 
his left by the Somerville Ford, the latter above the rail- 
road, — Fitzhugh Lee and Bobertson's cavalry with his 
right, and T. T. Munford's with the left wing ; General 
Stuart with the column on the right. 

My command marched on the 16th to position for cross- 



His letter of August 14, 1862. 



160 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

ing by the lower fords. Jackson was in position for the 
upper crossings. As all of the cavalry was not up, General 
Lee ordered his march for the 18th, to give time for the 
arrival of General Stuart and his marching troopers. 

Leaving the cavalry on the march, under General Fitz- 
hugh Lee, with instructions to camp on the plank-road 
opposite Raccoon Ford on the 17tli, General Stuart rode 
on the cars to General Lee's head-quarters, received his 
orders, and rode out on the plank-road to join his com- 
mand under Fitzhugh Lee, then due. The latter, how- 
ever, " by failure to comply with instructions," as his 
commander expressed it subsequently, lost a day in a 
roundabout ride, which so jaded his horses that another 
day was sacrificed to give them rest. As if this were not 
sufficient misfortune, Captain Fitzhugh (General J. E. B. 
Stuart's adjutant) was captured, and, as a crowning dis- 
aster, the despatch of the Confederate commander giving 
instructions for the march of his army as ordered for the 
18th was lost. The despatch was taken to General Pope, 
who, thus advised by accident, immediately set about re- 
tiring from Culpeper to the east bank of the Raj^pahan- 
nock. General Pope reported that 

''The cavalry expedition sent out on the IGth In the direction 
of Louisa Court-House captured the adjutant-general of General 
Stuart, and was very near capturing that officer himself. Among 
the papers taken was an autograph letter of General Eobert E, 
Lee to General Stuart, dated Gordonsville, August 15, which 
made manifest to me the position and force of the army, and 
their determination to overwhelm the army under my command 
before it could be reinforced by any portion of the Army of the 
Potomac." * 

Thus on that day Pope put his army in retreat by the 
several crossings of the Rappahannock to its strong camps 
of the north side, leaving his cavalry in observation. 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 29. 



HALLECK AND POPE IN FEDERAL COMMAND. 161 

As Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry failed to get to position on 
my right on the 17th, I ordered two regiments of infantry 
to be posted as guard on the road to Raccoon Ford until 
the cavalry could relieve them. The detail fell uj^on 
Toombs's brigade. As we were to be in wait during the 
17th, General Toombs rode off that morning to visit an 
old Congressional friend, and was absent when the order 
was received at his brigade head-quarters. The detail was 
filled by his next in rank. Colonel H. L. Benning, and duly 
posted. On his return. General Toombs rode uj^on his 
picket, claimed that his troops should not have been moved 
except by orders through himself, and ordered the detail 
back to their camps. Upon learning of General Stuart's 
mishap, and the ride of the Federal cavalry by Raccoon 
Ford, I sent to inquire how the cavalry happened to es- 
cape my picket-guard. Finding that the troops had been 
ordered off by General Toombs, the chief of stafiP was 
directed to put on his sword and sash and order him 
under arrest. Afterwards he was ordered to the rear, to 
confine himself to the limits of Gordonsville. 

In addition to Reno's command, Stevens's division of 
the Ninth Corps joined General Pope on the 15th. On 
the 17th, Reno sent out a party of two hundred and fifty 
men and captured Jackson's signal-station on Clarke's 
Mountain ; and it appears from the official report of this 
occurrence that the Federals were misinformed as to our 
position, and that up to the receipt of the captured de- 
spatch, General Pope knew nothing of the arrival of the 
troops of my command. 

On the 18th report came from Clarke's Mountain of 

unusual stir in the Federal commands about Culpeper 

Court-House, and General Lee sent for me to ride with 

him to the mountain to observe the movements. From 

the summit we had a fair view of many points, and the 

camp-flags, as they opened their folds to the fitful breezes, 

seemed to mark places of rest. Changing our glasses to 

11 



162 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the right and left and rear, the white tops of army 
wagons were seen moving. Half an hour's close watch 
revealed that the move was for the Kappahannock River. 
Changing the field of view to the bivouacs, they seemed 
serenely quiet, under cover from the noonday August sun. 
As we were there to learn from j)ersonal observation, our 
vigilance was prolonged until the wagons rolled down the 
declivities of the Rappahannock. Then, turning again to 
view the bivouacs, a stir was seen at all points. Little 
clouds of dust arose which marked the tramp of soldiers, 
and these presently began to swell into dense columns 
along the rearward lines. Watching without comment 
till the clouds grew thinner and thinner as they ap- 
proached the river and melted into the bright haze of the 
afternoon sun, General Lee finally put away his glasses, 
and with a deeply-drawn breath, expressive at once of 
disappointment and resignation, said, " General, we little 
thought that the enemy would turn his back upon us thus 
early in the campaign." 



CHAPTEE XIII. 

MAKING READY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN. 

General Lee modifies his Order of Marcli — Continuous Skirmishing — 
Cavalry Commander Stuart gets into General Pope's Head-quarters 
and captures his Personal Equipment — His Uniform Coat and Hat 
shown along the Confederate Lines — Jackson's Superb Flank Move- 
ment — Confederates capture Trains, Supplies, Munitions, and Prison- 
ers — Hooker and Ewell at Bristoe Station — Jackson first cfn the Old 
Field of Bull Run— Longstreet's Command joins passing Thorough- 
fare Gap — Pope practically throws Responsibility for Aggressive Ac- 
tion on McDowell — Preliminary Figliting — General Pope surprised 
by Jackson— Pope's Orders to Fitz-John Porter. 

Under the retrograde of the Union army, General Lee 
so modified his order of march as to meet the new condi- 
tions. On the 20th of August the march was made, the 
right wing to the vicinity of Kelly's Ford on the Kappa- 
hannock Kiver, the left to the railroad bridge and fords 
above. At Kelly's Ford it seemed possible to force a 
crossing. As we were preparing for it, an order came 
reporting the upper crossings too well defended, and call- 
ing for the right wing to march to that point, while the 
left marched up in search of more favorable points. As 
we were leaving Kelly's the enemy made a dash to cross, 
and engaged some of the brigades in a sharp fight, intend- 
ing to delay our movements, but the main column marched 
on, while this affair was still in j^rogress. By mutual 
consent the fight subsided, both parties joined their proper 
commands and proceeded on their upward march, each 
on its own side of the stream. At Beverley's Ford, 
Stuart's cavalry under Bosser crossed and made a lodge- 
ment on the east bank, but the near approach of the 
enemy's column threatening, before the infantry could get 
up in support, made necessary the abandonment of the 
ground, and the left wing continued to feel along higher 

163 



164 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

up for a crossing. Passing up, Trimble's brigade was left 
at Beverley's as guard to Jackson's rear. The enemy, 
conceiving an opportunity, crossed at Freeman's Ford and 
attacked Trimble. Meanwhile, a detachment had been 
called for from the right wing. Hood, with his own and 
Whiting's brigade, was ordered, and was in time to join in 
Trimble's fight, which ended in repulse of the adventurous 
force. 

The east banks of the Rappahannock lifted quite above 
those occupied by the Confederates, giving advantageous 
position to the Union artillery fire, and offering no point 
above Kelly's Ford to force a crossing. 

When the left wing marched from Rappahannock 
Bridge, the enemy crossed a considerable force to the 
west bank, and covered it with a number of superior bat- 
teries well posted on the east side. To dislodge that force 
I put a number of batteries into action, including the 
Washington Artillery, and, later, part of the reserved 
battalion under Colonel S. D. Lee. The combat consumed 
much of the day of the 23d, when the enemy withdrew 
from that bank and burned some of the dwellings as he left. 

Biding along the line of batteries during the combat, 
we passed a soldier-lad weeping over his brother, who had 
just been killed ; just then a shell came screaming by, 
exj)loded, and dashed its fragments into the ground near 
enough to dust us a little. " Dad drat those Yankees !" 
he said ; "if I had known that they were going to throw 
such things as that at a fellow, I would have stayed in 
Texas." He had travelled a thousand miles to volunteer 
in the same company with his brother. 

Assured of the transfer of McClellan's forces from the 
James, General Lee called up the divisions of Generals 
D. H. Hill, McLaws, the half division under J. G. 
Walker, and Hampton's cavalry from Richmond. Ander- 
son's division was marching from Orange Court-House as 
our reserve force. 



MAKING READY FOE, MANASSAS AGAIN. 165 

On the 22d, Munford's cavalry reported the Warrenton 
road open as far as the vicinity of General Po2:>e's head- 
quarters. General Stuart was ordered over, with parts 
of his brigades, to investigate and make trouble in the 
enemy's rear. He crossed at Waterloo and Hunt's Mill 
with fifteen hundred troopers and Pelham's horse artillery, 
and rode to Warrenton. Passing through, he directed 
his ride towards Catlett's Station to first burn the bridge 
over Cedar Creek. 

Before reaching Catlett's a severe storm burst upon 
him, bogging the roads and flooding the streams behind 
him. The heavy roads delayed his artillery so that it 
was after night when he approached Catlett's. He caught 
a picket-guard and got into a camp about General Pope's 
head-quarters, took a number of prisoners, some camp 
property, and, meeting an old acquaintance and friend in 
a colored man, who conducted him to General Pope's 
tents, he found one of the general's uniform coats, a hat, 
a number of official desj)atches, a large amount of United 
States currency, much of the general's personal equip- 
ments, and one of the members of his staff. Major Gould- 
ing. He made several attempts to fire the bridge near 
Catlett's, but the heavy rains put out all fires that could 
be started, when he sought axes to cut it away. By this 
time the troops about the camps rallied and opened severe 
fire against him, but with little damage. The heavy rain- 
fall admonished him to forego further operations and 
return to the army while yet there was a chance to cross 
Cedar Creek and the Bappahannock before the tides 
came down. On the night of the 23d he reached Sulj^hur 
Springs, where he met General Jackson's troops trying to 
make comfortable lodgement on the east bank, passed 
over, and resumed position outside General Lee's left. 
The despatch-book of General Pope gave information of 
his troops and his anxiety for reinforcements, besides 
mention of those that had joined him, but General 



166 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Stuart's especial pleasure and pride were manifested over 
the possession of the uniform coat and hat of General 
Pope. Stuart rode along the line showing them, and 
proclaiming that he was satisfied with the exchange that 
made even his loss at Verdierville before the march ; but 
the despatch lost at Verdierville was the tremendous blow 
that could not be overestimated. 

All of the 23d was spent in severe artillery combat. 
General Jackson had gained the east bank at Warrenton 
(Sulphur Springs) crossing, and there seemed a fair pros- 
pect of making a permanent lodgement, but the tides from 
the severe storm of the day and night previous were coming 
down in torrents, threatening floods at all of the fords. 

On the 22d, Pope had formed a plan of concentrating 
his forces to cross and attack Lee's right by the lower 
fords, but the freshet had shut him off in that quarter ; 
so he turned to the detachment of Jackson, on the east 
side, just cut ofiP from support. Marching uf) the river 
bank, Jackson succeeded in so reinforcing his detach- 
ment as to defend it to an upper crossing till it found safe 
footing on the west bank. The high water cut off all 
operations by direct moves on the 24tli. Meanwhile, 
General Pope had received the divisions of Kearny and 
Reynolds from McClellan's army, forty-five hundred and 
twenty-five hundred respectively. 

About this time a letter came to head-quarters of the 
right wing from General Toombs, expressing regret at his 
unfortunate mistake in relieving his troops from picket 
service, and asking to be released from arrest, that he 
might have the opportunity to show in the approaching 
conflicts his deep interest in the cause. The adjutant- 
general was instructed to say in reply that the chief of 
corps was pleased to know that the malefeasance was from 
want of exj)erience, not intentional breach of authority, 
and that he would be more than welcome back by the gen- 
eral and the troops of his brigade. 




GENERAL THOMAS J. JACKSON (Stonewall). 



MAKING EEADY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN. 167 

On the 25th, Jackson was ordered to pull away from 
our main force with the left wing, march by the crossings 
of the upper tributaries through Thoroughfare Gsup, and 
strike the railway in the enemy's rear at Manassas Junc- 
tion, his supply depot. Stuart's cavalry was ordered to 
follow during the night. 

By a rapid march Jackson crossed the fords of the 
upper streams and made his bivouac near Salem. Forcing 
his march on the 26th, he passed Thoroughfare Gap to 
Gainesville, where Stuart joined him with all of his cav- 
alry. From Gainesville he inclined to the right for 
Bristoe Station, the cavalry holding the curtain between 
his column and Pope's. A little after sunset he reached 
the Orange and Alexandria Kailroad, a march of thirty 
miles. Approaching the station, trains were heard on 
the rails. General Ewell divided his force and took two 
points on the rails, so as to cut off the trains. Mun- 
ford's cavalry assisted in the job. Two trains and a 
number of prisoners were taken, the greater part of the 
detachment at the station making safe retreat. His plans 
against General Lee's right cut off by the high water, 
General Pope extended his right, under Sigel, Banks, and 
Reno, in search of Jackson up the river, who meanwhile 
had spirited himself away looking towards Pope's rear. 
I was left on the river bank in front, the reserve in- 
fantry, P. H. Anderson's division, and artillery near at 
hand. 

Although the night of the 26th was very dark, and his 
troops were severely worn, to be sure of his opportunity, 
Jackson sent a detachment to Manassas Junction (seven 
miles) . The gallant Trimble, with five hundred of his men, 
volunteered for the service, and set out at once on the march. 
Stuart was afterwards ordered to join Trimble with his 
cavalry, and as ranking officer to command the operations 
of the entire force. The infantry advanced and attacked 
the enemy as soon as it could be formed for work, captured 



168 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

three hundred prisoners, an eight-gun battery complete, 
and immense quantities of army supplies. 

Feeling the main force of his adversary in his front 
awaiting opportunity, General Pope became anxious about 
his left and rear, and was further hampered by instruc- 
tions from the Washington authorities to hold his Fred- 
ericksburg connections and " fight like the devil." (It 
may have been fortunate for the Confederates that he 
was not instructed to fight like Jackson.) On the 23d he 
was informed of strong reinforcements to reach him at 
Warrenton Junction on the next day, and that larger 
forces would be shipped him on the 24th, to join him on 
the 25th. 

Nevertheless, he began to realize, as he felt Jackson's 
march to his right, that he must abandon the line of the 
Kaj^pahannock and attend on the movements of that com- 
mand gone astray by the mountains. He concentrated 
the Army of Virginia, to which Reynolds's division had 
been assigned, at and near Warrenton under McDowell ; 
Reno east of Warrenton about three miles, on the turn- 
pike ; Porter's (Fifth) corps near Bealton, ordered to join 
Reno, and Heintzelman's (Third) corps, ten thousand 
strong, at Warrenton Junction. The Sixth (Franklin's) 
Corps, ten thousand strong, Army of the Potomac, was at 
Alexandria awaiting transportation, as were the divisions 
of Sturgis, ten thousand, and Cox, seven thousand, — the 
latter from West Virginia. General Po]3e asked to have 
Franklin's corps march by the Warrenton turnpike to 
join him, and sent instructions to different parties to see 
that the guards in his rear were strengthened ; that at 
Manassas Junction by a division. 

Under assurances from Washington of the prompt ar- 
rival of forces from that quarter, he looked for the ap- 
proach of Franklin as far as Gainesville, marching by the 
Warrenton turnj^ike, and a division to reinforce the com- 
mand at Manassas Junction, so that when Jackson cut in 



MAKING EEADY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN. 169 

on his rear and captured the detachment at the Junction, 
he was not a little surprised. He was in position for 
grand tactics, however, midway between the right and left 
wings of his adversary's forces, that in his rear worn by 
severe marches and some fighting, that in his front be- 
hind a river, the crossings of which were difficult, and the 
lines of march to bring the distant wings to co-operation 
over routes that could be defended by small commands. 

Communication with Washington being severed, the 
forces at and near Alexandria were thrown in the dark. 
To move by rail they were liable to run into the wrong 
camps, and the rapid change by water to the new position 
left them short of land transportation. 

Pope stood on the evening of the 27th : McDowell's 
corps, including Reynolds's division, 15,500 ; Sigel's 
corps, 9000; Banks's, 5000; Reno's, 7000; Heintzel- 
man's and Porter's corps, 18,000, — in all 54,500 men, 
with 4000 cavalry ; Piatt's brigade, Sturgis's division, 
which joined him on the 26th, not included. In his rear 
was Jackson, 20,000 ; in front on the Rappahannock 
was my 25,000 ; R. H. Anderson's reserve division, 5000 ; 
total, 50,000, with 3000 of cavalry under Stuart. 

On the 26th I moved up to and crossed at Hinson's 
Mill Ford, leaving Anderson's division on the Warrenton 
Sulphur Springs route. 

On the 27th, Jackson marched at daylight to Manassas 
Junction with his own division, under Taliaferro, and 
A. P. Hill's, leaving Swell's at Bristoe Station, with orders 
to withdraw if severely pressed. Ajoproaching the Junc- 
tion, a cavalry regiment came in, threatening attack, and 
was driven off by Colonel Baylor's regiment. A field 
battery came from the direction of Centreville, and tried 
to make trouble at long range, but was driven off by 
superior numbers. Then a brigade of infantry under 
General Taylor, of New Jersey, just landed from the cars 
from Alexandria, advanced and made a desperate effort 



170 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

to recover the lost position and equipage at Manassas 
Junction. Field's, Archer's, Pender's, and Thomas's bri- 
gades, moving towards the railroad bridge, met Taylor's 
command and engaged it, at the same time moving to- 
wards its rear, threatening to cut off its retreat. It was 
driven back after a fierce struggle, General Taylor, com- 
manding, mortally wounded. Part of the Kanawha divi- 
sion under General Scammon was ordered to its support, 
but was only in time to assist in its retreat. Reporting 
this affair. General Jackson said, — 

^ ' The advance was made with great spirit and determination, 
and under a leader worthy of a better cause." 

The spoils were then quietly divided, such as could be 
consumed or hauled off, and the balance given to the 
torch. 

I marched from the Rappahannock, following on Jack- 
son's trail, and camped at White Plains. The march 
during the day was delayed about an hour by a large force 
of cavalry which showed itself on my right front. As I 
had no cavalry, a little time was spent in learning of its 
import and following. 

General Pope ordered McDowell, with his own corps, 
including Reynolds's division and Sigel's corps, to march 
so as to be at Gainesville at nightfall ; Reno's corps and 
Kearny's division of the Third to Greenwich to support 
McDowell. He rode with Hooker's division of the Third 
along the route by the railroad for Bristoe Station, ordered 
Porter's Fifth Corps to remain at Warrenton Junction till 
relieved by Banks's corps, then to push on towards Gaines- 
ville, Banks to follow by the railroad route. 

In the afternoon. Hooker encountered Ewell at Bristoe 
Station, where the divisions engaged in a severe fight, 
which was handsomely maintained till after night. Ewell, 
under his orders, withdrew to join Jackson. The conduct 
of the affair was about equally creditable to the commands. 



MAKING READY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN. 171 

After this affair, General Pope so far modified his order 
of the day as to call Porter to him by direct route, to 
march at one a.m. and join him at daylight. Kearny's 
division was ordered for Bristoe Station, R-eno's corps for- 
Manassas Junction, and McDowell, from Gainesville, was 
ordered to swing around to his right and march, guided 
by the Manassas Gap Railroad, to Manassas Junction. 

Ewell made his way along the railroad to Jackson in 
time to refresh his men on the good things of the captures 
and for several hours of sleei?. Fitzhugh Lee, with three 
regiments of cavalry, was ordered on to Fairfax Court- 
House and along the railroad towards Alexandria to cut 
off rail connection. 

General McClellan reached Alexandria, Virginia, on 
the 27th. On the 28th, Jackson was first to move at 
12.20 A.M. He applied the torch to the stores of pro- 
visions, and marched with his division, under Taliaferro, 
by the New Market Sudley Springs road across the War- 
renton turnpike, and pitched bivouac on a line from near 
Groveton, towards Sudley Mills, on the field of first Ma- 
nassas, at daylight. 

At one A.M., A. P. Hill marched from Manassas Junc- 
tion, crossed Bull Bun, and halted at Centreville. Ewell 
followed at daylight towards Centreville, crossed Bull 
Bun, marched up some distance, recrossed, and joined 
Jackson, forming on Taliaferro's left. After the morning 
fires of the bivouac burned out, Jackson's position could 
not be seen except upon near approach. He was hid 
away under the cuts and embankments of an unfinished 
railroad. 

The road upon which Porter marched was crowded 
during the night, so that he and his officers thought that 
they would make better time and be in better condition by 
marching at three a.m. He reached Bristoe at ten a.m., 
Kearny at eight, and Beno in due season. But it was 
late in the morning when McDowell was ready to march, 



172 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

and later in the day when his left swung out on the march 
to the Junction, 

At twelve o'clock, General Pope reached Manassas Junc- 
tion. Misled by the movements of A. P. Hill and Ewell, 
he ordered Reno's corps and Kearny's and Hooker's divi- 
sions of the Third to Centreville, in search of Jackson, 
while the latter was little more than a league from him, 
resting quietly in his hiding-place, and his detached di- 
visions had doubled on their courses and were marching 
to join him. McDowell, having information of my ap- 
proach, delayed his march, detaching Ricketts's division 
to hold me in check at Thoroughfare Gap. 

The first passage at arms of the day was between part 
of Stuart's cavalry, supported by B. T. Johnson's infantry, 
and Meade's brigade of McDowell's command. As the 
latter swung around for his march to the Junction, the 
brigade approached Jackson's right. A detachment was 
pushed out against Meade, and some artillery practice fol- 
lowed. The Confederates retired, but rejoorted no loss. 
Under the impression that the force encountered was some 
cavalry rear-guard or reconnoitring party, McDowell re- 
sumed his march " as soon as the killed and wounded were 
cared for." 

The noise made by this affair caused Sigel to counter- 
march his corps, and otherwise delayed the march of Mc- 
Dowell's entire forces, while it gave no inconvenience to 
the Confederates further than a change of front of part of 
Jackson's command to receive battle, not intended, by his 
adversary. Jackson changed his front, but finding the 
direction of the enemy changed so as to march away from 
him, he took the move for a general retreat, made report 
of it to A. P. Hill, who was yet north of Bull Ran, and 
ordered him to intercept the retreat by manning the lower 
fords of Bull Run. The order was received at ten a.m., 
but General Hill had intercepted despatches of General 
Pope giving notice of his preparation for battle at Manas- 



MAKING READY FOE MANASSAS AGAIN. 173 

sas the next day, and thought it better to march on and join 
Jackson. He filed into line on Jackson's left about noon. 

General Jackson was right. If General Hill had moved 
as ordered, he would have met detachments ordered by 
General Pope to Centreville, and held them back to the 
south side until Jackson could join him to hold the line. 
The natural sequence of Confederate operations was posi- 
tion to intercept General Pope's return to Washington. 
The scenes were shifting and inviting of adventure, and 
the marches should have followed them. General Hill was 
justified by the circumstances that influenced his march. 

When General Pope reached the Junction with Heint- 
zelman's and Peno's corps, the game was on other fields. 
As the last of the Confederate columns had hied away 
towards Centreville, he ordered thither those corps, and 
called up the Fifth to join him. He then changed the 
orders of McDowell's column, directing it towards Centre- 
ville, to mass his cavalry, and find Jackson, and presently 
(at two P.M.) so far modified these as to direct McDowell 
to use his own judgment, and give him the benefit of his 
views, as he knew the country better, but ordered that he 
should not go farther towards Manassas Junction. These 
instructions were urgent, with assurances that McDowell's 
moves should be supported by other columns. Had these 
been promptly executed, McDowell's entire force should 
have encountered Jackson before four o'clock, but Mc- 
Dowell did not find Jackson. As his division, under 
King, marched along the turnpike a little before night, 
Jackson saw and engaged it in battle, as we shall see. 

The head of my column reached Thoroughfare Gap 
early in the afternoon. Peports from General Jackson 
were that he was resting quietly on the flank of the enemy, 
and between him and Washington. Parties from the Gap 
reported it clear, and the Confederate commander called a 
rest for the night, but D. P. Jones's division was ordered 
on to occupy the Gap. 



174 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

As we approaclied it, officers riding to the front returned 
reporting the enemy coming in heavy columns on the other 
side. Jones was ordered to halt his division till he could 
advance his skirmishers. The Ninth Georgia Regiment, 
G. T. Anderson's brigade, was sent and followed at proper 
distance by the division. The skirmishers met the enemy's 
pickets in the Gap, drove them off, and followed till they 
in turn were met by a strong force and pushed back. The 
enemy's leading brigade reached the plateau running along 
the eastern side of the mountain, which, with his batteries 
and infantry, gave him command at that end. Anderson 
reinforced his Ninth by the First, then by his other regi- 
ments on the mountain-side, to the left of the Gap, and 
advanced till arrested by the impenetrable tangle of the 
mountain undergrowth. 

The Gap is a pass cut through Bull Kun Mountain for 
the flow of a streamlet, through Occoquan Creek, to the 
waters of the Potomac. Its mean width is eighty yards. 
Its faces of basaltic rock rise in vertical ascent from one 
hundred to three hundred feet, relieved hither and thither 
by wild ivy, creeping through their fissures and from the 
tojDS of boulders in picturesque drapery. It was in the 
midst of this bold and beautiful scenery, in this narrow 
gorge where the Indians had doubtless often contested ages 
ago, that the seasoned soldiers of our civilized armies now 
battled for right of way. 

Finding his passage over the mountain by the left side 
of the Gap blocked by the mountain tangle, Jones called 
up Toombs's brigade, under command of Colonel Benning, 
and ordered it over the mountain obstacle by the south 
side. Drayton's brigade was held in rear. By the time 
the troops were so disposed, Ricketts's division was well 
deployed along the plateau on the east. 

Benning put Major Waddell, with the Twentieth Geor- 
gia, on the mountain-side as skirmishers, and strengthened 
it by another under Colonel Holmes, in double time, to 



MAKING READY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN. 175 

gain the crest on that side. The Twentieth gained the 
crest while the Federals were yet about eighty yards below 
on their side. The Georgians knew how to maintain their 
advantage, and their fire arrested farther advance of the 
enemy, when, after a spirited fusillade, reinforcements 
joined them in good season, and extended the line and 
held it, driving back the second assaulting force and fol- 
lowing down the eastern slope. 

As soon as the fire of the Federal batteries opened, 
Hood was ordered with his two brigades to cross the moun- 
tain on the north side of the Gap aAvay by a cattle- trail, 
and three other brigades were despatched under General 
Wilcox to Hopewell Pass, about three miles north of 
Thoroughfare Gap. 

Advancing his men, selected for their long-range rifles, 
Benning drove off a battery seeking position to play upon 
the mountain slope and eastern end of the gorge, and 
moved forward under cover of a ravine until he gained a 
flank fire upon the enemy's batteries. This, with the 
march of Wilcox through Hopewell Pass and the crossing 
of one of Hood's brigades, gave the Confederates com- 
manding position, and E-icketts withdrew in time to escape 
disaster. 

About six o'clock McDowell put his troops on the 
countermarch, Sigel's corps and Eeynolds's division back 
by the New Market road for its crossing of the Warren- 
ton turnpike, and King's division of his own corj^s down 
the turnpike. A. P. Hill's and Ewell's divisions, return- 
ing from the north of Bull Kun, hardly had time for rest, 
when the march of King's division was reported. About 
the same time the divisions that had been ordered by Pope 
to Centreville reached that point, driving off some Con- 
federate cavalry loitering along the way. 

As King's division was marching by, Jackson thought 
to come out from his lurking-place to learn the meaning 
of the march. The direction of the move again impressed 



176 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

him that Pope was retreating, and that his escape to the 
north side of Bull Run would put his army in a position 
of safety before General Lee could join him. It was late, 
the sun had set, but Jackson was moved to prompt action, 
as the only means of arresting and holding Pope for Gen- 
eral Lee's arrival. He was in plain view of the white 
smoke of the rifles of my infantry as they climbed over 
Bull Run Mountain, seven miles away, and in hearing of 
our artillery as the boom of the big guns, resounding along 
the rock-faced cliffs, gathered volume to offer salutations 
and greetings for the union of comrades and commands. 
He changed the front of his right division, and, noting 
the movement of Sigel's troops along the New Market 
road, called out Ewell with his brigades under Lawton 
and Trimble, and in addition to the artillery of these com- 
mands used the horse artillery under Pelham. As formed, 
this new line was broadside against the turnpike, his left a 
little way from Groveton. 

The ground upon which the action occurred had been 
passed an hour before by the division commander, General 
Hatch, who saw no indication of the presence of a foe. As 
the division marched, the column was made up of the bri- 
gades of Hatch, Gibbon, Doubleday, and Patrick. The 
action fell against the brigade commanded by General Gib- 
bon, who, taking it for a cavalry annoyance to cover retreat, 
opened against it, and essayed aggressive fight, till he found 
himself engaged against a formidable force of infantry and 
artillery. He was assisted by part of Doubleday's brigade, 
and asked for other assistance, which failed to reach him, 
till night came and ended the contest. His fight was des- 
perate and courageous against odds, but he held it and his 
line till dark. His loss .was seven hundred and fifty-one, 
including Colonel O'Connor and Major May, mortally 
wounded, with many other officers with lighter hurts.* 

* Eebellioii Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 378. 



MAKING READY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN. 177 

General Doubleday joined the fight with his brigade, 
and reported his loss nearly half of the troops engaged. 
General Gibbon called it " a surprise." * And well he 
might, after his division commander had just passed over 
the route and failed to find any indication of the lurking 
foe. 

General Jackson reported, " The conflict here was firm 
and sanguinary." He fails to give his number lost, but 
acknowledges his severe loss in the division commanders. 
General Ewell losing a leg, and Taliaferro severely 
wounded. 

During the night the Federal commander rej^orted to 
his subordinates that McDowell had " intercepted the 
retreat of Jackson, and ordered concentration of the army 
against him," f whereas it was, of course, Jackson who 
had intercepted McDowell's march. He seems to have 
been under the impression that he was about to capture 
Jackson, and inclined to lead his subordinates to the same 
opinion. 

Of the time. Major Edward Pye reported, — 

"We were sent forward towards evening to pursue the enemy, 
who were said to be retreating. Found the enemy, but did not 
see them retreat. A deadly fire from three sides welcomed and 
drove us back. ' ' J 

After night Gibbon held his front by a line of skir- 
mishers, and withdrew his command to a place of rest. 
At one A.M. the division was withdrawn and marched 
back to Manassas. Ricketts, finding himself in isolated 
position at Gainesville, left at daylight and marched to 
Bristoe. Jackson moved his forces at daylight, and re- 
established his line behind the unfinished railroad, his 
own division under General Stark, Ewell's under General 
Lawton, with A. P. Hill on his left. 



* Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 381. 

t Ibid., pp. 74, 75. J Ibid., p. 371. 

12 



178 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

General Pope's orders for the night directed the march 
of Kearny's division from Centreville by the turn23ike 
at one a.m., to reinforce the troops against Jackson ; the 
other division of Heintzelman's corps (Hooker's) to 
march by the same route at daylight, and to be fol- 
lowed by the corps under E-eno. These orders were 
urgent, and directed that the commands should move 
promptly, leaving fragments behind if all could not be 
got together in time ; Kearny to attack at daylight, to 
be supported by Hooker. 

McDowell's operations of the afternoon left Sigel's corps 
and Reynolds's division in the vicinity of the field of 
King's fight. Gelieral Pope's orders were given under 
the impression that King's division was still occupying 
the ground of the late conflict, and that Ricketts's division 
was not far away ; but these divisions had been removed 
to points before mentioned, though special instructions 
had been sent McDowell and King to hold the position 
" at all hazards, to prevent the retreat of Jackson," with 
assurances that at daylight in the morning the entire 
force from Centreville and Manassas Junction should be 
up and in prompt co-operation. 

But McDowell had probably learned that Jackson had 
no thought of retreating, and King had found that his 
ground was not tenable. The order intended for King 
failed to reach him. 

Before he was advised of the withdrawal of King's di- 
vision. General Pope sent orders to General Porter direct- 
ing movements for the 29th, informing him of the orders 
of Kearny and Hooker, and directing Porter to move at 
daylight towards Centreville, for position in co-operation 
of the projected battle, and ordering Reno to march for 
the battle by the Warrenton turnpike. Under the orders. 
Porter marched towards Centreville, and Reno towards 
the field for battle. Kearny deferred his march till day- 
light, and was followed by Hooker's division at convenient 



MAKING READY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN. 179 

marching distance. Reno's column followed the march 
«of the latter. 

As soon as advised of the withdrawal of King's division 
from the ground of the 28th, General Pope sent as sub- 
stitutes for his orders of the early morning that General 
Porter should push forward with his corps and King's divi- 
sion of McDowell's command to Gainesville, to co-operate 
with his movements along the Warrenton turnpike.* This 
order was received by Porter at 9.30 A.M.,f but General 
McDowell joined this column, and as ranking officer ob- 
jected to the transfer of his division under King to other 
authority, which brought out the joint order to McDowell 
and Porter to have their joint commands execute the move 
towards Gainesville. 



* Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 518. 
t Ibid., p. 520. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS (bULL KUN). 

Battle opened by the Federals on Jackson's Right, followed by Kearny 
— Longstreet's Reconnoissance— Stuart, the Cavalry Leader, sleeps on 
the Field of Battle — Pope thought at the Close of the 29th that the 
Confederates were retreating — Second Day— Fitz-John Porter struck 
in Flank — Longstreet takes a Hand in the Fight late in the Day — 
Lee under Fire— The Federal Retreat to Centreville — That Point 
turned — Pope again dislodged— " Stonewall" Jackson's Appearance 
and Peculiarities— Killing of " Fighting Phil" Kearny — Losses- 
Review of the Campaign. 

General Pope at daylight sent orders to General 
Sigel's corps, with Reynolds's division, to attack as soon 
as it was light enough to see, and bring the enemy to a 
stand if possible. At the same time orders were sent 
Heintzelman and Reno for their corps to hurry along the 
turnpike and join on the right of Sigel. The batteries 
opened in an irregular combat on the left, centre, and 
right a little after eight o'clock, and drew from Jackson a 
monotonous but resolute response. And thus early upon 
the 29th of August was begun the second battle upon this 
classic and fateful field. 

I^ marched at daylight and filed to the left at Gaines- 
ville at nine o'clock. As the head of the column approached 
Gainesville the fire of artillery became more lively, and its 
volume swelled to proportions indicating near approach to 
battle. The men involuntarily quickened step, filed down 
the turnpike, and in twenty minutes came upon the battle 
as it began to press upon Jackson's right, their left battery 
partially turning his right. His battle, as before stated, 
stood upon its original line of the unfinished railroad. 

As my columns approached, the batteries of the leading 
brigades were thrown forward to ground of superior 
sweep. This display and the deploy of the infantry were 

180 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 181 

SO threatening to the enemy's left batteries that he thought 
prudent to change the front of that end of his line more 
to his left and rear. Hood's two brigades were deployed 
across the turnpike at right angles, supported by the bri- 
gade under Evans. A battery advanced on their right to 
good position and put in some clever work, which caused 
the enemy to rectify all that end of his line. Kemper 
deployed two of his brigades, supported by the third, on 
the right of Hood. The three brigades under Wilcox 
were posted in rear of Hood and Evans, and in close sup- 
porting distance. On Hood's left and near Jackson's 
right was open field, of commanding position. This was 
selected by Colonel Walton, of the Washington Artillery, 
for his battalion, and he brought it bounding into position 
as soon as called. The division under D. E,. Jones was 
deployed in the order of the others, but was broken off to 
the rear, across the Manassas Gap Railroad, to guard 
against forces of the enemy rej)orted in the direction of 
Manassas Junction and Bristoe. As formed, my line made 
an obtuse angle forward of Jackson's, till it approached 
Manassas Gap Raih'oad, where D. R. Jones's division was 
broken in echelon to the rear. At twelve o'clock we were 
formed for battle. 

About eleven o'clock. Hooker's division filed to the 
right from the turnpike, to reinforce the Federal right 
under Kearny, who, with Sigel's corps and Reynolds's 
division, were engaged in a desultory affair against Jack- 
son's left, chiefly of artillery. 

R. H. Anderson's division marched at daylight along 
the Warrenton turnpike for Gainesville. 

When I reported my troops in order for battle. General 
Lee was inclined to engage as soon as practicable, but did 
not order. All troops that he could hope to have were up 
except R. H. Anderson's division, which was near enough 
to come in when the battle was in progress. I asked 
him to be allowed to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's 



182 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

ground, and along his left. After an hour's work, mounted 
and afoot, under the August sun, I returned and reported 
adversely as to attack, especially in view of the easy ap- 
proach of the troops reported at Manassas against my 
right in the event of severe contention. We knew of 
Ricketts's division in that quarter, and of a considerable 
force at Manassas Junction, which indicated one corps. 

At two o'clock Kearny made an earnest opening against 
Jackson's left, but no information of battle reached us on 
the right. He made severe battle by his division, and with 
some success, but was checked by Jackson's movements to 
meet him. General Stevens supported his battle, but his 
numbers were not equal to the occasion. General Sigel 
joined in the affair, and part of General Hooker's divi- 
sion, making a gallant fight, but little jorogress. General 
Grover's brigade made a gallant charge, but a single bri- 
gade was a trifle, and it met with only partial success, and 
was obliged to retire with heavy loss of killed and wounded, 
— four hundred and eighty-four. 

At one time the enemy broke through the line, cut- 
ting off* the extreme left brigade, and gained position on 
the railroad cut ; but Jackson and A. P. Hill reinforced 
against that attack, and were in time to push it back and 
recover the lost ground. 

Their attacks were too much in detail to hold even the 
ground gained, but they held firmly to the battle and their 
line until after night, when they withdrew to await orders 
for the next day. 

Though this fight opened at two o'clock, and was fiercely 
contested till near night, no account of it came from head- 
quarters to my command, nor did General Jackson think to 
send word of it. General Lee, not entirely satisfied with 
the report of my reconnoissance, was thinking of sending 
some of the engineers for more critical survey of his right 
front, when his chief of cavalry sent to inform him of the 
approach of a formidable column of infantry and artillery 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 183 

threatening his right. Wilcox's division was changed to 
supporting position of our right, under Jones, and I rode 
to look at this new force, its strength, and the ground of 
its approach. It was the column of McDowell's and Por- 
ter's corps, marching under the joint order. Porter's corps 
in advance deployed Morell's division, and ordered But- 
terfield's brigade, preceded by a regiment of skirmishers, 
to advance on their right, Sykes's division to support 
Morell. As this was in process of execution, McDowell, 
whose corps was in rear, rode to the front and objected to 
the plan and attack so far from the main force. 

A few shots were exchanged, when all became quiet 
again. We saw nothing of McDowell's corps, and our 
cavalry had not been able to get far enough towards their 
rear to know of its presence or force. He afterwards 
drew off from Porter's column and marched by the 
Sudley Springs road to join the main force on the turn- 
pike. I rode back and reported to General Lee that the 
column was hardly strong enough to mean aggressive 
work from that quarter, and at the same time rejDorted a 
dust along the New Market road which seemed to indicate 
movement of other troops from Manassas. 

General Stuart rode up, making similar report, and 
asked for orders. As our chief was not ready with his 
orders at the moment, Stuart was asked to wait. The 
latter threw himself on the grass, put a large stone under 
his head, asked the general to have him called when his 
orders were ready for him, and went sound asleep. 

Our chief now returned to his first plan of attack by 
his right down the turnpike. Though more than anxious 
to meet his wishes, and anticipating his orders,' I sug- 
gested, as the day was far spent, that a reconnoissance in 
force be made at nightfall to the immediate front of the 
enemy, and if an ojDening was found for an entering 
wedge, that we have all things in readiness at daylight for 
a good day's work. After a moment's hesitation he as- 



184 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

sented, and orders were given for the advance at early- 
twilight. 

This gave General Stuart half an hour siesta. When 
called, he sprang to his feet, received his orders, swung 
inta his saddle, and at a lope, singing, " If you want to 
have a good time, jine the cavalry," his banjo-player, 
Sweeny, on the jump behind him, rode to his troopers. 

Wilcox was recalled and ordered to march in supi^ort 
of Hood and Evans when they advanced on the recon- 
noissance. It so happened that our advance had been 
anticipated by an order to move from the enemy's side 
against us. They attacked along the turnpike by King's 
division about sunset. 

To the Confederates, who had been searching for an 
opportunity during the greater part of the day, and were 
about to march through the approaching darkness to find 
it, this was an agreeable surprise. Relieved of that irk- 
iBome toil, and ready for work, they jumped at the pres- 
ence, to welcome in countercharge the enemy's coming. 
A fierce struggle of thirty minutes gave them advantage 
which they followed through the dark to the base of the 
high ground held by bayonets and batteries innumer- 
able as compared with their limited ranks. Their task 
accomplished, they were halted at nine o'clock to await 
the morrow. One cannon, a number of flags, and a few 
prisoners were taken. 

Generals Wilcox and Hood were ordered to carefully 
examine the position of the enemy and report of the fea- 
sibility of attack at daylight. They came to corps head- 
quarters a little before twelve o'clock, and made separate 
reports, both against attack, with minute items of their 
conclusions. Hood was ordered to have the carriage of 
the captured gun cut up and left, and both were ordered 
to withdraw their commands to their first positions. 

Meanwhile, General Pope had sent orders to General 
Porter, dated 4.30 p.m., to attack upon my right flank, but 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 185 

the order was not received until it was too late for battle, 
and the force was not strong enough, and a fight at that 
hour might have been more unfortunate than the fights by 
detail on their right. If it had been sent to General Mc- 
Dowell before he left, the two corps, if he could have been 
induced to go in, might have given serious trouble. The 
field on their left was favorable for tactics, but on Porter's 
front it was rough, and R. H. Anderson's division was in 
striking distance of their left, if that effort had been made. 

Anderson marched in the dark as far as Hood's front 
before reporting for position, and was ordered back to 
Gainesville. 

The 4.30 order was issued under the impression that my 
troops, or the greater part of them, were still at Thorough- 
fare Gap, and General Pope said, in his official report, — 

'^I believe, in fact I am positive, that at five o'clock in the 
afternoon of the 29th, General Porter had in his front no consid- 
erable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sur^ 
now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the 
right flank of Jackson and to have fallen upon his rear ; that 
if he had done so, we should have gained a decisive victory over 
the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any 
of the forces of Longstreet." * 

After night. Porter's column marched by its right to 
follow the route of McDowell. 

The morning of the 30th broke fair, and for the Fed- 
eral commander bright with anticipations for the day. He 
wired the Washington authorities of success, that " the 
enemy was retreating to the mountains," and told of his 
preparations for pursuit. It seems that he took my recon- 
noissance for a fight, and my withdrawal for retreat, also 
interpreting reports from the right as very favorable. He 
reported, — 

' '■ General Hooker estimated the loss of the enemy as at least 
two to one, and General Kearny as at least three to one." 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part ii. p. 40, General Pope. 



186 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

He construed tlie operations of the night of the 29th 
and the reports of the morning of the 30th as indications 
of retreat of the Confederates. Prisoners captured during 
the night, paroled and returning to him, so rejDorted on 
the morning of the 30th, and his general officers had 
impressions of the Confederate left that confirmed the 
other accounts, and convinced him that we were in retreat. 

The forces threatening our right the day before having 
marched around towards the turnj)ike, D. R. Jones's di- 
vision was advanced to position near Kemper's right. 
Colonel S. D. Lee's artillery battalion was advanced to 
relieve the Washington Artillery, making our line com- 
plete, in battle front. 

About one o'clock in the afternoon, General Pojdc or- 
dered attack against Jackson's front by the corps under 
General Porter, supported by King's division, Heintzel- 
man and Keno to move forward and attack Jackson's left, 
to turn it and strike down against the flank, Ricketts's 
division in support of it ; but Ricketts was recalled and 
put near the turnpike, to supj^ort that part of Porter's 
field. 

During the early j^art of this severe battle not a gun 
was fired by my troops, except occasional shots from S. D. 
Lee's batteries of reserve artillery, and less frequent shots 
from one or two of my other batteries. 

Developments appearing unfavorable for a general 
engagement. General Lee had settled upon a move by 
Sudley Springs, to cross Bull Run during the night and 
try to again reach Pope's rear, this time with his army. 

About three p.m. I rode to the front to prepare to make 
a diversion a little before dark, to cover the j)lan proposed 
for our night march. As I rode, batteries resting on the 
sides of the turnpike thought that battle was at hand, 
and called their officers and men to stand to their guns 
and horses. Passing by and beyond my lines, a message 
came from General Jackson reporting his lines heavily 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 187 

pressed, and asking to be reinforced. Riding forward a 
few rods to an open, which gave a view of Jackson's 
field, I came in sight of Porter's battle, piling up against 
Jackson's right, centre, and left. At the same time an 
order came from General Lee for a division to be sent 
General Jackson. Porter's masses were in almost direct 
line from the point at which I stood, and in enfilade fire. 
It was evident that they could not stand fifteen minutes 
under the fire of batteries planted at that point, while a 
division marching back and across the field to aid Jack- 
son could not reach him in an hour, more time probably 
than he could stand under the heavy weights then bearing 
down upon him. Boldness was prudence ! Prompt work 
by the wing and batteries could relieve the battle. Re- 
inforcements might not be in time, so I called for my 
nearest batteries. Ready, anticipating call, they sprang 
to their places and drove at speed, saw the opportunity 
before it could be pointed out, and went into action. 
The first fire was by Chapman's battery, followed in roll- 
ing practice by Boyce's and Reilly's. Almost immediately 
the wounded began to drop off from Porter's ranks ; the 
number seemed to increase with every shot ; the masses 
began to waver, swinging back and forth, showing signs 
of discomfiture along the left and left centre. 

In ten or fifteen minutes it crumbled into disorder and 
turned towards the rear. Although the batteries seemed 
to hasten the movements of the discomfited, the fire was 
less effective upon broken ranks, which gave them courage, 
and they made brave efforts to rally ; but as the new lines 
formed they had to breast against Jackson's standing 
line, and make a new and favorable target for the batteries, 
which again drove them to disruption and retreat. Not 
satisfied, they made a third effort to rally and fight the 
battle through, but by that time they had fallen back far 
enough to open the field to the fire of S. D. Lee's artil- 
lery battalion. As the line began to take shape, this 



188 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

fearful fire was added to that under wliicli they had tried 
so ineffectually to fight. The combination tore the line 
to pieces, and as it broke the third time the charge was 
ordered. The heavy fumes of gunpowder hanging about 
our ranks, as stimulating as sparkling wine, charged the 
atmosphere with the light and splendor of battle. Time 
was culminating under a flowing tide. The noble horses 
took the spirit of the riders sitting lightly in their sad- 
dles. As orders were given, the staff, their limbs already 
closed to the horses' flanks, pressed their spurs, but the 
electric current overleaped their speedy strides, and twenty- 
five thousand braves moved in line as by a single impulse. 
My old horse, appreciating the importance of corps head- 
quarters, envious of the spread of his comrades as they 
measured the green, yet anxious to maintain his role, 
moved up and down his limited space in lofty bounds, 
resolved to cover in the air the space allotted his more 
fortunate comrades on the plain. 

Leaving the broken ranks for Jackson, our fight was 
made against the lines near my front. As the plain 
along Hood's front was more favorable for the tread 
of soldiers, he was ordered, as the column of direction, to 
push for the plateau at the Henry House, in order to cut 
off retreat at the crossings by Young's Branch. Wilcox 
was called to support and cover Hood's left, but he lost 
sight of two of his brigades, — Featherston's and Pryor's, 
— and only gave the aid of his single brigade. KemjDcr 
and Jones were pushed on with Hood's right, Evans in 
Hood's direct support. The batteries were advanced as 
rapidly as fields were opened to them, Stribling's, J. B. 
Richardson's, Eshleman's, and Rogers's having fairest 
field for progress. 

At the first sound of the charge, General Lee sent to 
revoke his call in favor of Jackson, asked me to push 
the battle, ordered R. H. Anderson's division up, and 
rode himself to join me. 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 189 

In the fulness of the battle, General Toombs rode up 
on his iron-gray under sweat and sjDur, his hat off, and 
asked for his command. He was told that a courier was 
about to start with an order for the division commander, 
and would guide him. He asked to be the bearer of the 
order, received it, and with the guide rode to find his post 
in the battle. The meeting of the brigade and its com- 
mander was more than joyful. 

Jackson failed to pull up even on the left, which gave 
opportunity for some of the enemy's batteries to turn their 
fire across the right wing in enfilade, as we advanced, and 
the enemy strongly reinforced against us from troops 
drawn from Jackson's front, but we being on the jump, 
the fire of the batteries was not effective. It was severely 
threatening upon General Lee, however, who would ride 
under it, notwithstanding aj^peals to avoid it, until I 
thought to ride through a ravine, and thus throw a trav- 
erse between him and the fire. He sent orders to Jackson 
to advance and drive off or capture the batteries standing 
in his front and firing across our line, but it was not in 
season to relieve us. Hood's aggressive force was well 
spent when his troojDs approached the Chinn House, but 
R. H. Anderson was up and put in to reinforce and relieve 
his battle. 

General Pope drew Kicketts's division from his right 
to brace his left, then Reno's command to aid in checking 
our march, but its progress, furiously resisted, was steady, 
though much delayed. Piatt's brigade was also put 
against us. This made time for Porter to gather his 
forces. His regulars of Sykes's division, particularly, 
made desperate resistance, that could only be overcome 
by our overreaching lines threatening their rear. 

When the last guns were fired the thickening twilight 
concealed the lines of friend and foe, so that the danger 
of friend firing against friend became imminent. The 
hill of the Henry House was reached in good time, but 



190 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

darkness coming on earlier because of thickening clouds 
hovering over us, and a gentle fall of rain closely follow- 
ing, the plateau was shut off from view, and its ascent 
only found by groping through the darkening rainfall. 
As long as the enemy held the plateau, he covered the 
line of retreat Jby the turnpike and the bridge at Young's 
Branch. As he retired, heavy darkness gave safe-con- 
duct to such of his columns as could find their way through 
the weird mists. 

Captain William H. Powell, of the Fourth Regular 
Infantry, wrote of his experience, — 

"As we filed from tlie battle-field into tlie turnpike leading 
over the stone bridge, we came uj)on a group of mounted officers, 
one of whom wore a peculiar style of hat which had been seen 
on the field that day, and which had been the occasion of a great 
deal of comment in the ranks. As we passed these officers, the 
one with the peculiar hat called out in a loud voice, — 

" 'What troops are those?' 

" 'The regulars,' answered somebody. 

" 'Second Division, Fifth Corps,' replied another. 

" 'God bless them ! they saved the army,' added the officer. 

"Subsequently we learned that he was General Irvin Mc- 
Dowell." 

"As we neared the bridge we came ui)ou confusion. Men 
singly and in detachments were mingled with sutlers' wagons, 
artillery caissons, supply wagons, and ambulances, each striving 
to get ahead of the other. Vehicles rushed through organized 
bodies and broke the columns into fragments. Little detachments 
gathered by the road-side after crossing the bridge, crying out to 
members of their regiments as a guide to scattered comrades. 
And what a night it was ! Dark, gloomy, and beclouded by the 
volumes of smoke which had risen from the battle-field.* 

At six o'clock, General Pope received report of the 
Sixth Corps, that had marched from Alexandria under 
General Franklin to the vicinity of Centreville, and or- 
dered the several commands to concentrate about that 

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 191 

hamlet during the night. The Second Corps from the 
Army of the Potomac under General Sumner also joined 
him at Centreville. 

But for the dropping off of two of Wilcox's brigades 
from close connection with the right wing, and the deflec- 
tion of Drayton's brigade, which was taken off by some 
unauthorized and unknown person from my right to the 
support of cavalry, it is j)0ssible that my working column 
could have gained the plateau of the Henry House before 
it was dark. Or if Jackson had been fresh enough to 
pull up even with us, he could have retained the com- 
mands under Reno and Sykes's regulars in his front, 
which could have given us safe sweep to the plateau, an 
hour before sundown, and in sight of great possibilities. 

By morning of the 31st everything off the turnpike 
was nasty and soggy. Stuart's cavalry, followed by 
Pryor's brigade, were ordered across the Run at Stone 
Bridge as a diversion, while we were trying another move 
to reach the enemy's rear. The Confederates had worked 
all of the winter before, fortifying this new j^osition, just 
taken by Poj^e at Centreville. Direct pursuit by the 
turnpike against these fortifications would therefore be 
fruitless. 

General Jackson was called to head-quarters early in 
the morning. Uj)on receiving General Lee's orders to 
cross Bull Run at Sudley's and march by Little River 
turnpike to intercept the enemy's march, he said, 
" Good !" and away he went, without another word, or 
even a smile. 

Though the suggestion of a smile always hung about 
his features, it was commonly said that it never fully 
developed, with a single excejDtion, during his military 
career, though some claim there were other occasions on 
which it ripened, and those very near him say that he 
always smiled at the mention of the names of the Fed- 
eral leaders whom he was accustomed to encounter over 



1'92 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

in the Valley behind the Blue E-idge. Standing, he 
was a graceful figure, five feet ten inches in height, with 
brown wavy hair, full beard, and regular features. At 
first glance his gentle expression repelled the idea of his 
severe piety, the full beard concealing the lower features, 
which had they been revealed would have marked the 
character of the man who claimed " his first duty to God, 
and his next to Jackson and General Lee." Mounted, 
his figure was not so imposing as that of the bold dragoon, 
Charley May, on Black Tom. He had a habit of raising 
his right hand, riding or sitting, which some of his fol- 
lowers were wont to construe into invocation for Divine 
aid, but they do not claim to know whether the prayers 
were for the slain, or for the success of other fields. The 
fact is, he received a shot in that hand at the First Bull 
Run, which left the hand under partial paralysis and the 
circulation through it imperfect. To relieve the pressure 
and assist the circulation he sometimes raised his arm. 

I was ordered to look after the dead and those whose 
misfortune it was to be wounded, till Jackson could have 
time to stretch out on his new march, then to follow him, 
leaving the work to details and to General D. H. Hill's 
division, just coming in from Richmond. 

After giving orders for the day. General Lee rode out 
towards Centreville for personal observation, halted, and 
dismounted at a point which seemed safe from danger or 
observation. Suddenly alarm was given of " The enemy's 
cavalry !" The group dispersed in hot haste to have the 
heels of their animals under them. The rush and confu- 
sion frightened the general's horse, so that he pulled him 
violently to the ground, severely spraining his right wrist, 
besides breaking some of the bones of the hand. 

On reaching his head-quarters, Jackson ordered the as- 
sembly sounded, mounted his horse, and marched for the 
Sudley Springs crossing. He cleared the way in time for 
my column to reach that point at dark, the head of his 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 193 

own column tapping Little Kiver turnpike. The march 
was over a single-track country road, bad enough on the 
south side of the river, much worn through a post-oak 
forest over quicksand subsoil on the north side. If Jack- 
son had been followed by an enemy whose march he 
wished to baffle, his gun-carriages could not have made 
deeper cuts through the mud and quicksand. 

Stuart was ordered over to the Little River turnpike, 
and advanced to the vicinity of Ox Hill and Fairfax 
Court-House. He made some interesting captures and 
reports of movements by the enemy. He slept near their 
lines, north of the turnpike, east of Chantilly. 

The Little River and Warrenton turnpikes converge 
and join as they near Fairfax Court-House. At vulner- 
able points on the latter. General Pope posted parts of his 
command to cover his rearward march. At Ox Hill 
(Chantilly) were stationed Heintzelman's and Reno's 
corps, the divisions of Hooker, Kearny, Stevens, and 
Reno. 

Early on the 1st of September the Confederates resumed 
their march. Jackson reached Ox Hill late in the after- 
noon, and deployed by inversion, — A. P. Hill's division 
on his right, Ewell's under Lawton next, his own under 
Stuart on his left, on the right of the road. On the left 
of the road were Stuart's cavalry and the artillery. Two 
of Hill's brigades were thrown out to find the enemy, and 
were soon met by his advance in search of Jackson, which 
made a furious attack, driving back the Confederate bri- 
gades in some disorder. Stevens, appreciating the crisis 
as momentous, thought it necessary to follow the opportu- 
nity by aggressive battle, in order to hold Jackson away 
from the Warrenton turnpike. Kearny, always ready to 
second any courageous move, joined in the daring battle. 
At the critical moment the rain and thunder-storm burst 
with great violence upon the combatants, the high wind 
beating the storm in the faces of the Confederates. So 

13 



194 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

firm was the unexpected battle that part of Jackson's line 
yielded to the onslaught. At one moment his artillery- 
seemed in danger. Stevens was killed when the storm of 
battle, as well as that of the elements, began to quiet down. 
Stuart's cavalry drew near Jackson's left during the prog- 
ress of the battle. As I rode up and met General Jack- 
son, I remarked upon the number of his men going to 
the rear : 

*' General, your men don't appear to work well to-day." 
" No," he replied, " but I hope it will prove a victory 
in the morning." 

His troops were relieved as mine came up, to give them 
a respite till morning. While my reliefs were going 
around. General Philip Kearny rode to the line in search 
of his division. Finding himself in the presence of Con- 
federates, he wheeled his horse and put spurs, preferring 
the danger of musket-balls to humiliating surrender. 
Several challenges called, but not heeded, were followed 
by the ring of half a dozen muskets, when he fell mor- 
tally hurt, and so perished one of the most gallant and 
dashing of the Union generals. 

''September 2, 1862. 
''Major- General John Pope, 

" United States Army : 
"Sir, — The body of General Philip Kearny was brought from 
the field last night, and he was reported dead. I send it forward 
under a flag of truce, thinking the possession of his remains may 
be a consolation to his family. 

"I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"E. E. Lee, 

''General:'^ 

The rain so concealed the fight in its last struggles that 
the troops escaped before we were aware that it had been 
abandoned. 

As both Federal division commanders fell, the accounts 

* Rebellion Record. 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 195 

fail to do justice to their fight. Stevens in his short 
career gave evidence of courage, judgment, skill, and 
genius not far below his illustrious antagonist. 

During the fight Stuart had parties out seeking infor- 
mation, and early on the second had his troopers in the 
saddle in pursuit. The army, ready to move, awaited 
reports of the cavalry, which came from time to time, as 
they followed on the line of retreat. From Fairfax 
Court-House came the report that the enemy's rear had 
passed in rapid retreat quite out of reach, approaching 
the fortifications of Alexandria and Washington City. 
Arms were ordered stacked, and a good rest was given 
the troops. Stuart's cavalry pursued and engaged the 
retreating army. 

In the afternoon the First Corps started on the march 
via Dranesville for Leesburg and the Potomac River, fol- 
lowed on the third by the Second. 

The results to the Confederates of the several engage- 
ments about Manassas Plains were seven thousand prison- 
ers, two thousand of the enemy's wounded, thirty pieces 
of artillery, many thousand small-arms picked up from 
the field, and many colors, besides the captures made at 
Manassas Junction by General Jackson.* 

A fair estimate of forces engaged : 

Federal army, aggregate 63,000 

Confederates 53,500 

Losses between Rappahannock River and Washing- 
ton: 

Federals, aggregate 15,000 

Confederates 10,000 

The figures are given in round numbers, as the safest 
approximate estimate, but the records now accessible give 



* Rebellion Record, vol. xii. part 11. p. 558. General Lee's report. 



196 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

accurate details of losses in each command about the same 
as these. 

And so it came to pass that from Cedar Run and Bull 
Run we had the term All Run. It is due to the gallant 
Sumner and his brave corps, however, to say that they 
so covered the last as to save disgraceful retreat. 

A cursory review of the campaign reveals the pleasure 
ride of General Fitzhugh Lee by Louisa Court-House 
as most unseasonable. He lost the fruits of our summer's 
work, and lost the Southern cause. Proud Troy was laid 
in ashes. His orders were to meet his commander on the 
afternoon of the 17th, on the plank-road near Raccoon 
Ford, and upon this appointment was based General Lee's 
order of march for the 18th. If the march had been 
made as appointed. General Lee would have encountered 
the army of General Pope upon weak ground from Rob- 
ertson River to near Raccoon Ford of the Rapidan, and 
thus our march would have been so exj)edited that we 
could have reached Alexandria and Washington before 
the landing of the first detachment of the Army of the 
Potomac at Alexandria on the 24th. The artillery and 
infantry were called to amend the delinquency by severe 
marches and battles. 

It would have been possible to make good the lost time, ' 
but the despatch lost in the Stuart escapade was handed 
to General Pope that morning (the 18th), and gave him 
notice of our plans and orders. The delay thus brought 
about gave time for him to quit his weaker ground and 
retire to strong defensive heights behind the Rappahan- 
nock River, where he held us in check five days. 

Referring to the solid move proposed before opening 
the campaign by the upper Rapidan to strike Pope's 
right, it may be said that it was not so dependent upon 
the cavalry that was marching behind us. That used by 
Jackson in his battle of the 9th was enough for imme- 
diate use. Jackson could have passed the upper Rapidan 



SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS. 197 

on the 16th, and followed by the right wing in time to 
strike Pope's right on the 17th in solid phalanx, when 
time was mightier than cannon-balls. After losing eight 
days between Orange Court-House and the Rappahan- 
nock, we found at last that we must adopt the move by 
our left to get around the strong ground of the Rappa- 
hannock, and the move must now be made by detaclv- 
me7its, not so approved of the usages of war. I was west 
of the Rappahannock when the command should have 
been at Washington City. 

The conduct of General Pope's army after his receipt of 
the captured despatch was good, especially his plans and 
orders for the 27th and 28th. The error was his failure 
to ride with his working columns on the 28th, to look after 
and conduct their operations. He left them in the hands 
of the officer who lost the first battle of Manassas. His 
orders of the 28th for General McDowell to change direc- 
tion and march for Centreville were received at 3.15 p.m. 
Had they been promptly executed, the commands. King's 
division, Sigel's corps, and Reynolds's division, should 
have found Jackson by four o'clock. As it was, only the 
brigades of Gibbon and Doubleday were found passing 
by Jackson's position after sunset, when he advanced 
against them in battle. He reported it "sanguinary." 
With the entire division of King and that of Reynolds, 
with Sigel's corps, it is possible that Pope's campaign 
would have brought other important results. On the 
29tli he was still away from the active part of his field, 
and in consequence failed to have correct advice of the 
time of my arrival, and quite ignored the column under 
R. H. Anderson approaching on the Warrenton turnpike. 
On the 30th he was misled by reports of his officers and 
others to believe that the Confederates were in retreat, 
and planned his movements upon false premises. 

Jackson's march to Bristoe and Manassas Junction was 
hazardous, or seemed so, but in view of his peculiar talent 



198 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

for such work (the captured despatch of General Pope 
giving information of his affairs), and Lee's skill, it 
seemed the only way open for progressive manoeuvre. 
The strength of the move lay in the time it gave us to 
make issue before all of the Army of the Potomac could 
unite with the army under General Pope. His game of 
hide-and-seek about Bull Pun, Centreville, and Manassas 
Plains was grand, but marred in completeness by the 
failure of General A. P. Hill to meet his orders for the 
afternoon of the 28th. As a leader he was fine ; as a 
wheel-horse, he was not always just to himself He was 
fond of the picturesque. 



CHAPTER XV. 

THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGI^^. 

General Lee continues Aggressive Work — From Foraged Fields of 
Virginia into a Bounteous Land — Longstreet objected to the Move- 
ment on Harper's Ferry — Lee thinks tlie Occasion Timely for Pro- 
posal of Peace and Independence — Confederates singing through 
the Streets of Fredericktown — McCIellan's Movements — Cautious 
Marches— Lee's Lost Order handed to the Federal Chief at Frederick. 

" There is a tide in the affairs of men, 
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune ; 
Omitted, all the voyage of their life 
Is bound in shallows, and in miseries. 
On such a full sea are we now afloat." 

As our columns approached Leesburg, " Maryland, my 
Maryland" was in the air, and on the lips of every man 
from General Lee down to the youngest drummer. Our 
chief could have safely ordered the ranks to break in 
Virginia and assemble in Fredericktown. All that they 
would ask was a thirty minutes' plunge in the Potomac 
to remove some of the surplus dust, before they encoun- 
tered the smiles of the winsome lasses of Maryland. Yet 
he expressed doubt of trusting so far from home solely 
to untried and unknown resources for food-supplies. 
Receiving his anxious expressions really as appeals for 
reinforcement of his unexpressed wish, but warm to brave 
the venture, I related my Mexican War experiences with 
Worth's division, marching around the city of Monterey 
on two days' rations of roasting-ears and green oranges, 
and said that it seemed to me that we could trust the 
fields of Maryland, laden with ripening corn and fruit, to 
do as much as those of Mexico; that we could in fact 

199 



200 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

subsist on the bounty of the fields until we could open 
communication with our organized base of supplies. 

As factors in the problem, important as Lee's masterly 
science and Jackson's great skill, stood the fortitude and 
prowess of the Confederate soldiers, and their faith in the 
friendship and generosity of their countrymen. Hungry, 
sparsely clad, worn with continuous bivouac and battle 
since the 26th of June, proud of their record from the 
First to the honors of the Second Manassas, their cheery 
smiles and elastic step told better than words of anticij)a- 
tions of welcome from friends in Maryland, and of new 
fields of honor for their solid ranks, — of the day when 
they should be masters of the field and of a new-born 
republic. 

Though a losing battle, the Union armies had made a 
splendid fight at Second Manassas. The stand at Ox Hill 
was severe ; severe till the march of retreat, so that the 
Army of Northern Virginia should have held in profound 
respect its formidable adversary, seasoned by many bloody 
fields. 

The policy of the Richmond government was defensive 
rather than aggressive warfare, but the situation called for 
action, and there was but one opening, — across the Poto- 
mac. General Lee decided to follow his success in its 
natural leading, and so reported to the Richmond authori- 
ties. 

He was not so well equipped as an army of invasion 
should be, but the many friends in Maryland and the 
fields on the north side of the Potomac were more in- 
viting than those of Virginia, so freely foraged. He 
knew from events of the past that his army was equal to 
the service to which he thought to call it, and ripe for the 
adventure ; that he could march into Maryland and re- 
main until the season for the enemy's return into Virginia 
for autumn or w^inter work had passed, improve his trans- 
portation supplies, and the clothing of his army, and do 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 201 

that, if not more, for relief of our Southern fields and lim- 
ited means, besides giving his army and cause a moral in- 
fluence of great effect at home and abroad. He decided 
to make his march by the most direct route from Chan- 
tilly, where he had last fought, to the Potomac, and so 
crossed by the fords near Leesburg. Marching by this 
route, he thought to cut off a formidable force of Union 
troojDS at Winchester, at Martinsburg, and a strong garri- 
son occuj^ying the fortified position at Harper's Ferry. 

To summarize the situation, we were obliged to go into 
Maryland or retreat to points more convenient to suj)plies 
and the protection of Richmond. 

At Leesburg Lee learned that the Union troops in the 
Valley had left Winchester, and sent back orders to have 
the crippled and feeble soldiers wending their way to the 
army march through the Valley to join us in Maryland. 
Trains of supplies were ordered to move by the same route. 

On the 5th and 6th the columns crossed the Potomac 
by the fords near Leesburg. Stuart's cavalry, coming up 
from the line near Alexandria and the Long Bridge, 
passed to front and right flank of the army. General 
McLaws's division. General. J. G. Walker, with two bri- 
gades of his division, and General Hampton's cavalry 
brigade, including Colonel Baker's North Carolina regi- 
ment, joined us on the march. On the 7th our infantry 
and artillery commands came together near Frederick 
City. ^ 

Kiding together before we reached Frederick, the sound 
of artillery fire came from the direction of Point of Rocks 
and Harper's Ferry, from which General Lee inferred 
that the enemy was concentrating his forces from the 
Valley, for defence at HarjDer's Ferry, and proposed to 
me to organize forces to surround and capture the works 
and the garrison. 

I thought it a venture not worth the game, and sug- 
gested, as we were in the enemy's country and presence, 



202 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX, 

that he would be advised of any move that we made in a 
few hours after it was set on foot ; that the Union army, 
though beaten, was not disorganized ; that we knew a 
number of their officers who could put it in order and 
march against us, if they found us exposed, and make 
serious trouble before the capture could be accomplished ; 
that our men were worn by very severe and protracted 
service, and in need of repose ; that as long as we had 
them in hand we were masters of the situation, but dis- 
persed into many fragments, our strength must be greatly 
reduced. As the subject was not continued, I supposed 
that it was a mere expression of passing thought, until, 
the day after we reached Frederick, upon going over to 
head-quarters, I found the front of the general's tent 
closed and tied. Upon inquiring of a member of the 
staff, I was told that he was inside with General Jackson. 
As I had not been called, I turned to go away, when 
General Lee, recognizing my voice, called me in. The 
plan had been arranged. Jackson, with his three divi- 
sions, was to recross the Potomac by the fords above Har- 
per's Ferry, march via Martinsburg to Bolivar Heights ; 
McLaws's division by Crampton's Gap to Maryland 
Heights ; J. G. Walker's division to recross at Cheek's 
Ford and occupy Loudoun Heights, these heights overlook- 
ing the 230sitions of the garrison of Harper's Ferry ; D. H. 
Hill's division to march by the National road over South 
Mountain at Turner's Gap, and halt at the western base, to 
guard trains, intercept fugitives from Harper's Ferry, and 
support the cavalry, if needed ; the cavalry to face the 
enemy and embarrass his movements. I was to march 
over the mountain by Turner's Gap to Hagerstown. 

As their minds were settled firmly upon the enterprise, 
I offered no opposition further than to ask that the order 
be so modified as to allow me to send R. H. Anderson's 
division with McLaws and to halt my own column near 
the point designated for bivouac of General D. H. 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 203 

Hill's command. These suggestions were accepted, and 
the order * so framed was issued. 

It may be well to digress from my narrative for a mo- 
ment just here to remark that General Lee's confidence 
in the strength of his army, the situation of affairs, and 

« " Head-quabters Army of Northern Virginia, 

" September 9, 1862. 
" Special Orders, No. 191. 

" The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown 
road. General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after 
passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route 
towards Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, 
and, by Friday night, take possession of the Baltimore and Oliio Rail- 
road, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and inter- 
cept such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. 

" General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road as far as 
Boonsborough, where it will halt with the reserve, supply, and baggage 
trains of the army. 

" General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. 
Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown 
he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by Friday morning pos- 
sess himself of the Maryland Heights, and endeavor to capture the 
enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. 

" General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object 
in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's Ford, 
ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun 
Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning. Key's Ford on his left, and 
the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his 
right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with General McLaws 
and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. 

" General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear-guard of the army, 
pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ord- 
nance, supply-trains, etc., will precede General Hill. 

" General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the 
commands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws, and with 
the main body of the cavalry will cover the route of the army and bring 
up all stragglei's that may have been left behind. 

" The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after 
accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join 
the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown. 

" Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the 
regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments 
to procure wood, etc. 

"By command of General R. E. Lee. 

"R. H. Chilton, 
" Assistant Adjutant-General. 
" Major-General D. H. Hill, 

" Coinmanding Division.''^ 



204 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the value of the moral effect upon the country, North and 
South, was made fully manifest by the nature of the cam- 
paign he had just entered upon, especially that portion 
of it directed against Harper's Ferry, which, as events 
were soon to prove, weakened the effectiveness of his army 
in the main issue, which happened to be Antietam. 

In another and a very different way, and with even 
greater plainness, his high estimate of ojDportunity and 
favoring condition of circumstances existing at the time 
was indicated to the authorities, though of course not at 
that time made public. This was his deliberate and ur- 
gent advice to President Davis to join him and be pre- 
pared to make a proposal for peace and independence 
from the head of a conquering army. Fresh from the 
Second Manassas, and already entered upon the fateful 
Maryland campaign, he wrote the President this imjoor- 
tant letter : 

''Head-quarters near Fredericktown, Md., 

''Septembers, 1862. 
"His Excellency Jefferson Davis, 

^^ President of the Confederate States, Richnond, Ya. : 

"Mr. President, — The present position of affairs, in my opin- 
ion, places it in the power of the government of the Confederate 
States to propose with propriety to that of the United States the 
recognition of our independence. For more than a year both 
sections of the country have been devastated by hostilities which 
have brought sorrow and suffering upon thousands of homes, 
without advancing the objects which our enemies projDOsed to 
themselves in beginning the contest. Such a proposition, 
coming from us at this time, could in no way be regarded as 
suing for peace ; but, being made when it is in our power to in- 
flict injury upon our adversary, would show conclusively to the 
world that our sole object is the establishment of our indepen- 
dence and the attainment of an honorable peace. The rejection 
of this offer would prove to the country that the responsibility of 
the continuance of the war does not rest upon us, but that the 
party in power in the United States elect to prosecute it for pur- 
poses of their own. The proposal of peace would enable the 
people of the United States to determine at their coming elections 
whether they will support those who favor a prolongation of the 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 205 

war, or those who wish to bring it to a termination, which can 
but be productive of good to both parties without afifectiug the 
honor of either. 

"I have the honor to be, with great respect, 

"Your obedient servant, 

^'E. E. Lee, 
^^ GeneraV ^ 

And now I return to my narrative. 

General Walker's division was on detached service at 
the time of the order, trying to cut the canal. He 
marched, however, at the appointed time, found Cheek's 
Ford under the severe fire of the enemy's batteries, and 
marched on up the left bank as far as the Point of Rocks, 
where he crossed and rested on the 11th. On the 12tli 
he marched to and bivouacked at Hillsboro' ; on the 13th, 
to the foot of the Blue Kidge and occupied Loudoun 
Heights by a detachment under Colonel Cooke. 

Not satisfied with the organization of McLaws's column, 
I asked and obtained permission on the 10th to strengthen 
it by three other brigades, — Wilcox's, under Colonel Al- 
fred Cumming ; Featherston's, and Pryor's, which were at- 
tached to R. H. Anderson's division. 

The different columns from Frederick marched as or- 
dered, except in the change authorized for Anderson's 
division. It was a rollicking march, the Confederates 
playing and singing, as they marched through the streets 
of Frederick, " The Girl I left behind me." 

Jackson recrossed the Potomac on the 11th, at Light's 
Ford, ordered A. P. Hill's division by the turnpike to 
Martinsburg, his own and Ewell's northwest to^North 
Mountain Depot to intercept trooj^s that might retreat in 
that direction from Martinsburg. General White, com- 
manding the Union troops, abandoned Martinsburg the 
night of the 11th, having timely advice of Jackson's 
movements, and retreated to Harper's Ferry. On the 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part ii. p. 600. 



206 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

12th, Jackson's troops came together at Martinsburg, 
found some stores of bacon and bread rations, and marched 
on the loth for Harper's Ferry, where he found the Union 
troops in battle array along Bolivar Heights. 

I marched across South Mountain at Turner's Pass, and 
bivouacked near its western base. General Lee ordered 
my move continued to Hagerstown. The plans of the 
Confederates^ as blocked out, anticipated the surrender 
of Harper's Ferry on Friday, the 12th, or Saturday, 
the 13th, at latest. The change of my position from 
Boonsborough to Hagerstown further misled our cavalry 
commander and the commanders of the divisions at 
Boonsborough and Harj^er's Ferry into a feeling of 
security that there could be no threatening by the army 
from Washington. 

D. H. Hill's division crossed by Turner's Gap and 
halted near Boonsborough. McLaws took the left-hand 
road, marched through Burkittsville, and halted for the 
night at the east base of the mountain, near Crampton's 
and Brownsville Passes. 

Near Crampton's Pass on the west the mountain un- 
folds into two parallel ridges, the eastern, the general 
range of South Mountain, the western. Elk Ridge, open- 
ing out Pleasant Valley, about three miles from crest to 
crest. 

Crampton's is the northern of the two passes, and about 
eight miles south of Turner's. One mile south of Cramp- 
ton is the Brownsville Pass, and four miles from that the 
river pass, which cuts in between the Blue Bidge of Vir- 
ginia and South Mountain of Maryland. Through the 
river pass the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, the canal, and 
the Fredericktown turnpike reach out to the west, and at 
the pass is the little town of Biverton. Between River- 
ton and Harper's Ferry was the hamlet Sandy Hook, oc- 
cupied by about fifteen hundred Federal troops. Two 
roads wind through Pleasant Valley, one close under 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 207 

South Mountain, the other hugging the foot-hills of Elk 
Ridge, — the latter rugged, little used. 

Harper's Ferry, against which Lee's new movement 
was directed, nestles at the confluence of the Potomac and 
Shenandoah Rivers, on the Virginia side, under the tow- 
ering cliffs of Maryland or Cumberland Heights. At 
Harper's Ferry the river cuts in so close under Maryland 
Heights that they stand almost perpendicularly over it. 
The crowded space between the heights and the river, 
filled by the railway, canal, and turnpike, was made by 
blastings from the southern extremities of Maryland 
Heights. Under the precipice the railroad bridge crosses 
the Potomac, and a pontoon bridge was laid a few yards 
above it. 

McLaws marched over into Pleasant Valley on the 
11th, through Brownsville Pass, near which and over Elk 
Ridge a road passes through Solomon's Gap of Elk Ridge. 
From the top of this gap is a rugged way along the ridge 
leading down to its southern projections and limits, by 
which infantry only could find foothold. That southern 
point is called Maryland Heights. Two brigades — Ker- 
shaw's and Barksdale's — under General Kershaw were 
ordered to ascend Elk Ridge, march along its summit, 
driving off opposition, and capture the enemy's position 
on the heights. General Semmes was left near the pass, 
over which the troops had marched with his own and 
Mahone's brigades, the latter under Colonel Parham with 
orders to send a brigade to the top of Solomon's Gap to 
cover Kershaw's rear. General Wright, of Anderson's 
division, was ordered with his brigade and two pieces of 
artillery along the crest ridge of South Mountain to its 
projection over Riverton. General Cobb was ordered 
with his brigade along the base of Elk Ridge, to be 
abreast of Kershaw's column. With the balance of his 
command, General McLaws moved down the Valley by 
the South Mountain road, connecting his march, by signal, 



208 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

with General Kershaw's. Kershaw soon met a strong 
force of skirmishers, which was steadily pushed back till 
night. General Wright, without serious opposition, 
reached the end of the mountain, when R. H. Anderson 
sent another brigade — Pryor's — to occupy Weverton. On 
the 13th, Kershaw renewed his fight against very strong 
positions, forced his way across two abatis, along a rugged 
plateau, dropj)ing off on both sides, in rocky cliffs of forty 
or fifty feet, encountered breastworks of logs and boul- 
ders, struggled in a severe fight, captured the position, the 
enemy's signal station, and at four p.m. gained possession 
of the entire hold. Cobb's brigade was advanced, and 
took possession of Sandy Hook without serious opposition. 
The column near South Mountain was advanced to com- 
j^lete the grasp against the enemy at Harper's Ferry. Up to 
this hour General McLaws had heard nothing direct from 
Generals Jackson and Walker, though from the direction 
of the former sounds of artillery reached him, and later 
a courier told that Jackson thought his leading division 
would approach at two o'clock that afternoon. During 
the day heavy cannonading was heard towards the east 
and northeast, and rumors reached McLaws of the advance 
of the enemy from Frederick, but the signal-parties and 
cavalry failed to discover movements, so the firing was 
not credited as of significance. The morning of the 14th 
was occupied in cutting a road for his artillery uj) to the 
point overlooking Harj^er's Ferry, and at two p.m. Cap- 
tains Kead and Carlton had their best guns in position 
over the town. But during these progressions the Confed- 
erates on other fields had been called to more serious work. 
General McClellan, moving his columns out from the 
vicinity of Washington City on the 5th, made slow and 
very cautious marches to save fatigue of his men and at 
the same time cover the capital against unforeseen contin- 
gency ; so slow and cautious was the march that he only 
covered forty or fifty miles in seven days. On the 12th 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 209 

his head-quarters were at Urbana, where he received the 
following telegram from President Lincoln : 

"Governor Curtin telegraphs me, ' I have advices that Jack- 
son is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the 
whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland.' " 

The President added, — 

"Eeceiving nothing from Harper's Ferry or Martinsburg to- 
day, and positive information from Wheeling that the line is cut, 
corroborates the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac. 
Please do not let him get off without being hurt." * 

Elsewhere General McClellan has written of the 12th : 

"During these movements I had not imjjosed long marches on 
the columns. The absolute necessity of refitting and giving some 
little rest to the troops worn down by previous long- continued 
marches and severe fighting, together with the uncertainty as to 
the actual position, strength, and intentions of the enemy, ren- 
dered it incumbent upon me to move slowly and cautiously until 
the head- quarters reached Urbana, where I first obtained reliable 
information that the enemy's object was to move upon Harper's 
Ferry and the Cumberland Valley, and not upon Washington 
and Baltimore." 

His army was organized : Right wing, under General 
Burnside : First and Ninth Corps ; the Kanawha Divi- 
sion, under General J. D. Cox, was assigned with the 
Ninth Corps about the 8th instant. 

Centre column : Second and Twelfth Corps, under Gen- 
eral Sumner. 

Left wing : Sixth Corps and Couch's division of the 
Fourth under General Franklin ; Sykes's division. Fifth 
Corps, independent.f 

Besides the despatches of the lltli and 12th, his cav- 
alry under General Pleasonton, which was vigilant and 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part 1. p. 41. MoClellan's official ac- 
count. 

t Record, vol. xix. part i. 

14 



210 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

pushing, sent frequent reports of his gteady progress. In 
the afternoon Pleasonton and the Ninth Corps under Gen- 
eral Keno entered Fredericktown. This advance, by the 
National road, threatened to cut off two of Stuart's cavalry 
regiments left at the Monocacy Bridge. To detain the 
enemy till these were withdrawn, the outpost on that road 
was reinforced. Hampton retired his cavalry beyond 
Frederick and posted his artillery to cover the line of 
march, where he was soon attacked by a formidable force. 
To make safe the retreat of the brigade, a cavalry charge 
was ordered, under Colonel Butler, Lieutenant Meaghan's 
squadron leading. Colonel Moore, of the Twenty-eighth 
Ohio Cavalry, and a number of other prisoners were cap- 
tured. This so detained the enemy as to give safe with- 
drawal for the brigade to Middletown, leaving Lieutenant- 
Colonel Martin's cavalry and two guns on guard at the 
gap of the Catoctin range of mountains. 

Before withdrawing from Frederick on the 12th, Gen- 
eral Stuart sent orders for the brigade under General 
Fitzhugh Lee to move around the right of the Union 
army and ascertain the meaning and strength of its 
march. 

Following his orders of the 12th, General Pleasonton 
detached a cavalry brigade on the 13th and section of ar- 
tillery under Colonel McReynolds to follow Fitzhugh 
Lee, and Bush's Lancers were sent to Jefferson for Gen- 
eral Franklin's column. With his main force he pursued 
the Confederates towards Turner's Pass of South Moun- 
tain. Midway between Frederick and South Mountain, 
running parallel, is a lesser range, Catoctin, where he 
encountered Stuart's rear-guard. After a severe affair he 
secured the pass, moved on, and encountered a second 
force near Middletown. Beinforced by Gibson's battery, 
he attacked and forced the way to a third stand. This in 
turn was forced back and into the mountain at Turner's 
Pass. 



THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 211 

On that day McClellan's columns marched : Ninth 
Corps, to and near Middletown, eight miles ; First Corps, 
to the Monocacy, eight miles ; Twelfth Corps, to Freder- 
ick, nine miles ; Second Corps, to Frederick, eight miles ; 
Sixth Corps, to Buckeystown, seven miles ; Couch's di- 
vision, to Licksville, six miles ; Sykes's division, to Fred- 
erick, eight miles. 

At Frederick, General Lee's special order No. 191 was 
handed to General McClellan at his head-quarters with 
his centre (Sumner's) column. 

How lost and how found we shall presently see, and 
see that by the mischance and accident the Federal com- 
mander came in possession of information that gave a 
spur, and great advantage, to his somewhat demoralized 
army. 



CHAPTER XVI. 

" THE LOST order" SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 

How the Federals found the Despatch— With every Advantage McClel- 
lan "made haste slowly" — Lee turns back to meet him at South Moun- 
tain — Longstreet preferred that the Stand should be made at Sharps- 
burg — The Battle at the Pass — Many killed— General Garland of the 
Confederate and General Reno of the Union side— A future President 
among the wounded — Estimate of Forces engaged. 

The strange losing and stranger finding of Lee's " Gen- 
eral Order No. 191," commonly referred to as " the lost 
despatch," which he had issued September 9 for the move- 
ment of his army, made a difference in our Maryland 
campaign for better or for worse. 

Before this tell-tale slip of paper found its way to Mc- 
Clellan's head-quarters he was well advised by his cavalry, 
and by despatches wired him from east and west, of the 
movements of Lee's army, and later, on that eventful 13th 
day of September, he received more valuable information, 
even to a complete revelation of his adversary's plans and 
purpose, such as no other commander, in the history of 
war, has had at a time so momentous. So well satisfied 
was he that he was master of the military zodiac that he 
despatched the Washington authorities of Lee's " gross 
mistake" and exposure to severe penalties. There was not 
a point upon which he wanted further information nor a 
plea for a moment of delay. His army was moving 
rapidly ; all that he wished for was that the plans of the 
enemy would not be changed. The only change that oc- 
curred in the plans was the delay of their execution, 
which worked to his greater advantage. By following the 
operations of the armies through the complications of the 
campaign we may form better judgment of the work of 
the commanders in finding ways through its intricacies : 

212 



"the lost order" — SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 213 

of the efforts of one to grasp the envied crown so hap- 
lessly tendered ; of the other in seeking refuge that might 
cover catastrophe involved in the complexity of miscon- 
ceived plans. 

The copy of the order that was lost was sent by Gen- 
eral Jackson to General D. H. Hill under the impression 
that Hill's division was part of his command, but the di- 
vision had not been so assigned, and that copy of the 
order was not delivered at Hill's head-quarters, but had 
been put to other use. The order sent to General Hill 
from general head-quarters was carefully preserved. 

When the Federals marched into Frederick, just left 
by the Confederates, General Sumner's column went into 
camp about noon, and it was then that the despatch was 
found by Colonel Silas Colgrove, who took it to division 
head-quarters, whence it was quickly sent to the Federal 
commander. 

General McClellan reported to General Halleck that 
the lost order had been handed him in the evening, 
but it is evident that he had it at the time of his noonday 
despatch to the President, from his reference to the facts 
it exposed. 

It is possible that it was at first suspected as a ruse 
de guerre, and that a little time was necessary to convince 
McClellan of its genuineness, which may account for the 
difference between the hinted information in his despatch 
to General Halleck and the confident statement made at 
noonday to the President. 

Some of the Confederates were a little surprised that a 
matter of such magnitude was intrusted to pen-and-ink 
despatches. The copy sent me was carefully read, then 
used as some persons use a little cut of tobacco, to be as- 
sured that others could not have the benefit of its con- 
tents. 

It has been in evidence that the copy that was lost had 
been used as a wrapper for three fragrant Confederate 



214 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

cigars in the interim between its importance when issued 
by the Confederate chief and its greater importance when 
fo-und by the Federals. 

General Halleck thought the capital in imminent peril 
before he heard from McClellan on the 13th, as shown on 
that day by a despatch to General McClellan : 

''The capture of this place will throw us back six months, if 
it should not destroy us." 

But later, the " lost despatch" having turned up at head- 
quarters of General McClellan, that commander apprised 
the authorities of the true condition of affairs in the fol- 
lowing : 

" Head-quarters, Frederick, September 13, 1862, 12 m, 
(" Eeceived 2.35 a.m., September 14.) 
'' To THE President : 

"I have the whole rebel force in front of me, but am confident, 
and no time shall be lost. I have a difficult task to perform, but 
with God's blessing will accomplish it. I think Lee has made a 
gross mistake, and that he will be severely punished for it. The 
army is in motion as rapidly as possible, I hope for a great suc- 
cess if the plans of the rebels remain unchanged. We have pos- 
session of Catoctin. I have all the plans of the rebels, and will 
catch them in their own trap if my men are equal to the emer- 
gency. I now feel that I can count on them as of old. All forces 
of Pennsylvania should be placed to co-operate at Chambersburg. 
My respects to Mrs. Lincoln. Eeceived most enthusiastically by 
the ladies. Will send you trophies. All well, and with God's 
blessing will accomplish it. 

''Geo. B. McClellan." 

"Frederick City, Md., September 13, 1862, 11 p.m. 

("Eeceived 1 p.m., September 14.) 
" Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

' '• General-in Chief: 

" An order from General E. E. Lee, addressed to General D. H. 
Hill, which has accidentally come into my hands this evening, — 
the authenticity of which is unquestionable, — discloses some of 



"the lost order" — SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 215 

the plans of the enemy, and shows most conclusively that the 
main rebel army is now before us, including Long-street's, Jack- 
son's, the two Hills' s, McLaws's, Walker's, R. H. Anderson's, and 
Hood's commands. That army was ordered to march on the 10th, 
and to attack and capture our forces at Harper's Ferry and Mar- 
tiusburg yesterday, by surrounding them with such a heavy force 
that they conceived it impossible they could escape. They were 
also ordered to take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Eail- 
road ; afterwards to concentrate again at Boonsborough or Hagers- 
town. That this was the plan of campaign on the 9th is con- 
firmed by the fact that heavy firing has been heard in the direc- 
tion of Harper's Ferry this afternoon, and the columns took the 
roads specified in the order. It may, therefore, in my judgment, 
be regarded as certain that this rebel army, which I have good 
reasons for believing amounts to 120,000 men or more, and know 
to be commanded by Lee in person, intended to attempt pene- 
trating Pennsylvania. The of&cers told their friends here that 
they were going to Harrisburg and Philadelphia. My advance 
has pushed forward to-day and overtaken the enemy on the 
Middletown and Harper's Ferry roads, and several slight engage- 
ments have taken place, in which our troops have driven the 
enemy from their position. A train of wagons, about three- 
quarters of a mile long, was destroyed to-day by the rebels in 
their flight. We took over fifty prisoners. This army marches 
forward early to-morrow morning, and will make forced marches, 
to endeavor to relieve Colonel Miles, but I fear, unless he makes 
a stout resistance, we may be too late. 

" A report came in just this moment that Miles was attacked 
to-day, and repulsed the enemy, but I do not know what credit 
to attach to the statement. I shall do everything in my j)ower to 
save Miles if he still holds out. Portions of Burnside's and 
Franklin's corps move forward this evening. 

" I have received your despatch of ten a.m. You will perceive, 
from what I have stated, that there is but little probability of the 
enemy being in much force south of the Potomac. I do not, by 
any means, wish to be understood as undervaluing the importance 
of holding Washington. It is of great consequence, but upon the 
success of this army the fate of the nation depends. It was for 
this reason that I said everything else should be made subordi- 
nate to placing this army in proper condition to meet the large 
rebel force in our front. Unless General Lee has changed his 
plans, I expect a severe general engagement to-morrow. I feel 
confident that there is now no rebel force immediately threaten- 



216 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

ing Washington or Baltimore, but that I have the mass of their 
troops to contend with, and they outnumber me when united. 

^' Geo. B. McClellan, 

' ' Major- General. ' ' * 



With the knowledge afforded by securing Lee's " lost 
order" the passes of the South Mountain became im- 
portant points. If he could force them, McClellan 
might fall on the divided columns of the Confederates 
and reach Harper's Ferry in time to save its garrison ; 
but Lee received intelligence of his only moderate forward 
movement, and, without knowing then how it came to be 
made, recalled a force to make resistance, and, so supple- 
menting or complementing by his rapid moves the Federal 
commander's slowness, saved his campaign from the disas- 
trous failure that threatened it. 

General McClellan claimed to have been more vigorous 
in pursuit after he received the " lost despatch," but 
events do not support the claim. He had time after the 
despatch was handed him to march his army to the foot 
of South Mountain before night, but gave no orders, 
except his letter to General Franklin calling for vigor- 
ous action, which was afterwards tempered by caution 
to wait for developments at Turner's Pass. He gave no 
intimation of the despatch to his cavalry leader, who 
should have been the first to be advised of the points in 
his possession. General Pleasonton had pushed the Con- 
federate cavalry back into the mountains long before night 
of the 13th under his instructions of the 12th. Had he 
been informed of the points known by his chief in the 
afternoon, he would have occupied South Mountain at 
Turner's Pass before any of the Confederate infantry was 
there or apprised of his approach. General McClellan's 
orders for the 14th were dated, — 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part ii. p 281. 



"the lost OKDER" SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 217 

''13th, 6.45 P.M., Coucli to move to Jefferson with his whole 
division, and join Franklin. 

"13th, 8.45 P.M., Sumner to move at seven a.m. 

" 13th, 11.30 P.M., Hooker to march at daylight to Middletown. 

"13th, 11.30 P.M., Sykes to move at six a.m., after Hooker on 
the Middletown and Hagerstown road. 

"14th, one a.m., artillery reserve to follow Sykes closely. 

" 14th, nine A.M., Sumner ordered to take the Shockstown road 
to Middletown. 

"Franklin's corps at Buckeystowu to march for Burkitts- 
ville." * 

He wrote General Franklin at 6.20 p.m., giving the 
substance of information of the despatch, but not men- 
tioning when or how he came by it, and ordered him to 
march for the mountain pass at Crampton's Gap, to seize 
the pass if it was not strongly guarded, and march for 
Rohrersville, to cut oif the command under McLaws about 
Maryland Heights, capture it, and relieve the garrison at 
Harper's Ferry, and return to co-operate in capturing the 
balance of the Confederate army north of the Potomac ; 
but, in case the gap was occupied by a strong force, to 
await operations against it until he heard the engagement 
of the army moving upon Turner's Pass. He wrote Gen- 
eral Franklin that General Pleasonton had cleared the 
field east of the mountain of Confederate cavalry. After 
relieving Harper's Ferry, Franklin was to destroy bridges 
and guard against crossing of the Confederates to the 
north side, his idea being to cut the Confederate army in 
two and capture or break it up in detail. His appeal was 
urgent for the best work that a general could exercise. 
The division under General Couch was ordered to General 
Franklin, without waiting for all of its forces to join. This 
is the only order of the records that indicates unusual 
action on the part of the Union commander, and General 
Franklin's evidence before the Committee on the Conduct 

* Rebelliou Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 48. 



218 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

of the War shows that his orders of the 13th were so 
modified on the 14th as to direct his wait for Couch's 
division to join him, and the division joined him after 
nightfalL 

The divisions of the Ninth Corps reached Middletown 
on the 13th, under the orders of the 12th, issued before 
the lost despatch was found, one of them su23porting 
Pleasonton's cavalry ; but Rodman's, under misconception 
of orders, marched back towards Frederick. 

South Mountain range, standing between the armies, 
courses across Maryland northeast and southwest. Its 
average height is one thousand feet; its rugged passes 
give it strong military features. The pass at Turner drops 
off about four hundred feet. About a mile south of this 
the old Sharpsburg road crosses at a greater elevation 
through rugged windings ; a fork of this road, on the 
mountain-side, makes a second way over below Fox's Pass, 
while another turns to the right and leads back into the 
turnpike at the summit, or Mountain House. 

On the north side of the turnpike a road leads off to 
the right, called the old Hagerstown road, which winds its 
course through a valley between a spur and the mountain, 
and courses back to the turnpike along the top. A more 
rugged route than this opens a way to the mountain-toj) 
by a route nearer the pike. 

General Pleasonton, not advised of the lost despatch, 
did not push for a careful reconnoissance on the 13th. 
At the same time, General Stuart, forced back into the 
mountains, finding his cavalry unserviceable, advised 
General D. H. Hill of severe pressure, called for a brigade 
of infantry, ordered Hampton's cavalry down to Cramp- 
ton's Pass to assist Robertson's brigade, Colonel Munford 
commanding, leaving the Jeff Davis Legion, under 
Colonel Martin, Colonel Kosser with another cavalry de- 
tachment, and Stuart's horse artillery to occupy the passes 
by the old Sharpsburg road. Colquitt's brigade of infan- 



"the lost order" — SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 219 

try reported to him under his call. After posting it near 
the east base of the mountain to hold the pass, he rode to 
join his other cavalry detachments down at Crampton's 
Pass. He only knew of two brigades of infantry press- 
ing him back, and so reported. His cavalry, ordered 
around the Union right under General Fitzhugh Lee, 
for information of the force in his front, had failed to 
make report. General Hill ordered two brigades, Gar- 
land's and Colquitt's, into the pass to report to Stuart, and 
drew his other three near the foot of the mountain. Gar- 
land's brigade filed to the right after ascending the moun- 
tain, and halted near the turnpike. Colquitt's brigade 
took its j)osition across the turnpike and down towards 
the base of the mountain. Lane's batteries at the summit. 

It seems that up to the night of the 13th most of the 
Confederates were looking with confidence to the surrender 
at Harper's Ferry on the 13th, to be promptly followed 
by a move farther west, not thinking it possible that a 
great struggle at and along the range of South Mountain 
was impending ; that even on the 14th our cavalry leader 
thought to continue his retrograde that day. General 
Hill's attention was given more to his instructions to pre- 
vent the escape of fugitives from Harper's Ferry than to 
trouble along his front, as the instructions covered more 
especially that duty, while information from the cavalry 
gave no indication of serious trouble from the front. 

A little after dark of the 13th, General Lee received, 
through a scout, information of the advance of the Union 
forces to the foot of South Mountain in solid ranks. 
Later information confirmed this report, giving the esti- 
mated strength at ninety thousand. General Lee still 
held to the thought that he had ample time. He sent for 
me, and I found him over his map. He told of the re- 
ports, and asked my views. I thought it too late to march 
on the 14th and properly man the pass at Turner's, and 
expressed preference for concentrating D. H. Hill's and 



220 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

my own force behind the Antietam at Sharpsburg, where 
we could get together in season to make a strong defensive 
fight, and at the same time check McClellan's march 
towards Harper's Ferry, in case he thought to relieve the 
beleaguered garrison by that route, forcing him to first 
remove the obstacle on his flank. He preferred to make 
the stand at Turner's Pass, and ordered the troops to 
march next morning, ordering a brigade left at Hagers- 
town to guard the trains. No warning was sent McLaws 
to j^repare to defend his rear, either by the commanding 
general or by the chief of cavalry. The hallucination 
that McClellan was not capable of serious work seemed 
to pervade our army, even to this moment of dreadful 
threatening. 

After retiring to my couch, reflecting upon aflairs, my 
mind was so disturbed that I could not rest. As I studied, 
the perils seemed to grow, till at last I made a light and 
wrote to tell General Lee of my troubled thoughts, and 
appealed again for immediate concentration at Sharps- 
burg. To this no answer came, but it relieved my mind 
and gave me some rest. 

At daylight in the morning the column marched (eight 
brigades with the artillery), leaving Toombs's brigade. 
A regiment of G. T. Anderson's that had been on guard 
all night was not relieved in time to join the march, and 
remained with Toombs. The day was hot and the roads 
dry and beaten into impalpable powder, that rose in clouds 
of dust from under our feet as we marched. 

Before sunrise of the 14th, General Hill rode to the 
top of the mountain to view the front to which his bri- 
gade had been called the day before. As he rode he re- 
ceived a message from General Stuart, informing him that 
he had sent his main cavalry force to Crampton's Pass, 
and was then en route to join it. He found Garland's 
brigade at the summit, near the Mountain House, on the 
right of the road, and Colquitt's well advanced down the 



"the lost order" SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 221 

east side. He withdrew the latter to the summit, and 
posted two regiments on the north side of the pike behind 
stone walls, the others on the south side under cover of a 
woodland. Upon learning of the approaches to his posi- 
tion, he ordered the brigade under G. B. Anderson and 
one of Ripley's regiments up, leaving Rodes's brigade 
and the balance of Ripley's to watch for refugees from 
Harper's Ferry. 

While he was withdrawing and posting Colquitt's bri- 
gade, General Pleasonton was marching by the road three- 
fourths of a mile south, feeling his way towards Fox's 
Gap, with the brigade of infantry under Colonel Scam- 
mon. Co-operating with this advance, Pleasonton used 
his cavalry along the turnpike. His batteries were put 
in action near the foot of the mountain, except one section 
of McMullen's under Lieutenant Crome, which advanced 
with the infantry. The battle was thus opened by Gen- 
eral Pleasonton and General Cox without orders, and 
without information of the lost despatch. The latter had 
the foresight to suj^port this move with his brigade under 
Colonel Crook. Batteries of twenty-pound Parrott guns 
were posted near the foot of the mountain in fine position 
to open upon the Confederates at the summit. 

After posting Colquitt's brigade. General Hill rode off 
to his right to examine the approach to Fox's Gap, near 
the point held by Rosser's cavalry and horse artillery. 
As he passed near the gap he heard noise of troops work- 
ing their way towards him, and soon artillery opened fire 
across the gap over his head. He hurried back and sent 
Garland's brigade, with Bondurant's battery, to meet the 
approaching enemy. Garland made connection with Ros- 
ser's detachment and engaged in severe skirmish, arresting 
the progress of Scammon's brigade till the coming of 
Crook's, when Cox gave new force to his fight, and after 
a severe contest, in which Garland fell, the division ad- 
vanced in a gallant charge, which broke the ranks of tiie 



222 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

brigade, discomfited by the loss of its gallant leader, part 
of it breaking in confusion down the mountain, the left 
withdrawing towards the turnpike. G. B. Anderson's 
brigade was in time to check this success and hold for re- 
inforcements. Ripley's brigade, called up later, came, 
but passed to the right and beyond the fight. General 
Hill had posted two batteries on the summit north of the 
turnpike, which had a destructive cross fire on Cox as he 
made his fight, and part of Colquitt's right regiments were 
put in, in aid of G. B. Anderson's men. About two p.m.. 
General Cox was reinforced by the division under General 
Wilcox, and a little after three o'clock by Sturgis's divi- 
sion, the corps commander. General Beno, taking com- 
mand with his last division under Bodman. 

As Sturgis's division came into the fight, the head of 
my column reached the top of the pass, where the brigades 
of G. T. Anderson and Drayton, under General D. B. 
Jones, filed to the right to meet the battle, and soon after 
General Hood with two brigades. The last reinforcement 
braced the Confederate fight to a successful stand, and 
held it till after night in hot contest, in which many brave 
soldiers and valuable ofiicers were lost on both sides. 

The fight was between eight brigades on the Union side, 
with a detachment of cavalry and superior artillery attach- 
ments, against two of D. H. Hill's and four of my bri- 
gades, with Bosser's detachment of cavalry and artillery. 
Bipley's brigade of Hill's division marched for the fight, 
but lost its direction and failed to engage. The Con- 
federate batteries made handsome combat, but were of 
inferior metal and munitions. Numerically, the Union 
brigades were stronger than the Confederates, mine having 
lost more than half its numbers by the wayside, from ex- 
haustion under its forced march. It seems that several 
brigades failed to connect closely with the action. Bip- 
ley's, on the Confederate side. General Hill said, " didn't 
pull a trigger." G. T. Anderson claimed that some of his 



"the lost order" SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 223 

skirmishers pulled a few triggers, while Harland's Union 
brigade of Rodman's division seems to have had little 
use for its guns. Lieutenant Crome brought a section of 
McMullen's battery up in close connection with Cox's 
advance, put it in, and held it in gallant action till his 
gunners were reduced to the minimum of working force, 
when he took the place of cannoneer and fought till mor- 
tally wounded. 

On the Union side the officers had their time to or- 
ganize and place their battle, and showed skill in their 
work. The Confederates had to meet the battle, as it was 
called, after its opening, on Rosser's detachment. The 
lamented Garland, equal to any emergency, was quick 
enough to get his fine brigade in, and made excellent 
battle, till his men, discouraged by the loss of their chief, 
were overcome by the gallant assault under Cox. General 
Reno, on the Union side, an officer of high character and 
attainments, was killed about seven o'clock p.m. Among 
the Union wounded was Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes, 
afterwards President of the United States. 

The pass by the lower trail, old Sharpsburg road, was 
opened by this fight, but the Confederates standing s# 
close upon it made it necessary that they should be dis- 
lodged before it could be utilized. 

The First Corps marched from the Monocaey at day- 
light and approached the mountain at one p.m. General 
Hooker had three divisions, under Generals Hatch, Rick- 
etts, and Meade. General Hatch had four brigades, 
Generals Ricketts and Meade three each, with full ar- 
tillery appointments. At two o'clock, General Hooker 
was ordered north of the turnpike to make a diversion in 
favor of the troops operating on the south side under 
General Reno. Meade's division was marched, followed 
by Hatch's and Ricketts's, — Meade's on the right. Hatch 
on Meade's left, Ricketts in reserve. Meade's division was 
deployed along the foot-hills. A cavalry regiment under 



224 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Colonel Williams, First Massachusetts, was sent to the 
far right in observation. Meade's advance was followed 
by Hatch and Ricketts. 

General Hill's only available force to meet this formi- 
dable move was his brigade under General Rodes. He 
ordered Rodes to his left to a prominent position about a 
mile off which commanded that part of the field. Cutts's 
battalion of artillery had been j)Osted on the left of the 
turnpike, to cover by its fire the route just assigned for 
Hooker's march. The weight of the attack fell ujiion 
Rodes's brigade, and was handsomely received. Evans's 
brigade, fortunately, came up, and was sent to General 
Hill, who ordered it out to connect with Rodes's right. 
Before making close connection it became engaged, and 
operated near Rodes's right, connecting with his fight 
and dropping back as the troops on his left were gradually 
forced from point to point. 

As the brigades under Generals Kemper, Garnett, 
and Colonel Walker (Jenkins's brigade) approached the 
mountain, a report reached general head-quarters that 
the enemy was forcing his way down the mountain by the 
old Sharpsburg road. To meet this General Lee ordered 
those brigades to the right, and they marched a mile and 
more down a rugged way along the base of the mountain 
before the rej)ort was found to be erroneous, when the 
brigades were ordered back to make their way to the pike 
and to the top of the mountain in double time. General 
Rodes had five regiments, one of which he left to partially 
cover the wide opening between his position and the turn- 
pike. In view of the great force apj^roaching to attack 
him his fight seemed almost hopeless, but he handled his 
troops with skill, and delayed the enemy, with the little 
help that finally came, till night, breaking from time to 
time as he was forced nearer our centre at the turn- 
pike. 

Gibbon's brigade had been called from Hooker's corps, 



" THE LOST order" SOUTH MOUNTAIlSr. 225 

and was ordered up the mountain by the direct route as 
the corps engaged in its fight farther off on the right. 

A spur of the mountain trends towards the east, open- 
ing a valley between it and the mountain. Through this 
valley and over the rising ground Meade's division ad- 
vanced and made successful attack as he encountered the 
Confederates. Cooper's battery marched, and assisted in the 
several attacks as they were pushed up the mountain slope. 
The ground was very rough, and the Confederates worked 
hard to make it too rough, but the divisions, with their 
strong lines of skirmishers, made progress. Rodes made 
an effort to turn the right of the advancing divisions, but 
Hooker put out a brigade from Hatch's division, which 
pushed off the feeble effort, and Kodes lost his first 
position. 

It was near night when the brigades under Generals 
Kemper and Garnett and Colonel Walker returned from 
their march down the foot of the mountain and reached 
the top. They were put in as they arrived to try to cover 
the right of Rodes and Evans and fill the intervening 
space to the turnpike. As they marched, the men dropped 
along the road, as rapidly as if under severe skirmish. So 
manifest was it that nature was exhausted, that no one 
urged them to get up and try to keejD their ranks. As the 
brigades were led to places along the line, the divisions 
of Hatch and Ricketts were advancing ; the former, in 
range, caught the brigades under fire before their lines 
were formed. At the same time Meade's division was 
forcing Rodes and Evans from their positions, back 
towards the turnpike. 

General McClellan claimed fifteen hundred prisoners 
taken by his troops, and that our loss in killed and 
wounded was greater than his own, which was fifteen 
hundred. He estimated the forces as about equal, thirty 
thousand each. General D. H. Hill does not admit that 
the Confederates had more than nine thousand. 

16 



226 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Several efforts have been made to correctly report the 
numerical strength of my column, some erroneously in- 
cludmg the brigades detached with R. H. Anderson's, 
and others the brigade of General Toombs and the 
regiment of G. T. Anderson's brigade, that were left 
at Hagerstown. General Hill concedes reluctantly that 
four thousand of my men came to his support in detach- 
ments, but does not know how to estimate the loss. Con- 
sidering the severe forced march, the five brigades that 
made direct ascent of the mountain were in good order. 
The three that marched south of the turnpike, along a 
narrow mountain trail part of the way, through wood- 
lands and over boulders, returning, then up the mountain, 
the last march at double time, were thinned to skeletons 
of three or four hundred men to a brigade when they 
reached the Mountain House. That they succeeded in 
covering enough of the position to conceal our retreat after 
night is sufficient encomium of their valorous spirit. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

PRELIMINAKIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE, 

Confederates retreat from South Mountain — Federals follow and harass 
them — Franklin and Cobb at Crampton's Pass — A spirited Action — 
Fighting around Harper's Ferry — Its Capitulation — The Confederates 
take Eleven Thousand Prisoners— Jackson rejoins Lee — Description 
of the Field of Antietam — McClellan posts his Corps — Lee's Lines 
advantageously placed — Hooker's Advance on the Eve of Battle 
should have been resisted. 

At first sight of the situation, as I rode up the moun- 
tain-side, it became evident that we were not in time nor 
in sufficient force to secure our holding at Turner's Gap, 
and a note was sent General Lee to prepare his mind for 
disappointment, and give time for arrangements for re- 
treat. 

After nightfall General Hill and I rode down to head- 
quarters to make report. General Lee inquired of the 
prospects for continuing the fight. I called upon General 
Hill to demonstrate the situation, positions and forces. He 
explained that the enemy was in great force with com- 
manding positions on both flanks, which would give a 
cross-fire for his batteries, in good range on our front, 
making the cramped position of the Confederates at the 
Mountain House untenable. His explanation was too 
forcible to admit of further deliberation. General Lee 
ordered withdrawal of the commands to Keedysville, and 
on the march changed the order, making Sharpsburg 
the point of assembly. General Hill's troops were first 
withdrawn, and when under way, the other brigades fol- 
lowed and were relieved by General Fitzhugh Lee's cav- 
alry on the mountain at three o'clock in the morning. 
Hood's two brigades, with G. T. Anderson's, as rear- 
guard. 

227 



228 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

General Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was ordered to cover 
our march, but Pleasonton pushed upon him so severely 
with part of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry and Tidball's 
battery that he was forced off from our line through Boons- 
borough and found his way to the Potomac off the rear of 
General Lee's left, leaving his killed and wounded and 
losing two pieces of artillery. Otherwise our march was 
not disturbed. In addition to his regular complement of 
artillery, General D. H. Hill had the battalion under 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Cutts. The batteries were as- 
signed positions near the ridge under the crest, where they 
could best cover the fields on the farther side of the 
stream. A few minutes after our lines were manned, 
information came of the capitulation of Harper's Ferry, 
and of the withdrawal of the troops to the Virginia side 
of the Potomac. 

General Toombs's brigade joined us early on the 15th, 
and was posted over the Burnside Bridge. He was subse- 
quently ordered to detach two regiments, as guard for 
trains near Williamsport. 

As long as the armies were linked to Harper's Ferry, the 
heights in front of Sharpsburg offered a formidable defen- 
sive line, and in view of possible operations from Harper's 
Ferry, through the river pass, east of South Mountain, 
formed a beautiful point of strategic diversion. But when 
it transpired that Harper's Ferry was surrendered and 
the position was not to be utilized, that the troops there 
were to join us by a march on the south side, its charms 
were changed to j)erplexities. The threatening attitude 
towards the enemy's rear vanished, his line of communi- 
cation was open and free of further care, and his army, 
relieved of entanglements, was at liberty to cross the 
Antietam by the upper fords and bridges, and approach 
from vantage-ground General Lee's left. At the same 
time the Federal left was reasonably secured from aggres- 
sion by cramped and rugged ground along the Confed- 



PRELIMINAKIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE. 229 

erate right. Thus the altered circumstances changed all 
of the features of the position in favor of the Federals. 

Approaching Crampton's Gap on the morning of the 
14th, Hampton's cavalry encountered the enemy's and 
made a dashing charge, which opened his way to Mun- 
ford's, both parties losing valuable officers and men. 
When General Stuart rode up, he saw nothing seriously 
threatening, and ordered Hampton south to the river pass ; 
thinking that there might be something more imj)ortant 
at that point, he rode himself to Maryland Heights to see 
General McLaws, and to witness the operations at Har- 
per's Ferry, posting Colonel Munford with two regiments 
of cavalry, two regiments of Mahone's brigade under 
Colonel Parham, part of the Tenth Georgia Infantry, 
Chew's battery of four guns, and a section of navy how- 
itzers, to guard the pass. The infantry regiments were 
posted behind stone walls at the base of the mountain, the 
cavalry dismounted on the flanks acting as sharp-shooters. 

At noon General Franklin marched through Burkitts- 
ville with his leading division under General Slocum, 
holding the division under General W. F. Smith in re- 
serve. His orders were to wait until Couch's division 
joined him, but he judged that the wait might be more 
favorable to the other side. Slocum deployed his bri- 
gades, Bartlett's, Newton's, and Torbert's, from right to 
left, posted Wolcott's battery of six guns on his left and 
rear, and followed the advance of his skirmish line, the 
right brigade leading. When the Confederate position 
was well developed, the skirmishers were retired, and the 
order to assault followed, — the right regiments of New- 
ton's brigade supporting Bartlett's assault, the regiments 
on the left supporting Torbert's. The Confederates made 
a bold effort to hold, but the attack was too well organized, 
and too cleverly pushed to leave the matter long in doubt. 
Their flanks, being severely crowded upon, soon began to 
drop off, when a sweeping charge of Slocum's line gained 



230 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the position. The brigades of General Brooks and Col- 
onel Irwin of General Smith's division were advanced to 
Slocum's left and joined in pursuit, which was so rapid 
that the Confederates were not able to rally a good line ; 
the entire mountain was abandoned to the Federals, 
and the pursuit ended. Some four hundred prisoners, 
seven hundred stand of arms, and one gun were their 
trophies in this affair. General Franklin's total loss was 
five hundred and thirty-three.* 

General McLaws had ordered General Cobb's brigade 
and the other regiments of Mahone's to reinforce the 
troops at the gap, but they only came up as the Federals 
were making their sweeping charge, and were driven back 
with their discomfited comrades. General Semmes's bri- 
gade at the Brownsville Pass, a mile south, with five or 
six guns, attempted to relieve their comrades, but the 
range was too great for effective work. That McLaws 
was not prepared for the sudden onslaught is evident from 
the assurances made him by the cavalry commander. His 
orders for Cobb were severe enough, but Franklin was too 
prompt to allow Cobb to get to work. Upon hearing the 
noise of battle, he followed his orders, riding with General 
Stuart, but the game was played before he could take part 
in it. Night came and gave him time to organize his 
forces for the next day. Had the defenders been posted 
at the crest of the mountain it is probable they could 
have delayed the assaulting forces until reinforced. But 
cavalry commanders do not always post artillery and in- 
fantry to greatest advantage. 

General Cobb made worthy effort to arrest the retreat 
and reorganize the forces, but was not able to fix a rally- 
ing-point till after the pass was lost and the troops were 
well out of fire of the pursuers. General Semmes came 
to his aid, with his staff, but could accomplish nothing 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 183. 





^CC ^::■^--e»L-t-t_JJ/^ 



Commanding First Division, First Army Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. 



PRELIMINARIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE. 231 

until he drew two of his regiments from Brownsville Pass 
and established them with a battery as a rallying-point. 
General McLaws reformed his line about a mile and a 
half south of the lost gap, and drew all of his force not 
necessary to the bombardment at Harper's Ferry to that 
line during the night. 

Under cover of the night, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Davis, 
at the head of the Union cavalry, left Harper's Ferry, 
crossed the Potomac, marched up the left bank, through 
Sharpsburg, and made good his escape, capturing some 
forty or fifty Confederate wagons as they were moving 
south from Hagerstown. 

We left McLaws in possession of Maryland Heights, on 
the 14th, with his best guns planted against the garrison 
at Harper's Ferry. The Potomac River was between his 
and Jackson's and Walker's forces, and the Shenandoah 
divided Jackson's and Walker's commands. Walker 
posted his division to defend against the escape from 
Harper's Ferry, and planted three Parrott guns of Cap- 
tain French's battery and two rifle pieces of Captain 
Branch's on Loudoun Heights, having effective fire along 
Bolivar Heights. General Jackson sent word to McLaws 
and Walker that the batteries were not to open till all 
were ready, but the latter, hearing the engagement along 
South Mountain drawing nearer, and becoming impatient 
lest delay should prove fatal, ordered his guns to open 
against the batteries along Bolivar Heights, and silenced 
those under range. 

General Jackson ordered A. P. Hill's division along 
the left bank of the Shenandoah to turn the enemy's left, 
the division under Lawton down the turnpike in support 
of Hill, and his own division to threaten against the 
enemy's right. Hill's division did its work in good style, 
securing eligible positions on the enemy's left and left rear 
of Bolivar Heights, and planted a number of batteries 
upon them during the night ; and Jackson had some of 



232 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

his best guns passed over the Shenandoah to commanding 
points near the base of Loudoun Heights. At daylight 
Lawton's command moved up close to the enemy. At the 
same time the batteries of Hill's division opened fire, and a 
little later all the batteries, including those of McLaws and 
Walker. The signal ordered for the storming columns 
was to be the cessation of artillery fire. In about one 
hour the enemy's fire ceased, when Jackson commanded 
silence upon his side. Pender's brigade started, when the 
enemy opened again with his artillery. The batteries of 
Pegram and Crenshaw dashed forward and renewed raj)id 
fire, when the signal of distress was raised. 

Colonel D. H. Miles, the Federal commander at Har- 
per's Ferry, was mortally wounded, and the actual surren- 
der was made by General White, who gave up eleven 
thousand prisoners, thirteen thousand small-arms, seventy- 
two cannon, quantities of quartermaster's stores and of 
subsistence.* 

General Franklin had posted his division under General 
Couch at Rohrersville on the morning of the 15th, and 
proceeded to examine McLaws's line established the night 
before across Pleasant Valley. He found the Confederates 
strongly posted covering the valley, their flanks against 
the mountain-side. Before he could organize for attack 
the firing at Harper's Ferry ceased, indicating surrender 
of that garrison and leaving the troo23S operating there 
free to march against him. He prepared, therefore, for 
that eventuality. 

The " lost order" directed the commands of Generals 
Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomjDlishing the 
objects for which they had been detached, to join the main 
body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown. Under 
the order and the changed condition of affairs, they were 
expected, in case of early capitulation at Harper's Ferry, 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 961. . 



PRELIMINARIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE. 233 

to march up the Rohrersville-Boonsboroiigh road against 
McClellan's left. There were in those columns twenty- 
six of General Lee's forty brigades, equipped with a fair 
apportionment of artillery and cavalry. So it seemed to 
he possible that Jackson would order McLaws and Walker 
up the Rohrersville road, and move with his own corps 
through the river pass east of South Mountain, against 
McClellan's rear, as the speedier means of relief to Gen- 
eral Lee's forces. But prudence would have gone with 
the bolder move of his entire command east of the moun- 
tain against McClellan's rear, with a fair field for strategy 
and tactics. This move would have disturbed McClellan's 
plans on the afternoon of the 15th, while there seemed 
little hoj^e that McClellan would delay his attack until 
Jackson could join us, marching by the south side. 

The field, and extreme of conditions, were more en- 
couraging of results than was Napoleon's work at Areola. 

General Jackson judged it better to join us by the south 
side, marched promptly with two of his divisions (leaving 
A. P. Hill with six brigades to receive the surrender and 
captured property), then ordered Walker's and McLaws's 
troops to follow his march. With his report of surrender 
of the garrison he sent advice of his march by the south 
side to join us. 

At daylight on the 15th the head of General Lee's 
column reached the Antietam. General D. H. Hill, in 
advance, crossed and filed into position to the left of the 
Boonsborough turnj^ike, G. B. Anderson on his right, 
Garland's brigade under Colonel McRae, Bipley, and 
Colquitt, Bodes in rear near Sharj)sburg, my command 
on his right. The two brigades under Hood were on my 
right, Kemper, Drayton, Jenkins (under Colonel Walker), 
Washington Artillery, on the ridge near the turnpike, and 
S. D. Lee's artillery. Pickett's brigade (under Garnett) 
was in a second line, G. T. Anderson's brigade in rear of 
the battalions, Evans's brigade on the north side of the 



234 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

turnpike ; Toombs's brigade joined and was posted at 
bridge No. 3 (Burnside Bridge). As the battalions of 
artillery attached to the divisions were all that could find 
places, General Lee sent the reserve artillery under Gen- 
eral Pendleton across the Potomac. 

As soon as advised of the surrender and Jackson's 
march by the south side, my brigades under Hood were 
moved to the extreme left of the line, taking the division 
of General D. H. Hill within my limits, while three of 
S. D. Lee's batteries were sent in support of Hood's bri- 
gades. The jDursuit ordered by General McClellan was 
the First, Second, and Twelfth Corps by the Boons- 
borough turnpike, the Ninth Corps and Sykes's division 
of the Fifth by the old Sharpsburg road ; * the Ninth 
and Fifth to reinforce Franklin by the Rohrersville road, 
or move to Sharpsburg. 

About two o'clock in the afternoon the advance of the 
Union army came in sight. General Porter had passed 
the Ninth Corps with his division under Sykes and joined 
Richardson's division of the Second. These divisions de- 
ployed on the right and left of the turnpike and posted 
their batteries, which drew on a desultory fire of artillery, 
continuing until night. The morning of the 16tli opened 
as the evening of the previous day closed, except for the 
arrival of the remainder of the Union troops. The Ninth 
Corps took post at the lower bridge oi^posite the Con- 
federate right, the First, the other divisions of the 
Second, and the Twelfth Corps resting nearer Keedysville. 
The display of their finely appointed batteries was im- 
posing, as seen from Sharpsburg Heights. 

Before maturing his plans, General McClellan had to 
make a careful reconnoissance, and to know of the dispo- 
sition to be made of the Confederate forces from Harper's 
Ferry. 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 47. 



PRELIMINARIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE. 235 

Of the latter point he was informed, if not assured, 
before he posted the Ninth Corps. Four batteries of 
twenty-pound Parrotts were planted on the height over- 
looking the Antietam on their right ; on the crest near 
the Burnside Bridge, Weed's three-inch guns and Benja- 
min's twenty-pound Parrotts. At intervals between those 
were posted some ten or more batteries, and the practice 
became more lively as the day wore on, till, observing the 
unequal combat, I ordered the Confederates to hold their 
ammunition, and the batteries of the other side, seeming 
to approve the order, slackened their fire. 

The Antietam, hardly worthy the name river, is a 
sluggish stream coming down from Pennsylvania heights 
in a flow a little west of south till it nears the Potomac, 
when it bends westward to its confluence. It is spanned 
by four stone bridges, — at the Williamsport turnpike, 
the Boonsborough-Sharpsburg turnpike, the Bohrersville 
turnpike, and another near its mouth. The third was after- 
wards known as the Burnside Bridge. From the north sub- 
urbs of Sharpsburg the Hagerstown turnpike leads north 
a little west two miles, when it turns east of north to the 
vanishing point of operations. A mile and a half from 
Sharpsburg on the west of this road is the Dunker chapel, 
near the southern border of a woodland, which spreads 
northward half a mile, then a quarter or more westward. 
East of the pike were open fields of corn and fruit, with 
occasional woodlands of ten or twenty acres, as far as the 
stream, where some heavier forests cumbered the river 
banks. General Lee's line stood on the Sharpsburg 
Heights, his right a mile southeast of the village, the line 
extending parallel with the Hagerstown turnpike, three 
miles from his right, the left curved backward towards 
the rear, and towards the great eastern bend of the Poto- 
mac, near which were the cavalry and horse artillery. 
Along the broken line were occasional ridges of limestone 
cropping out in such shape as to give partial cover to 



236 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

infantry lying under tliem. Single batteries were posted 
along the line, or under the crest of the heights, and the 
battalions of the Washington Artillery, Cutts's, and S. D. 
Lee's. 

In forming his forces for the battle. General McClellan 
divided his right wing, posted the Ninth Corps on his 
left, at the Burnside Bridge, under General Cox, and as- 
signed the First Corps, under General Hooker, for his 
right flank. General Burnside was retained on his left. 
The plan was to make the main attack against the Con- 
federate left, or to make that a diversion in favor of the 
main attack, and to follow success by his reserve. 

At two P.M. of the 16th, Hooker's First Corps crossed 
the Antietam at the bridge near Keedysville and a near- 
by ford, and marched against my left brigades, Generals 
Meade, Ricketts, and Doubleday commanding the divi- 
sions, battalions, and batteries of field artillery. The 
sharp skirmish that ensued was one of the marked pre- 
liminaries of the great battle ; but the Federals gained 
nothing by it except an advanced position, which was of 
little benefit and disclosed their purpose. 

General Jackson was up from Harper's Ferry with 
Ewell's division and his own, under Generals Lawton and 
Jones. They were ordered out to General Lee's left, and 
took post west of the Hagerstown turnpike, the right of 
his line resting on my left, under Hood, Winder's and 
Jones's brigades on the front, Starke's and Taliaferro's on 
the second line, Early's brigade of Ewell's division on 
the left of Jackson's division, with Hays's brigade for a 
second ; Lawton's and Trimble's brigades were left at rest 
near the chapel ; Poague's battery on Jackson's front ; 
five other batteries prepared for action. Following Jack- 
son's march to the left. General J. G. Walker came up 
with his two brigades, and was posted on my extreme 
right in the position left vacant by the change of Hood's 
brigades. 



PRELIMIlSrARIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE. 237 

General Hooker was joined, as he marched that after- 
noon, by his chief, who rode with him some little distance 
conversing of pending affairs. It subsequently transpired 
that Hooker thought the afternoon's work ordered for his 
corps (thirteen thousand) so far from support extremely 
venturesome, and he was right. Jackson was up and in 
position with two divisions well on the flank of the attack 
to be made by Hooker. Hood with S. D. Lee's batteries 
received Hooker's attack, and arrested its progress for the 
day. If Jackson could have been put into this fight, and 
also the brigades under J. G. Walker, Hooker's command 
could have been fought out, if not crushed, before the 
afternoon went out. He was beyond support for the day, 
and the posting along the Antietam was such — we will 
soon see — as to prevent effective diversion in his favor. 
Events that followed authorize the claim for this combi- 
nation, that it would have so disturbed the plans of Gen- 
eral McClellan as to give us one or two days more for 
concentration, and under that preparation we could have 
given him more serious trouble. 

Hood's skirmish line was out to be driven, or drawn in, 
but throughout the severe engagement his line of battle 
was not seriously disturbed. After night General Jackson 
sent the brigades of Trimble and Lawton, under General 
Lawton, to replace Hood's men, who were ordered to re- 
plenish ammunition, and, after getting food, to resume 
their places on my right. Preparing for battle. General 
Jackson sent the brigade under General Early to support 
Stuart's cavalry and horse artillery, and Lawton drew his 
brigade, under General Hays, to support his others on 
the right of Jackson's division. 

General Mansfield crossed during the night with the 
Twelfth Corps and took position supporting General 
Hooker's command, with the divisions of Generals A. S. 
Williams and George S. Greene, and field batteries. 

A light rain began to fall at nine o'clock. The troops 



238 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

along either line were near enough to hear voices from 
the other side, and several spats occurred during the night 
between the pickets, increasing in one instance to ex- 
change of many shots ; but for the most part there was 
silence or only the soft, smothered sound of the summer 
rain over all that field on which was to break in the 
morning the storm of lead and iron. 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

BATTLE OF SHARPSBUEG, OR ANTIETAM. 

Bloodiest Single Day of the War — Comparison of Casualties — Hooker 
opens the Fight against Jackson's Centre — Many Officers among the 
Fallen early in the Day— McLaws and Walker in time to meet Sum- 
ner's Advance under Sedgwick — Around Dunker Chapel — Richard- 
son's splendid Advance against the Confederate Centre the Signal 
of the bursting of another Storm— Longstreet's and D. H. Hill's 
Troops stood before it — Fall of General G. B. Anderson — General 
Richardson mortally wounded — Aggressive Spirit of his Command 
broken — Wonderful Cannon-shot — General D. H. Hill's Third Horse 
killed under him. 

The field that I have described — the field lying along 
the Antietam and including in its scope the little town of 
Sharpsburg — was destined to pass into history as the 
scene of the bloodiest single day of fighting of the war, 
and that 17th of September was to become memorable as 
the day of greatest carnage in the campaigns between the 
North and South. 

Gettysburg was the greatest battle of the war, but it 
was for three days, and its total of casualties on either 
side, terrible as it was, should be one-third larger to make 
the average per diem equal to the losses at Sharpsburg. 
Viewed by the measure of losses, Antietam was the 
fourth battle of the war, Spottsylvania and the Wilder- 
ness, as well as Gettysburg, exceeding it in number of 
killed and wounded, but each of these dragged its tragedy 
through several days. 

Taking Confederate losses in killed and wounded as the 
criterion of magnitude in battles, the Seven Days' Battle 
(following McClellan's retreat), Gettysburg, and Chicka- 
mauga exceeded Sharpsburg, but each of these occupied 
several days, and on no single day in any one of them 
was there such carnage as in this fierce struggle. 

239 



240 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The Confederates lost in killed and wounded in the 
Seven Days' Battle 19,739, — more, it will be observed, 
than at Gettysburg (15,298), though the total loss, in- 
cluding 5150 captured or missing, at the latter, brought 
the figures up to those of the former (20,614), in which 
the captured or missing were only 875. Our killed and 
wounded at Chickamauga were 16,986, but that was in 
two days' battle, while at Chancellorsville in three days 
tlie killed and wounded were 10,746. It is impossible to 
make the comj^arison with absolute exactness for the Con- 
federate side, for the reason that our losses are given for 
the entire campaign in Maryland, instead of separately 
for the single great battle and several minor engage- 
ments. Thus computed they were 12,187.* But nearly 
all of these are known to have been losses at Sharpsburg, 
and, making proper deductions for the casualties in other 
actions of the campaign, the Confederate loss in this single 
day's fighting was still in excess of that at the three 
days' fight at Chancellorsville (10,746), and for the single 
day far larger proportionally than in the two days at 
Chickamauga, three days at Gettysburg, or seven days 
on the bloody Chickahominy. 

But the sanguinary character of this battle is most 
strikingly exhibited by a comparison of the accurate 
figures of the Federal losses, returned specifically for the 
day. These show a total killed and wounded of 11,657 
(or, including the captured and missing, 12,410), as con- 
trasted with 17,567 killed and wounded in three days at 
Gettysburg, 16,141 in eight days at Spottsylvania, and 
14,283 in the three days at the Wilderness, while the 
three and two days' fighting respectively at Chancellors- 
ville and Chickamauga were actually productive of less 
loss than this battle of one day. The exceeding losses 



* Some authorities say (iucludiug a small number of " captured or 
missing") 12,601. 



BATTLE OF SHAEPSBUEG, OR ANTIETAM. 241 

of this battle are further shown by the fact that of the 
11,657 Federals stricken on the field, the great number 
of 2108 were actually slain, — more than two-thirds of 
the number killed in three days at Gettysburg (3070). 
And this tremendous tumult of carnage was entirely 
compassed in the brief hours from dawn to four o'clock 
in the afternoon. 

At three o'clock in the morning of the 17th firing along 
the picket lines of the confronting and expectant armies 
became quite frequent, and before daylight the batteries 
began to 23lough the fields in front of them, feeling, as it 
were, for the ranks of men whose destruction was better 
suited to their ugly purpose. 

As the dawn came, the fire spread along both lines from 
left to right, across the Antietam and back again, and the 
thunder of the big guns became continuous and increased 
to mighty volume. To this was presently added the 
sharper rattling of musketry, and the surge of mingling 
sound sweeping uj) and down the field was multiplied and 
confused by the reverberations from the rocks and hills. 
And in this great tumult of sound, which shook the 
air and seemed to shatter the cliffs and ledges above the 
Antietam, bodies of the facing foes were pushed forward 
to closer work, and soon added the clash of steel to the 
thunderous crash of cannon-shots. 

The first impact came from Hooker's right division 
under Doubleday, led by the choice brigade under Gib- 
bon. It was deployed across the turnpike and struck the 
centre of Jackson's division, when close engagement was 
strengthened by the brigades of Patrick, Phelps, and part 
of Hofmann's, Ricketts's division, engaged in close connec- 
tion along Lawton's front. Hooker supported his battle 
by his division under Meade, which called into action 
three of D. H. Hill's brigades, — Eipley's, Colquitt's, and 
McEae's. Hartsuff", the leading spirit of Ricketts's di- 
vision, was the first general officer to fall severely hurt, 

16 



242 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

and later fell the commander of the corps, wounded also. 
General Starke, commanding Jackson's division, was 
killed. At six o'clock the Twelfth Corps came in, when 
General Lawton called for Hood's brigades, " and all the 
help he could bring." Hood's and G. T. Anderson's 
brigades were put in, and the brigades from my right, 
under J. G. Walker, marched promptly in response to 
this call. 

The weight of Mansfield's fight forced Jackson back 
into the middle wood at the Dunker chapel, and D. H. 
Hill's brigades to closer lines. Hood was in season to 
brace them, and hold the line as he found it. In this 
fight the corps commander. General Mansfield, fell, mor- 
tally wounded, which took from that corjDS some of its 
aggressive power. 

Jackson, worn down and exhausted of ammunition, 
withdrew his divisions at seven a.m., except Early's bri- 
gade, that was with the cavalry. This he called back 
to vacant ground on Hood's left. Two detachments, one 
under Colonel Grigsby, of Virginia, the other under 
Colonel Stafford, of Louisiana, remained on the wooded 
ground off from the left of Jackson's position. One of 
the regiments of Early's brigade was left with the cav- 
alry. Stuart retired to position corresponding to the line 
of Jackson's broken front. The brigade under G. T. 
Anderson joined on Hood's right, and the brigades under 
J. G. Walker coming up took place on Hood's left, 
Walker leaving two regiments to fill a vacant place be- 
tween Anderson's brigade and Hood's right. Walker, 
Hood, and D. H. Hill attacked against the Twelfth Corps ; 
worn by its fight against Jackson, it was driven back 
as far as the post-and-rail fence in the east open, where 
they were checked. They were outside of the line, their 
left in the air and exposed to the fire of a thirty-gun 
battery posted at long range on the Hagerstown road by 
General Doubleday. Their left was withdrawn, and the 



BATTLE OF 

SHARPSBURG 




BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 243 

line rectified, when Greene's brigade of the Twelfth re- 
sumed position in the northeast angle of the wood, which 
it held until Sedgwick's division came in bold march. 

In these fights offensive and defensive the artillery bat- 
talions under Lieutenant-Colonel S. D. Lee and Major 
Frobel were in active combat, the former from the first 
shot made before daylight. They had been severely 
worked, and were nearly exhausted of ammunition. The 
Washington Artillery was called on for a battery to as- 
sist them, and some of the guns of that battalion were 
sent for ammunition. Miller's battery of four Napoleon 
guns came. 

As Jackson withdrew. General Hooker's corps retired 
to a point on the Hagerstown road about three-quarters 
of a mile north of the battle-ground, where General 
Doubleday established his thirty-gun battery. Jackson's 
and Hooker's men had fought to exhaustion, and the 
battle of the Twelfth Corps, taken up and continued by 
Mansfield, had taken defensive relations, its chief mor- 
tally wounded. 

Generals Lawton, Ripley, and J. R. Jones were severely 
wounded, and Colonel Douglas, commanding Lawton's 
brigade, killed. A third of the men of Lawton's, Hays's, 
and Trimble's brigades were reported killed or wounded. 
Four of the field officers of Colquitt's brigade were killed, 
five were wounded, the tenth and last contused by a 
shell. All of Jackson's and D. H. Hill's troops engaged 
suffered proportionally. Hood's, Walker's, and G. T. 
Anderson's, though longer engaged, did not lose so 
severely. 

General Hooker's aggregate of loss was 2590 ; General 
Mansfield's, 1746. 

The Federal batteries, of position, on the east side were 
more or less busy during the engagement, having occa- 
sional opportunities for a raking fire on the troops along 
Jackson's line and my left. The horse artillery under 



244 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Stuart was strengthening to the Confederate left, and had 
occasional opportunities for destructive fire across the 
Union right when coming into action. 

Although the battle along the line of contention had 
become defensive, there were threatening movements on 
the Boonsborough pike by Sykes's division and the horse 
artillery under Pleasonton, and Burnside was busy at his 
bridge, working to find his way across. 

At the close of the Walker-Hood-Hill affair. Hood 
found his line making a large angle with the line of the 
latter, which was rectified, drawing in the angle. Early's 
regiments were in the wood between Walker and the 
cavalry, and the detachments under Colonels Grigsby and 
Stafford in the wood some distance in advance of Early's 
left. 

The line thus organized was thin and worn by severe 
attrition. The men were losing strength and the ammu- 
nition getting low. Some gathered cartridges from their 
fallen comrades and distributed them as far as they would 
go, others went for fresh supplies. 

McLaws's column came up at nine o'clock. He reported 
at General Lee's head-quarters, where he was ordered at 
rest, and afterwards reported to me, with General Lee's 
orders for his own division, and asked the disposition to 
be made of R. H. Anderson's. He was ordered to send 
the latter to report to General D. H. Hill. 

Coincident with these arrivals, heavy columns of Federal 
infantry and artillery were seen crossing the Antietam. 
Morell's division of the Fifth Corps was up and relieved 
Kichardson's of the Second, which had been in our front 
since its arrival on the 15th. Richardson's following the 
march of the troops by the ujDper crossing advised us that 
the next engagement would be by the Second Corps, under 
General Sumner ; Sedgwick's division was in the lead as 
they marched. Our left centre was almost exhausted of 
men and ammunition. The divisions of French and Rich- 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 245 

ardson followed in left echelon to Sedgwick. Hood's bri- 
gades had retired for fresh supply of ammunition, leaving 
the guard to Walker's two brigades, G. T. Anderson's 
brigade on Walker's right, part of Early's brigade on 
Walker's left, and the regiments under Colonels Grigsby 
and Stafford off the left front. McLaws's division was 
called for, and on the march under conduct of Major 
Taylor of general head-quarters staff. 

At sight of Sumner's march, General Early rode from 
the field in search, as he reported, of reinforcements. 
His regiments naturally waited on the directions of the 
leader. 

General Sumner rode with his leading division under 
General Sedgwick, to find the battle. Sedgwick marched 
in column of brigades, Gorman, Dana, and Howard. 
There was no officer on the Union side in charge of the 
field, the other corps commanders having been killed or 
wounded. General Sumner testified, — 

'^ On going upon the field I found that General Hooker's corps 
had been dispersed and routed. I passed him some distance in 
the rear, where he had been carried wounded, but I saw nothing 
of his corps at all, as I was advancing with my command on the 
field. There were some troops lying down on the left which I 
took to belong to Mansfield's command. In the mean time Gen- 
eral Mansfield had been killed, and a portion of his corps (for- 
merly Banks's) had also been thrown into confusion." * 

He passed Greene's brigade of the Twelfth, and marched 
through the wood, leaving the Dunker chapel on his 
left. 

As McLaws approached, General Hood was sent to give 
him careful instructions of the posture, of the grounds, 
and the impending crisis. He marched with his brigades, 
— Cobb's, Kershaw's, Semmes's, and Barksdale's. The 
leading brigade filed to the right, before the approaching 

* Report of Committee, part i. p. 368. 



246 



FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 



Kershaw's leading 



regiment filed into line as 



march. 

Sedgwick's column approached the south side of the 
Dunker chapel wood, — the latter on a diagonal march, — 
while Kershaw's regiment was in fair front against it. 



<5, 



' « "^(.t <?• COUGRIGSBY ^ 

^ •a- ~ - ~ - 






COL?STAFFORD , 'S^ 










Confederate ■ 



Relative positions of McLaws and other Confederates and Sedgwick at their 

opening. 

The regiment opened prompt fire, and the other regiments 
came into line in double time, opening fire by company as 
they came to the front. The other brigades came into 
line by companies, and forward into line by regiments. 
Armistead's brigade had been drawn from K. H. Ander- 
son's column to reinforce McLaws. 

Sedgwick's diagonal march exposed his left to a 
scattering fire from Walker's left brigade under M. 
Kansom, but he kept his steady march while Walker in- 
creased his fire. McLaws increasing his fire staggered 
the march of Sedgwick, and presently arrested it. The 
regiments under Colonels Stafford and Grigsby, coming 
from their lurking-places, opened fire on Sedgwick's right 
rear. At McLaws's opening Sedgwick essayed to form 
line of battle ; the increasing fire on his right and left 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR AISTTIETAM. 247 

rear, with the terrible fire in front, was confusing, but the 
troops were eager to return the fire they found pouring 
into their lines from three-quarters of a circle. To counter 
the rear fire of Walker, General Sumner ordered the rear 
brigade to face about. The troops, taking this to mean a 
rearward march, j^roceeded to execute it without awaiting 
further orders, which was soon followed by the other 
brigades. 

McLaws and Walker, pushing their success, were joined 
by G. T. Anderson's, the brigades of D. H. Hill's left, 
and those of R. H. Anderson's division, making strong 
battle through the woodland and open to the post-and-rail 
fence and to the Roulette House, where they encountered 
Sumner's division under French, and parts of the Twelfth 
Corps rallied on that part of the field. This contention 
was firm and wasting on both sides, but held with per- 
severing courage until Richardson's reserve, under Brooke, 
was put against Hill's right and broke the Confederate 
line back to the woodlands south of the chapel, where 
Early's regiments had formed a rallying line. 

When Hill's right was struck and pressed so severely, 
Rodes's brigade, the reserve of his division, was ordered 
out to support his right. The brigade advanced in good 
strong battle, but General Rodes reported that he could 
not move his Sixth Alabama Regiment in time, notwith- 
standing his personal efforts ; that with the support of 
that regiment the battle line of the Confederates could 
have waited other supports. 

General Sumner was eager in riding with his leading 
division. He was always anxious to get in in time to use 
all of his power, and thought others like himself. Had he 
formed the corps into lines of divisions, in close echelon, 
and moved as a corps, he would have marched through 
and opened the way for Porter's command at bridge No. 
2, and Pleasonton's cavalry, and for Burnside at the third 
bridge, and forced the battle back to the river bank. 



248 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

He was criticised for his opposition to Franklin's pro- 
posed attack, but the chances are even that he was right. 
The stir among Franklin's troops was observed from a 
dead angle of our lines, and preparations were made to 
meet it. General Jackson was marching back to us, and 
it is 2)ossible that the attack might have resulted in min- 
gling our troops with Franklin's down on the banks of the 
Antietam. 

After this fight the artillery battalions of S. D. Lee and 
Frobel, quite out of ammunition, retired to replenish. 
The battery of Napoleons was reduced to one section, that 
short of ammunition and working hands. 

General Hill rallied the greater part of G. B. Ander- 
son's and Rodes's brigades in the sunken road. Some of 
Rij)ley's men came together near Miller's guns at the 
Hagerstown pike. General R. H. Anderson and his next 
in rank, General Wright, were wounded. The next 
officer. General Pryor, not advised of his new authority, 
the brigades assembled at points most suited to their con- 
venience, in rear of D. H. Hill's brigades. 

But time was up. Confederate affairs were not encour- 
aging. Our men were all leg- weary and heavy to handle, 
while McClellan, with his tens of thousands, whom he had 
marched in healthful exercise the past two weeks, was 
finding and pounding us from left to right under con- 
verging fire of his batteries east and west of the An- 
tietam. 

The signal of the approaching storm was the bursting 
of Bichardson's command, augmented by parts of French's 
division, through the field of corn, hardly ruffled by the 
affair at the Boulette House, spreading its grand march 
against our centre. They came in brave style, in full 
appreciation of the work in hand, marched better than 
on drill, unfolded banners making gay their gallant step. 

The Fifth Corps and Pleasonton's cavalry were in 
active preparation to cross at the second bridge and join 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OK ANTIETAM. 249 

on Kichardson's left, and Burnside at tlie third bridge 
was pressing his claim for a passage against our right. 

I had posted G. T. Anderson's brigade behind a stone 
fence near the Hagerstown pike, about the safest spot to 
be found on the field of Sharpsburg, — a dead angle, so to 
speak. The batteries on the field north and the long- 
range thirty-gun battery of General Doubleday were 
playing their fire down the pike, taking their aim by 
the direction of the road, where they stood. This 
brought their fire into the field about one hundred yards 
in rear of Anderson's line. As the fire came from an 
enfilade direction, the troops assumed that they were under 
enfilade fire, and General Anderson changed position 
without reporting. General D. H. Hill got hold of him 
and moved him to the Boonsborough pike to defend 
against Sykes's and Pleasonton's forces, advancing in that 
quarter. Thus, when Richardson's march approached its 
objective, the Confederates had Boyce's battery, well out 
in the corn-field, facing the march ; Miller's section of 
Napoleons in the centre, and a single battery at McLaws's 
rear, with fragments of scattered brigades along the pike, 
and the Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment to hold 
the left centre, besides the brigades in the sunken road, 
and the brigades of R. H. Anderson's division awaiting 
the bloody struggle. They received the severe attack 
in firm holding for a long half-hour, the enemy pressing 
closer at intervals, until an order of General Rodes's was 
misconstrued and part of his brigade under Lieutenant- 
Colonel Lightfoot, of the Sixth Alabama Regiment, was 
forced to the rear, and marched off, informing others that 
that was the order. 

General G. B. Anderson fell mortally wounded. The 
enemy pressed in on his outer flank and called for surren- 
der of the forces cut off and outflanked. Meagher's bri- 
gade was retired to replenish ammunition, and Barlow 
swung to his right and came against our fragments about 



250 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Miller's guns, standing near his flank. Miller had two 
guns, the others off for a supply of ammunition. Cooke's 
Twenty-seventh North Carolina Regiment was well organ- 
ized, but short of ammunition ; fragments of Ripley's 
brigade and some others were on the turnpike; Miller 
was short of hands and ammunition, even for two guns ; 
McLaws's division and the other jmrt of Walker's were 
in front of threatenings of parts of French's division and 
of troops rallying on their front, and the Sixth Corps was 
up and coming against them, so that it seemed hazardous 
to call them off and leave an open way. Our line was 
throbbing at every 23oint, so that I dared not call on Gen- 
eral Lee for helj). Sergeant Ellis thought that he could 
bring up ammunition if he was authorized to order it. 
He was authorized, and rode for and brought it. I 
held the horses of some of my staff who helped to man 
the guns as cannoneers. 

As the attacking forces drew nearer, Colonel Cooke re- 
ported his ammunition exhausted. He was ordered to 
hold on with the bayonet, and sent in return that he 
would " hold till ice forms in regions where it was never 
known," or words to that effect. As Kichardson ad- 
vanced through the corn he cut off the battery under 
Boyce, so that it was obliged to retire to save itself, and as 
Barlow came upon our centre, the battery on our left was 
for a time thrown out of fire lest they might injure friend 
as much as foe. Barlow marched in steady good ranks, 
and the remnants before him rose to the emergency. 
They seemed to forget that they had known fatigue ; the 
guns were played with life, and the brave spirits man- 
ning them claimed that they were there to hold or to go 
down with the guns. 

As our shots rattled against the armored ranks. Colonel 
Fairfax clapped his hands and ran for other charges. 
The mood of the gunners to a man was one of quiet but 
unflinching resolve to stand to the last gun. Captain 




in^-y^ ^'''^^-;^^<..^-^<^--t^ 




Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General, First Corps. 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 251 

Miller charged and double-charged with sj^herical case 
and canister until his guns at the discharge leaped in the 
air from ten to twelve inches. 

When the crest was reached, the rush that was expected 
to sweep us away paused, — the Confederates became hope- 
ful. Soon the advancing ranks lay behind the crest, and 
presently drew nearer Richardson's j^art of the line, then 
mounting the crest over the Piper House. This latter 
point, once established, must cut and break the Confed- 
erate position as effectually as our centre just saved. He 
occupied the Piper House with two regiments under 
Colonel Brooke in advance of his line along the crest, 
and called up some of his batteries. 

The Confederates meanwhile were collecting other bat- 
teries and infantry in defence, when a shot from one of 
our batteries brought Richardson down, mortally wounded. 
His taking-off broke the aggressive spirit of the division 
and reduced its fight to the defensive. The regiments at 
the Piper House found their position thus advanced too 
much exposed, and withdrew to the stronger line of the 
crest. General Meagher's brigade came up with ammuni- 
tion replenished. General Hancock was despatched to 
take command of the division. In the midst of the 
tragedy, as Richardson approached the east crest, there 
was a moment of amusement when General Hill, with 
about fifty men and a battle-flag, ran to gain a vantage- 
point for flank fire against Richardson's left. Colonel 
Ross, observing the move and appreciating the opj^or- 
tunity, charged with two regiments for the same and 
secured it. General Hill claimed (and rightly) that it 
had effect in giving the impression that there were other 
forces coming to supj^ort him. 

Another regiment came to the relief of the Twenty- 
seventh, under Cooke. The movement of troops in that 
quarter was construed by the enemy as a threatened flank 
move against Richardson, which caused some little delay 



252 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

in his march. Though the Confederates had but frag- 
ments here and there, the enemy were kept busy and 
watchful lest they should come upon another surprise 
move. 

The Confederates were surprised but much relieved 
when they found this affair reduced to the defensive, and 
assumed that every missile they sent must have found one 
or more victims. But accounts of the other side make 
clear that the result was due to accidental artillery shots 
that cut down Colonel Barlow, the aggressive spirit of 
Richardson's right column, and General Richardson him- 
self at his culminating moment. Barlow fell from a case- 
or canister-shot, as did Richardson. All the Union ac- 
counts refer to a battery on their right throwing shell, and 
the " two brass guns in front throwing case and canister," 
and this latter was the only artillery at work against them 
at the time of Barlow's fall. When Barlow's command 
drew nearer the division the brass guns were turned upon 
Richardson, but at the moment of his taking-off another 
battery was in action on his left. General D. H. Hill 
thought that Carter's battery was in time to divide the 
honor of the last shot with the section of Napoleons under 
Miller. 

Orders were given General Pleasonton, at the second 
bridge, to be ready to enter the battle as soon as the at- 
tack by Richardson should open the way. To meet these 
orders skirmishers were advanced, and Tidball's battery, 
by piece, using canister, to drive back the Confederate 
sharp-shooters. The Fifth Corps (General Porter's) was 
ordered to be ready for like service. 

When Richardson swung his line up along the crest at 
the Piper House, Pleasonton advanced troopers and bat- 
teries, crossed the bridge at a gallop by the Fifth Regular 
Cavalry, Farnsworth's brigade. Rush's brigade, two regi- 
ments of the Fifth Brigade under B. F. Davis, and the 
batteries of Tidball, Robertson, Hains, and Gibson. The 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 253 

batteries were put into action under the line of skirmisliers, 
that were reinforced by Sykes's division of the Fifth and 
Tenth Infantry under Lieutenant Poland. 

General Hill seized a musket and by example speedily 
collected a number of men, who joined him in reinforcing 
the line threatened by this heavy display. The parts of 
brigades under General Pryor, Colonels Cummings, Posey, 
and G. T. Anderson afterwards got up to help the brigade 
of Evans already there. By these, with the batteries of 
Squires, Gardner, and Pichardson, this threatening demon- 
stration was checked. Then it was reinforced by the bat- 
teries of Pandol, Kusserow, and Van Peed, and the Fourth 
United States Infantry, Captain Dryer ; the first battalion 
of the Twelfth, Captain Blount ; second battalion of the 
Twelfth, Captain Anderson ; first battalion of the Four- 
teenth, Captain Brown, and second battalion of the Four- 
teenth, Captain McKibbin, of Sykes's division ; the bat- 
teries posted to command the field, right and left, to cover 
Sumner's and Burnside's fronts, as soon as they could rise 
to the plateau. S. D. Lee's batteries were back on the 
crest, replenished of ammunition, while the Union bat- 
teries were on low ground, near the river. A very 
clever well-organized advance was made, but their advan- 
tages of position and the tenacious hold of the Confed- 
erates, even after the attack reached the crest, enabled 
them to drive back the assaulting forces. The horse bat- 
teries went back to positions on the west side after replen- 
ishing with ammunition, except Gibson's, which was put 
in defensive attitude on the east. Pleasonton, with a com- 
prehensive view of the opportunity, called for additional 
force, but two of Morell's brigades had been ordered by 
the upper crossing to Sumner's relief, and a detachment 
had been sent to assist Burnside, which reduced the Fifth 
Corps to the minimum of force necessary to the service to 
which it was assigned ; not equal to the aggressive fight 
to which it was invited. But for the breaking up of 



254 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Richardson's aggression, this last advance could have 
gained the field. 

The Third Brigade of the Second Division, Sixth 
Corps, made an erratic march across part of the field, the 
Seventh Maine Regiment leading, and retired like a 
meteor that loses its own fire. 

A little after one o'clock this and other parts of the line, 
except at the Burnside Bridge, settled down to defensive. 
Burnside was still hard at work in search of a practical 
line of advance, Toombs standing manfully against him. 

During the lull, after the rencounter of Walker's, 
Hill's, and Hood's divisions against Mansfield's last fight. 
General Lee and myself, riding together under the crest 
of General D. H. Hill's part of the line, were joined by 
the latter. We were presently called to the crest to ob- 
serve movements going on in the Union lines. The two 
former dismounted and walked to the crest ; General Hill, 
a little out of strength and thinking a single horseman 
not likely to draw the enemy's fire, rode. As we reached 
the crest I asked him to ride a little apart, as he would 
likely draw fire upon the grouj). While viewing the field 
a puff of white smoke was seen to burst from a cannon's 
mouth about a mile off. I remarked, " There is a shot for 
General Hill," and, looking towards him, saw his horse 
drop on his knees. Both forelegs were cut off just below 
the knees. The dropping forward of the poor animal so 
elevated his croup that it was not an easy matter for one 
not an exj)ert horseman to dismount a la militaire. To 
add to the dilemma, there was a rubber coat with other 
wraps strapped to the cantle of the saddle. Failing in 
his attempt to dismount, I suggested that he throw his 
leg forward over the pommel. This gave him easy and 
graceful dismount. This was the third horse shot under 
him during the day, and the shot was one of the best 
I ever witnessed. An equally good one was made by a 
Confederate at Yorktown. An officer of the Topograph- 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 255 

ical Engineers walked into the open, in front of our lines, 
fixed his jDlane table and seated himself to make a map 
of the Confederate works. A non-commissioned officer, 
without orders, adjusted his gun, carefully aimed it, and 
fired. At the re23ort of the gun all eyes were turned to 
see the occasion of it, and then to observe the object, 
when the shell was seen to explode as if in the hands of 
the officer. It had been dropj^ed squarely upon the draw- 
ing-table, and Lieutenant Wagner was mortally wounded.* 
Of the first shot. Major Alfred A. Woodhull, under date 
of June 8, 1886, wrote, — 

"On the 17tli of September, 1862, I was standing in Weed's 
battery, whose position is correctly given in the map, when a 
man on, I think, a gray horse, appeared about a mile in front 
of us, and footmen were recognized near. Captain Weed, who 
was a remarkable artillerist, himself sighted and fired the gun 
at the horse, which was struck." 



* Of this shot, Captain A. B. More, of Richmond, Virginia, wrote, 
under date of June 16, 1886, — 

"The Howitzers have always been proud of that shot, and, thinking 
it would interest you, I write to say that it was fired by Corporal Holz- 
burton, of the Second Company, Riclimond Howitzers, from a ten-pound 
Parrott." 



CHAPTER XIX. 

BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM (CONTINUED). 

Closing Eveuts of the Great Struggle — Buruside crosses the Bridge he 
made famous — Toombs made Gallant Defence, but was outnumbered 
and dislodged — The Confederate Brigades from Harper's Ferry under 
A. P. Hill in Time for the Final Crisis — Burnside's Advance arrested 
by them — The Battle against Burnside " appeared to spring from the 
Earth" — "Lee's old War Horse"— The Killing of a Kinsman at the 
Bridge seriously affects General D. R. Jones — The Sharp Fight at 
Shepherdstown— Confederates retreat— Casualties of the Battle — 
Confederate Losses in the Campaign — Neither McClellan's Plan nor 
Execution was strong. 

At one or two points near our centre were dead angles 
into which I rode from time to time for closer observation 
of the enemy when his active aggression was suspended. 
General Burnside was busy at his crossing, but no report 
of progress had been sent me. One of my rides towards 
the Dunker chapel revealed efforts of the enemy to renew 
his work on that part of the field. Our troops were 
ordered to be ready to receive it. Its non-aggression sug- 
gested an opi^ortunity for the Confederates, and I ordered 
McLaws and Walker to prepare to assault. Hood was 
back in position with his brigades, and Jackson was re- 
ported on his way, all in full supply of ammunition. It 
seemed j)robable that by concealing our movements under 
cover of the wood from the massed batteries of Double- 
day's artillery on the north, and the batteries of position on 
the east, we could draw our columns so near to the enemy 
in front before our move could be known that we would 
have but a few rods to march before we could mingle our 
ranks with those of the enemy ; that our columns massed 
and in goodly numbers, pressing severely upon a single 
point, would give the enemy much trouble, and might cut 
him in two, and break uj) his battle arrangements at the 

256 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBUEG, OR ANTIETAM. 257 

lower bridge ; but just then General Jackson reported, 
with authority from General Lee, that he with the cavalry 
was ordered to march around and turn the entire position 
of the enemy by his right flank, and strike at his rear. 
He found that the march would be long and extremely 
hazardous, and abandoned his orders. So it aj)pears that 
counsels were divided on both sides. General McClellan 
disapproving the attack proposed by Franklin, and Gen- 
eral Lee preferring a flank move. 

Of the proposed attack from the Union side, General 
Franklin reported, — 

"Slocum's division arrived on the field about eleven o'clock. 
Immediately after its arrival two of his brigades (Newton's and 
Torbert's) were formed in column of attack to carry the wood in 
the immediate vicinity of the White Church. The other brigade 
(Bartlett's) had been ordered by General Sumner to keep near his 
right. As this brigade was to form the reserve for the column 
of attack, I waited until it came uj). About the same time Gen- 
eral Sumner arrived on the spot and directed the attack to be 
postponed, and the enemy at once proceeded to fill the wood with 
infantry, and planted a battery there which opened a severe fire 
upou us. Shortly afterwards the commanding general came to 
the position, and decided that it would not be prudent to make 
the attack, our position on the right being then considerably in 
advance of what it had been in the morning." * 

General McClellan claimed that his batteries on the 
east side disj)ersed a column marching in the afternoon to 
reinforce against General Sumner. This was probably 
Jackson's command marching to their position on the line. 
The fire only hurried the march of the troops to the front, 
where they resumed their position. 

We left General Toombs defending the crossing at the 
Burnside Bridge, with the Second, Twentieth, and Fiftieth 
Georgia Regiments, and a company of Jenkins's brigade 
of South Carolina troops, against the Ninth Corps, com- 



* Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 377. 
17 



258 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

manded by General J. D. Cox, General Burnside, the com- 
mander of the right wing present, commanding. Toombs 
had in his line of infantry five hundred and fifty men part 
way up the swell of Sharpsburg Heights. Behind him he 
posted Eubank's battery, and overlooking were J. B. Rich- 
ardson's and Eshleman's to rake the bridge ; others near. 
The road on the Union side leading to the bridge runs 
parallel to the river about three hundred yards before it 
reaches the bridge, and turns up-stream after crossing. On 
the parallel to this line of march on the Confederate side 
Toombs posted his infantry, the South Carolina com2oany 
in a marginal woodland above the bridge. Above and 
near the bridge w^as a fording-place for infantry ; a thou- 
sand yards below was a practicable ford for infantry and 
artillery, by a country road. Toombs's orders were, when 
dislodged, to retire south so as to open the field of fire to 
all the troops on the heights behind him, the fire of his 
batteries to be concentrated upon the bridge, and his in- 
fantry arranged for a like converging fire. The ravines 
cutting the swells of the foot-hills gave him fair ground 
for retreat when he found his position no longer tenable. 
He was to so manoeuvre as to have a flank fire on the 
advancing columns, and gradually encircle so as to join 
his division after passing the crest. 

Early in the morning. General Burnside had been or- 
dered to prepare the Ninth Corps for attack at the bridge, 
but to await further orders. At eight o'clock orders were 
sent to carry the bridge, gain possession of the heights, 
and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and 
its rear. The order was repeated, and, finally, losing 
patience. General McClellan sent the inspector-general 
(Colonel Sackett) 

^'To deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push 
forward his troops without a moment's delay, and if necessary to 
carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet, and I ordered 



BATTLE OF SHA]:P.^BUIIG, OR ANLiLTAM. 259 

Colonel Sackett to remain with General Burnside and see that the 
order was promptly executed." * 

Upon receipt of the first order General Burnside ad- 
vanced his troops, General Crook's brigade, supported 
by General Sturgis's division, to the bridge and ford just 
above it. These were preceded by the Eleventh Con- 
necticut Regiment as skirmishers under Colonel Kings- 
bury, who essayed crossing by the upper ford, but after 
severe skirmish Colonel Kingsbury was killed and the 
effort failed. The division under General Kodman sup- 
ported by Scammon's brigade (commanded by Colonel 
Ewing) moved towards the lower ford. Colonel Scam- 
mon, commanding the Kanawha division, moved with this 
cohmm. 

Wilcox's division was in rear of Sturgis, in reserve, and 
near the left of Benjamin's battery. Clark's and Durell's 
batteries were posted on the right. One section of Sim- 
monds's battery was with Crook's brigade, the other with 
Benjamin's battery. Dahlgren's boat-howitzers covered 
the ford at Rodman's crossing. The last order was re- 
ceived at ten o'clock. The line of skirmishers advanced 
and engaged across the river. Crook's brigade marched 
for the bridge. After a severe engagement of some 
hours. General Crook posted two of Simmonds's guns in 
position to cover the bridge, and after some little time 
General Sturgis's division approached the bridge, led by 
Naglee's brigade. The Second Brigade, General Ferrero, 
was jDOsted a little in reserve. The Second Maryland, 
Colonel Duryea, and Sixth New Hampshire Regiments 
were ordered forward in double time with bayonets 
fixed to carry the bridge. They made a gallant, dash- 
ing charge, crowding the bridge almost to its western 
debouche, but the fire concentrated a storm that stunned 
their ranks, thinned and cut them down until they were 

* Rebellion Record, vol. i. part i. p. 83. 



260 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

forced to retire. General Burnside repeated the order to 
force the way at all hazards. Arrangements were made, 
and when concluded the Fifty-first New York and Fifty- 
first Pennsylvania Regiments were sent. They found a 
route better covered from the Confederate fire than that 
of the first column while marching for the bridge. 

By a dashing charge on double time they passed it under 
exulting hurrahs and most gallant work, and gained the 
west bank. The crossing by Bodman's division at the 
lower ford made our position at the bridge untenable, 
and General Toombs was prepared to retire the moment 
the west bank was gained in his rear. 

Union troops were hurried over, and organized for ad- 
vance over Sharj)sburg Heights, but Sturgis's division had 
suffered, and, the ammunition getting low, it was found 
necessary to replace it by the division under General 
Wilcox, and Sturgis was ordered to hold position near the 
bridge in reserve. The brigades under Bodman made 
their crossing sooner, and waited a little for those at the 
bridge. As soon as the latter formed on the west bank, 
Bodman drew nearer. He was supported by the Scam- 
mon brigade of the Kanawha division, the brigade under 
General Crook to move with the troops from the bridge. 

Clark's, Durell's, Cook's, Muhlenberg's, and part of 
Simmonds's batteries crossed with the infantry. About 
four o'clock the troops were over and advanced under very 
severe fire of artillery and infantry, increasing in force as 
they ascended the heights, but the march was continued 
in bold, admirable style, the troops engaging in steady, 
brave fight as they marched. Overreaching my right, 
they forced it back, breaking off Jones's right brigades 
under Drayton, Kemper, and Garnett. Toombs, working 
his way to the rear, managed to encircle the advancing 
column and join the other brigades under D. B. Jones as 
they were forced back. Jones used some of them in or- 
ganizing a stand on the flank of the Union columns. 



BATTLE OF SHAKPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 261 

Toombs was joined in his rearward move by his regiments 
that had been sent off as train guards, by a battalion of 
the Eleventh Georgia under Major Little, and sent the 
regiments with him to replenish ammunition. Meanwhile, 
steady advancing battle was made by the Federals. 

Batteries from all parts of our field drove to General 
Lee, as well as detachments of infantry, including some 
with fresh wounds from the morning battle, but the battle 
moved bravely on. 

When General Lee found that General Jackson had left 
six of his brigades under General A. P. Hill to receive 
the property and garrison surrendered at Harper's Ferry, 
he sent orders for them to join him, and by magic spell 
had them on the field to meet the final crisis. He ordered 
two of them guided by Captain Latrobe to guard against 
approach of other forces that might come against him by 
bridge No. 4, Pender's and Brockenbrough's, and threw 
Branch's, Gregg's and Archer's against the fore-front of 
the battle, while Toombs's, Kemper's, and Garnett's en- 
gaged against its right. Mcintosh's battery, sent in ad- 
vance by A. P. Hill, was overrun and captured. Pegram's 
and Crenshaw's batteries were put in with Hill's three 
brigades. The Washington Artillery, S. D. Lee's, and 
Frobel's found places for parts of their batteries, am- 
munition replenished. D. H. Hill found opportunity to 
put in parts of his artillery under Elliott, Boyce, Carter, 
and Maurin. Toombs's absent regiments returned, as he 
made his way around to the enemy's right, and joined the 
right of General D. B. Jones. The strong battle concen- 
trating against General Burnside seemed to sj)ring from 
the earth as his march bore him farther from the river. 
Outflanked and staggered by the gallant attack of A. P. 
Hill's brigades, his advance was arrested. 

The contention about the heights and suburbs of 
Sharpsburg was anxiously held. General Cox, reinforced 
by his reserve under General Sturgis, handled well his 



262 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

left against A. P. Hill ; but, assailed in front and on his 
flank by concentrating fires that were crushing, he found 
it necessary to recover his lines and withdraw. A. P. 
Hill's brigades, Toombs and Kemper, followed. They 
recovered Mcintosh's battery and the ground that had 
been lost on the right before the slow advancing night 
dropped her mantle upon this field of seldom equalled 
strife. 

When the Ninth Corps dropped back under the crest 
they had so bravely won, the battle of Sharpsburg vir- 
tually ended, though the fire between the lines was con- 
tinued till nine o'clock. The field made classic by a 
struggle of eighteen hours, too fearful to contemplate, was 
yet cumbered by the dead and wounded. After the firing 
ceased, parties from both sides, by mutual consent, went in 
search of fallen comracies. 

After riding along the lines, giving instructions for the 
night and morning, I rode for general head-quarters to 
make report, but was delayed somewhat, finding wounded 
men hidden away under stone walls and in fence corners, 
not yet looked after, and afterwards in assisting a family 
whose home had been fired by a shell, so that all the other 
officers had arrived, made their reports, and were lounging 
about on the sod, when I rode up. General Lee walked 
up as I dismounted, threw his hands upon my shoulders, 
and hailed me with, " Here is my old war-horse at last !" 

One of those peculiarly painful personal experiences 
which are innumerable in war, but seldom get into print 
(save in fiction), came under my observation in this 
battle. Colonel H. W. Kingsbury, who was killed while 
gallantly leading the Eleventh Connecticut Regiment at 
the ford near the Burnside Bridge, was a brother-in-law 
of General D. B. Jones, who commanded the Confederates 
immediately opposing him. His taking-off" was a severe 
blow to Jones, and one from which he never recovered. 
His health had not been strong for some time. He asked 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 263 

leave of absence shortly after this occurrence, and, gradu- 
ally but hopelessly sinking, in a few months passed over 
to the silent majority to join his fallen kinsman. 

A few shots were exchanged early on the IStli, but a 
kindly feeling seemed to take possession of the troops, as 
they were not ordered into action, and excuses were j^assed 
between the lines for looking after wounded comrades, 
which resulted in a quasi truce for the day. 

The Burnside battle may be likened to that contem- 
plated for Fitz-John Porter under his 4.30 order at the 
Second Manassas. The latter, however, had the smaller 
force, while Burnside's numbers were greater. 

In the afternoon General Lee was advised of new ar- 
rivals in General McClellan's army, and, thinking the few 
stragglers who came u]) to swell his own ranks were not 
sufficient to justify him in renewing the battle on the 
19th, ordered his trains back, and after night marched 
his troops across the Potomac at the ford near Shepherds- 
town. 

General Stuart was ordered to cross ahead of the gen- 
eral move, recross the Potomac at Williamsport, and stand 
guard to the rear of the columns in case of danger to their 
crossing. The road being clear at nine o'clock, the army 
marched ; the First Corps, in advance, crossed about two 
A.M. on the 19th, awaited to guard the crossing, and at 
daylight was deployed on the south side. A. P. Hill's 
division covered the retreat of the army, and the cavalry 
under Fitzhugh Lee was to follow, relieving lines of 
picket guards and helping the feeble footmen. The rear 
of the Confederate column crossed into Virginia at ten 
A.M., unmolested. As the pursuit was not threatening, 
General Lee ordered his army to continue the march to 
proper points of bivouac, holding the artillery reserve 
under General Pendleton and an infantry detail of the 
brigades of Armistead and Lawton, commanded by Col- 
onels Hodges and Lamar, as guard at the ford. General 



264 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Pendleton posted some thirty guns in position for con- 
verging fire at the ford, and put a line of skirmishers 
near it, holding the infantry reserve and eleven guns at 
the rear. 

About noon the Union cavalry appeared on the other 
bank. The batteries of Gibson, Tidball, and Kobertson 
were put in action, but relieved about two o'clock by ar- 
tillery of the Fifth Corps. After a severe combat the 
Fourth Michigan Regiment and parts of the One Hun- 
dred and Eighteenth Pennsylvania and Eighteenth and 
Twenty-second Massachusetts were ordered over under 
General Griffin. They forced the passage under artillery 
and infantry fire, scaled the heights, and got possession of 
five guns of different batteries and a number of small-arms, 
when, night approaching, the detachment was recalled. 

General Pendleton rejjorted the result to general head- 
quarters, and General Lee ordered General Jackson to 
send his nearest division back to the ford early in the 
morning. 

A. P. Hill's division was ordered. He was fortunate 
in approaching the ford (Boteler's) before the Federals 
had crossed all of their advancing column ; formed his 
brigades in two lines and advanced to attack. General 
Porter, upon the report of this advance, found that his 
troops could not get position on the south bank in time to 
meet this threatening, ordered the troops withdrawn to 
cover about the canal and adjacent heights, and succeeded 
in getting most of his men safely back. 

General Hill deployed the brigades of Gregg, Thomas, 
and Pender as his front line, under command of General 
Gregg. Lane's (Branch's brigade), Archer's, and Brock- 
enbrough's brigades were of his second line, commanded 
by General Archer. In this order the division advanced 
and engaged in a severe struggle. Finding the fight on 
his front heavy. General Pender called to General Archer 
for support, and the latter, moving by his left, brought his 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 265 

brigade on Pender's left, when the advance was pushed to 
successful issue. The One Hundred and Eighteenth Penn- 
sylvania Regiment was thrown into confusion and suffered 
heavy loss. One of the guns lost the day before was 
recovered and two hundred prisoners taken. The losses 
were between two hundred and fifty and three hundred 
on each side, the Federals losing about twenty more than 
the Confederates. The Confederate accounts of this affair 
were overdrawn, but they were reassuring after the severe 
experience about South Mountain and Sharpsburg. 

The Army of Northern Virginia was then marched to 
the vicinity of Martinsburg, where it remained in repose 
for several days, then retired to the vicinity of Winches- 
ter. The Army of the Potomac concentrated about Har- 
per's Ferry, refitting its supplies and transportation. 

We may say of the battle of Sharpsburg that the Con- 
federates foiled every attack that was made, and brought 
the Army of the Potomac to a stand at night, yet the 
Federal commander scored a success that was startling. 

The commander of the Army of the Potomac reported 
his strength as 87,164. His estimate of the strength of 
the Army of Northern Virginia was 97,445. The Con- 
federate commander estimated his own strength for battle 
at 37,000, and that of his adversary at 90,000. 

The Confederates fought all of their men that were on 
the field, except two brigades of A. P. Hill's division and 
some of their field batteries. 

Of the Federals, the Fifth Corps, except about one bri- 
gade of infantry, was not in action ; and the Sixth 
Corps, except Irwin's brigade, seems to have had little 
serious work. 

It is generally conceded that the Federals, in addition 
to advantage of numbers, had their organizations in hand, 
were better fed and clothed, and better prepared, there- 
fore, to muster a larger portion of their number for battle. 

The casualties of the First Corps, Army of Northern 



266 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Virginia, in the engagements at South Mountain, Cramp- 
ton's Gap, Maryhind Heights, Harper's Ferry, and 
Sharpsburg, as tabulated in the official report, were 7508.* 
Neither General Jackson's report nor General D. H, 
Hill's furnishes a detailed account of casualties. The 
former gives aggregate figures 2438, the latter 3241, — 
making a grand aggregate of 13,187.t None of these 
reports include the losses of the cavalry command, nor 
is there a report of them found among the Kecords. 

The Army of Northern Virginia concentrated at and 
near Fredericktown on the 9tli of September, 1862, num- 
bered a trifle over 61,000, all arms. General Lee's esti- 
mate of his troops engaged at Sharpsburg was 37,000. 
This may not include his cavalry arm, conceding w^hich, 
his force on the field should have been about 41,000. 
Estimating the cavalry loss at -500, our losses of battle 
should be 13,687, which leaves 20,000 to be accounted for 
as lost by severe continuous labor and marches. This, 
added to the losses in action, makes a grand total of 33,687 
lost in the Maryland campaign. The losses from over- 
work were only temporary. Most of them were back in 
the ranks within fifteen days after the return to Virginia. 
But all of these large figures are trifles compared to the 
lamentable loss of the fruits of devoted service from the 
Chickahominy campaign to the Potomac. 

The casualties of the Union side, reported by official 
count, were 12,410. 

The best tactical moves at Antietam were made by 
Generals McLaws, A. P. Hill, Gibbon, and Patrick, and 
Colonels Barlow and Cross. Generals D. H. Hill and 
Hood were like game-cocks, fighting as long as they could 
stand, engaging again as soon as strong enough to rise. 



* This includes eighty-five lost by S. D. Lee's artillery, not regularly 
assigned as part of the corps. 

t Surgeon Lafayette Guild, medical director of the Army of Northern 
Virginia, in his official tabulated report, accounts for 10,291 only. 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 267 

General Toombs and Colonel Benning performed very- 
clever work at the Burnside Bridge. Of Colonel Cooke, 
the Twenty-seventh North Carolina Begiment, Caj)tain 
Miller, Sergeant Ellis, and their men of the Washington 
Artillery, General Lee said, " They were heroic." 

General McClellan's plan of the battle was not strong, 
the handling and execution were less so. Battles by the 
extreme right and left, divided by a river, gave us the 
benefit of interior lines, and it was that that saved the 
Confederate army, for it became manifest early in the day 
that his reserves were held at the bridge No. 2, which 
gave us freer use of our inner lines. 

Following is a condensed but accurate presentation of 
the organization of the contending armies in the battle 
of Sharpsburg and the Maryland campaign : * 

Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee com- 
manding. 
Longstreet's Corps, Major-General James Longstreet. 

McLaws's Division, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws -.—Kersliaiv's Bri- 
gade, Brig. -Gen. J. B. Kershaw ; 2d S. C, Col. John D. Kennedy ; 3d 
S. C, Col. James D. Nance ; 7th S. C, Col. D. Wyatt Aiken and Capt. 
John S. Hard ; 8th S. C, Lieut.-Col. A. J. Hoole. Cobb^s Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Howell Cobb, Lieut.-Col. C. C. Sanders, Lieut.-Col. William 
MacRae ; 16th and 24th Ga., Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, loth N. C. Semmes^s 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Paul J. Semmes ; 10th Ga., Capt. P. H. Loud ; 53d 
Ga., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Sloan and Capt. S. W. Marshborne ; 15th Va., 
Capts. E. M. Morrison and E. J. Willis ; 32d Va., Col. E. B. Montague. 
Barksdale's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Barksdale ; 13th Miss., Lieut.- 
Col. Kennon McElroy ; 17th Miss., Lieut.-Col. John C. Fiser ; 18th Miss., 
Maj. J. C. Campbell and Lieut.-Col. William H. Luse ; 21st Miss., Capt. 
John Sims and Col. Benjamin G. Humphreys. Artillery, Maj. S. P. 
Hamilton, Col. H. C. Cabell ; Manly's (N. C.) battery, Capt. B. C. 
Manly; Pula.ski (Ga.) Art., Capt. J. P. W. Read ; Richmond (Faj-ette) 
Art., Capt. M. C. Macon ; Richmond Howitzers (1st Co.), Capt. E. S. 
McCarthy ; Troup (Ga.) Art., Capt. H. H. Carlton. 

Anderson's Division, Maj.-Gen. Richard H. Anderson :—TF//eoa:'s 
Brigade, Col. Alfred Gumming ; 8th, 9th, 10th, and lltli Ala. Mahone's 
Brigade, Col. William A. Parham ; 6th, 12th, 16th, 41st, and 61st Va. 
Featherston'' s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Winfleld S. Featherston, Col. Carnot 
Posey ; 12th Miss., 16th Miss., Capt. A. M. Feltus ; 19th Miss., 2d Miss. 

* Compiled from the official reports. 



268 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Battn, Armlstead^s Brigade^ Brig.-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead, Col. J. 
G. Hodges ; 9th, 14th, 38th, 53d, and 57th Va. Pryor's Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Roger A. Pryor ; 14th Ala., 2d and 8th Fla., 3d Va. Wright's 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. R. Wright; 44th Ala., 3d, 22d, and 48th Ga. 
Artillery, Maj. John S. Saunders ; Donaldson ville (La.) Art. (Maurin's 
battery), Huger's (Va.) battery, Moorman's (Va.) battery, Thompson's 
(Grimes's) (Va.) battery. 

Jones's Division, Brig.-Gen. David R. Jones :—7'oo»i6s's Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Robert Toombs, Col. Henry L. Benning ; 2d Ga., Lieut.-Col. 
William R. Holmes and Major Skidmore Harris ; 15th Ga., Col. W. T. 
Milliean ; 17th Ga., Capt. J. A. McGregor ; 20th Ga., Col. J. B. dim- 
ming. Drayton'' s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. Drayton ; 50th Ga., 
Lieut.-Col. F. Kearse ; 51st Ga., 15th S. C, Col. W. D. De Saussure. 
JPickett's Brigade, Col. Eppa Hunton, Brig.-Gen. R. B. Garnett ; 8th 
Va., Col. Eppa Hunton ; 18tli Va., Maj. George C. Cabell ; 19th Va., Col. 
J. B. Strange, Lieut. W. N. Wood, and Capt. J. L. Cochran ; 28th Va., 
Capt. Wingfield ; 56th Va., Col. William D. Stuart and Capt. McPhail. 
Kemper''s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. L. Kemper ; 1st, 7th, 11th, 17th, and 
24th Va. Jenkins's Brigade, Col. Joseph Walker ; 1st S. C. (Vols.), 
Lieut.-Col. D. Livingston ; 2d S. C. Rifles, 5th S. C, Capt. T. C. Beck- 
ham ; 6th S. C, Lieut.-Col. J. M. Steedman, Capt. E. B. Cantey ; 4th S. C. 
(Battn.), Palmetto (S. C) Sliarp-shooters. Anderson's Brigade, Col. 
George T. Anderson ; 1st Ga. (Regulars), Col. W. J. Magill ; 7th, 8th, and 
9th Ga. ; 11th Ga., Maj. F. H. Little. Artillery, Fauquier (Va.) Art. 
(Stribling's battery),* Loudoun (Va.) Art. (Rogers's battery),* Turner 
(Va.) Art. (Leake's battery),* Wise (Va.) Art. (J. S. Brown's battery). 

Walker's Division, Brig.-Gen. Jolin G. Wallver :^ Walker's Bri- 
gade, Col. Van H. Manning, Col. E. D. Hall ; 3d Ark., Capt. John W. 
Reedy ; 27th N. C, Col. J. R. Cooke ; 46th N. C, Col. E. D. Hall ; 4Sth 
N. C, Col. R. C. Hill ; 30th Va., French's (Va.) battery, Capt. Thomas 
B. French. Ransom's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr. ; 24th 
N. C, Lieut.-Col. John L. Harris ; 25th N. C, Col. H. M. Rutledge ; 
35th N. C, Col. M. W. Ransom ; 49th N. C, Lieut.-Col. Lee M. McAfee ; 
Brancli's Field Art. (Va.), Capt. Brancli. 

Hood's Division, Brig.-Gen. John B. Hood -.—Hood's Brigade, Col. 
W. T. Wofford ; 18th Ga., Lieut.-Col. S. Z. Rufl^"; Hampton (S. C.) Le- 
gion, Lieut.-Col. M. W. Gary ; 1st Tex., Lieut.-Col. P. A. Work ; 4th 
Tex., Lieut.-Col. B. F. Carter ; 5th Tex., Capt. I. N. M. Turner. Law's 
Brigade, Col. E. M. Law ; 4th Ala., Lieut.-Col. O. K. McLemore ; 2d 
Miss., Col. J. M. Stone ; 11th Miss., Col. P. F. Liddell ; 6th N. C, Maj. 
Robert F. Webb. Artillery, Maj. B. W. Frobel ; German Art. (S. C), 
Capt. W. K. Bachman ; Palmetto Art. (S. C), Capt. H. R. Garden ; 
Rowan Art. (N. C), Capt. James Reilly. 

Evans's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Nathan G. Evans, Col. P. F. Stevens ; f 
17th S. C, Col. F. W. McMaster ; 18th S. C, Col. W. H. Wallace ; 22d 
S. C, Lieut. -Col. T. C. Watkins and Maj. M. Hilton; 23d S. C, Capt. 

* Left at Leesburg. 

t Commanding brigade while General Evans commanded provisional 
division. 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 269 

S. A. Durham and Lieut. E. R. White ; Holcombe (S. C.) Legion, Col. 
P. F. Stevens ; Macbeth (S. C.) Art., Capt. R. Boyce, 

Artillery :— Washington (La.) Artillery, Col. J. B. Walton ; 1st Co., 
Capt. C. W. Squires ; 2d Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson ; 3d Co., Capt. M. 
B. Miller ; 4th Co., Capt. B. F. Eshleman. Lee's Battalion, Col. S. D. 
Lee; Ashland (Va.) Art., Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr. ; Bedford (Va.) Art., 
Capt. T. C. Jordan; Brooks (S. C.) Art., Lieut. William Elliott; Eu- 
bank's (Va.) battery, Capt. J. L. Eubank ; Madison (La.) Light Art., 
Capt. (I. V. Moody ; Parker's (Va.) battery, Capt. W. W. Parker. 

Jackson's Corps, Major-General Thomas J. Jackson. 

Ewell's Division, Brig.-Gen. A. R. Lawton, Brig.-Geu. Jubal A. 
Early : — Lawton''s Brigade, Col. M. Douglass, Maj. J. H. Lowe, Col. 
John H. Lamar ; IStli and 26th Ga., 31st Ga., Lieut.-Col. J. T. Crowder ; 
38th, 60th, and 61st Ga. Earhj's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Jubal A. Early, 
Col. William Smith ; 13th Va., Capt. F. V. Winston ; 25th, 31st, and 
44th Va.; 49th Va., Col. William Smith ; 52d Va., Col. M. G. Harman ; 
58th Va. Trimble's Brigade, Col. James A. Walker; 15th Ala., Capt. 
I. B. Feagin ; 12th Ga., Capt. Rogers ; 21st Ga., Maj. Thomas C. Glover ; 
21st N. C, Capt. Miller ; 1st N. C. Battn.* Hays's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
Harry T. Hays ; 5th La., 6tli La., Col. H. B. Strong ; 7th, 8th, and 14th 
La. Artille7-g,-f Maj. A. R. Courtney; Charlottesville (Va.) Art. (Car- 
rington's battery), Cliesapeake (Md.) Art. (Brown's battery), Courtney 
(Va.) Art. (Latimer's battery), Johnson's (Va.) battery. La. Guard Art. 
(D'Aquin's battery), 1st Md. Batt. (Dement's battery), Staunton (Va.) 
Art. (Balthis's battery). 

Hill's Light Division, Maj. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill -.—Branch' s 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. L. O'B. Branch, Col. James H. Lane; 7th N. C, 
18th N. C, Lieut.-Col. Purdie ; 28tli, 33d, and 37th N. C. Gregg's Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. Maxcy Gregg; 1st S. C. (provisional army), Maj. E. 
MeCrady, Jr., Col. D. H. Hamilton ; 1st S. C. Rifles, Lieut.-Col. James 
M. Perrin ; 12th S. C, Col. Dixon Barnes, Lieut.-Col. C. Jones, and 
Maj. W. H. McCorkle; 13th S. C, Col. O. E. Edwards; 14th S. C, 
Lieut.-Col. W. D. Simpson. Field's Brigade, Col. Brockenbrough ; 40tli, 
47th, and 55th Va., 22d Va. Battn. Archer's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. 
Archer, Col. Peter Turney ; 5th Ala. Battn., Captain Hooper ; 19th Ga., 
Maj. J. H. Neal and Capt. F. M. Johnston ; 1st Tenn. (provisional 
army), Col. Peter Turney ; 7th Tenn., Maj. S. G. Shepard and Lieut. G. 
A. Howard ; 14th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. J. W. Lockert. Bender's Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. William D. Pender, Col. R. H. Brewer; 16th N. C, Lieut.- 
Col. Stowe ; 22d N. C, Maj. C. C. Cole ; 34th and 38th N. C. Thomas's 
Brigade, Col. Edward L. Thomas; 14th Ga., Col. R. W. Folsom ; 35th 
Ga., 4.5th Ga., Maj. W. L. Grice ; 49th Ga., Lieut.-Col. S. M. Manning. 
Artillerij,X Maj. R. L. Walker; Branch (N. C.) Art. (A. C. Latham's 

* Attached to Twenty-first North Carolina Regiment. 

t John R. Johnson's and D'Aquin's batteries were the only ones pres- 
ent with this division at Sharpsburg. 

X Braxton's, Crenshaw's, Mcintosh's, and Pegram's batteries engaged 
at Sharpsburg. 



270 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

battery), Crenshaw's (Va.) battery, Fredericksburg (Va.) Art. (Brax- 
ton's battery), Letcher (Va.) Art. (Davidson's battery), Middlesex (Va.) 
Art. (Fleet's battery), Pee Dee (S. C.) Art. (Mcintosh's battery), Purcell 
(Va.) Art. (Pegram's battery). 

Jackson's Division, Brig. -Gen. John R. Jones, Brig.-Gen. W. E. 
Starke, Col. A. J. Grigsby : — Winder^s Brigade, Col. A. J. Grigsby, 
Lieut. -Col. R. D. Gardner (4th Va.), Maj. H. J. Williams ; 2d Va., Capt. 
R. T. Colston ; 4th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. D. Gardner ; 5th Va., Maj. H. J. 
WilHams; 27th Va., Capt. F. C. Wilson ; 33d Va., Capt. Golladay and 
Lieut. Walton. Taliaferro's Brigade, Col. E. T. H. Warren, Col. J. W. 
Jackson, Col. J. L. Sheffield ; 47th and 48th Ala., 10th, 23d, and 37th 
Va. Jones's Brigade, Col. B. T. Johnson, Brig.-Gen. J. R. Jones, Capt. 
J. E. Penn, Capt. A. C. Page, Capt. R. W. Withers ; 21st Va., Capt. A. 

C. Page ; 42d Va., Capt. R. W. Withers ; 48th Va., Capt. Chandler ; 1st 
Va. Battn., Lieut. C. A. Davidson. Starke's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wil- 
liam E. Starke, Col. L. A. Stafford, Col. E. Pendleton ; 1st La., Lieut.- 
Col. M. Nolan ; 2d La., Col. J. M. Williams ; 9th La., 10th La., Capt. H. 

D. Monier; 15tli La., Coppens's (La.) battalion. Artillery, Ma]. L. M. 
Shumaker ; Alleghany ( Va.) Art. (Carpenter's battery), Brocken- 
brough's (Md.) battery, Danville (Va.) Art. (Wooding's battery), Hamp- 
den (Va.) Art. (Caskie's battery), Lee (Va.) Batt. (Raines's), Rockbridge 
(Va.) Art. (Poague's battery). 

Hill's Division, Maj.-Gen. Daniel H. Hill :— Ripley's Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, Col. George Doles ; 4th Ga., Col. George Doles ; 
44th Ga., Capt. Key ; "ist N. C, Lieut.-Col. H. A. Brown ; 3d N. C, Col. 
William L. De Rosset. Rodes's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes ; 3d 
Ala., Col. C. A. Battle ; 5th Ala., Maj. E. L. Hobson ; 6th Ala., Col. J. B. 
Gordon ; 12th Ala., Col. B. B. Gayle and Lieut.-Col. S. B. Pickens ; 26th 
Ala., Col. E. A. O'Neal. Garland's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Samuel Gar- 
land, Jr., Col. D. K. McRae ; 5th N. C, Col. D. K. McRae and Capt. T. 
M. Garrett ; 12th N. C, Capt. S. Snow ; 13th N. C, Lieut.-Col. Thomas 
Ruffin, Jr. ; 20th N. C, Col. Alfred Iverson ; 23d N. C, Col. D. H. Chris- 
tie. Anderson's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George B. Anderson, Col. R. T. 
Bennett ; 2d N. C, Col. C. C. Tew and Capt. G. M. Roberts ; 4th N. C, 
Col. Bryan Grimes and Capts. W. T. Marsh and D. P. Latham ; 14th 
N. C, Col. R. T. Bennett ; 30th N. C, Col. F. M. Parker and Maj. W. W. 
Sillers. Colquitt's Brigade, Col. A. H. Colquitt ; 13th Ala., Col. B. D. 
Fry ; 6th Ga., Lieut.-Col. J. M. Newton ; 23d Ga., Col. W. P. Barclay ; 
27th Ga., Col. L. B. Smith ; 28th Ga., Maj. T. Graybill and Capt. N. J. 
Garrison. Artillery,''' Maj. Pierson ; Hardaway's (Ala.) battery, Capt. 
R. A. Hardaway ; JefT Davis (Ala.) Art., Capt. J. W. Bondurant ; Jones's 
(Va.) battery, Capt. William B. Jones ; King William (Va.) Art., Capt. 
T. H. Carter. 

Reserve Artillery, Brig.-Gen. William N. Pendleton : — Brown's 
Battalion,^ Col. J. Thompson Brown ; Powhatan Art. (Dance's battery). 



* Cutts's and Jones's battalions also under D. H. Hill's command at 
Sharpsburg. 
t First Virginia Artillery. 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 271 

Richmond Howitzers, 2d Co. (Watson's battery), Riclimond Howitzers, 
3d Co. (Smith's battery), Salem Art. (Hupp's battery), Williamsburg 
Art. (Coke's battery). Cutts's Battalion, * Lieut.-Col. A. S. Cutts ; 
Blacltshears's (Ga.) battery, Irwin (Ga.) Art. (Lane's battery), Lloyd's 
(N. C.) battery, Patterson's (Ga.) battery, Ross's (Ga.) battery. Joneses 
Battalion* Maj. H. P. Jones. Morris (Va.) Art. (R. C. M. Page's bat- 
terjOi Orange ( Va.) Art. (Peyton's battery). Turner's (Va.) battery, Wim- 
bish's (Va.) battery. Nelson^s Battalion, Maj. William Nelson ; Am- 
herst (Va.) Art. (Kirkpatrick's battery), Fluvanna (Va.) Art. (Ancell's 
battery), Huekstep's (Va.) battery, Johnson's (Va.) battery, Milledge 
(Ga.) Art. (Milledge's battery). Miscellaneous, Cutshaw's (Va.) battery, 
Dixie (Va.) Art. (Chapman's battery), Magruder (Va.) Art. (T. J. Page, 
Jr.'s, batter^O, Rice's (Va.) battery, Capt. W. H. Rice ; Thomas's (Va.) 
Art. (E. J. Anderson's battery).t 

Cavalry, Maj.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart : — Hampton^ s Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen.Wade Hampton ; 1st N. C, Col. L. S. Baker ; 2d S. C, Col. M. C. But- 
ler ; 10th Va., Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. P. M. B. Young ; Jeff Davis 
Legion, Lieut.-Col. W. T. Martin. Zee's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh 
Lee ; 1st Va., Lieut.-Col. L. Tiernan Brien ; 3d Va., Lieut.-Col. John T. 
Thornton ; 4th Va., Col. William C. Wickham ; 5th Va., Col. T. L. Ros- 
ser ; 9th Va. Robertson'' s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. B. H. Robertson, Col. 
Thomas T. Munford ; 2d Va., Col.T. T. Munford and Lieut.-Col. Burks ; 
6th Va. ; 7th Va., Capt. S. B. Myers ; 12th Va., Col. A. W. Harman ; 17th 
Va. Battn. 

Horse Artillery, Capt. John Pelham :— Chew's (Va.) battery, 
Hart's (S. C.) battery, Pelham's (Va.) battery. 

Army of the Potomac, t Ma.tor-General George B. McClellan, 

U. S. Army. 

General Head-quarters : — Escort, Capt. James B. Mclntyre ; In- 
dependent Company Oneida (N. Y.) Cav., Capt. Daniel P. Mann ; 4th 
U. S. Cav., Co. A, Lieut. Thomas H. McCormick ; 4th U. S. Cav., Co. E, 
Capt. James B. Mclntyre. Regidar Engineer Battalion, Capt. James 

C. Duane. Provost Guard, Maj. William H. Wood. 2d U. S. Cav., 
Cos. E, F, H, and K, Capt. George A. Gordon ; 8th U. S. Inf., Cos. A, 

D, F, and G, Capt. Royal T. Frank ; 19th U. S. Inf., Co. G, Capt. Ed- 
mund L. Smith ; 19th U. S. Inf., Co. H, Capt. Henry S. Welton. Head- 
quarters Guard, Maj. Granville O. Haller ; 93d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Ben- 
jamin C. Butler. Quartermaster's Guard, 1st U. S. Cav., Cos. B, C, H, 
and I, Capt. Marcus A. Reno. 



* With D. H. Hill's division at Sharpsburg. 

t Left at Leesburg. 

X Compiled from the records of the Adjutant-General's Office. On 
September 14 the right wing of the army, consisting of the First and 
Ninth Corps, was commanded by Major-General Burnside ; the centre, 
composed of the Second and Twelfth Corps, by Major-General Sumner, 
and the left wing, comprising the Sixth Corps and Couch's division 
(Fourth Corps), by Major-General Franklin. 



272 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

First Army Corps,* (1) Major-General Joseph Hooker, f (2) Brig- 
adier-General, George G. Meade. Escort, 2d N. Y. Cav., Cos. A, 
B, I, and K, Capt. John E. Nay lor. 

First Division, (1) Brig.-Gen. Rufus King,t (2) Brig.-Gen. John P. 
Hatch, § (3) Brig.-Gen. Abner Doubleday : — First Brigade, Col. Walter 
Phelps, Jr. ; 22d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John McKie, Jr. ; 24th N. Y., Capt. 
John D. O'Brian ; 30th N. Y., Col. William M. Searing ; 84th N. Y. (14th 
Militia), Maj. William H. de Bovoise ; 2d U. S. Sharp-shooters, Col. 
Henry A. V. Post. Second Brigade, (1) Brig.-Gen. Abner Doubledaj', 
(2) Col. William P. Wainwright, f (3) Lieut.-Col. J. William Hofmann ; 
7th Ind., Maj. Ira G. Grover ; 76th N. Y., Col. William P. Wainwright, 
Capt. John W. Young ; 95th IST. Y., Maj. Edward Pye ; 56th Pa., Lieut.- 
Col. J. William Hofmann, Capt. Frederick Williams. Third Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Marsena R. Patrick ; 21st N. Y., Col. William F. Rogers ; 23d 
N. Y., Col. Henry C. HoflTman ; 35th N. Y., Col. Newton B. Lord ; 80th 
N. Y. (20th Militia), 'Lieut.-Col. Theodore B. Gates. Fourth Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon ; 19th Ind., Col. Solomon Meredith, Lieut.-Col. 
Alois O. Bachman, Capt. William W. Dudley ; 2d Wis., Col. Lucius Fair- 
child, Lieut.-Col. Thomas S. Allen ; 6th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Edward S. 
Bragg, Maj. Rufus R. Dawes ; 7th Wis., Capt. John B. Callis, Artil- 
lery, Capt. J. Albert Monroe ; N. H. Light, First Batt., Lieut. Freder- 
ick M. Edgell ; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. D., Capt. J. Albert Monroe ; 1st 
N. Y. Light, Batt. L, Capt. John A. Reynolds ; 4th U. S., Batt. B, 
Capt. Joseph B. Campbell, Lieut. James Stewart. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. James B. Ricketts : — First Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Abram Duryea ; 97th N. Y., Maj. Charles Northrup ; 104th 
N. Y., Maj. Lewis C. Skinner ; lOoth N. Y., Col. Howard Carroll ; 107tli 
Pa., Capt. James Mac Thomson. Second Brigade, (1) Col. William 
A. Christian, (2) Col. Peter Lyle ; 26th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Ricliard H. 
Richardson ; 94th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Calvin Littleheld ; 88th Pa., Lieut.- 
Col. George W. Gile, Capt. Henry R. Myers ; 90th Pa., Col. Peter Lyle, 
Lieut.-Col. William A. Leech. Third Brigade, (1) Brig.-Gen. George L. 
Hartsuff,t (2) Col. Richard Coulter ; 16th Me.,|| Col. Asa W. Wildes ; 12th 
Mass., Maj. Elisha Burbank, Capt. Benjamin F. Cook ; 13th Mass., Maj. 
J. Parker Gould ; 83d N. Y. (9th Militia), Lieut.-Col. William Atterbury ; 
11th Pa., Col. Richard Coulter, Capt. David M. Cook. Artillery, 1st Pa. 
Light, Batt. F, Capt. Ezra W. Matthews ; Pa. Light, Batt. C, Capt. 
James Thompson. 

Third Division, (1) Brig.-Gen. George G. Meade, (2) Brig.-Gen. Tru- 
man Seymour -.—First Brigade, (1) Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour, (2) Col. 
R. Biddle Roberts ; 1st Pa. Reserves, Col. R. Biddle Roberts, Capt. Wil- 
liam C. Talley ; 2d Pa. Reserves, Capt. James N. Byrnes ; 5th Pa. Re- 



* Designation changed from Third Corps, Army of Virginia, to First 
Army Corps, by General Orders, No. 129, Adjutant-General's Office, 
September 12, 1862. 

t Wounded September 17. % Relieved September 14. 

I Wounded September 14. 

II Joined September 9, and detached September 13 as railroad guard. 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 273 

serves, Col. Joseph W. Fisher ; 6th Pa. Reserves, Col. William Sinclair ; 
13th Pa. Reserves (1st Rifles), Col. Hugh W. McNeil, Capt. Dennis Mc- 
Gee. Second Brigade, Col. Albert L. Magilton ; 3d Pa. Reserves, Lieut.- 
Col. John Clark ; 4th Pa. Reserves, Maj. John Nyce ; 7th Pa. Reserves, 
Col. Henry C. Bolinger, Major Chauncey M. Lyman ; 8th Pa. Reserves, 
Maj. SilasM. Baily. Third Brigade, (1) Col. Thomas F. Gallagher,* (2) 
Lieut.-Col. Robert Anderson ; 9th Pa. Reserves, Lieu t.-Col. Robert An- 
derson, Capt. Samuel B. Dick ; 10th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. Adoniram 
J. Warner, Capt. Jonathan P. Smith ; 11th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. 
Samuel M. Jaclvson ; 12th Pa. Reserves, Capt. Richard Gustin. Artil- 
lery, 1st Pa. Light, Batt. A, Lieut. John G. Simpson ; 1st Pa. Liglit, 
Batt. B, Capt. James H. Cooper ; 1st Pa. Light, Batt. G,t Lieut. Frank 
P. Amsden ; 5th U. S., Batt. C, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom, 

Second Army Corps, Major-General, Edwin V. Sumner. Escort, 
6th N. Y. Cav., Co. D, Capt. Henry W. Lyon ; 6th N. Y. Cav., Co. K, 
Capt. Riley Johnson. 

First Division, (1) Maj.-Geu. Israel B. Richardson, t (2) Brig.-Gen. 
John C. Caldwell, (3) Brig.-Gen. Win fleld S. Hancock; First Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell ; 5th N. H., Col. Edward E. Cross ; 7th N. 
Y., Capt. Charles Brestel ; 61st and 64th N. Y., Col. Francis C. Barlow, 
Lieut.-Col. Nelson A. Miles ; 81st Pa., Maj. H. Boyd McKeen. Second 
Brigade, (1) Brig.-Gen. Thomas F. Meagher, (2) Col. John Burke ; 29th 
Mass., Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Barnes ; 63d N. Y., Col. John Burke, Lieut.- 
Col. Henry Fowler, Maj. Richard C. Beutley, Capt. Joseph O'Neill ; 69th 
N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James Kelly, Maj. James Cavauagh ; 88th N. Y., Lieut.- 
Col. Patrick Kelly. Third Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke ; 2d Del., Capt. 
David L. Strieker ; 52d N. Y., Col. Paul Frank ; 57th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. 
Philip J. Parisen, Maj. Alford B. Chapman ; 66th N. Y., Capt. Julius 
Welile, Lieut.-Col. James H. Bull ; 53d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Richards McMi- 
chael. Artillery, 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. B, Capt. Rufus D. Pettit ; 4th 
U. S., Batts. A and C, Lieut. Evan Thomas. 

Second Division, (1) Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick,^ (2) Brig.-Gen, 
Oliver O. Howard -.—First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Willis A. Gorman ; 15th 
Mass., Lieut.-Col. John W. Kimball ; 1st Minn., Col. Alfred Sully ; 34th 
N. Y., Col. James A. Suiter ; 82d N. Y. (2d Militia), Col. Henry W. Hud- 
son ; Mass. Sharp-shooters, 1st Co., Capt. John Saunders ; Minn. Sharp- 
shooters, 2d Co., Capt. William F. Russell. Second Brigade, (1) Brig.- 
Gen. Ohver O. Howard, (2) Col. Joshua T. Owen, (3) Col. De Witt C. 
Baxter ; 69th Pa., Col. Joshua T. Owen ; 71st Pa., Col. Isaac J. Wistar, 
Lieut. Richard P. Smith (adjutant), Capt. Enoch E. Lewis ; 72d Pa., Col. 
De Witt C. Baxter ; 106th Pa., Col. Turner G. Morehead. Third Bri- 
gade, (1) Brig-.Gen. Napoleon J. T. Dana,t (2) Col. Norman J. Hall ; 19th 
Mass., Col. Edward W. Hinks, Lieut.-Col. Arthur F. Devereux ; 20th 
Mass., Col. William R. Lee ; 7th Mich., Col. Norman J. Hall, Capt. 

* Wounded September 14. 

t Detached at Washington, D. C, since September 6. 

X Wounded September 17. 

18 



274 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Charles J. Hunt ; 42d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. George N. Bomford, Maj. James 
E. Mallon ; 59th N. Y., Col. William L. Tidball. Artillery, 1st R I. 
Light, Batt. A, Capt. John A. Tompkins ; 1st U. S., Batt. I, Lieut. 
George A, Woodruff. 

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. William H. French : — First Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Nathan Kimball ; 14th Ind., Col. William Harrow ; 8th Ohio, 
Lieut.-Col. Franklin Sawyer; 132d Pa., Col. Richard A. Oakford, Lieut.- 
Col. Vincent M. Wilcox ; 7th W. Va., Col. Joseph Snider. Second Bri- 
gade, Col. Dwight Morris ; 14th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Sanford H. Perkins ; 
108th N. Y., Col. Oliver H. Palmer ; 130th Pa., Col. Henry I. Zinn. Third 
Brigade, (1) Brig.-Gen. Max Weber,* (2) Col. John W. Andrews ; 1st Del., 
Col. John W. Andrews, Lieut.-Col. Oliver H. Hopkinson ; 5th Md., Maj. 
Leopold Blumenberg, Capt. E. F. M. Faehtz ; 4th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John 
D. McGregor. Unattached Artillery, 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. G, Capt. 
John D, Frank ; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. B, Capt. John G. Hazard ; 1st 
R. I. Light, Batt. G, Capt. Charles D. Owen. 

Fourth Army Corps. 

First Division,! Maj.-Gen. Darius N. Couch : — First Brigade, Brig - 
Gen. Charles Devens, Jr. ; 7th Mass., Col. David A. Russell ; 10th Mass., 
Col. Henry L. Eustis ; 36th N. Y., Col. William H. Browne ; 2d R. I., 
Col. Frank Wheaton. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe ; 62d 
N. Y., Col. David J. Nevin ; 93d Pa., Col. James M. McCarter ; 98th Pa., 
Col. John F. Ballier ; 102d Pa., Col. Thomas A. Rowley ; 139th Pa.,t Col. 
Frank H. Collier. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John Cochrane; 65th 
N. Y., Col. Alexander Shaler ; 67th N. Y., Col. Julius W. Adams ; 122d 
N. Y., Col. Silas Titus ; 23d Pa., Col. Thomas H. Neill ; 61st Pa., Col. 
George C. Spear ; 82d Pa., Col. David H. Williams. Artillery, N. Y. 
Light, 3d Batt., ? Capt. William Stuart ; 1st Pa. Light, Batt. C, Capt. 
Jeremiah McCarthy ; 1st Pa. Light, Batt. D, Capt. Michael Hall , 2d 
U. S., Batt. G, Lieut. John H. Butler. 

Fifth Army Corps, Major-General Fitz-John Porter. Escort, 
1st Maine Cavalry (detachment), Capt. George J. Summat. 

First Division, Maj.-Gen. George W. Morell : — First Brigade, Col. 
James Barnes ; 2d Me., Col. Charles W. Roberts ; 18th Mass., Lieut.-Col. 
Joseph Hayes; 22d Mass., Lieut.-Col. William S. Tilton ; 1st Mich., Capt. 
Emory W. Belton ; 13th N. Y., Col. Elisha G. Marshall ; 25th N. Y., Col. 
Charles A. Johnson ; 118th Pa., Col. Charles M. Prevost ; Mass. Sharp- 
shooters, 2d Co., Capt. Lewis E. Wentworth. Second Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Charles Griffin ; 2d D. of C, Col. Charles M. Alexander ; 9th Mass., 
Col. Patrick R. Guiney ; 32d Mass., Col. Francis J. Parker ; 4th Mich., 
Col. Jonathan W. Childs ; 14th N. Y., Col. James McQuade ; 62d Pa., 
Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer. Third Brigade, Col. T. B. W. Stockton ; 20th 

* Wounded September 17. 

t Assigned to the Sixth Corps as the Third Division, September 26, 
1862. 
X Joined September 17. § Joined September 15. 



BATTLE OF SHAKPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 275 

Me., Col. Adelbert Ames ; 16th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Nerval E. Welch ; 12th 
N. Y., Capt. William Huson ; 17th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Nelson B. Bartram ; 
44th N. Y., Maj. Freeman Conner ; 83d Pa., Capt. Orpheus S. Woodward ; 
Mich. Sharp-sliooters, Brady's co., Lieut. Jonas H. Titus, Jr. Artillery, 
Mass. Light, Batt. C, Capt. Augustus P. Martin ; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. 
C, Capt. Richard Waterman ; 5tli U. S., Batt. D, Lieut. Charles E. Haz- 
lett. Sharp-shooters, 1st U. S., Capt. John B. Isler. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George Sykes -.—First Brigade, Lieut.- 
Col. Robert C. Buchanan ; 3d U. S., Capt. John D. Wilkins ; 4th U. S., 
Capt. Hiram Dryer; 12th U. S., 1st Battn., Capt. Matthew M, Blunt; 
12tli U. S., 2d Battn., Capt. Thomas M. Anderson ; 14th U. S., 1st Battn., 
Capt. W.Harvey Brown ; 14th U. S., 2d Battn., Capt. David B. McKib- 
bin. Second Brigade, Maj. Charles S. Lovell ; 1st and 6th U. S., Capt. 
Levi C. Bootes ; 2d and 10th U. S., Capt. John S. Poland ; 11th U. S., 
Capt. DeL. Floyd-Jones ; 17th U. S., Maj. George L. Andrews. Third 
Brigade, Col. Gouverneur K. Warren ; 5th N. Y., Capt. Cleveland Wins- 
low ; 19th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. John W. Marshall. Artillery, 1st U. S., 
Batts. E and G, Lieut. Alanson M. Randol ; 5th U. S., Batt. I, Capt. 
Stephen H. Weed ; 5th U. S., Batt. K, Lieut. William E. Van Reed. 

Third Division,* Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys •.—First Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. Erastus B. Tyler ; 91st Pa., Col. Edgar M. Gregory ; 
126th Pa., Col. James G. Elder ; 129th Pa., Col. Jacob G. Frick ; 134th 
Pa., Col. Matthew S. Quay. Second Brigade, Col. Peter H. Allabach ; 
123d Pa., Col. John B. Clark ; 131st Pa,, Lieut.-Col. William B. Shaut ; 
133d Pa., Col. Franklin B. Speakman ; 155th Pa., Col. Edward J, Allen. 
Artillery, Capt, Lucius N. Robinson ; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. C, Capt, Al- 
mont Barnes ; 1st Ohio Light, Batt. L, Capt. Lucius N. Robinson. Ar- 
tillery Reserve, Lieut.-Col. Williain Hays ; 1st Battn. N. Y. Light, Batt. 
A, Lieut. Bernhard Wever ; 1st Battn. N. Y. Light, Batt, B, Lieut. Al- 
fred von Kleiser ; 1st Battn. N. Y. Light, Batt. C, Capt. Robert Lang- 
ner ; 1st Battn. N. Y. Light, Batt. D, Capt, Charles Kusserow ; N. Y. 
Light, 5th Batt., Capt. Elijah D. Taft ; 1st U. S., Batt. K, Capt. William 
M. Graham ; 4th U. S., Batt. G, Lieut. Marcus P. Miller. 

Sixth Army Corps, Major-General WiLiiiAM B. Franklin. 
Escort, 6th Pa, Cav., Cos. B and G, Capt. Henry P. Muirheid. 

First Division, Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocuni -.—First Brigade, Col. 
Alfred T. A. Torbert ; 1st N. J., Lieut.-Col. Mark W. Collet ; 2d N. J., 
Col. Samuel L. Buck ; 3d N. J., Col. Henry W. Brown ; 4th N. J., Col. 
William B. Hatch. Second Brigade, Col. Joseph J. Bartlett ; 5th Me., 
Col. Nathaniel J. Jackson ; 16th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Joel J. Seaver ; 27th 
N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Alexander D. Adams ; 96th Pa., Col. Henry L. Cake. 
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John Newton ; 18th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. George 
R. Myers ; 31st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pinto ; 32d N. Y., Col. Rod- 
erick Matheson ; Maj. George F. Lemon ; 95th Pa., Col. Gustavus W. 
Town. Artillery, Capt. Emory Upton ; Md. Light, Batt. A, Capt. John 

* This division was organized September 12, and reached the battle- 
field of Antietam September 18. 



276 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

W. Wolcott ; Mass. Light, Batt. A, Capt. Josiah Porter ; N. J. Light, 
Batt. A, Capt. WilHam Hexamer ; 2d U. S., Batt. D, Lieut. Edward 
B. WilUston. 

Second Division, Maj.-Gen. William F. Smitli : — First Brigade, (1) 
Brig.-Gen. Winfield S. Hancoels,* (2) Col. Amasa Cobb ; 6th Me., Col. 
Hiram Burnham ; 43d N. Y., Maj. John Wilson ; 49th Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
William Brisbane ; 137th Pa., Col. Henry M. Bossert ; 5th Wis., Col. 
Amasa Cobb. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. T. H. Brooks ; 2d Vt., 
Maj. James H. Walbridge ; 3d Vt., Col. Breed N. Hyde ; 4th Vt., Lieut.- 
Col. Charles B. Stoughton ; 5th Vt., Col. Lewis A. Grant ; 6th Vt., Maj. 
Oscar L. Tuttle. Third Brigade, Col. William H. Irwin ; 7th Me., Maj. 
Thomas W. Hyde ; 20th N. Y., Col. Ernest von Vegesack ; 33d N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Joseph W. Corning ; 49th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William C. Al- 
berger, Maj. George W. Johnson ; 77th N. Y., Capt. Nathan S. Babcock. 
ArtUlery, Capt. Romeyn B. Ayres ; Md. Light, Batt. B, Lieut. Theodore 
J. Vanneman ; N. Y. Light, 1st Batt., Capt. Andrew Cowan ; 5th U. S., 
Batt. F, Lieut. Leonard Martin. 

Ninth Army Corps, MAJOR-GENERAii Ambrose E. BuRNSiDE,t 
Major-General Jesse L. Reno,^ Brigadier-General Jacob D. 
Cox. Escort, 1st Me. Cav., Co. G, Capt. Zebulon B, Blethen. 

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando B. Willeox : — First Brigade, Col. 
Benjamin C. Christ ; 28th Mass., Capt. Andrew P. Carraher ; 17th Mich., 
Col. William H. Withington ; 79th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. David Morrison ; 
50th Pa., Maj. Edward Overton, Capt. William H. Diehl. Second Bri- 
gade, Col. Thomas Welsh ; 8th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Frank Graves, Maj. 
Ralph Ely ; 46th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Joseph Gerhart ; 45th Pa., Lieut.- 
Col. John I. Curtin ; 100th Pa., Col. David A. Leckey. Artillery, Mass. 
Light, 8th Batt., Capt. Asa M. Cook ; 2d U. S., Batt. E, Lieut. Samuel 
N. Benjamin. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis : — First Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. James Naglee ; 2d Md., Lieut.-Col. J. Eugene Duryea ; 6th 
N. H., Col. Simon G. Griflin ; 9th N. H., Col. Enoch Q. Fellows ; 48th 
Pa., Lieut.-Col. Joshua K. Sigfried. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Edward 
Ferrero ; 21st Mass., Col. William S. Clark ; 35th Mass., Col. Edward A. 
Wild, Lieut.-Col. Sumner Carruth ; 51st N. Y., Col. Robert B. Potter; 
51st Pa., Col. John F. Hartranft. Artillery, Pa. Light, Batt. D, Capt. 
John W. Durell ; 4th U. S., Batt. E, Capt. Joseph C. Clark, Jr. 

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Isaac P, Rodman : § — First Brigade, Col. 
Harrison S. Fairchild ; 9th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Edgar A. Kimball ; 89th 
N. Y., Maj. Edward Jardine ; 103d N. Y., Maj. Benjamin Ringold. Sec- 
ond Brigade, Col. Edward Harland ; 8th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Hiram Ap- 

* Assigned to First Division, Second Army Corps, September 17. 

t On the 16th and 17th, Major General Burnside exercised general 
command on the left, and Brigadier-General Cox was in immediate 
command of the corps. 

X Killed September 14. 

I Wounded September 17. 



BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM. 277 

pelman, Maj. John E. Ward ; lltli Conn., Col. Henry W. Kingsbury ; 
16th Conn., Col. Francis Beacli ; 4th R I., Col. William H. P. Steere, 
Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Curtis. Artillery, 5th U. S., Batt. A, Lieut. Charles 
P. Muhlenberg. 

Kanawha Division, (1) Brig.-Gren. Jacob D. Cox, (2) Col. Eliakim P. 
Scanimon. First Brigade, (1) Col. Eliakim P. Scamnion, (2) Col. Hugh 
Ewing ; 12th Ohio, Col. Carr B. White ; 23d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Rutherford 
B. Hayes, Maj. James M. Comly ; 30th Ohio, Col. Hugh Ewing, Lieut.- 
Col. Theodore Jones, Maj. George H. Hildt ; Ohio Light Art., 1st Batt., 
Capt. James R. McMullin ; Gilmore's co. W. Va. Cav., Lieut. James 
Abraham ; Harrison's co. W. Va. Cav., Lieut. Dennis Delaney. Sec- 
ond Brigade, Col. George Crook ; 11th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Augustus H. 
Colenu\n, Maj. Lyman J. Jackson ; 28th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Gottfried 
Becker ; 36th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Melvin Clarke ; Schambeck's co. Chicago 
Dragoons, Capt. Frederick Schambeck ; Ky. Light Art., Simmonds's 
battery, Capt. Seth J. Simmonds. Unattached, 6th N. Y. Cav. (8 cos.), 
Col. Thomas C. Devin ; Ohio Cav., 3d Ind. Co., Lieut. Jonas Seamen ; 
3d U. S. Art., Batts. L and M, Capt. John Edwards, Jr. 

Twelfth Army Corps,* (1) JNIajor-General Joseph K. F. Mans- 
field,! (2) Brigadier-General Alpheus S. Williams. Escort, 
1st Mich. Cav., Co. L, Capt. Melvin Brewer. 

First Division, (1) Brig.-Gen. Alpheus S. Williams, (2) Brig.-Gen. 
Samuel W, Crawford, J (3) Brig.-Gen. George H. Gordon. First Brigade, 
(1) Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford, (2) Col. Joseph F. Knipe ; 5tli Conn., 
Capt. Henry W. Daboll ; 10th Me., Col. George L. Beal ; 28th N.Y., Capt. 
William H. H. Mapes ; 46th Pa., Col. Joseph F. Knipe, Lieut.-Col. James 
L. Selfridge ; 124th Pa., Col. Joseph W. Hawley, Maj. Isaac L. Halde- 
man ; 125th Pa., Col. Jacob Higgins ; 128th Pa., Col. Samuel Croasdale, 
Lieut.-Col. William W. Hamersly, Maj. Joel B. Wanner. TJiird Bri- 
gade, (1) Brig.-Gen. George H. Gordon, (2) Col. Thomas H. Ruger ; 27th 
Ind., Col. Silas Colgrove ; 2d Mass., Col. George L. Andrews ; 13th IST. J., 
Col. Ezra A. Carman ; 107th N. Y., Col. R. B. Van Valkenburgh ; Zouaves 
d'Afrique,? Pa. ; 3d Wis., Col. Thomas H. Ruger. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George S. Greene -.—First Brigade, (1) 
Lieut-Col. Hector Tyndale,t (2) Maj. Orrin J. Crane ; 5th Ohio, Maj. 
John Collins; 7th Ohio, Maj. Orrin J.Crane, Capt. Frederick A. Sey- 
mour; 29th Ohio,|| Lieut. Theron S. Winship ; 66th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. 
Eugene Powell ; 28th Pa., Maj. Ario Pardee, Jr. Second Brigade, Col. 
Henry J. Stamrook ; 3d Md., Lieut.-Col. Joseph M. Sudsburg ; 102d N.Y., 

* Designation changed from Second Corps, Army of Virginia, to 
Twelfth Army Corps, by General Orders, No. 129, Adjutant-General's 
Office, September 12, 1862. 

t Mortally wounded September 17. 

X Wounded September 17. 

§ No officers present ; enlisted men of company attached to Second 
Massachusetts. 

II Detached September 9. 



278 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Lieut.-Col. James C. Lane ; 109th Pa.,* Capt. George E. Seymour ; 111th 
Pa., Maj. Thomas M. Walker. Third Brigade, (1) Col. William B. Good- 
rich,! (2) Lieut.-Col. Jonathan Austin ; 3d Del., Maj. Arthur Maginnis ; 
Purnell Legion, Md., Lleut.-Col. Benjamin L. Simpson ; 60th N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Charles R. Brundage ; 78th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Jonathan Aus- 
tin, Capt. Henry R. Stagg. Artillery, Capt. Clermont L. Best ; Me. Light, 
4th Batt., Capt. O'Neil W. Robinson ; Me. Light, 6th Batt., Capt. Free- 
man McGilvery ; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. M., Capt. George W. Cothran ; 
N. Y. Light, 10th Batt, Capt. John T. Bruen ; Pa. Light, Batt. E, Capt. 
Joseph M. Knap ; Pa. Light, Batt. F, Capt. Robert B. Hampton ; 4th U. 
S., Batt. F, Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg. 

Cavalry Division, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Pleasontou -.—First Brigade, 
Maj. Charles J. Whiting ; 5th U. S., Capt. Joseph H. McAvthur ; 6th U. 
S., Capt. William P. Sanders. Second Brigade, Col. John F. Farns- 
worth ; 8th 111., Maj. William H. Medill ; 3d Ind., Maj. George H. Chap- 
man ; 1st Mass., Capt. Casper Crowninshield ; 8th Pa., Capt. Peter Kee- 
nan. Third Brigade, Col. Richard H. Rush ; 4th Pa., Col. James H. 
Childs, Lieut.-Col. James K. Kerr ; 6th Pa., Lieut.-Col. C. Ross Smith. 
Fourth Brigade, Col. Andrew T. McReynolds ; 1st N. Y., Maj. Alonzo 
W. Adams ; 12th Pa., Major James A. Congdon. Fifth Brigade, Col. 
Benj. F. Davis ; 8th N. Y., Col. Benjamin F. Davis ; 3d Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
Samuel w Owen. Artillery, 2d U. S., Batt. A, Capt. John C. Tidball ; 
2d U. S., Batts. B and L, Capt. James M. Robertson ; 2d U. S., Batt. M, 
Lieut. Peter C. Hains ; 3d U. S., Batts. C and G, Capt. Horatio G. Gib- 
son. Unattached, 1st Me. Cav.,t Col. Samuel H. Allen ; 15th Pa. Cav. 
(detachment). Col. William J. Palmer, 

* Detached September 13. 

t Killed September 17. 

X Detached at Frederick, Md. 



CHAPTER XX. 

REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 

Confederate Expectations — General Lee's Salutatory to the People of 
Maryland — The "Lost Despatch"— McClellan's Movements— Turn 
in the Tide of War— A Miracle great as the throwing down of the 
Walls of Jericho — In Contempt of the Enemy the Confederate Army 
was dispersed — Harper's Ferry a " Man -Trap"— It diverted the Army 
from the Main Issue — Lee and McClellan compared and contrasted— 
Tribute to the Confederate Private Soldier. 

For conveying to tlie reader a comprehensive view of 
the military zodiac at the time we crossed the quiet 
Potomac, the 5th day of September, 1862, and an under- 
standing of the logical sequence of the events f( llowing, 
something should be added here to the plain narrative of 
occurrences, and so I undertake a review of the Maryland 
campaign. 

The Army of Northern Virginia was afield without a 
foe. Its once grand adversary, discomfited under two 
commanders, had crept into cover of the bulwarks about 
the national capital. The commercial, social, and blood 
ties of Maryland inclined her people to the Southern 
cause. A little way north of the Potomac were inviting- 
fields of food and supplies more plentiful than on the 
southern side ; and the fields for march and manoeuvre, 
strategy and tactics, were even more inviting than the 
broad fields of grain and comfortable pasture-lands. 
Propitious also was the prospect of swelling our ranks by 
Maryland recruits. 

At the head of the army of sixty thousand men en- 
couraged, matured, and disciplined by victory stood the 
Confederate chief, challenging on its own soil the army 
that had marched to conquer the Southern capital. On 
the 7th he pitched his bivouac about Frederick City. On 

279 



280 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the 8th he made his salutatory to the people in these 
words : 

" Head-quaeters Army of IS'orthern Virginia, 

''Near Fredericktown, Md., September 8, 1862. 

"To THE People of Maryland: 

"It is right tliat you should know the j)urpose that brought 
the army under my command within the limits of your State, so 
far as that purpose concerns yourselves. The people of the Con- 
federate States have long watched with the deepest sympathy the 
wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of 
a commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest 
social, political, and commercial ties. They have seen with pro- 
found indignation their sister State deprived of every right and 
reduced to the condition of a conquered x)rovince. Under the 
pretence of suj)porting the Constitution, but in violation of its 
most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and 
imprisoned upon no charge and contrary to all forms of law. The 
faithful and manly protest against this outrage made by the ven- 
erable and illustrious Marylander, to whom in better days no 
citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and 
contempt ; the government of your chief city has been usurped 
by armed strangers ; your legislature has been dissolved by the 
unlawful arrest of its members ; freedom of the press and of 
speech has been suppressed ; words have been declared offences 
by an arbitrary decree of the Federal Executive, and citizens 
ordered to be tried by a military commission for what they may 
dare to speak. Believing that the people of Maryland possessed 
a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of 
the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign 
yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of free- 
men, and to restore independence and sovereignty to your State. 
In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is 
prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining 
the rights of which you have been desj)oiled. 

' ' This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are 
concerned. No constraint upon your free will is intended ; no 
intimidation will be allowed within the limits of this army, at 
least. Mary landers shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom 
of thought and speech . We know no enemies among you, and 
will protect all, of every opinion. It is for you to decide your 
destiny freely and without constraint. This army will respect 



REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 281 

your choice, whatever it may be ; and while the Southern 
people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position 
among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your 
own free will. 

"B. E. Lee, 
"General, Commanding.''^ 

At this very time the recently displaced commander, 
General McClellan, reinstated in command, was march- 
ing for an opportunity to recover his good name, and 
the Union cavalry was active and aggressive in work 
against the Confederates at Poolesville. 

On the 9th the Confederate commander organized his 
plans for the surrounding and caj^ture of Harper's Ferry, 
and put his army in motion on the 10th. Close upon the 
heels of the march followed the Army of the Potomac, 
only twenty-five miles behind the rear of the Confederate 
army, with the cavalry of the armies in contact. The 
march of the former was as cautious as that of the latter 
was venturesome. On the 10th the Union commander was 
informed of the march of J. G. Walker's brigades up the 
river from Cheek's Ford. On the 11th his signal service 
reported the camp across the river at Point of Rocks. On 
the 12th, at Urbana, he was informed of the combination 
against Harper's Ferry, and the march towards the Cum- 
berland Valley, and ordered pressing pursuit to force the 
Confederates to a stand. Under that order General Pleas- 
onton, the Federal cavalry leader, hurried his troops and 
cleared the way to South Mountain on the 13th. From 
day to day the Confederates marched their dispersing 
columns, from day to day the Union columns converged 
in easy, cautious marches. At noon of the 13th, General 
Lee's order distributing his forces and a despatch from 
the Governor of Pennsylvania were handed General Mc- 
Clellan, — the former the celebrated " lost despatch," 
given on a previous page, — the latter reading as fol- 
lows : 



282 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

^' Haeeisbueg, Pa., September 13, 1862. 
^^ Major -General George B. MoClellan : 

''When may we expect General Eeynolds here? Services 
needed immediately. Longstreet' s division is said to have reached 
Hagerstown last night. Jackson crossed the Potomac at Wil- 
liamsport to capture Martinsbnrg and Harper's Ferry. We are 
assembling militia rapidly at Chambersburg. Can we do anything 
to aid your movements "? . ^ * /-i r>, 

•^ "A. G. CURTIN, 

^' Governor of Pennsylvania.'''' 

This told of the change of march of my brigades from 
Turner's Pass to Hagerstown, and, with the "lost de- 
spatch," revealed that Hill's five brigades were the only 
troops at the former place. 

The same afternoon General McClellan's signal service 
despatched him that the Union signal station on Maryland 
Heights had gone down. General Lee's signals failed to 
^connect, so that General McClellan was better informed of 
the progress of the Confederate movements than was the 
Confederate commander. That afternoon the Union army 
was in hand for battle. The Confederates were dis23ersed 
and divided by rivers, and drifting thirty and forty and 
fifty miles apart. Under similar circumstances General 
Scott, or General Taylor, or General Worth would have 
put the columns at the base of South Mountain before 
night, and would have passed the unguarded gajas before 
the sun's rays of next morning could have lighted their 
eastern slopes. 

The Union commander claims to have ordered more 
vigorous pursuit after the " lost despatch" was handed 
him, but there is nothing to support the claim except his 
call on General Franklin, and in that he only ordered 
preparation at Crampton's to await events at Turner's 
Pass. 

General Pleasonton was at Turner's Pass on the after- 
noon of the 13th, and made a reconnoissance of the ways 
leading up the east side of the mountain. He was not 



REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 283 

informed of the despatches received by his chief, nor 
had he any information of Confederate movements ex- 
cept such as he had gleaned in closely following their 
rear. At daylight of the 14tli he led General Cox and 
the Ninth Corps to attack, and in this manner the battle 
was opened. 

His orders to call the Confederates to a stand did not 
anticipate the ^provocation of a general engagement, but 
a wait for his chief, who rode up about one o'clock. He 
thought that he was battling against seventeen brigades, 
while there were but five ; and, had the battle been held 
in wait for McClellan, his well-known habit of careful 
reconnoissance would have consumed the balance of the 
day. His last orders for General Franklin directed a wait 
for Couch's division, which joined him at eight o'clock in 
the evening. It is difficult to find that a quicker move 
was given the Union army in consequence of the " lost 
despatch ;" but one may rather concede General Hill's 
claim, that in consequence of that despatch the Union 
army was so delayed as to give the Confederates time 
to make their way back to the soil of " Old Vir- 
ginia." Without it, the main column of the Union 
forces could have marched through Crampton's Pass, 
and relieved Harper's Ferry on the 14th, but, guided 
by it, their commander found it important to first guard 
against the seventeen brigades that should be at Turner's 
Pass, on the right rear of a column, moving against 
Crampton's. 

The razing of the walls of Jericho by encircling marches 
of priests and soldiers, at the signal of long-drawn blasts 
of sacred horns and shouts of the multitude, was scarcely 
a greater miracle than the transformation of the con- 
quering army of the South into a horde of disordered 
fugitives before an army that two weeks earlier was flying 
to cover under its homeward ramparts. 

Providence helps those who can avail themselves of 



284 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

His tender care, but permits those who will to turn froin 
Him to their own arrogance. That His gracious hand was 
with the Confederates in their struggles on the Chicka- 
hominy, and even through the errors of the Bull Run 
campaign, cannot be questioned. When, however, in 
self-confidence, they lost sight of His helping hand, and 
in contempt of the enemy dispersed the army, they 
were given up to the reward of vainglory. That the 
disaster was not overwhelming they have to thank the 
plodding methods of the Union commander. With as 
much faith as Captain Joshua, his success would have 
been as complete. 

But for the proper solution of the campaign we must 
turn again to the condition of the Confederate army when 
it crossed into Maryland. It was then all that its leaders 
could ask, and its claim as master of the field was estab- 
lished, but it was worn by severe marches and battles, 
and in need of rest. Its record before and after shows 
that, held in hand and refreshed by easy marchings and 
comfortable supplies, it would have been prepared to main- 
tain its suj)remacy. The first necessity was a little time to 
refresh, while the grand object was to draw the enemy 
from his intrenched lines to free and open battle. These 
facts carefully observed, the Confederate army would have 
been assured of its claim and prestige. 

In the confusion about Washington incident to the 
Bull Bun campaign, General McClellan was ordered to 
receive the retreating columns and post them to defend 
and hold their fortified lines. He had not emerged from 
the clouds that hung about his untoward campaign in 
Virginia, but, familiar with the provisions that had been 
made for defence, he was most available for the service. 
He had hardly posted the troops and arranged the gar- 
rison when he found that the Confederates, instead of 
moving against his fortifications, had turned the head of 
their columns north, and were marching to invade Union 



REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 285 

territory. He was quick to discover his opportunity, and, 
after posting guards for the works about the capital, as- 
sumed command of the army and took the field, lest 
another commander should be assigned. His clouded 
fame and assumption of authority committed him to early 
aggressive work. He had nothing to lose, but the world 
to gain, and that upon the field of battle. 

All that the Confederates had to do was to hold the 
army in hand and draw the enemy to a field wide enough 
for manoeuvre ; then call him to his battle. It is possible 
that ragged affairs about the mountain passes might have 
given him safe retreat to his capital, leaving the army of 
the South afield, a free lance. 

It had been arranged that the Southern President 
should join the troops, and from the head of his victo- 
rious army call for recognition. Maryland would have 
put out some of her resources, and her gallant youth 
would have helped swell the Southern ranks, — the twenty 
thousand soldiers who had dropped from the Confederate 
ranks during the severe marches of the summer would 
have been with us. Volunteers from all parts of the 
South would have come, swimming the Potomac to find 
their President and his field-marshal, while Union troops 
would have been called from Kentucky and Tennes- 
see, and would have left easy march for the Confederate 
armies of the West to the Ohio Piver. 

Even though the Confederates were not successful, 
the fall elections were against the Federal adminis- 
tration. With the Southern armies victorious, the re- 
sults of the contest at the polls would have been so 
pronounced as to have called for recognition of the 
Confederacy. 

General McClellan wrote General Halleck of the effect, 
in case of defeat of his army, — 

"But if we should be so unfortunate as to meet with defeat, 
our country is at their mercy." 



286 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

So much has been said and written about Harper's 
Ferry and the surrender of the garrison, that it seems 
difficult to pass it without notice. In more than one 
report General McClellan mentioned it as a " shameful" 
surrender. He had disapproved the position as false, and 
asked if it could not be given up. Colonel Miles, the com- 
mander, who gave his life in its defence, was acting under 
the following order from the department commander, — 
viz. : 

^ ' Baltimoee, September 5, 1862. 
'' Colonel Miles, Harper's Ferry: 

' ' The position on the heights ought to enable you to punish the 
enemy passing up the road in the direction of Harper's Ferry. 
Have your wits about you, and do all you can to annoy the rebels 
should they advance on you. Activity, energy, and decision must 
be used. You will not abandon Harper's Ferry without defend- 
ing it to the last extremity. 

''John E. Wool, 

' ' Major- General. ' ' * 

The simple truth is, it was defended to the last extrem- 
ity. The nearer the approach of the succoring army, the 
more imperative would have been the demand for action 
on the part of the Confederate columns, and had battle 
been forced it could not possibly have resulted in any save 
one way, — Confederate victory, and an overwhelming one 
at that. 

The position was denounced as a " man-trap," and so it 
proved to Colonel Miles and his eleven thousand troops, 
but it was in fact a far more formidable trap for the Con- 
federates, who to seize it sacrificed the fruits of heavy 
war, — victory in the main battle of the campaign, — and 
were forced to draw their crippled ranks to homeward 
defence. General Jackson wanted it till he got posses- 
sion ; then gave it up. General McClellan wanted to 
give it up before it was taken. After it had been taken 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xix. part i. p. 520. 



( 



REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 287 

and given up, he reoccupied it. It was left severely alone 
in the Gettysburg campaign, — an admission by both sides 
of its uselessness as a point d'appui. 

A word in closing about the chiefs opposed in this great 
campaign. General Lee and General McClellan were 
both graduates of the United States Military Academy at 
West Point. The former took the second honor of the 
class of 1829, the latter the second honor of the class of 
1846. Their service in the United States army was as 
military engineers. In 1854 they were both selected by 
Secretary of War Jefferson Davis for promotion to the 
new cavalry regiments as lieutenant-colonel and captain 
respectively. Their early opportunities, social and educa- 
tional, were superior. They studiously improved them in 
youth, and applied them with diligence in after-life. Aspi- 
rations leading to the higher walks of social and profes- 
sional life seem to have been alike controlling forces in 
the character and career of each. They were not un- 
mindful that physical development was important in sup- 
port of mental improvement. In moral tone and habits 
they may be called exemplars. In his service, General 
Lee's pride was duty to his government and to the army 
under his command. He loved admiration of the outside 
world, but these duties better. General McClellan's am- 
bition was not so limited. 

In stature General Lee stood five feet ten inches, was 
of well-developed muscular figure, as trim as a youth, and 
weighed one hundred and seventy pounds. In features he 
was a model of manly beauty. His teeth were of ivory 
whiteness ; his mouth handsome and expressive of frank- 
ness, kindness, and generosity. His nose and chin were 
full, regular, strong, and gave his face force and character. 
'Twas seldom that he allowed his mind to wander to the 
days of his childhood, and talk of his father and his early 
associates, but when he did, he was far more charming 
than he thought. As a commander he was much of the 



288 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

AVellington " Up-and-at-'em" style. He found it hard, 
the enemy in sight, to withhold his blows. With Mc- 
Clellan it was more difficult to strike than to march for 
the enemy. 

General McClellan was of short, stout figure, but was 
of soldierly presence, graceful, and handsome-featured. 

In their mounts neither of the great commanders lost 
anything of his admirable presence. Both were masters 
of the science but not of the art of war. Lee was suc- 
cessful in Virginia ; McClellan in Maryland. 

Unjust criticism has been passed upon the Confederate 
soldiers in the Maryland campaign, based principally upon 
the great number of absentees. To those who have spent 
their lives near the ranks of soldiers and learned from 
experience that there is a limit to physical endurance, 
explanation is not called for ; to those who look upon the 
soldier as a machine, not even needing oil to facilitate 
motive power, I will say, try to put yourselves in the sol- 
diers' places. Another point to be noted was, that in the 
Confederate ranks there were thousands of soldiers who 
had been wounded once, twice, and in some instances 
three times, who in any other service would have been 
on the pension-rolls at their comfortable homes. 

Sickness and weakness that creep into an army from 
irregular food, collected in the stress of march, were no 
trifling impediments to the maintenance of our ranks in 
vigorous form. 

When, in mature judgment, the historian builds monu- 
ments of words for the leaders of the campaign in Mary- 
land, there will be flowers left for the private soldiers, and 
for the private soldiers' graves. 

The full significance of Sharpsburg to the Federal au- 
thorities lay in the fact that they needed a victory on 
which to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, which 
President Lincoln had prepared two months before and 
had held in abeyance under advice of members of his 



REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGIS. 

Cabinet until the Union arms should win a succ 
Although this battle was by no means so comj^lete a vic- 
tory as the President wished, and he was sorely vexed 
with General McClellan for not pushing it to completion, 
it was made the most of as a victory, and his Emancipa- 
tion Proclamation was issued on the 22d of September, 
five days after the battle. This was one of the decisive 
political events of the war, and at once put the great 
struggle outwardly and openly upon the basis where it 
had before only rested by tacit and covert understanding. 
If the Southern army had been carefully held in hand, 
refreshed by easy marches and comfortable supplies, the 
proclamation could not have found its place in history. 
On the other hand, the Southern President would have 
been in Maryland at the head of his army with his mani- 
festo for peace and independence. 



19 



CHAPTER XXL 

REORGANIZATION AND REST FOR BOTH ARMIES. 

The Confederates appoint Seven Lieutenant-Geuerals — The Army of 
Northern Virginia organized in Corps — General McClellan relieved, 
and General Burnside appointed Commander of the Army of the 
Potomac — A Lift for tlie South — McClellan was growing — Burnside's 
"Three Grand Divisions" — Tlie Campaign of the Rappalianuock— 
Getting Ready for Fredericlvsburg— Longstreet occupies Fredericks- 
burg — The Town called to surrender by General Sumner — Exodus of 
the Inhabitants under a Threat to shell the Town. 

Under an act not long before passed by the Confed- 
erate Congress authorizing the appointment of seven 
lieutenant-generals, the authorities at Richmond about 
this time sent commissions to Lieutenant-Generals Long- 
street, Polk, Holmes, Hardee, E. K. Smith, Jackson, and 
Pemberton, and made appointments of a number of 
major-generals. Under these appointments General Lee 
organized the Army of Northern Virginia into corps 
substantially as it subsequently fought the battle of Fred- 
ericksburg.* 

The Confederate army rested along the lines between 
the Potomac and Winchester till late in October. On the 
8th, General Stuart was ordered across to ride around the 
Union army, then resting about Sharpsburg and Har- 
per's Ferry. His ride caused some excitement among the 
Union troops, and he got safely to the south side with the 
loss of a few men slightly wounded, on the 12th. On the 
26th, General McClellan marched south and crossed the 
Potomac east of the Blue Ridge. Jackson was assigned 
the duty of guarding the passes. I marched south, cor- 
responding with the march of the Army of the Potomac. 

* See organization of the army appended to account of the battle of 
Fredericksburg. 
290 




^ 



LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET (1862). 



REORGANIZATION AND REST FOR BOTH ARMIES. 291 

A division crossed at Ashby's Gap to Upperville to look 
for the head of McClellan's army. He bore farther east- 
ward and marched for Warrenton, where he halted on 
the 5th of November. The division was withdrawn from 
Upperville and marched for Culpeper Court-House, ar- 
riving at that point at the same time as McClellan's at 
Warrenton, — W. H. F. Lee's cavalry the day before me. 
Soon after the return to Culpeper Court-House, Evans's 
brigade was relieved of duty with the First Corps and 
ordered south. Hood had a brush with a cavalry force at 
Manassas Gap, and part of McLaws's division a similar 
experience at the east end of Chester Gap. 

I reached Culpeper Court-House with the divisions of 
McLaws, R. H. Anderson, and Pickett. Hood's division 
was ordered behind Robertson River, and Ransom to 
Madison Court-House, General Jackson with the Second 
Corps remaining in the Shenandoah Valley, except one 
division at Chester Gap of the Blue Ridge. 

The Washington authorities issued orders on the 5th 
of November relieving General McClellan of, and assign- 
ing General Burnside to, command of the Army of the 
Potomac. On the 9th the army was put under General 
Burnside, in due form. 

When informed of the change, General Lee exjDressed 
regret, as he thought that McClellan could be relied upon 
to conform to the strictest rules of science in the conduct 
of war. He had been McClellan's preceptor, they had 
served together in the engineer corps, and our chief thought 
that he thoroughly understood the displaced commander. 
The change was a good lift for the South, however ; Mc- 
Clellan was growing, was likely to exhibit far greater 
powers than he had yet shown, and could not have given 
us opportunity to recover the morale lost at Sharpsburg, 
as did Burnside and Hooker. 

General Burnside, soon after assuming command, and 
while waiting at Warrenton, made a radical change in the 



292 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

organization of the army by consolidating the corps into 
three " Grand Divisions" as follows : 

The Right Grand Division, General Sumner commanding.— 
Second Armj^ Corps, General D. W. Couch ; Ninth Army Corps, Gen- 
eral O. B. Wilcox. 

Centre Grand Division, General Joseph Hooker commanding. 
— Third Army Corps, General George Stoneman ; Fifth Army Corps, 
General Daniel Butterfield. 

Left Grand Division, General W. B. Franklin commanding. 
— First Army Corps, General J. F. Reynolds ; Sixth Army Corps, Gen- 
eral W. F. Smith. 

Cavalry Division.— General Alfred Pleasonton. 

Artillery, siege, and field batteries, 370 guns, General Henry J. Hunt, 
Chief. 

At the time of the change of commanders the Con- 
federates were looking for a Federal move north of Ciil- 
peper Court-House, and were surveying the ground be- 
hind Robertson River for a point of concentration of the 
two wings to meet that move. 

General Burnside, however, promptly planned opera- 
tions on other lines. He submitted to President Lincoln 
his proposition to display some force in the direction of 
Gordonsville as a diversion, while with his main army he 
would march south, cross the Rappahannock at Fred- 
ericksburg, and reach by a surprise march ground nearer 
Richmond than the holdings of the Confederates. This 
was approved by the President with the suggestion that 
its success depended upon prompt execution. 

On the 15th light began to break upon the Confeder- 
ates, revealing a move south from Warrenton, but it was 
not regarded as a radical change from the Orange and 
Alexandria Railroad line of advance. A battery of ar- 
tillery was sent with a regiment of infantry to reinforce 
the Confederate outpost at Fredericksburg under Colonel 
Ball. 

On the 17th information came that the Right Grand Di- 
vision under General Sumner had marched south, leaving 



I 



EEOEGANIZATION AND REST FOR BOTH ARMIES. 293 

the railroad, and General W. H. F. Lee's cavalry was 
ordered to Fredericksburg, 

The next morning I marched with two divisions, Mc- 
Laws's and Ransom's, the former for Fredericksburg, the 
latter towards the North Anna. The same day. General 
Lee ordered a forced reconnoissance by his cavalry to 
Warrenton, found that the Union army was all on the 
march towards Fredericksburg, and ordered my other 
divisions to follow on the 19th. 

At the first disclosure he was inclined to move for a ^^o- 
sition behind the North Anna, as at that time the position 
behind Fredericksburg appeared a little awkward for the 
Confederates, but, taking into careful consideration the 
position of the Union army on the Stafford side, the 
former appeared the less faulty of the two. Defence be- 
hind the Anna would have been stronger, but the ad- 
vantage of the enemy's attack would also have been en- 
hanced there. Then, too, anticipation of the effect of 
surprising the enemy in their intended surprise had some 
influence in favor of Fredericksburg. 

The Burnside march was somewhat of the Horace 
Greeley " On-to-Richmond" nolens-volens style, which, if 
allowed to run on long enough, sometimes gains headway 
that is troublesome. 

General Sumner reached Falmouth on the 17th, and 
proposed to cross, but his advance was met and forced 
back by Colonel Ball's command. 

I rode with the leading division for Fredericksburg, 
and was on the heights on the 19th. My head-quarters 
were there when General Sumner called uj^on the civil 
authorities to surrender the city by the following commu- 
nication : 

''Head-quaetees Aemy of the Potomac, 

^'November 21, 1862. 
'^Mayoe and Common Council of Feedeeicksbueg : 

'' Gentlemen, — Under cover of the houses of your city shots 
have been fired upon the troops of my command. Your mills 



294 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

and manufactories are furnisliing provisions and tlie material for 
clothing for armed bodies in rebellion against the government of 
the United States. Your railroads and other means of transpor- 
tation are removing supplies to the depots of such troops. This 
condition of things must terminate, and, by direction of General 
Burnside, I accordingly demand the surrender of the city into 
my hands, as the representative of the government of the United 
States, at or before five o'clock this afternoon. 

' '■ Failing an affirmative reply to this demand by the hour indi- 
cated, sixteen hours will be permitted to elapse for the removal 
from the city of women and children, the sick and wounded and 
aged, etc., which period having expired, I shall proceed to shell 
the town. Upon obtaining possession of the city, every necessary 
means will be taken to preserve order and secure the protective 
operation of the laws and policy of the United States govern- 
ment. 

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

''E. V. Sumner, 
" Bvt. Maj.-Gen. TJ. 8. Army, commanding Bight Grand Division.^ ^ * 

The officers who received the call, by consent of Gen- 
eral Patrick, who delivered it, referred the paper to my 
head-quarters. I asked the civil authorities to reply that 
the city would not be used for the purposes complained of, 
but that neither the town nor the south side of the river 
could be occupied by the Union army except by force of 
arms. 

General Sumner ordered two batteries into position 
commanding the town, but in a few hours received the 
following reply from the mayor : 

''Mayor's Office, 
"Fredericksburg, Nov ember 21, 1862. 
"Brevet Major-General E. V. Sumner, 
' ' Commanding TJ. S. Army : 
"Sir, — I have received, at 4.40 o'clock this afternoon, your 
communication of this date. In it you state that, under cover 
of the houses of this town, shots have been fired upon the troops 
of your command ; that our mills and manufactories are furnish- 
ing provisions and the material for clothing for armed bodies in 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxi. part i. p. 783. 



REORGANIZATION AND REST FOR BOTH ARMIES. 295 

rebellion against the government of the United States ; that our 
railroads and other means of transportation are removing sup- 
plies to the depots of such troops ; that this condition of things 
must terminate ; that, by command of Major-General Burnside, 
you demand the surrender of this town into your hands, as the 
representative of the government of the United States, at or be- 
fore five o'clock this afternoon ; that, failing an affirmative reply 
to this demand by the time indicated, sixteen hours will be per- 
mitted to elapse for the removal from the town of the women and 
children, the sick, wounded, and aged, w^hich period having 
elapsed, you will proceed to shell the town. 

' ' In reply I have to say that this communication did not reach 
me in time to convene the Council for its consideration, and to 
furnish a reply by the hour indicated (five p.m.). It was sent to 
me through the hands of the commanding officer of the Confed- 
erate States near this town, to whom it was first delivered, by 
consent of General Patrick, who bore it from you, as I am in- 
formed, and I am authorized by the commander of the Confed- 
erate army to say that there was no delay in passing it through 
his hands to me. 

''In regard to the matters complained of by you, the firing of 
shot upon your troops occurred upon the northern suburbs of the 
town, and was the act of the military officer commanding the 
Confederate forces near here, for which matter (neither) the citi- 
zens nor civil authorities of this town are responsible. In regard 
to the other matters of complaint, I am authorized by the latter 
officer to say that the condition of things therein complained of 
shall no longer exist ; that your troops shall not be fired on from 
this town ; that the mills and manufactories here will not furnish 
any further supplies of provisions or material for clothing for 
the Confederate troops, nor will the railroads or other means of 
transportation here convey supplies from the town to the depots 
of said troops. 

" Outside of the town the civil authorities of Fredericksburg 
have no control, but I am assured by the military authorities of 
the Confederate army near here that nothing will be done by 
them to infringe the conditions herein named as to matters within 
the town. But the latter authorities inform us that, while their 
troops will not occupy the town, they will not permit yours to 
do so. 

' ' You must be aware that there will not be more than three or 
four hours of daylight within the sixteen hours given by you for 
the removal of the sick and wounded, the women and children, 



296 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the aged and infirm, from this place ; and I have to inform you 
that, while there is no railroad transportation accessible to the 
town, because of the interruption thereof by your batteries, all 
other means of transportation within the town are so limited as 
to render the removal of the classes of persons spoken of within 
the time indicated as an utter impossibility. 

' ' I have convened the Council, which will remain in session 
awaiting any further communications you may have to make. 
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"M. Slaughter, 

''Mayor:' 

To this General Sumner responded the same day, — 

"Mayor and Common Council of Fredericksburg, Va. : 

' ' Your letter of this afternoon is at hand, and, in consideration 
of your pledges that the acts complained of shall cease, and that 
your town shall not be occupied by any of the enemy's forces, 
and your assertion that a lack of transportation renders it impos- 
sible to remove the women, children, sick, wounded, and aged, I 
am authorized to say to you that our batteries will not open upon 
your town at the hour designated. 

"General Patrick will meet a committee or representative 
from your town to-morrow morning, at nine o'clock, at the Lacy 
House. 

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"E. V. Sumner, 
'' Brevet Major -General, U. S. Army, Commanding Division^'' 

As the inference from the correspondence was that the 
shelling vv^as only postponed, the people were advised to 
move with their valuables to some place of safety as soon 
as possible. Without complaint, those who could, packed 
their precious effects and moved beyond reach of the 
threatened storm, but many preferred to remain and en- 
counter the dangers rather than to leave their homes and 
valuables. The fortitude with which they bore their trials 
quickened the minds of the soldiers who were there to 
defend them. One train leaving with women and chil- 
dren was fired upon, making some confusion and dismay 
among them, but the two or three shells did no other 
mischief, and the firing ceased. 



I 



CHAPTER XXII. 

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 

Description of the Field — Marye's Heights — Position of the Troops of 
Longstreet's Command — General Jackson called down from Orange 
Court-House, and Preparations made for a Determined Stand — Signal 
Guns at Three o'Cloek in the Morning announce the Long-Expected 
Battle — Burnside's Bridge-Builders thrice driven back from their 
Work— The Crossing finally made by Boats— Federals under Hot 
Fire enter Fredericksburg — How they obtained their Foothold on 
the West Bank of the Rappahannock — Gallant Officers and Men — 
Ninety-seven killed or wounded in the Space of Fifty Yards— Gen- 
eral Burnside's Plan of Battle— Strength of the Contending Forces. 

McLaws's division of my corps was posted on the 
heights in rear of the city, one brigade in the sunken road 
in front of the Marye mansion, the others extending across 
the Telegraph road through the wood of Lee's Hill. 
As the other divisions of the corps came up they were 
posted, R. H. Anderson on Taylor's Hill ; Ransom in 
reserve, near corps head-quarters ; Pickett in the wood, 
in rear of McLaws's right ; Hood at Hamilton's Crossing. 

The Federal Grand Divisions under Franklin and 
Hooker marched on the 18tli of November, and on the 
19th pitched their camps, the former at Stafford Court- 
House, and the latter at Hartwood, each about ten miles 
from Falmouth. A mile and a half above Fredericksburg 
the Rappahannock cuts through a range of hills, which 
courses on the north side in a southeasterly direction, nearly 
parallel, and close to its margin. This range (Stafford 
Heights) was occupied by the enemy for his batteries of 
position, one hundred and forty-seven siege guns and 
long-range field batteries. These heights not only com- 
mand those of the west, but the entire field and flats 
opened by the spreading out of the range on the west 
side. At points, however, they stand so close beside the 

297 



298 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

river that the guns on their crest could not be so depressed 
as to plunge their fire to the water. The heights are cut 
at points by streamlets and ravines leading into the river, 
and level up gradually as they approach nearer to the 
Potomac on its west slope, and towards the sea on the 
south. The city of Fredericksburg nestles under those 
heights on the opposite bank. McLaws had a brigade 
on picket service, extending its guard up and down the 
banks of the river, in connection with details from R. H. 
Anderson's division above and Hood's below, the latter 
meeting Stuart's cavalry vedettes lower down. 

At the west end of the ridge where the river cuts 
through is Taylor's Hill (the Confederate left), which 
stands at its highest on a level with Stafford Heights. 
From that point the heights on the south side spread, 
unfolding a valley about a mile in width, affording a 
fine view of the city, of the arable fields, and the heights 
as they recede to the vanishing limits of sight. Next be- 
low Taylor's is Marye's Hill, rising to half the elevation 
of the neighboring heights and dropping back, leaving a 
plateau of half a mile, and then swelling to the usual 
altitude of the range. On the plateau is the Marye man- 
sion. Along its base is a sunken road, with retaining 
walls on either side. That on the east is just breast-high 
for a man, and just the height convenient for infantry 
defence and fire. From the top of the breast-work the 
ground recedes gradually till near the canal, when it drops 
off three or four feet, leaving space near the canal of a 
rod or two of level ground. The north end of the sunken 
road cuts into the plank or Gordonsville road, which is 
an extension of Hanover Street from near the heart of 
the town. At the south end it enters the Telegraph road, 
extending out from the town limits and up over the third, 
or Telegraph Hill, called, in its bloody baptismal, " Lee's 
Hill." An unfinished railroad lies along the Telegraph 
road as far as the highlands. The Fredericksburg and 




jTcdeTals 
Confederaies 1 



i 



I 



BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 299 

Potomac Railroad lies nearly parallel with the river 
four miles, and then turns south through the highlands. 
The old stage road from the city runs about half-way be- 
tween the river and the railroad four miles, when it turns 
southwest and crosses the railroad at Hamilton's Crossino;. 
The hamlet of Falmouth, on the north side of the river, 
was in front of the right centre of the Federal position, 
half a mile from Fredericksburg. 

General Jackson, advised of General Burnside's move 
to Fredericksburg, drew his corps east of the Blue E-idge 
as far as Orange Court-House. 

Before the end of November it became evident that 
Fredericksburg was to be our winter station and the scene 
of a severe battle before it could be relieved. General 
Lee advised the citizens who still remained in the place 
(and some who had returned) to remove their effects. 
Those who had friends found comfortable places of rest, 
but many took the little that they could get away with, 
and made their homes in the deep forest till the storm 
could pass. Still, none complained of the severe ordeal 
which they were called upon to endure. 

Towards the latter part of the month General Jackson 
was called down and assigned position on the right near 
Hamilton's Crossing and the Massaponax. He objected 
to the position, preferring the North Anna, but General 
Lee had already weighed the matter, and had decided in 
favor of Fredericksburg. Hood's division, relieved at 
Hamilton's Crossing, was drawn to my right and stretched 
across the valley of Deep Bun, a little to the rear of 
Jackson's left and McLaws's right. 

Batteries of position were assigned from the reserve 
artillery along the heights, with orders to cover the guns, 
by epaulements or pitting them. The work was progress- 
ing while the guns were held under cover remote from 
the enemy's better appointed artillery until the positions 
were covered by solid banks or good pits. The small field 



300 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

pieces were removed for safety to convenient points for 
field service in case opportunity called for them. The 
Confederates had three hundred and six guns, including 
two thirty-pound Parrotts of Richmond make. These 
were covered by epaulements on Lee's Hill. 

On the 1st of December the batteries of reserve artil- 
lery were relieved from the First Corps by those of the 
Washington and Alexander's artillery. Orders were 
given to examine all lines of approach, and to measure 
particularly the distance of the crossings of the canal on 
the Plank and Telegraph roads ; to inspect and improve 
the parapets and pits along the front, and to traverse all 
battei'ies not securely covered against the batteries oppo- 
site Taylor's Hill, and others within range of our lines, 
and McLaws was directed to open signal line with his 
brigade and guards along the river bank. 

The day after Jackson joined us several gun-boats were 
reported in the lower river at Port Royal. D. H. Hill's 
division was detached with several select batteries to watch 
and guard at that point against a crossing, should it be 
attempted, and to engage and try the metal of the gun- 
boats. After some little practice the boats drew off and 
dropped down-stream ; but Hill's division was left near 
the point in observation with W. H. F. Lee's cavalry. 
The brigade of cavalry under General Hampton kept 
careful watch of the fords of the upper Rappahannock. 
To guard against further encroachments of the gun-boats, 
a battery was intrenched on the river bank under direc- 
tion of Major T. M. R. Talcot, of the general staff. At 
the river, sharp-shooters, by concealing themselves in 
the ravines and pits, could escape artillery fire and lie 
in secure readiness to attack parties engaged in laying 
bridges. After driving off working parties they were 
to seek cover till again needed. By such practice they 
were to delay the bridge-builders till the commands had 
time to assemble at their points of rendezvous. The nar- 



BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 301 

row, deep bed of the stream, a mile away from any point 
of the Confederate lines where batteries could be planted, 
and covered as it was by the guns of Stafford Heights, 
prevented the thought of successful resistance to laying 
bridges at any point from Falmouth to the extreme left 
of the Federal line ; but the strong ground ujjon which 
the Confederates were to accept battle offset the uncomfort- 
able feeling in regard to the crossing of the river. 

General Burnside made some show of disposition to 
cross fourteen miles below, at Skinker's Neck, but that 
was under guard of D. H. Hill's division, and he saw that 
his purpose could not be effected. The plan which he 
finally adopted was to span the river by bridges near the 
centre and lower limits of the city, and two others a mile 
below the latter, and just below the mouth of Deep Run, 
the Right Grand Division to cross by the upper and 
second bridges, the Left Grand Division by the lower 
bridges, and the Centre Grand Division to be in position 
near the others to reinforce their battle. 

The stir and excitement about the enemy's camps on the 
10th of December, as well as the reports of scouts, gave 
notice that important movements were pending. Notice 
was given the commands, and the batteries were ordered 
to have their animals in harness an hour before daylight 
of the next morning, and to continue to hitch up daily 
at that hour until further orders. 

At three o'clock on the morning of the 11th the deep 
boom of a cannon aroused both armies, and a second gun was 
recognized as the signal for battle. In a few minutes the 
commands were on the march for their positions. Orders 
were sent to call D. H. Hill's division and all of the Sec- 
ond Corps to their ground along the woodland over Ham- 
ilton's Crossing. 

Barksdale's brigade of Mississippians was on picket duty 
in Fredericksburg at the time ; the Seventeenth and Eigh- 
teenth Regiments, with the Eighth Florida, of R. H. An- 



302 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

derson's division, were on the river line ; the other regi- 
ments of the brigade and the Third Georgia, of R. H. 
Anderson's, in reserve. 

The first noise made by the enemy's bridge-builders was 
understood by the picket guards, as was all of their early 
work of construction, but a heavy mist along the water 
concealed them from view until their work upon the bridge 
was well advanced. As soon as the forms of the workmen 
could be discerned the skirmishers opened fire, which was 
speedily answered from the other side in efforts to draw 
the fire from the bridge-builders, but the Confederates 
limited their attention to the builders till they were driven 
off, when they ceased firing. Another effort to lay the 
bridge met a like result. Then a third received the 
same stormy repulse, when it seemed that all the cannon 
within a mile of the town turned their concentrating fire 
of shot and shell upon the buildings of the devoted city, 
tearing, crushing, bursting, burning their walls with angry 
desperation that must have been gratifying to spirits deep 
down below. 

Under the failures to lay the bridge. General Hunt 
suggested that the pontoon-boats be filled with infantry- 
men, rushed across and landed on the other bank until a 
sufiicient force was in position to protect the bridge-build- 
ers. Barksdale had been notified before noon that the 
army was in position, and that he could withdraw his 
troops at any moment, but he preferred his little fight in 
Fredericksburg. At four o'clock, when the landing was 
made by the boats, he thought the city safe against artil- 
lery practice, and was pleased to hold till night could 
cover his withdrawal. 

Colonel Norman J. Hall, of the Seventh Michigan 
Regiment, commanded the troops working for a foothold 
on the west bank. After the several attempts to have the 
bridge built, he accepted General Hunt's proposition to 
load the boats and have the men push across. Lieutenant- 



BATTLE OF FEEDEKICKSBUEG. 

Colonel Baxter, commanding the regiment, volunteered to 
lead the party. Caj)tain Weymouth, of the Nineteenth 
Massachusetts, proposed to support the move. Under sig- 
nal for artillery fire to cease, the command of Lieutenant- 
Colonel Baxter pushed across. Under the best fire the 
pickets could bring to bear only one man was killed and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter and several men were wounded. 
The party of seventy were rushed up the bank, gained 
position, captured some prisoners, and were soon rein- 
forced. The enemy's fire over the west bank was so 
sweeping that Barksdale could not reinforce at the point 
of landing. The Nineteenth Massachusetts was deployed 
to the right, and the Seventh Michigan to the left. 
The Twenty-eighth Massachusetts reinforced them. The 
Twelfth and Fifty-ninth New York and One Hundred 
and Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania Begiments joined the 
command in the city. Colonel Hall found that he must 
prepare for some fighting, and speedily, as night was 
coming on. He sent to the rear to ask for time to pre- 
pare and make his fight to suit him, but was hurried on 
by the division pushing forward to get across the bridge, 
with orders to secure the streets at all hazards. The 
Seventh Michigan and Nineteenth Massachusetts had 
been brought to a stand, when the Twenty-eighth Massa- 
chusetts was rushed forward in gallant style. Colonel 
Hall reported, " Platoon after platoon were swept away, 
but the head of the column did not falter. Ninety-seven 
ofiicers and men were killed or wounded in the space 
of about fifty yards." The eastern part of the town was 
occupied, and at a late hour of the night the Confederates 
retired. 

As Barksdale's brigade withdrew, he was relieved at 
the sunken road by the Eighteenth and Twenty-fourth 
Georgia Begiments and Cobb's Georgia Legion, General 
T. B. B. Cobb in command. 

The Third Grand Division had no severe work in lay- 



J4 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

ing the bridges below Deep Run, and were ready for co- 
operation some hours in advance of the right. 

The Federals occupied the 12th in moving the Right 
Grand Division into the city by the upper bridges, and 
the Left Grand Division by the bridges below Deep 
Creek. One hundred and four guns crossed with the 
right, one hundred and twenty with the left. The Centre 
Grand Division was held in reserve. Two divisions of 
the Third CorjDS were sent to the lower bridges during the 
night to support the battle of the left, and were ordered 
over on the 13th. 

The plan of battle by the Federal commander, in brief, 
was to drive the Confederate right back into the high- 
lands and follow that success by attacking the Confederate 
left by his Right Grand Division. 

The heginn'mg only of this plan was carried out. The 
Left Grand Division having duly crossed the river at the 
lower bridges on the 12th, — the Sixth Corps and Bayard's 
brigade of cavalry, then the First Corps, — the Sixth de- 
ployed two divisions, supported by the third, parallel to 
the old Richmond road ; the First formed at right angles to 
the Sixth, its right on the left of the Sixth, its left on the 
river, two divisions on the front line, one in support. The 
cavalry was sent out to reconnoitre. The entire field of 
the command was an open plain between the highlands 
and the river, traversed by the old Richmond road, which 
had well-formed embankments and ditches on both 
sides. 

The Federal troops of their left divisions were in full 
view of the heights (Lee's Hill) occupied by the Confed- 
erates ; those of the right were concealed by the buildings 
of Fredericksburg and under the river banks, and their 
bridges were under the steep also. The two brigades on 
the right of the Sixth Corps were to the right of Deep 
Run ; the others, of the First and Sixth Corps, on the 
left. The batteries of the corps were under authority 



BATTLE OF FEEDERICKSBUEG. 305 

of corps commanders. There were but few shots ex- 
changed during the 12th, and these not of great damage. 

On the Confederate side the First Corps (Longstreet's) 
was in position from Taylor's Hill across Deep Run Bot- 
tom. The Second Corps was in mass about the wooded 
heights at Hamilton's Crossing. His cavalry and horse 
artillery were on his right in the Massaponax Valley. 
General R. Ransom's division was posted in rear of the 
left of Marye's Hill ; his Twenty-fourth North Carolina 
Regiment was advanced to the left of Cobb's line in the 
sunken road. His brigade under Colonel Cooke was de- 
ployed as sharp-shooters on the crest of the hill. He was 
especially charged with looking after the left of Cobb's 
line. In front of this line and about six hundred yards 
from it was a canal, or large wet ditch, about four hundred 
yards out from the city limits. The crossings at the Plank 
and Telegraph roads had been bridged, and the bridges 
were ordered wrecked, but were only partially destroyed, 
the string-pieces being left in place. The corps in posi- 
tion, the Confederate commander prepared to stand and 
receive battle. 

In concluding this account of the confronting armies 
on the eve of battle, let us glance at their relative strength 
as expressed in numbers. 

The Army of the Potomac, as reported by General 
Burnside, had on December 10 an " aggregate present for 
duty" of 132,017 * officers and men (not including cav- 
alry). The Army of Northern Virginia was reported by 
General Lee on the same date to have had an aggregate 
of 69,391 f (not including cavalry). 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxi, part i. p. 1121. 
t,Ibid., p. 1057. 



20 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG (CONTINUED). 

The Battle-field veiled by a Heavy Fog— Terrific Fighting of the 13th 
of December — Forlorn Hope of the Federals — General Meade's Di- 
vision of Franklin's Command makes the First Advance — General 
French leads against the Confederate Left — Hancock follows — General 
Cobb killed— The Sunken Road and Stone Wall below Marye's Hill- 
Desperate Advances and Determined Repulses — Humphreys's Heroic 
Assault — The Stone Wall "a Sheet of Flame" — General Jackson loses 
his Opportunity to advance — The Charge of Meade's Divisions com- 
pared with that of Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble's Columns at 
Gettysburg — Forty Per Cent, killed in charging Lines here, and Sixty 
Per Cent, at Gettysburg— Total Losses — Peace to be declared because 
Gold had gone to 200— Organization of the Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia. 

On the morning of the 13th of December the confront- 
ing armies, which were destined that day to clash in one 
of the bloodiest conflicts of the war, stood completely veiled 
from each other's sight by an impenetrable mist. The 
entire Confederate army was now for the first time upon 
the field, for General Jackson had during the night 
brought up his scattered divisions from down the river. 

Before daylight I rode to view my line and troops from 
right to left. Hood's division on the right was found on 
the alert, as was the enemy near that point. The voices 
of the Union officers as they gave their commands were 
carried to us with almost startling clearness by the heavy 
fog that covered the field and surroundings. So heavy 
was this fog that nothing could be seen at a distance 
of ten or twelve rods, and yet so distinctly were the 
voices of the officers brought to us that they seemed quite 
near at hand, and General Hood was looking for assault- 
ing columns against his front. He was told that such 
move would p)ut the enemy's column in a cul-de-sac, and 
therefore his position was in no clanger of attack; that 

306 



BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 307 

the attack would be aimed against Jackson's front ; that 
in case it broke through there he should swing around to 
his right and take the attacking forces in reverse ; that 
Pickett's division would be ordered to a corresponding 
move on his left, with the batteries of the two divisions in 
the plain off the left ; that my front would be attacked, 
but it was safely posted, and not likely to need other than 
the troops on that ground. Pickett's command was under 
arms, expecting orders. They were given instructions 
similar to those just mentioned for Hood. The divisions 
of McLaws, Ransom, and R. H. Anderson were in readi- 
ness, as were all the batteries. But the fog, nothing 
abated, hung so heavy that not a sight for a cannon-shot 
was open till a late hour of the morning. 

The front of the Second Corps was occupied by A. P. 
Hill's division, the brigades of Archer, Lane, and Pender 
on the first line ; those of Thomas, Gregg, and Brocken- 
brough on the second. A third line was occupied by 
Taliaferro's and Early's divisions. D. H. Hill's division 
was off to the rear of the right. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Walker posted a fourteen-gun battery of the division ar- 
tillery on A. P. Hill's right, and two other field batteries 
on the plain on his left. Stuart's horse artillery and cav- 
alry were on the plain on the right, in the valley of the 
Massaponax, supf)orting the Second Corps. 

About 7.45 in the morning General Hardie, of Burn- 
side's staff, reported to General Franklin that his orders 
would reach him in a few minutes by the hands of an aide- 
de-camp. Hardie was ordered to remain near General 
Franklin's head-quarters. At eight o'clock the order 
came, and at 8.30 Meade's division moved towards the 
general direction of Jackson's position. 

At ten o'clock the fog lifted and revealed Meade's lines, 
six batteries on his left and four on his right. Gibbon's 
division supporting the right and Doubleday's covering 
the left. The order for the commander of the Left Grand 



308 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Division was to make the advance by at least one division. 
The divisions of the First Corps were thought to fully 
meet the terms of the order. 

Meade's lines advanced in handsome, solid ranks, leaving 
heavy reserves of the Sixth Corps and two divisions of 
the Third that had been called over from the Centre 
Grand Division. The fire of Stuart's horse artillery 
against their left caused delay until some of the batteries 
of the left engaged and drove oflP the fire. After half 
an hour's delay the advance was resumed, the batteries 
thrown to the front to shell the field in search of the 
Confederate batteries. The latter had been ordered, for 
the most part, to reserve their fire for infantry. After an 
hour's heavy artillery practice Meade's march was re- 
sumed, and with great vigor, the batteries ploughing the 
way for the infantry columns. At the same time the 
fourteen-gun battery of A. P. Hill's right and his left 
batteries replied with equal spirit and j^i^actice, though 
with unequal metal. 

The view of the battle of the enemy's left burst upon 
us at Lee's Hill, as the mist rolled away under the bright 
noonday sun. We noted the thin, pale smoke of infantry 
fire fading in the far away of their left, the heavy clouds 
rising from the batteries on both sides of the river, the 
bright armored ranks and banners, and our elevation 
seemed to draw them so close to us, on their right, that 
we thought to turn our best guns upon that part of the 
line, and General Lee authorized the test of their range. 
Only a few shots were sent when the troops that had been 
lying concealed in the streets of the city came flying out 
by both roads in swarms at double time and rushed 
towards us. Every gun that we had in range opened 
upon the advancing columns and ploughed their ranks 
by a fire that would test the nerves of the bravest soldiers. 
But the battle of the Federal left had the first opening, 
and calls for first notice. 



BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 309 

Under a strong artillery combat Meade marched for- 
ward, with Gibbon's division in close support on his right, 
and Doubleday's farther off on his left. The line en- 
countered Lane's brigade front in a steady, hard fight, 
and, develoj)ing against Archer's left, broke through, 
forcing the brigades back, encountered Thomas's and 
Gregg's brigades, threw the latter into confusion, and killed 
General Gregg. Brockenbrough's and Pender's brigades 
turned against the penetrating columns and were forced 
back. Under skilful handling the brigades finally 
brought the battle to steady work, but Meade's impetuous 
onward march was bravely made and pressed until three 
brigades of Early's division were advanced and thrown 
into action, commanded by Colonels Atkinson, Walker, 
and Hoke. These, with the combined fire of Hill's broken 
lines, forced Meade back. Two regiments of Berry's bri- 
gade of the Third Corps came to the relief of Meade and 
were driven back, when Gibbon's division which followed 
was met, and after severe battle was repulsed. The Con- 
federates made a partial following of the success, beyond 
the railroad, and until they encountered the fire of the 
relieving divisions under Birney and Sickles and the re- 
serve batteries. Doubleday's division protected Meade's 
left as Jackson's right under Taliaferro partially engaged 
against them ; both encountered loss. Hood got one of 
his brigades in in time to follow the troops as they retired 
towards their reserve line. At the first moment of the 
break on Jackson's lines Pickett rode to Hood and urged 
that the opportunity anticipated was at hand, but Hood 
failed to see it in time for effective work. About two p.m. 
the battle quieted into defensive j)ractice of artillery and 
sharp-shooters. 

The opening against the Confederate left, before re- 
ferred to, was led by French's division of the Second 
Corps, about 10.30. The Eighteenth and Twenty-fourth 
Georgia Regiments, Cobb's Georgia Legion, and the 



310 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Twenty-fourth North Carolina Regiment were in the 
sunken road, the salient point. On Marye's Hill, back 
and above, was the Washington Artillery, with nine guns, 
Kansom's and Cooke's North Carolina brigade in open 
field, the guns under partial cover, pitted. Other bat- 
teries on Taylor's and Lee's Hills posted to this defence 
as many as twenty guns, holding under range by direct 
and cross fire the avenues of aj^proach and the open field 
along Cobb's front. 

French's division came in gallant style, but somewhat 
hurried. He gathered his ranks behind the swell of 
ground near the canal and moved to the assault. An in- 
tervening plank fence gave the troops some trouble in 
crossing under fire, so that his ranks were not firm after 
passing it to the attack. Hancock, coming speedily with 
his division, was better organized and in time to take uj) 
the fight as French was obliged to retire. This advance 
was handsomely maintained, but the galling fire they en- 
countered forced them to open fire. Under this delay 
their ranks were cut up as rapidly as they had collected 
at the canal, and when within a hundred yards of the 
stone wall they were so thinned that they could do nothing 
but surrender, even if they could leap to the road-bed. 
But they turned, and the fire naturally slackened, as their 
hurried steps took them away to their partial cover. The 
troops behind the stone wall were reinforced during this 
engagement by two of Cooke's regiments from the hill-top, 
ordered by General Hansom, and General McLaws or- 
dered part of Kershaw's brigade in on their right. 

After Hancock's engagement some minutes passed be- 
fore arrangements were made for the next. Howard's di- 
vision had been feeling for a w^ay to get by Cobb's left, 
when he was called to the front attack, and ordered over 
the same ground. He arranged his forces with care, and 
advanced in desperate fight. Under the severe fire of the 
Confederates his troops were provoked to return fire, and 



BATTLE OF FREDEKICKSBURG. 311 

during the delay thus caused his ranks were so speedily 
decimated that they in turn were obliged to return to 
cover. The Confederate commander, General Cobb, was 
killed. General Kershaw, with the other regiments of his 
brigade, was ordered to the front. The Washington Ar- 
tillery, exhausted of ammunition, was relieved by guns 
of Alexander's battalion. The change of batteries seemed 
to give new ho23e to the assaulting forces. They cheered and 
put in their best practice of sharp-shooters and artillery. 
The greater j)art of Alexander's loss occurred while gal- 
loping up to his position. General Ransom advanced the 
other regiments of his brigade to the crest of the hill. 
At the suggestion of General Lee the brigades of Jenkins 
and Kemper of Pickett's division were called up and as- 
signed, the former to General McLaws and the latter to 
General Kansom. A su23ply of ammunition was sent 
down to the troops in the road in time to meet the next 
attack, by Sturgis's division of the Ninth Corps, which 
made the usual brave fight, and encountered the same 
damaging results. Getty's division of the Ninth Corps 
came to his support on the left, but did not engage fiercely, 
losing less than eight hundred men. Carroll's brigade of 
Whipple's division. Third Corps, came in on Sturgis's left, 
but only to brace that part of the fight. 

As the troops hurried forward from the streets of the 
city for the Telegraph road, they came at once under the 
fire of the long-range guns on Lee's Hill. The thirty- 
pound Parrotts were particularly effective in having the 
range and dropping their shells in the midst of the col- 
umns as they dashed forward. Frequently commands 
were broken up by this fire and that of other long-range 
guns, and sought shelter, as they thought, in the rail- 
road cut, but that point was well marked, and the shots 
were dropped in, in enfilade fire, with precision, often 
making wide gaps in their ranks. The siege guns of 
Stafford Heights gave their especial attention to oar 



312 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

heavy guns and put tlieir shots over the parapets very 
often. 

One shell buried itself close under the parapet at Gen- 
eral Lee's side, as he sat among the officers of his staff, 
but it failed to explode. Soon after this our big Parrott 
gun burst into many fragments. It was closely surrounded 
by General Lee and staff, officers 'of the First Corps 
head-quarters, and officers and gunners of the battery, 
but the explosion caused no other damage than the loss 
of the gun. 

Griffin's division was next ordered to attack, and made 
the usual desj)erate struggle. The Confederates mean- 
while had accumulated such force in the road that a single 
division, had it reached that point, would have found its 
equal in numbers, and of greater vigor, with Ransom at 
the top of the hill prepared to rush down and join in 
the melee. At that hour we could have safely invited 
one division into our midst, if assured it was to be the 
last. 

The next attack was made by Humphreys's division. 
Its commander was a man of superior attainments and 
accomplishments in the walks of civil as well as military 
life. He measured justly the situation, and arranged his 
battle in the only order by which success could have been 
made possible, but he had only two brigades with which 
to take a position not assailable and held by more than 
three brigades of suj^erior 'troops. His troops were new, 
so that he felt called to personal example as well as skilful 
handling. He ordered the attack with empty muskets, 
and led with his brigade commanders, but half-way up 
towards the goal his men stopped to load and open fire, 
which neither he nor his officers could prevent, so they 
were driven back. Then he made a like effort with his 
other brigade, under special orders from Generals Burnside 
and Hooker that the point must be carried before night, — 
and the dew was then falling. (Just then our second big 



BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 313 

Parrott gun went into fragments, but without damage 
to the men.) The troops that had been driven back from 
previous attacks joined in trying to persuade Hum- 
phreys's men not to go forward. Notwithstanding the 
discouraging surroundings, he led his men on, encountered 
the same terrific and death-dealing opposition, and his 
men retired in greater confusion, going beyond his control 
to the vicinity of the city before he could get them again 
in ranks. His account of the last effort is interesting: 

'^The stone wall was a sheet of flame that enveloped the head 
and flanks of the column. Officers and men were falling rapidly, 
and the head of the column was at length brought to a stand when 
close uj) to the wall. Up to this time not a shot had been fired 
by the column, but now some firing began. It lasted but a min- 
ute, when, in spite of all our efforts, the column turned and began 
to retire slowly. I attempted to rally the brigade behind the nat- 
ural embankment so often mentioned, but the united efforts of 
General Tyler, myself, our staff, and other officers could not arrest 
the retiring mass." * 

At that time there were three brigades behind the stone 
wall and one regiment of Ransom's brigade. The ranks 
were four or five deep, — the rear files loading and passing 
their guns to the front ranks, so that the volleys by bri- 
gade were almost incessant j)Ourings of solid sheets of lead. 

Two brigades of Sykes's division, First and Second Reg- 
ulars, were sent to the front to guard the line. It was 
some time after nightfall, so that their line could only be 
distinguished by the blaze of their fire. Some of the bat- 
teries and infantry engaged against their fire till night 
was well advanced. 

General Jackson thought to advance against the enemy's 
left late in the afternoon, but found it so well posted and 
guarded that he concluded the venture would be too haz- 
ardous. He lost his opportunity, failing to follow close 
upon the repulse of Meade's and Gibbon's divisions. His 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxi. part i. p. 432. 



314 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

command was massed and well in hand, with an open 
field for infantry and artillery. He had, including the 
divisions of Hood and Pickett, — ordered to work with 
him, — about fifty thousand men. Franklin had, including 
troops of the Centre Grand Division, about equal force. 

The charge of Meade's division has been compared with 
that of Pickett's, Pettigrew's, and Trimble's at Gettys- 
burg, giving credit of better conduct to the former. The 
circumstances do not justify the comparison. 

When the fog lifted over Meade's advance he was within 
musket-range of A. P. Hill's division, closely supported on 
his right by Gibbon's, and guarded on his left by Double- 
day's division. On Hill's right was a fourteen-gun bat- 
tery, on his left eight guns. Meade broke through Hill's 
division, and with the support of Gibbon forced his way 
till he encountered part of Swell's division, when he was 
forced back in some confusion. Two fresh divisions of the 
Third Corps came to their relief, and there were as many 
as fifty thousand men at hand who could have been thrown 
into the fight. Meade's march to meet his adversary was 
half a mile, — the troops of both sides fresh and vigorous. 

Of the assaulting columns of Pickett, Pettigrew, and 
Trimble, only four thousand seven hundred under Pickett 
were fresh ; the entire force of these divisions was only 
fifteen thousand strong. They had a mile to march over 
open field before reaching the enemy's line, strengthened 
by field-works and manned by thrice their numbers. The 
Confederates at Gettysburg had been fought to exhaustion 
of men and munitions. They lost about sixty per cent, 
of the assaulting forces, — Meade about forty. The latter 
had fresh troops behind him, and more than two hundred 
guns to cover his rallying lines. The Confederates had 
nothing behind them but field batteries almost exhausted 
of ammunition. That Meade made a brave, good fight is 
beyond question, but he had superior numbers and ap- 
pointments. At Gettysburg the Confederate assault was 



BATTLE OF FEEDERICKSBUKG. 



315 



made against intrenclied lines of artillery and infantry, 
where stood fifty thousand men. 

A series of braver, more desperate charges than those 
hurled against the troops in the sunken road was never 
known, and the piles and cross-j)iles of dead marked a 
field such as I never saw before or since. 

Between 1.30 and 2.30 of the afternoon several orders 
and messages were sent by General Burnside calling on 
General Franklin to renew the battle of the left. Before 
2.30 he received from General Burnside, through his aide- 
de-camp. Captain Goddard, this despatch : 

'^Tell General Franklin, with my compliments, tliat I wish 
him to make a vigorous attack with his whole force. Our right 
is hard pressed." 

Under ordinary circumstances this would be regarded 
as a strong order, but Franklin had gone far enough in his 
first battle to be convinced that an attack by his " whole 
force," the other end of the army " hard pressed," would 
be extremely hazardous. If undertaken and proved dis- 
astrous, he could have been made to shoulder the whole 
responsibility, for a " wish" imj^lies discretion. It is not 
just to the subordinate to use such language if orders are 
intended to be imperative. Men bred as soldiers have no 
fancy for orders that carry want of faith on their face. 

The losses at Fredericksburg were as follows : * 



UNION 


ARMY. 








Organization. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 

or 
Missing. 


Total. 


Right Grand Division (Sumner) . . 
Centre Grand Division (Hooker) . . 
Left Grand Division (Franklin) . . 
Engineers 


523 
352 
401 

8 


4281 

2501 

2761 

49 

8 


640 

502 

625 

2 


5,444 
3,355 

3,787 
59 


Artillery Reserve 


8 


Aggregate 


1284 


9600 


1769 


12,653 



* Vol. xxi. of the Official Records. 



316 



FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 
CONFEDERATE ARMY. 



Organization. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Captured 

or 
Missing. 


Total. 


First Army Corps (Longstreet) . . 
Second Array Corps (Jackson) . . . 
Stuixrt's Cavalry 


251 
344 


1516 

2545 

13 


127 

520 


1894 

3415 

13 






Aarffreffate 


695 


4074 


653 


5322 







During the night, before twelve o'clock, a despatch- 
bearer lost his way and was captured. He had on his 
person a memorandum of the purpose of General Burn- 
side for renewing the battle against Marye's Hill in the 
morning. The information was sent up to general head- 
quarters, and orders were sent General Ransom to intrench 
his brigade along the crest of the hill. Orders were sent 
other parts of the line to improve defences and prepare 
for the next day in ammunition, water, and rations, under 
conviction that the battle of next day, if made as ordered, 
would be the last of the Army of the Potomac. 

Morning came and passed without serious demonstra- 
tions on the part of the enemy. Orders were sent out, 
however, for renewed efforts to strengthen the position. 
Colonel Alexander found a point at which he could pit a 
gun in enfilade position to the swell of ground behind 
which the enemy assembled his forces before advancing to 
the charge, and Lieutenant-Colonel Latrobe sunk a gun 
in similar position for fire across the field of their charges. 
We were so well prepared that we became anxious before 
the night of the 14th lest General Burnside would not 
come again. In the night he drew back to the river, and 
during the night of the 15th recrossed and sent his troops 
to their camps. 

The stone wall was not thought before the battle a very 
important element. We assumed that the formidable 
advance would be made against the troops of McLaws's 







Chief of Staff of the First Corps, after the Battle of the Wilderness. 



BATTLE OF FEEDEMCKSBURG. 317 

division at Lee's Hill, to turn the position at the sunken 
road dislod-e my force stationed there, then to occupy 
he sunk n-road^and afterwards ascend to the plateau 
;;:n which tl. Marye ---n stands; that thrswouW 
brins their forces under cross and direct fire of all of our 
Ltteries-short- and long-range guns-m such concen- 
tration as to beat them back in bad disorder 

General Hood's failure to meet his orders to make 
counter to the anticipated attack upon Jackson was re- 
Trted in the official accounts. As he was high in favor 
S ie authorities, it did not seem prudent to attempt to 
push the matter, a« called for under the ordinary usages of 
war " Bw peccare in bello rum Itcet. 

General Lee went down to Kichmond soon after the 
battle to propose active operations, --^l^^^^f^: 
formation that gold had advanced to 200 in New Yoik , 
hat the war w!s over and peace would be announced in 
sixty days; that it was useless to harass the lOops by 
i sJrvice. As gold had gone well up on the bou*- 
ern side without bringing peace, it was diftculfo'^ sol- 
diers to see the bearing that it could have on the other 
side ; still, we had some trust and hope m the judgment 

"^Theforces available for battle at Fredericksburg were : 
Federal (according to General Burn^de's "-eport); 116,683 
Confederate, 78,000. About fifty thousand of the Union 
troops were put into battle, and less than twenty thousand 
of the Confederates were engaged. 

The organization of the Confederate army at this time 

was as follows : 

Akmy of Northern Vikginia. 

FIRST CORPS, LIEUTENANT-GENEBAI. JAMES LONGSTREET. 

MCLAWS-S DIVISION, MaJ^Gen. I^^^^^"^ ^cLaw. :-^«. W. 5^ 
gade, Brig.-Geo. Joseph B. Kershaw ■ M ^^^^^■^'^^^'^^^f^^^ ulj. 
3d S. C, Col. James D. Nanee L.ei^-Crf^Will.am D. ^^^ 

^T^l.T^-.^-:^^'rc7u-^(. Xt Bla.a ; Sth S. C. 



318 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Capt. E. T. Stackhouse ; 5th S. C, Col. W. D. DeSaussure ; 3d S. C. Battn., 
Lieut.-Col. W. G. Rice. Barksdale's Brigade, Brig.-Geo. William 
Barksdale ; 13th Miss., Col. J. W. Carter ; 17th Miss., Col. John C. Fiser ; 
18th Miss., Lieut.-Col. W. H. Luse ; 21st Miss., Col. Benjamin G. Hum- 
phreys. Cobb's Brigade, (1) Brig.-Gen. T. R. R. Cobb, (2) Col. Robert 
McMillan ; 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan ; 18th Ga., Lieut.-Col. S. Z. Ruff; 
24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan ; Cobb Legion ; Phillips's Legion, Col. 
B. F. Cook. Semmes's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. PaulJ. Semmes ; 10th, 50th, 
51st, and 53d Ga. Artillery, Col. H. C. Cabell ; Manly's (N. C.) battery. 
Read's (Ga.) battery, Richmond Howitzers (1st), McCarthy's battery ; 
Troup (Ga.) Art. (Carlton's battery). 

Anderson's Division, Maj.-Geu. Richard H.Anderson: — Wileox's 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Cudmus M. Wilcox ; 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 14th 
Ala. Mahone's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone ; 6th, 12th, 16th, 
41st, and 61st Va. Featherston'' s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. S. Feather- 
ston ; 12th, 16th, 19th, and 48th Miss. (5 cos.). WrighVs Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. A. R. Wright ; 3d (Col. Edward J. Walker), 22d, 48th (Capt. M. 
R. Hall), and 2d Ga. Battn. (Capt. C. J. Moffett). Perry's Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. E. A. Perry ; 2d, 5th, and 8th Fla., Capt. David Lang, Capt. 
Thomas R. Love. Artillery, Donaldsonville (La.) Art., Capt. V. Maurin ; 
Huger's (Va.) battery, Capt. Frank Huger ; Lewis's (Va.) battery, Capt. 
John W. Lewis ; Norfolk (Va.) Light Art. Blues, Lieut. William T. Peet. 

Pickett's Division, Maj.-Gen. George E. Pickett r—G'arne^^'s Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. Richard B. Garnett ; 8th, 18th, 19th, 2Sth, and 56th Va. 
ArTuistead's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lewis A. Armistead ; 9th, 14th, 38th, 
53d, and 57th Va. Kemper's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James L. Kemper ; 
1st, 3d, 7th, 11th, and 24th Va. Jenkins's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. M. Jen- 
kins ; 1st (Hagood's), 2d (Rifles), 5th, and 6th S. C. ; Hampton Legion ; 
Palmetto Sharp-shootei's. Corse's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Montgomery D. 
Corse ; 15th, 17th, 30th, and 32d Va. Artillery, Dearing's (Va.) battery, 
Fauquier (Va.) Art. (Stribling's battery), Richmond (Fayette) Art. 
(Macon's battery). 

Hood's Division, Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood : — Law's Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. E. M. Law ; 4th and 44th Ala. ; 6th and 54th N. C. (Col. J. C S. 
McDowell) ; 57th N. C, Col. A. C. Goodwin. Robertson's Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. J. B. Robertson ; 3d Ark. ; 1st, 4th, and 5th Tex. Anderson's Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. George T. Anderson ; 1st (Regulars), 7th, 8th, 9th, and 
11th Ga. Toombs's Brigade, Col. H. L. Benning; 2d, 15th, 17th, and 
20th Ga. Artillery, German (S. C.) Art. (Bachman's battery). Palmetto 
(S. C.) Light Art. (Garden's batteryj. Rowan (N. C.) Art. (Reilly's 
battery). 

Ransom's Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr. :— Hansom's Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. Robert Ransom, Jr. ; 24th, 25th (Lieut.-Col. Samuel C. 
Bryson), 35th, and 49th N. C. ; Branch's (Va.) battery. Cooke's Bri- 
gade, (1) Brig.-Gen. J. R. Cooke, (2) Col. E. D. Hall ; 15th N. C. ; 27th 
N. C, Col. John A. Gilmer, Jr. ; 46th N. C, Col. E. D. Hall ; 48th N. C, 
Lieut.-Col. Samuel H. Walkup ; Cooper's (Va.) battery. 

First Corps Artillery:* — Washington {La.) Artillery, Col. J. B. 

* Not assigned to divisions. 



BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 319 

Walton ; 1st Co., Cai^t. C. W. Squires ; 2d Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson ; 
3d Co., Capt. M. B. Miller ; 4th Co., Capt. B. F. Eshleman. Alexander'' s 
Battalion, Lieut.-Col. E. Porter Alexander ; Bedford (Va.) Art., Capt. 
Tyler C. Jordan ; Eubank's (Va.) battery, Capt. J. L. Eubanlc ; Madison 
Light Art. (La.), Capt. Geo. V. Moody; Parker's (Va.) battery, Capt. 
William W. Parker ; Rhett's (S. C.) battery, Capt. A. B. Rhett ; Wool- 
folk's (Va.) battery, Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr. 

Second Cokps, Lieutenant-General Thomas J. Jackson. 

D. H. Hill's Division, Maj.-Gen. Daniel H. Hill -.—First Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. R. E. Rodes ; 3d, 5tb, 6th, 12th, and 26th Ala. Second [Eip- 
ley^s) Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George Doles ; 4th Ga. ; 44th Ga., Col. John B. 
Estes ; 1st and 3d N. C. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. H. Colquitt ; 13th 
Ala. ; 6th, 23d, 27th, and 28th Ga. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alfred 
Iverson ; 5th, 12th, 20th, and 23d N. C. Fifth (Bamseur's) Brigade, Col. 
Bryan Grimes ; 2d, 4th, 14th, and 30th N. C. Artillery, Maj. H. P. 
Jones; Hardaway's (Ala.) battery, Jeff Davis (Ala.) Art. (Boixiurant's 
battery), King William (Va.) Art. (Carter's battery), Morris (Va.) Art. 
(Page's battery), Orange (Va.) Art. (Fiy's battery). 

A. P. Hill's Division, Maj.-Gen. Ambrose P. Hill :— First {Field'' s) 
Brigade, Col. J. M. Brockenbrough ; 40th, 47th (Col. Robert M. Mayo), 
65th, and 22d Va. Battn., Lieut.-Col. E. P. Tayloe. Second Brigade, (1). 
Brig.-Gen. Maxcy Gregg, (2) Col.D. H. Hamilton ; 1st S. C. (P. A.), Col. 
D. H. Hamilton ; 1st fe\ C. Rifles ; 12th, 13th, and 14th S. C. (Col. Samuel 
McGowan). Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas ; 14th, 35th, 45th, 
and 49th Ga. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Lane ; 7th N. C, Lieut.- 
Col. J. L. Hill ; 18th N. C, Col. Thomas J. Purdie ; 28th N. C, Col. S. D. 
Lowe ; 33d N. C, Col. Clark M. Avery ; 37th N. C, Col. W. M. Barbour. 
Fifth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Archer ; 5th Ala. Battn., Maj. A. S. Van 
de Gi'aaff, Capt. S. D. Stewart ; 19th Ga., Lieut.-Col. A. J. Hutchins ; 1st 
Tenn. (Pro. Army), Col. Peter Turney, Lieut.-Col. N.J. George, Capt. M. 
Turney, Capt. H. J. Hawkins ; 7th Tenn., Col. John F. Goodner ; 14th 
Tenn., Lieut.-Col. J. W. Loekert. Sixth Brigade, (1) Brig.-Gen. William 
D. Pender, (2) Col. A. M. Scales ; 13th N. C, Col. A. M. Scales ; 16th 
N. C, Col. John S. McElroy ; 22d N. C, Maj. Christopher C. Cole ; 34th 
and 38th IST. C. Artillery, Lieut.-Col. R. L. Walker ; Branch (N. C.) 
Art., Lieut. J. R. Potts ; Crenshaw (Va.) Batt., Lieut. J. EUett ; Fred- 
ericksburg (Va.) Art., Lieut. E. A. Marj'e ; Johnson's (Va.) battery, Lieut. 
V. J. Clutter ; Letcher (Va.) Art., Capt. G. Davidson ; Pee Dee (S. C.) 
Art., Capt. D. G. Mcintosh ; Purcell (Va.) Art., Capt. W. J. Pegram. 

EwELL's Division, Brig.-Gen. Jubal A. Early -.—Laicton's Brigade, 
(1) Col. E. N. Atkinson, (2) Col. C. A. Evans ; 13th Ga., Col. J. M. Smith ; 
26th Ga., Capt. B. F. Grace ; 31st Ga., Col. C. A. Evans ; 38th Ga., Capt. 
William L. McLeod ; 60th Ga., Col. W. H. Stiles ; 61st Ga., Col. J. H. 
Lamar, Maj. C. W. McArthur. Trimble^s Brigade, Col. R. F. Hoke ; 
15th Ala. ; 12th Ga. ; 21st Ga., Lieut.-Col. Thomas W. Hooper ; 21st 
N. C. and 1st N. C. Battn. Early's Brigade, Col. J. A. Walker ; 13th 
Va., Lieut.-Col. J. B. Terrill ; 25th, 31st, Mth, 49th, 52d, and 58th Va. 
Hays's {1st La.) 'Brigade, Gen. Harry T. Hays ; 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 
9th La. Artillery, Capt. J. W. Latimer ; Charlottesville ( Va.) Art., Capt. 



320 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

J. McD. Carrington ; Chesapeake (Md.) Art., Lieut. John E. Plater ; 
Courtney (Va.) Art., Lieut. W. A. Tanner ; 1st Md. Batt, Capt. William 
F. Dement; La. Guard Art., Capt. Louis E. D'Aquin ; Staunton (Va.) 
Art., Lieut. Asher W. Garber. 

Jackson's Division, Brig.-Gen. William B. Taliaferro : — First Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. E. F. Paxton ; 2d Va., Capt. J. Q. A. Nadenbousch ; 
4th Va., Lieut.-Col. R. D. Gardner, Maj. William Terry ; 5tli Va., Lieut.- 
Col. H. J. Williams ; 27th Va., Lieut.-Col. J. K. Edmondson ; 33d Va., 
Col. Edwin G. Lee. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. R. Jones ; 21st, 42d, 
and 48th Va. ; 1st Va. Battn. Third {Taliaferro's) Brigade, Col. E. T. 
H. Warren ; 47th Ala., Capt. James M. Campbell ; 48th Ala., Capt. C. B. 
St. John ; 10th Va., Capt. W. B. Yancey ; 23d Va., Capt. A. J. Richard- 
son ; 37th Va., Col. T. V. Williams. Fourth {Starke's) Brigade, Col. 
Edmund Pendleton ; 1st La. (Vols.), Lieut.-Col. M. Nolan ; 2d La., Maj. 
M. A. Grogan ; 10th La., Maj. John M. Legett ; 14th La., Capt. H. M. 
Verlander ; 15th La., Lieut.-Col, McG. Goodwyn ; Coppens's (La.) Battn. 
Artillery, Capt. J. B. Broekenbrough ; Carpenter's (Va.) battery, Lieut. 
George McKendree ; Danville (Va.) Art., Capt. G. W. Wooding ; Hamp- 
den (Va.) Art., Capt. W. H. Caskie ; Lee (Va.) Art., Lieut. C. W. Statham ; 
Lusk's (Va.) battery. 

Reserve Artillery,* Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton -.—Broivn's Bat- 
talion, Col. J. Thompson Brown ; Brooke's (Va.) battery. Dance's battery, 
Powhatan Art., Hupp's battery, Salem Art., Poague's (Va.) battery, 
Rockbridge Art., Smith's battery, 3d Howitzers ; Watson's battery, 2d 
Howitzers. Cutts's {Ga.) Battalion, Lane's battery, Patterson's battery, 
Ross's battery, Capt. H. M. Ross. Nelson's Battalion, Maj. William 
Nelson ; Kirkpatrick's (Va.) battery, Amherst Ai't. ; Massie's (Va.) bat- 
tery, Fluvanna Art. ; Milledge's (Ga.) battery. Miscellaneous Batteries, 
Ells's (Ga.) battery ; Nelson's (Va.) battery, Hanover Art., Capt. G. W. 
Nelson ; Breathed (Va.) batterj', J. Breathed ; Chew's (Va.) battery, 
R. P. Chew ; Hart's (S. C.) battery, J. F. Hart ; Henry's (Va.) battery, 
M. W. Henry ; Moorman's (Va.) battery, M. N. Moorman. 

Cavalry,! Maj.-Gen. James E. B. Stuart ■.—First Brigade,X Brig.- 
Gen. Wade Hampton ; 1st N. C, Col. L. S. Baker ; 1st S. C, Col. J. L. 
Black ; 2d S. C, Col. M. C. Butler ; Cobb (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. P. M. 
B.Young; Phillips's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. William W. Rich. Second 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee; 1st Va., Col. James H. Drake; 2d 
Va., Col. Thomas T. Munford ; 3d Va., Col. T. H. Owen ; 4th Va., Col. 
William C. Wickham ; 5th Va. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. H. F. 



* Majors Garnett, Hamilton, and T. J. Page, Jr., are mentioned in the 
reports as commanding artillery battalions, but their composition is not 
stated. 

t Organization of brigades as established November 10, 1862. On 
roster for December 16, 1862, Hart's, Breathed's, Moorman's, and Chew's 
batteries appear as attached, res]Dectively, to the First, Second, Third, 
and Fourth Brigades. Commanders are given as reported December 16, 
1862. 

X Detachment on raid to Dumfries. 



BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG. 321 

Lee ; 2d N. C, Col. S. Williams ; 9th Va., Col. R L. T. Beale ; 10th Va., 
Col. J. Lucius Davis ; 13th Va., Col. J. R. Chambliss, Jr. ; 15th Va., Col. 
William B. Ball. Fourth Brigade,''^ Brig.-Geu. W. E. Jones ; 6th Va., 
Col. John S. Green ; 7th Va., Col. R H. Dulany ; 12th Va., Col. A. W. 
Harman ; 17th (Va.) Battn., Lieut.-Col. O. R. Funsten ; White's (Va.) 
Battn., Maj. E. V. White. 

* In the Shenandoah Valley. 



21 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

PREPARING FOR THE SPRING OF '63. 

Burnside's Abortive Moves— The " Mud March" — General Hooker 
supersedes Burnside — The Confederates strengthen their Position for 
the Winter — Longstreet ordered to Petersburg— Secretary of War 
Seddon and the Author talk of General Grant and the Confederate 
Situation on the Mississippi and in the West— Longstreet makes a 
Radical Proposition for Confederate Concentration in Tennessee, 
thus to compel Grant to abandon Vicksburg— The Skilful Use of 
Interior Lines the Only Way of equalizing the Contest— Battle 
of Chancellorsville, Lee's Brilliant Achievement— Criticism — Death 
of " Stonewall" Jackson — The Resolve to march Northward — The 
Army reorganized in Three Corps— Ewell and A. P. Hill appointed 
Lieutenant-Generals. 

Before we were fully settled in our winter quarters, 
and when just beginning to enjoy our camp theatricals, 
we heard that General Burnside was looking for another 
crossing by the lower Rappahannock. We were not 
greatly concerned about that, however, as we thought the 
quicksands along the flats, made especially protective by 
the winter rains, would so delay his march as to allow us 
ample time to prepare for him. But the Washington 
authorities having received reports of it through some 
of the superior officers of the Army of the Potomac, the 
march was arrested by orders of the War Department. 

Another move was set on foot a few weeks later, at a 
time when General Lee happened to be in Richmond. 
The information was forwarded to him and the army or- 
dered under arms, prepared to take the field. A few 
weeks before, General Burnside had ordered material to be 
hauled to the point below, which he had chosen when pre- 
paring for his crossing that had been arrested by the War 
Department. When we found that his army was in motion. 
General Jackson insisted that the crossing would be made 

322 



PKEPAKING FOR THE SPRING OF '63. 323 

below, and proposed to march his corps down to meet it. 
He was tokl that the neck of land between the Potomac 
and the Rappahannock was so interlaced with wet-weather 
streams and ravines that the route leading below was not 
practicable at that season ; that the quicksands on the flats 
of the west side were formidable obstacles to the march 
of an army ; that the only jiossible route for crossing the 
river was by the fords of the highlands, and that he must 
hold his troops ready to move accordingly. He was 
not satisfied with the refusal to accept his construction of 
the enemy's purpose, and demurred against authority 
less than General Lee's, but found that the order must be 
obeyed. 

Not many hours after the report came, the noise of 
the army working through the mud was distinctly heard 
by my picket guards along the upper river. Some 
of the guards called out derisively, offering help to get 
the batteries through the mud if they could only be 
assured that the army would cross. The bottomless roads 
and severe weather broke uj^ the campaign, and the move 
back to camp was reported to me before the Confederates 
marched from their camps. This effort, called by Burn- 
side's soldiers " The Mud March," was followed by the 
assignment of General Hooker to command of the Army 
of the Potomac. 

Long and close study of the field from the Potomac to 
the James River, and the experiences of former campaigns, 
made it clear that the Army of the Potomac had been 
drawn into a false position, and it became manifest that 
there were but two moves left open for its spring cam- 
paign, — first, by crossing the upper fords of the Rap- 
pahannock ; secondly, by detaching forces to the south 
side of the James, and by that route moving against 
Richmond. 

To guard against the former I laid out lines for field- 
works and rifle-pits covering all approaches by the upper 



324 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

fords as far as the road leading from United States Ford. 
From that point the line broke to the rear, crossing the 
Plank road and extending back half a mile to command 
the road from Chancellorsville to Spottsylvania Court- 
House. When the lines for these works were well marked, 
I was ordered, with the divisions of Hood and Pickett 
and Dearing's and Henry's artillery battalions, to the south 
side near Petersburg, to be in position to meet the latter 
move, leaving the divisions of McLaws and R. H. An- 
derson to finish the work on the lines of defence. 

After passing to the south side of James E,iver, assign- 
ing the troops to points of observation near Blackwater 
River, and establishing head-quarters at Petersburg, I 
learned that there was a goodly supply of produce along 
the east coast of Virginia and North Carolina, inside the 
military lines of the Federal forces. To collect and trans- 
port this to accessible points for the Confederates, it was 
necessary to advance our divisions so as to cover the 
country, and to hold the Federal forces in and about their 
fortified positions while our trains were at work. To that 
end I moved with the troops in Virginia across the Black- 
water to close lines about the forts around Suffolk, and 
ordered the troops along our line in North Carolina to a 
like advance. The movements were executed without 
serious trouble, and the work was prosecuted up to the 
time of my recall by General Lee. 

While lying near Suffolk a couple of young men dressed 
as citizens entered my tent one night with letters from 
Secretary of War Seddon, recommending them as trust- 
worthy and efficient scouts. They were sent off through 
the swamp to find their way to Norfolk and southward to 
report of roads or routes for our troops in case we should 
wish to make a detour for the capture of Suffolk. One 
of them, Harrison, proved to be an active, intelligent, en- 
terprising scout, and was retained in service. 

The accounts that we gained indicated that Suffolk 



PREPARING FOR THE SPRING OF '63. 325 

could be turned and captured with little loss, but as we 
had given it up the year before as untenable, and were 
liable to be called upon at any moment to give it up 
again, it appeared that the " cost of the whistle" would be 
too high. 

The only occurrence of serious moment while we had 
our forces about Suffolk was the loss of Caj^tain Stribling's 
battery, which had been inadvertently j)osted by the officer 
in charge of the artillery on a neck running out into a 
bend of the Nansemond River. The Federal gun-boats, 
seeing the opportunity, came into the river and took posi- 
tions commanding the ground in rear of the battery so as 
to sweep the field against all succoring parties, while a 
direct attack was made upon the battery, resulting in its 
capture. 

About this time the soldiers on both sides had consider- 
able amusement over a Federal signal station that was 
inside our lines as we had laid them. The Union troops 
had some time previously trimmed up a tall pine-tree 
and built near the top a platform for use as a signal sta- 
tion, and, coming upon this, to gratify his curiosity a Con- 
federate soldier climbed to the staging and seated himself 
for a leisurely view of the Federal forces inside their 
works. An artillerist of the other side, after allowing 
sufficient time to satisfy a reasonable curiosity, trained one 
of his rifle guns upon the platform, and sent a shell 
screaming and bursting too near for the comfort of the 
" man up a tree." As he did not care to be seen in pre- 
cipitate retreat, he thought to wait a little, but a second 
shot admonished him that hurry, if less graceful, might 
be more wise than deliberate retreat. Acting under press- 
ure of the situation, his legs, to the amusement of the men 
on both sides, soon brought him to safe cover. When night 
closed in over the belliojerents this soldier went to work on 
a scheme by which he ho23ed to get even with the Yankees. 
He carefully constructed and equipped a full-sized man, 



326 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

dressed in a new suit of improved " butternut" * dry-goods, 
and, in due form christening him " Julius Csesar," took 
him to the platform, adjusted him to graceful position, and 
made him secure to the framework by strong cords. A 
little after sunrise " Julius Csesar" was discovered by some 
of the Federal battery officers, who prepared for the 
target, — so inviting to skilful 25ractice. The new soldier 
sat under the hot fire with irritating indifference until the 
Confederates, not able to restrain their hilarity, exposed 
the joke by calling for " three cheers for Julius Caesar." 
The other side quickly recognized the situation, and good- 
naturedly added to ours their cheers for the old hero. 

About the 28th day of April the Army of the Potomac, 
under General Hooker, took up its march for the fords of 
the upper Rappahannock to cross against General Lee at 
Fredericksburg. At the same time General Grant crossed 
the Mississippi below Vicksburg, marched against General 
Pemberton's army in Mississippi, and was driving it back 
upon its fortifications about Vicksburg. 

When General Hooker's movements were so developed 
as to make sure of his purpose, repeated calls came to 
me over the wires to pull away from Suffolk and return 
to General Lee with all speed. These came from General 
Lee, and also from the Richmond authorities. In reply I 
despatched that our trains were at the front along the 
coast collecting supplies ; that they would be hurried 
to our rear, and as soon as safe we would march. The 
calls became so frequent and urgent, however, that I in- 
quired if we should abandon our trains. To this no 
answer came ; and I was left to the exercise of my own 
judgment. 

As soon as the trains were safely back, we drew off, 
marched back to the Blackwater, and thence e/n route for 



* The Confederate dry-goods factories, for want of other dye-stuffs, 
had long before this resorted to tlie use of the butternut coloring. 



PREPARING FOR THE SPRING OF '63. 327 

Richmond and Fredericksburg. Before we reached the 
former place a telegram came announcing the great battle 
and victory of Chancellorsville. 

Passing through Richmond, I called to report to Sec- 
retary of War Seddon, who referred to affairs in Missis- 
sippi, stating that the department was trying to collect an 
army at Jackson, under General Joseph E. Johnston, 
sufficient to push Grant away from his circling lines about 
Vicksburg. He spoke of the difficulty of feeding as well 
as collecting an army of that magnitude in Mississippi, 
and asked my views. 

The Union army under General Rosecrans was then 
facing the Confederate army under General Bragg in 
Tennessee, at Murfreesboro' and Shelbyville. 

I thought that General Grant had better facilities for 
collecting supplies and reinforcements on his new lines, 
and suggested that the only prospect of relieving Vicks- 
burg that occurred to me was to send General Johnston 
and his troops about Jackson to reinforce General Bragg's 
army ; at the same time the two divisions of my command, 
then marching to join General Lee, to the same point ; that 
the commands moving on converging lines could have rapid 
transit and be thrown in overwhelming numbers on Rose- 
crans before he could have help, break up his army, and 
march for Cincinnati and the Ohio River ; that Grant's 
was the only army that could be drawn to meet this 
move, and that the move must, therefore, relieve Vicks- 
burg. 

It was manifest before the war was accepted that the 
only way to equalize the contest was by skilful use of our 
interior lines, and this was so impressed by two years' 
experience that it seemed time to force it upon the Rich- 
mond authorities. But foreign intervention was the 
ruling idea with the President, and he preferred that as 
the easiest solution of all problems. 

The only objection offered by the Secretary was that 



328 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Grant was such an obstinate fellow that he could only be 
induced to quit Vicksburg by terribly hard knocks. 

On the contrary, I claimed that he was a soldier, and 
would obey the calls of his government, but was not lightly 
to be driven from his purpose. 

My march was continued, and we joined General Lee 
at Fredericksburg, where I found him in sadness, notwith- 
standing that he was contemplating his great achievement 
and brilliant victory of Chancellorsville, for he had met 
with great loss as well as great gains. The battle had cost 
heavily of his army, but his grief was over the severe 
wounding of his great lieutenant, General Thomas Jona- 
than Jackson, the head of the Second Corps of the Army 
of Northern Virginia ; cut off, too, at a moment so much 
needed to finish his work in the battle so handsomely 
begun. With a brave heart, however. General Lee was 
getting his ranks together, and putting them in condition 
for other useful work. 

At the time of the battle of Chancellorsville the Army 
of the Potomac, according to its return of a few days before, 
consisted of officers and men actually available for line 
of battle, 113,838, with 404 pieces of artillery.* The 
return of casualties showed the enormous loss of 17,287. 
Returns of the Army of Northern Virginia for March, 
1863, showed an effective aggregate of 59,681 ; f batteries 
in action, about 160 guns. To this may possibly be added 
one thousand of troops returning during April in time for 
the battle. The casualties reported by the medical direc- 
tor numbered 10,281, but reports of the commanders 
showed over 12,000, not including artillery or cavalry, or 
slightly wounded and missing, which would j)robably add 
another thousand. 

Chancellorsville is usually accepted as General Lee's 
most brilliant achievement, and, considered as an indepen- 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxv. part ii. p. 320. 
t Ibid., p. 696. 



PEEPARING FOR THE SPRING OF '63. 329 

dent afiair, it was certainly grand. As I had no part in 
its active conduct, it is only apropos to this writing to 
consider the plan of battle as projected some four months 
previous, — i.e., to stand behind our intrenched lines and 
await the return of my troops from Suffolk. 

Under that plan General Lee would have had time to 
strengthen and improve his trenches, while Hooker was 
intrenching at Chancellorsville. He could have held his 
army solid behind his lines, where his men would have 
done more work on the unfinished lines in a day than in 
months of idle camp life. 

General Hooker had split his army in two, and was vir- 
tually in the condition which President Lincoln afterwards 
so graphically described in his letter addressed to him 
June 5 following, — viz. : 

'^I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, 
like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs 
front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick 
the other." 

My impression was, and is, that General Lee, standing 
under his trenches, would have been stronger against 
Hooker than he was in December against Burnside, and 
that he would have grown stronger every hour of delay, 
while Hooker would have grown weaker in morale and 
in confidence of his plan and the confidence of his trooj)S. 
He had interior lines for defence, while his adversary was 
divided by two crossings of the river, which made Lee's 
sixty thousand for defence about equal to the one hundred 
and thirteen thousand under General Hooker. By the 
time that the divisions of Pickett and Hood could have 
joined General Lee, General Hooker would have found 
that he must march to attack or make a retreat without 
battle. It seems probable that under the original plan 
the battle would have given fruits worthy of a general 
engagement. The Confederates would tlien have had 



330 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

opportunity, and have been in condition to so follow 
Hooker as to have compelled his retirement to Washing- 
ton, and that advantage might have drawn Grant from 
Vicksburg ; whereas General Lee was actually so crijDpled 
by his victory that he was a full month restoring his army 
to condition to take the field. In defensive warfare he 
was perfect. When the hunt was up, his combativeness 
was overruling. 

It was probably a mistake to draw McLaws away from 
his position at Marye's Hill, where he and Ransom had 
successfully held against six or seven severe attacks of the 
Burnside battle, with three brigades, two of his own and 
one of Ransom's. General Early was assigned to that 
position with five brigades. He was attacked by about 
one-fourth the number of McLaws's assailants, the posi- 
tion was carried, and Early was driven off in confusion, 
losing, besides large numbers as prisoners, many pieces of 
artillery. His especial assignment was to defend the Plank 
road against the enemy's march to attack General Lee's 
rear. Instead, he retreated by the Telegraph road, leav- 
ing the Plank road free for the enemy. After driving 
Early off, the enemy marched by the Plank road, and 
Early marched back to his late position at Marye's Hill. 
So General Lee was obliged to take McLaws and Ander- 
son from his battle at Chancellorsville to drive back the 
force threatening his rear. 

The battle as pitched and as an independent affair was 
brilliant, and if the war was for glory could be called 
successful, but, besides putting the cause upon the hazard 
of a die, it was crippling in resources and of future prog- 
ress, while the wait of a few days would have given time 
for concentration and opportunities against Hooker more 
effective than we experienced with Burnside at Freder- 
icksburg. This was one of the occasions where success 
was not a just criterion. 

After reporting to General Lee, I offered the sugges- 



PREPARING FOR THE Sp'rING OF '63. 331 

tions made to Secretary Seddon, in regard to the means 
that should be adopted for the relief of Vicksburg. I 
thought that honor, interest, duty, and humanity called 
us to that service, and asked the aid of his counsels with 
the War Department, and reinforcements from his army 
for the West, to that end. I suggested that General 
Johnston, instead of trying to collect an army against 
General Grant, should be sent to reinforce General Bragg, 
then standing against the Union forces under General 
Kosecrans in Middle Tennessee ; that at the same time he 
should send my divisions, just up from Suffolk, to join 
Johnston's reinforcements to Bragg's army ; that the 
combination once made should strike immediately in over- 
whelming force upon Bosecrans, and march for the Ohio 
Biver and Cincinnati. 

He recognized the suggestion as of good combina- 
tion, and giving strong assurance of success, but he was 
averse to having a part of his army so far beyond his 
reach. He reflected over the matter one or two days, and 
then fell upon the plan of invading the Northern soil, and 
so threatening Washington as to bring about the same 
hoped-for result. To that end he bent his energies. 

His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and 
improper to offer suggestions leading to a different course. 
All that I could ask was that the policy of the campaign 
should be one of defensive tactics ; that we should work 
so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position 
as we might find in his own country, so well adapted to 
that purpose, — which might assure us of a grand triumph. 
To this he readily assented as an important and material 
adjunct to his general plan. His confidence in making 
moves threatening Washington and the invasion of Mary- 
land and Pennsylvania grew out of the known anxiety 
of the Washington authorities as to the safety of their 
capital and of quiet within the Union lines. 

In the midst of his work of preparation came the an- 



332 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

nouncement that General Jackson's trouble had taken an 
unfortunate turn, that he was thought to be sinking, and 
not many hours after that the news came that he had gone 
to rest. But the full realization of all that this meant 
was delayed until, at the railroad station, the train that 
was to bear his remains to their final resting-place started 
upon its sad journey. Then officers and soldiers gath- 
ered to do last honors to their dead comrade and chieftain 
seemed suddenly to realize that they were to see " Stone- 
wall" Jackson no more forever, and fully to measure the 
great misfortune that had come upon them. And as we 
turned away, we seemed to face a future bereft of much 
of its hopefulness. 

General Jackson's death suggested to General Lee a 
reorganization of his army into three corps, and R. S. 
Ewell and A. P. Hill, ajDpointed lieutenant-generals, were 
assigned to the Second and Third respectively. 

As the senior major-general of the army, and by reason 
of distinguished services and ability. General Ewell was 
entitled to the command of the Second Corps, but there 
were other major-generals of rank next below Ewell whose 
services were such as to give them claims next after 
Ewell's, so that when they found themselves neglected 
there was no little discontent, and the fact that both the 
new lieutenant-generals were Virginians made the trouble 
more grievous.* Afterwards, when Early, noted as the 
weakest general officer of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
was appointed lieutenant-general over those who held 
higher rank than he, there was a more serious feeling of 
" too much Virginia." Longstreet and Jackson had been 
assigned by General Johnston. 

In our anxious hours and hopeful anticipations the little 

* General D. H. Hill was next in rank to General Ewell. He M''as the 
hero of Bethel, Seven Pines, South Mountain, and the hardest fighter 
at Sharpsburg. His record was as good as that of "Stonewall" Jack- 
son, but, not being a Virginian, he was not so well advertised. 



PREPAKING FOR THE SPRING OF '63. 333 

quarrel was soon lost sight of, — displaced by affairs of 
greater moment. Reaction began to show the effect of 
General Lee's strong hand and hard work. Hope and 
confidence impaired by the failure of the Maryland cam- 
paign were restored, and we prepared to abandon all 
uncomfortable thoughts with the graves of our fallen 
comrades. 

As soon as affairs took such shape as to assure me that 
the advance northward was inevitable, I sent a requisition 
down to Richmond for gold coin for my scout Harrison, 
gave him what he thought he would need to get along in 
Washington, and sent him off with secret orders, telling 
him that I did not care to see him till he could bring 
information of importance, — that he should be the judge 
of that. He wanted to know where he would find us, and 
was told that the head-quarters of the First Corps were 
large enough for any intelligent man to find. With these 
orders he left us, and after about three weeks was arrested 
in Pennsylvania and brought under guard to my head- 
quarters. 



CHAPTER XXV. 

INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA. 

Plan of the Confederate March North — General Lee hoped to di'aw 
Troops from the South and develop Important Results North of the 
Potomac — He wanted Beauregard sent to support the Movement — 
The Authorities in Richmond failed to comprehend — The Value of 
the " Interior Lines" not appreciated— Spirited Cavalry Fight at 
Brandy Station between Stuart's and Pleasonton's Commands— En- 
gagement of Ewell and Milroy at Winchester— The Question of Au- 
thority for the Cavah-y Movements— Lieutenant-Colonel Fremantle 
of the Coldstream Guards, British Army, as a Guest and Observer 
— The Confederate Advance reaches Pennsylvania Soil — General Lee 
issues Orders for a March on Harrisburg — Municipal Authorities of 
York and Gettysburg surrender to General John B. Gordon. 

The absorbing study now was the projected campaign 
into Maryland and Pennsylvania, — the invasion of the 
enemy's country. The plan of defensive tactics gave 
some hope of success, and, in fact, I assured General Lee 
that the First Corps would receive and defend the battle 
if he would guard its flanks, leaving his other corps to 
gather the fruits of success. The First Corps was as solid 
as a rock — a great rock. It was not to be broken of good 
position by direct assault, and was steady enough to work 
and wait for its chosen battle. 

The Valley of the Shenandoah gave us firm, broad 
roads for the march north, curtained by the solid range 
of the Blue Ridge and South Mountains. There were 
some Federal troops occupying points in the Valley of 
Virginia, but not more than enough to give healthful em- 
ployment to our leading columns as they advanced. The 
army as reorganized in three corps had three divisions of 
each corps, with four brigades to the division, except R. 
H. Anderson's, Pickett's, and Rodes's, each of which had 
five. J. E. B. Stuart's cavalry consisted of the brigades 

334 



INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA. 335 

of Wade Hamilton, Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Bev- 
erly Robertson, and W. E. Jones. The cavalry of Jen- 
kins and Imboden, operating in the Valley and West Vir- 
ginia near our route, was to move, the former with Ewell, 
the latter on his left. Six batteries of horse artillery 
under Major R. F. Beckham were of Stuart's command, 
and to each army corps were attached five battalions of 
artillery of four guns to a battery, and four batteries to a 
battalion, making of the whole artillery organization, in- 
cluding batteries of reserve and the thirty guns of horse 
artillery, two hundred and eighty-seven guns. In the 
three army corps there were thirty-nine brigades, proper, 
of infantry. 

In the Army of the Potomac were fifty-one brigades 
of infantry, eight brigades of cavalry, and three hun- 
dred and seventy guns of artillery. The artillery ap- 
pointments were so superior that our ofiicers sometimes 
felt humiliated when posted to unequal combat with their 
better metal and munitions. In small-arms also the 
Union troops had the most improved styles. 

Notwithstanding, we were prepared to march forward 
and cheerfully accept the gage, hoping to overbalance 
these advantages through the morale afforded by brave 
hearts and the strategic skill to throw the onus of battle 
upon the enemy. 

The plan of campaign as projected was by the march 
of the Second Corps through the Valley of the Shenan- 
doah to drive off* or capture the Federal forces stationed 
along the Valley, and continue the march to Pennsylva- 
nia until further orders, meanwhile collecting supj^lies for 
the advance and for those who were to follow, Jenkins's 
brigade of cavalry working with the advance, and Im- 
boden's on its left ; the First Corps and main force of 
cavalry to march near the east base of the Blue Ridge, 
threatening towards the rear line of the Army of the 
Potomac, and occupy the Blue Ridge, while the trains and 



336 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

other troops passed behind the mountains to follow the 
advance march. Stuart's cavalry brigades were to ob- 
serve between the First Corps and the Union army. 
When the Third Corj)s had passed behind the First, the 
latter and the cavalry were to withdraw and follow the 
general march. Stuart, whose movements were to corre- 
spond to those of the First Corps, was to follow its with- 
drawal and cross the Potomac on our right flank at Shep- 
herdstown. The brigades of Generals M. Jenkins and 
M. D. Corse of Pickett's division, left in Virginia near 
Petersburg and Hanover Junction, were to follow and join 
their division, as will soon appear. 

General Beauregard was to be called from his post, in 
the South, with such brigades as could be pulled away 
temporarily from their Southern service, and thrown for- 
ward, with the two brigades of Pickett's division (Jenkins's 
and Corse's) and such others as could be got together, 
along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in threatening 
attitude towards Washington City, and he was to suddenly 
forward Pickett's brigades through the Valley to the di- 
vision, and at his pleasure march on, or back towards 
Richmond. 

As the season of fevers along the coast of the Carolinas 
was approaching. General Lee thought that active opera- 
tions in the far South, esi^ecially along the seaboard, would 
be suspended, that his move northward might draw most 
of them towards him, and j^ossibly troops operating in 
the Southwest, the latter being really a prominent part 
of the object of his northern march. He thought that 
Beauregard's apjoearance in Northern Virginia would in- 
crease the known anxiety of the Washington authorities 
and cause them to draw troops from the South, when in 
the progress of events other similar movements might 
follow on both sides until important results could be de- 
veloped north of the Potomac. 

His early experience with the Richmond authorities 



INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA. 337 

taught liim to deal cautiously with them in disclosing his 
views, and to leave for them the privilege and credit of 
approving, step by step, his apparently hesitant policy, 
so that his j)lans were disclosed little at a time ; and, find- 
ing them slow in approving them, still slower in advancing 
the brigades of Pickett's division, and utterly oblivious of 
the efiect of a grand swing north on our interior lines, he 
did not mention the part left open for Beauregard until 
he had their approval of the march of the part of his 
command as he held it in hand. The jDart assigned for 
Beauregard became the subject for correspondence be- 
tween the authorities and the officers who knew nothing 
of the general ideas and plans. The latter failed to see 
any benefit to accrue by taking troops from their com- 
mands, and naturally offered objections to their going. 
The authorities, not comprehending the vast strength to 
be gathered by utilizing our interior lines, failed to bring 
about their execution, and the great possibility was not 
fully tested. 

In pursuance of the plan for the northern campaign 
our march was taken up on Wednesday, the 3d of June, 
McLaws's division of the First Corps marching on that 
date from Fredericksburg, and Hood's from near Orange 
Court-House on the 4th ; Rodes's division of the Second 
Corps followed, and on the 5th Johnson's and Early's of 
the Second. Pickett of the First, with three of his bri- 
gades, followed the course of Hood's division. All were 
to assemble at Culpeper Court-House, near our cavalry 
head-quarters. The Third Corps, General A. P. Hill, 
was left in observation of the enemy at Fredericksburg. 

When General Hooker discovered the thinning of our 
camps in rear of Fredericksburg, he put a bridge across 
the Rappahannock at Deep Pun, crossed a considerable 
force of artillery and infantry, and constructed a line of 
rifle-pits along the river bank. At the rej)ort of these 
movements. General Lee thought to delay the movements 

22 



338 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

of the Second Corps, thougli he hurried those of the First 
to draw off the Federals from action against Hill, but 
holding the Second ready to go back to hira should there 
be need. Hill made a similar demonstration against 
Hooker, threatening on the river below, though not so 
far as to cross it, which caused the Federals to draw their 
troops from the south side. The Second Corps was then 
hurried on to Culpeper Court-House. 

The First and Second Corps waited at the court-house to 
know if indications about Fredericksburg were such as to 
warrant the onward march. General Hooker, not con- 
vinced that General Lee had left him, ordered his cavalry 
under General Pleasonton, sujDported by two brigades of 
infantry, to cross the E-appahannock in search of Stuart's 
cavalry, and to secure information of the Confederate 
plans. Pleasonton's force, including infantry, was eleven 
thousand. He divided his command, sending one half by 
Beverley's, the other by Kelly's Ford, to march on con- 
verging roads to Brandy Station, near Fleetwood, the 
latter point the head-quarters of our cavalry chief, five 
miles west of Rappahannock Bridge. 

Happily for the Confederates, the cavalry brigades had 
been drawn together on the 8th for review by General 
Lee, and rested that night not remote from cavalry head- 
quarters. On the 9th, Pleasonton's columns made an un- 
looked-for advance and engaged the Confederates, before 
notice could be sent to the columns at their camps. The 
march resulted in a very severe and strongly disputed 
cavalry fight, ending in heavy losses on both sides. Gen- 
eral Stuart called for infantry supports before the close 
of the conflict, but succeeded in recovering his position 
before the infantry reached him, — not, however, until some 
important despatches were taken by the enemy, which 
gave the information they were seeking. Stuart reported 
485 officers and men lost ; Pleasonton, 907, and three 
pieces of artillery. On the 10th, Ewell took up his 



INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA. 339 

march for the Valley by Chester Gap. Now, General 
Milroy had a division of nine thousand Federals at Win- 
chester, and sought to hold it contrary to his orders to 
retire to the command at Harper's Ferry. He had a bri- 
gade on outpost at Berryville under McReynolds. Gen- 
eral Kelly had ten thousand men at Harper's Ferry, with 
a strong detachment of infantry and a battery at Martins- 
burg, under Colonel B. F. Smith. 

Upon entering the Valley, General Ewell detached 
Kodes's division and Jenkins's cavalry to cut ofiP and cap- 
ture the force at Berryville, but McReynolds withdrew 
in time to join the forces at Winchester. This Confeder- 
ate column then marched for Martinsburg, and got j^os- 
session there on the 14th, the garrison marching out and 
joining the troops on Maryland Heights. The artillery 
trying to escaj^e north towards Williamsport was followed 
so closely that they lost some three or four guns. With 
his divisions under Johnson and Early, General Ewell 
marched to Winchester and attacked and carried the out- 
works of Milroy's fortified position, when the latter, after 
calling a council, decided to retreat, leaving his artillery 
and wagon-trains. Ewell had anticipated this, and sent 
a part of Johnson's division, one brigade, to intercept him 
on the Martinsburg road. The commands met about day- 
light, and there ensued a severe engagement, successful to 
the Federals till reinforcements came to the Confederates, 
when Milroy's command was broken up, part of his troops 
escaping to Harper's Ferry and part getting over the 
Potomac at Hancock. The Federals at Harper's Ferry 
abandoned their position in Virginia, seeking shelter on 
the heights on the Maryland side. 

On his march through the Valley, General Ewell took 
4000 prisoners and small-arms, 25 cannon, 11 standards, 
250 wagons, 400 horses, and large quantities of subsistence 
and quartermaster's stores, with a loss of 269 of all arms. 
He crossed the Potomac on the 15th, occupying Hagerstown 



340 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

and Sharpsburg, on the Maryland side, and sent the 
cavalry brigade, under Jenkins, north towards Chambers- 
burg. 

By the plan of march from the Valley of Virginia the 
leading corps (Second) was to divide and cross the Poto- 
mac Kiver at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, the 
column through Williamsport to march through Hagers- 
town and Chambersburg towards Harrisburg, collecting 
produce and supplies for the army, Imboden's cavalry on 
its left flank. The eastern column was to march through 
Sharpsburg, Emmitsburg, and Gettysburg towards the 
bridge over the Susquehanna River at Wrightsville, Jen- 
kins's cavalry brigade working with the two columns. 
The Third Corps, passing behind the Blue Ridge, was to 
cross at Shepherdstown and follow the march of the east- 
ern column. The First Corps was to draw back from the 
Blue Ridge and cross the Potomac at Williamsport, to be 
followed by the cavalry, which was to cross at Shepherds- 
town and ride severely towards Baltimore, to force the 
enemy to eastern concentration. 

The object of the march of the eastern columns, besides 
opening a wide field for foraging, was to draw the enemy 
from the route of travel of the supply trains, and to press 
him off east to give opportunity for the western columns 
to file in between him and Washington. 

The reconnoissance and cavalry fight made against 
Stuart at Fleetwood gave General Hooker conclusive evi- 
dence of the march of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
and he drew off from Stafford Heights on the 13tli, and 
marched towards the Orange and Alexandria Railroad 
and the Potomac River. The First Corps was ordered 
north along the east base of the Blue Ridge to guard our 
line of march and cover, in a measure, the Confederate 
plans, Stuart's cavalry to ride between the First Corps 
and the Union army. On the 19th the divisions of the 
First Corps were posted along the Blue Ridge from 



INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA. 341 

Ashby's Gap on the right to Snicker's Gap on the left, 
McLaws at the former, Hood at the latter, Pickett's three 
brigades between the others. Under the impression that 
the cavalry was to operate with the First Corps, in the 
general plan, the commander was ordered to follow its 
withdrawal west of the Blue Ridge and cross the Potomac 
on its right at Shei^herdstown, and make his ride towards 
Baltimore. He claimed that General Lee had given him 
authority to cross east of the Blue Ridge. 

After the First Corps was in position on the Blue Ridge, 
and while the Third was passing our rear down the Val- 
ley, it seems that General Lee so far modified the plan of 
march north as to authorize his cavalry chief to cross 
the Potomac with part of his command east of the Blue 
Ridge, and to change the march of the Third Corps by 
Hagerstown and Chambersburg. The point at which the 
cavalry force should cross the river was not determined 
between the Confederate commander and his chief of 
cavalry, there being doubt whether the crossing could 
better be made at Point of Rocks, between the Union 
army and the Blue Ridge, or between that army and 
Washington City. That question was left open, and I 
was ordered to choose between the two points named at 
the moment that my command took up its line of march. 

The First Corps was withdrawn from the Blue Ridge 
on the 20th, forded the Shenandoah, and camped on its 
left bank. On the 21st, Pleasonton came, in full force, 
supported by infantry, against Stuart's cavalry brigades. 
The severe part of the fight came from Ujiperville, and 
succeeded in driving Stuart back into Ashby's Gap. Part 
of McLaws's division was sent back in time to su23port 
Stuart, and in the morning McLaws ordered Wofford's 
brigade down u]3on the plain, but Pleasonton had with- 
drawn. The infantry was recalled after an exchange of 
a few shots at great range. 

Connected with the cavalry raid and orders authorizing 



342 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

it are matters of more than usual interest. On the 22d 
the Confederate commander sent unsealed instructions to 
his cavalry chief, through head-quarters of the First 
Corps, to be forwarded, provided the cavalry could he 
spared from my front and could make the ride without 
disclosing our plans, expressing his jjreference for the 
ride through Hopewell Gap east of the Union army. 
As previously stated, I was to decide at the last moment 
between the two points that had been named. As my 
front was changed to the rear for the march north, the 
cavalry could be of no service there. The extent of 
authority with me, therefore, was to decide whether 
the crossing should be made at the Point of Kocks or 
around through Hopewell Gap east of the Union army. 
The crossing at Point of Rocks was not only hazardous, 
but more likely to indicate our plans than any move that 
could be made, leaving the ride through Hopewell Gap 
the only route for the raiding party. In my note to Gen- 
eral Stuart enclosing General Lee's instructions was this 
item : 

^'P. S. — I think your passage of the Potomac by our rear at 
the present moment will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You 
had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the route 
in rear of the enemy." 

This has been put in italics and published as evidence 
that the raid was made by my orders, as well as by Gen- 
eral Lee's. In the postscript three points are indicated: 

First, the move along my rear to the crossing at Point 
of Rocks. 

Second, my preferred march on my flank to the Shep- 
herds town crossing. 

Third, the route indicated by General Lee. 

All of which General Stuart understood as well as I did. 
Especially did he know that my orders were that he should 
ride on the right of my column, as originally designed, to 




Lieutenant-Colonel Coldstream Guards, Her Majesty's Service. 



INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA. 343 

the Shepherdstown crossing. In the body of my note were 
orders that he should report to me of affairs along the 
cavalry line before leaving ; that he should assign Gen- 
eral Hamj)ton to command of the cavalry to be left with 
us, with orders to report at my head-quarters. These 
orders, emanating properly from the commander of the 
rear column of the army, should not have been questioned, 
but they were treated with contumely. He assigned 
General Robertson to command the cavalry that was left 
on the mountain, without orders to report at my head- 
quarters ; and though left there to guard passes of the 
Blue E-idge, he rode on a raid, so that when the cavalry 
was most needed it was far away from the army. The 
raid and the absence of the cavalry at the critical 
moment were severely criticised through the army and 
the country. If General Stuart could have claimed au- 
thority of my orders for his action, he could not have 
failed to do so in his official account. He offered no 
such excuse, but claimed to act under the orders of his 
chief, and reported that General Lee gave consent to 
his application for leave to make the march. So our 
plans, adopted after deep study, were suddenly given 
over to gratify the youthful cavalryman's wish for a 
nomadic ride. 

About this time we entertained a distinguished visitor. 
An officer of the British service, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Arthur J. L. Fremantle, of the Coldstream Guards, 
brought letters from the Secretary of War to General 
Lee and myself. He was seeking opportunity to observe 
the campaign as a non-combatant ; he travelled with us, 
divided his time between general head-quarters and 
head-quarters of the First Corps, cheerfully adapted his 
tastes to the rough ways of Confederate soldiers, and 
proved to be an interesting companion. To avoid the 
blockade he came to the Confederacy through Mexico. 
He gave a graphic account of his experience in Texas and 



344 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

travel after crossing the Kio Grande to the interior in a 
two-horse hack. The drivers of his conveyance were Mr. 
Sargeant and Judge Hyde, two characters whom I had 
met years before while in army service on the Texas 
frontier. They called their team Grant and Sherman, 
and enjoyed their glorious rides down the smooth slopes 
of the prairie roads, as they rattled their heels upon the 
box of the hack and plied their team. Grant and Sherman, 
with whips and oaths. But the great novelty to him was 
the position of the judge. In England there are few 
judges comparatively, and those of high estate. To find 
an American judge playing assistant to a hack-driver was 
refreshing, and Colonel Fremantle thoroughly enjoyed 
it. I now have the pleasure to salute our genial war-time 
visitor as governor at Malta and Lieutenant-General Sir 
Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, K.C.M., G.C.B., and to 
offer congratulations to Her Most Noble Majesty upon 
her worthy subject. 

On the 23d of June the divisions of the Third Corps 
passed on towards the Potomac, followed by those of the 
First, the former crossing at Shepherdstown, the latter at 
Williamsport. The corps came together at Hagerstown, 
in Maryland, continued their march till the 27th, and 
rested two days at Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania. The 
cavalry under General Imboden, ordered on General 
Ewell's loft, was due as far north as McConnellsburg, but 
had halted at Hancock. 

On the 28th, General Lee issued orders for the march 
ujDon Harrisburg. General Ewell had marched his main 
column through Chambersburg to Carlisle. His column, 
intending to move east of the mountains through Emmits- 
burg and Gettysburg, had marched parallel to the main 
column as far as Greenwood, when orders were renewed 
for it to march east through Gettysburg. General Early, 
commanding, ordered Gordon's brigade and a detachment 
of cavalry through Gettysburg; but his other troops 



INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA. 345 

marched north through Mummasburg. The failure of 
the Imboden cavalry on his left caused General Ewell to 
send General George H. Steuart through McConnellsburg 
as guard of that flank. Steuart's command rejoined him 
at Carlisle. As General Ewell marched he sent us three 
thousand head of beef cattle and information of five 
thousand barrels of flour. He halted at Carlisle on the 
27th. The municipal authorities of Gettysburg and York 
surrendered to General Gordon, who took some prisoners 
of the State militia, and marched to the bridge over the 
Susquehanna at Wrightsville, where he had other prison- 
ers, but the bridge was burned before him. His brigade 
returned to the vicinity of York, where the division had 
marched and bivouacked on the night of the 28th. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

GETTYSBURG — FIRST DAY. 

Information of Federal Force and Positions brought by the Scout Har- 
rison — General Lee declines to credit it— General Longstreet suggests 
a Change of Direction in Conformance with the Revelation — General 
Meade had succeeded Hooker in Command Five Days before Battle- 
Positions on the Eve of the First Day— Confederate Cavalry " not in 
sight" — "The Eyes of the Army" sadly needed— A Description of the 
Famous Battle-field— Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill engage the Fed- 
erals—Death of General John F. Reynolds— The Fight on Seminary 
Ridge— General Hancock in Federal Command on the Field— Con- 
cerning the Absent Cavalry and Information given by the Scout — 
Conditions at the Close of the First Day's Fight. 

The eve of the great battle was crowded with events. 
Movements for the concentration of the two vast armies 
went on in mighty force, but with a silence in strong con- 
trast to the swift-coming commotion of their shock in 
conflict. It was the pent quiet of the gathering storm 
whose bursting was to shake the continent and suddenly 
command the startled attention of the world. 

After due preparation for our march of the 29th, all 
hands turned in early for a good night's rest. My mind 
had hardly turned away from the cares and labors of the 
day, when I was aroused by some one beating on the pole 
of my tent. It proved to be Assistant Inspector-General 
Fairfax. A young man had been arrested by our out- 
lying pickets under suspicious circumstances. He was 
looking for General Longstreet's head-quarters, but his 
comfortable apparel and well-to-do, though travel-stained, 
appearance caused doubt in the minds of the guards of 
his being a genuine Confederate who could be trusted 
about head-quarters. So he was sent up under a file of 
men to be identified. He proved to be Harrison, the 
valued scout. He had walked through the lines of the 

346 




The Confederate scout wlio brought to General Lee the first news of Meade's assignniAit to 
command, and the positions of tlie Corps of the Army of the Potomac. 



GETTYSBURG — FIRST DAY. 347 

Union army during the night of the 27th and the 28th, 
secured a mount at dark of the latter day to get in as soon 
as possible, and brought information of the location of 
two corps of Federals at night of the 27th, and approxi- 
mate positions of others. General Hooker had crossed 
the Potomac on the 25th and 26tli of June. On the 27th 
he had posted two army corps at Frederick, and the scout 
reported another near them, and two others near South 
Mountain, as he escaped their lines a little after dark of 
the 28th. He was sent under care of Colonel Fairfax to 
make report of his information at general head-quarters. 
General Lee declined, however, to see him, though he 
asked Colonel Fairfax as to the information that he 
brought, and, on hearing it, expressed want of faith in re- 
ports of scouts, in which Fairfax generally agreed, but 
suggested that in this case the information was so near 
General Longstreet's ideas of the probable movements of 
the enemy that he gave credit to it. I also sent up a note 
suggesting a change of direction of the head of our column 
east. This I thought to be the first and necessary step 
towards bringing the two armies to such concentration 
east as would enable us to find a way to draw the enemy 
into battle, in keeping with the general plan of campaign, 
and at the same time draw him off from the travel of our 
trains. 

There were seven corps of the Army of the Potomac 
afield. We were informed on the 28th of the approxi- 
mate positions of five of them, — three near Frederick and 
two near the base of South Mountain. The others, of 
which we had no definite information, we now know were 
the Sixth (Sedgwick's) , south of Frederick and east of the 
Monocacy, and the Twelfth, towards Harper's Ferry. 

On the 26th, General Hooker thought to use the Twelfth 
Corps and the garrison of Harper's Ferry to strike the 
line of our communication, but General Halleck forbade 
the use of the troops of that post, when General Hooker 



348 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

asked to be relieved of the responsibility of command, 
and was succeeded by General Meade on the night of the 
27th. 

If General Hooker had been granted the authority for 
which he applied, he would have struck our trains, ex- 
posed from Chambersburg to the Potomac without a cav- 
alryman to ride and report the trouble. General Stuart 
was riding around Hooker's army. General Robertson was 
in Virginia, General Imboden at Hancock, and Jenkins's 
cavalry was at our front with General Ewell. 

By the report of the scout we found that the march of 
Ewell's east wing had failed of execution and of the effect 
designed, and that heavy columns of the enemy were hover- 
ing along the east base of the mountain. To remove this 
pressure towards our rear, General Lee concluded to make 
a more serious demonstration and force the enemy to look 
eastward. With this view he changed direction of the pro- 
posed march north, by counter-orders on the night of the 
28th, calling concentration east of the mountains at Cash- 
town, and his troops began their march under the last 
orders on the 29th. 

It seems that General Hill misconstrued the orders of 
the day, or was confused by the change of orders, and was 
under the impression that he was to march by York and 
cross the Susquehanna towards Philadelphia or Harris- 
burg. He ordered his leading division under Heth to 
'Cashtown, however, and followed with Pender's division 
on the 30th, leaving orders for the division of K. H. An- 
derson to follow on the 1st. The purpose of General Lee's 
march east was only preliminary, — a concentration about 
Cashtown. 

General Ewell Avas ready to march for Harrisburg on 
the 29th, when orders reached him of the intended concen- 
tration at Cashtown. He was at Carlisle with Rodes's and 
E. Johnson's divisions and the reserve artillery ; his other 
division under Early was at York. On the 30th, Rodes 



GETTYSBURG — FIRST DAY. 349 

was at Heidlersburg, Early near by, and Johnson, with 
the reserve artillery, near Green Village. 

Pettigrew's brigade of Heth's division, advancing to- 
wards Gettysburg on the 30th, encountered Buford's 
cavalry and returned to Cashtown. 

On the 29th, General Meade wired General Halleck, — 

" If Lee is moving for Baltimore, I expect to get between his 
main army and that place. If he is crossing the Susquehanna, 
I shall rely upon General Couch, with his force, holding him, 
until I can fall upon his rear and give him battle, which I shall 
endeavor to do. . . . My endeavor will be, in my movements, to 
hold my force well together, with the hope of falling upon some 
portion of Lee's army in detail.* 

As the change of orders made Gettysburg prominent as 
the point of impact, the positions of the commands rela- 
tive thereto and their distances therefrom are items of 
importance in considering the culmination of events. 

POSITIONS OF ARMY OF NORTHEEN VIRGINIA, NIGHT OF JUNE 30. 

General Lee's head-quarters, Greenwood. 

First Corps, Chambersburg, twenty-four miles to Gettysburg ; 
part at Greenwood, sixteen miles. 

Second Corps and Jenkins's cavalry, Heidlersburg, ten miles ; 
part near Green Village, twenty-three miles (Johnson's division 
and trains). 

Third Corps, near Greenwood, sixteen miles, and Cashtown, 
eight miles. 

Stuart's cavalry, circling between York and Carlisle, out of 
sight. 

Eobertson's cavalry, in Virginia, beyond reach. 

Imboden's cavalry, at Hancock, out of sight. 

The Confederates not intending to precipitate battle. 

POSITIONS OF ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 

General Meade's head-quarters, Taney town, fourteen miles. 
General Hunt, artillery reserve, Taneytown. 
First Corps, Marsh Eun, six miles. 

* Report Committee, vol. i. p. 480. 



350 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Second Corps, Uniontown, twenty-two miles. 
Third Corps, Bridgeport, twelve miles. 
Fifth Corps, Union Mills, fifteen miles. 
Sixth Corps, Manchester, twenty-two miles. 
Eleventh Corps, Emmitsburg, twelve miles. 
Twelfth Corps, Littletown, nine miles. 
Kilpatrick's cavalry, Hanover, thirteen miles. 
Gregg's cavalry, Manchester, twenty -two miles. 
Buford's cavalry, Gettysburg. 

It should be borne in mind that the field of contention 
was south and east of Gettysburg, so that the Union troo^^s 
were from two to four miles nearer their formation for 
battle than were the Confederates, who had to march from 
two to four miles beyond the town. 

Referring to the map, it may be seen that the Confed- 
erate corps had two routes by which to march for concen- 
tration, — viz., from Heidlersburg to Cashtown, part of 
the Second Corps ; on the road from Chambersburg, the 
First, Third, and part of the Second Corps (with all of 
the trains of the latter) , with but a single track, the Cham- 
bersburg-Gettysburg turnpike. Some of their distances 
were greater than any of the columns of the enemy, while 
the Army of the Potomac had almost as many routes of 
march as commands, and was marching from day to day 
anticipating a general engagement, which they were espe- 
cially cautioned on the 30th was imminent. 

General Hill decided to go beyond Cashtown on the 
1st to ascertain as to the enemy reported at Gettysburg. 
He gave notice of his intentions to General Ewell, and 
sent back to the commanding general to have Anderson's 
division sent forward. He was at Cashtown with Heth's 
and Pender's divisions and their batteries; his reserve 
artillery with Anderson's division at Fayetteville. 

The armies on the night of June 30 stood thus : 

The Confederate : First Corps, two divisions at Green- 
wood (except one brigade detached under orders from 
head-quarters at New Guilford) ; Pickett's three brigades 



GETTYSBURG FIRST DAY. 351 

at Chambersburg, left under orders from head-quarters to 
guard trains ; the Second Corps, two divisions near Heid- 
lersburg, one near and north of Chambersburg ; the Third 
Corps at Cashtown and Fayetteville ; cavalry not in sight 
or hearing, except Jenkins's brigade and a small detach- 
ment. 

The Union army : the First Corps on Marsh Kun, 
the Second at Uniontown, the Third at Bridgeport, the 
Fifth at Union Mills, the Sixth at Manchester, the 
Eleventh at Emmitsburg, the Twelfth at Littlestown, 
Fitzpatrick's cavalry at Hanover, Buford's at Gettysburg 
(except one brigade, detached, guarding his trains) . Gen- 
eral Meade's head-quarters and reserve artillery were at 
Taneytown. His army, including cavalry, in hand. 

General Lee's orders called his troops on converging 
lines towards Cashtown, but he found that part of his in- 
fantry must be left at Chambersburg to await the Imboden 
cavalry, not up, and one of Hood's brigades must be de- 
tached on his right at New Guilford to guard on that side 
in place of Robertson's cavalry (in Virginia). So that 
as he advanced towards his adversary, the eyes and ears 
of his army were turned afar off, looking towards the 
homes of non-combatants. It is bootless to this writing 
to restate whence came this mishap. There is no doubt it 
greatly disturbed General Lee's mind, and he would have 
called a halt under ordinary circumstances, but his orders 
did not contemplate immediate movements beyond Cash- 
town. In that he felt safe, depending upon his cavalry 
coming up in time to meet him there. 

He was in his usual cheerful spirits on the morning of 
the 1st, and called me to ride with him. My column was 
not well stretched on the road before it encountered the 
division of E. Jo hnson (Second Corps) cutting in on our 
front, with all of Ewell's reserve and supply trains. He 
ordered the First Corps halted, and directed that John- 
son's division and train should pass on to its corps, the 



352 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

First to wait. During the wait I dismounted to give 
Hero a little respite. (The Irish groom had christened 
my favorite horse " HaToT) 

After a little time General Lee proposed that we should 
ride on, and soon we heard reports of cannon. The fire 
seemed to be beyond Cashtown, and as it increased he 
left me and rode faster for the front. 

The brigades of Gamble and Devin of Buford's cav- 
alry were the force that met Pettigrew's brigade on the 
afternoon of the 30th, when the latter retired to the post 
of the divisions at Cashtown. 

From Gettysburg roads diverge to the passes of the 
mountains, the borders of the Potomac and Susquehanna, 
and the cities of Baltimore and Washington ; so that it 
was something of a strategic point. From the west side 
two broad roads run, one northwest to Chambersburg 
via Cashtown, the other southwest through Fairfield to 
Hagerstown. They cross an elevated ridge, a mile out 
north, and south of the Lutheran Seminary, known to 
the Confederates as Seminary Ridge, covered by open 
forests. At the northward, about two miles from the 
town, the ridge divides, a lesser ridge putting out west, and 
presently taking a parallel course with the greater. This 
was known as McPherson's Ridge, and was about five 
hundred yards from the first, where the road crosses it. 
Nearly parallel with the Chambersburg pike and about two 
hundred yards distant was the cut of an unfinished rail- 
road. Willoughby's Run flows south in a course nearly 
parallel to and west of the ridge, and is bordered by tim- 
bered lands. North of Gettysburg the grounds are open 
and in fair fields. Directly south of it a bold ridge rises 
with rough and steep slopes. The prominent point of the 
south ridge is Cemetery Hill, and east of this is Gulp's 
Hill, from which the ridge turns sharply south half a 
mile, and drops off into low grounds. It was well wooded 
and its eastern ascent steep. East of it and flowing south 



GETTYSBUKU FIKST DAY. 853 

is Rock Creek. From Cemetery Hill the ground is ele- 
vated, the ridge sloping south to the cropping out of 
Little Round Top, Devil's Den, and the bolder Round 
Top, the latter about three miles south of the town. Ceme- 
tery Hill is nearly parallel to Seminary Ridge, and is 
more elevated. 

At five o'clock on the morning of July 1, General A. 
P. Hill marched towards Gettysburg with the divisions of 
Heth and Pender, and the battalions of artillery under 
Pegram and Mcintosh, Hetli's division and Pegram's ar- 
tillery in advance. R. H. Anderson's division, with the 
reserve artillery left at Fayetteville, was ordered to march 
and halt at Cashtown. About ten o'clock Heth en- 
countered Buford's cavalry. Archer's brigade, leading, 
engaged, and Davis's brigade came up on his left with part 
of Pegram's artillery. The cavalry was forced back till 
it passed Willoughby's Run. 

On the 30th of June, General John F. Reynolds had 
been directed to resume command of the right wing of 
the Union army, — First, Third, and Eleventh Corps. He 
was advised that day of the threatening movements of the 
Confederates on the Cashtown and Mummasburg roads. 
At the same time the indications from General Meade's 
head-quarters pointed to Pipe Creek as the probable line 
in case of battle. Reynolds, however, prepared to sup- 
port Buford's line of cavalry, and marched at eight o'clock 
on the 1st of July with Wadsworth's division and Hall's 
battery, leaving the other divisions of Doubleday and 
Robinson with the artillery to follow under General 
Doubleday, who became commander of the corps upon 
the assignment of Reynolds to command of the wing. 

As Reynolds approached Gettysburg, in hearing of the 
cavalry fight, he turned the head of his column to the 
left and marched through the fields towards the engage- 
ment. As the cavalry skirmish line retired and passed 
Willoughby's Run, he api^roached with his reinforcements, 

23 



354 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Brigadier-General Cutter in advance, and was put in on 
the north of the Cashtown road, followed by Hall's 
battery. Brigadier-General Meredith following, his bri- 
gade was put into line on the left. As fast as the troops 
got into line they became severely engaged. Doubleday, 
in advance of the divisions under him, put Meredith's 
brigade in formidable position on a strip of woodland on 
the left. 

As the Confederate left advanced through the railroad 
cut they came upon Hall's battery, and were about to get 
it, when it was saved by speedy withdrawal, which caused 
the Union right to retire, while Archer's brigade of the 
Confederate right, in pushing to the front, came in open 
space before Meredith's brigade, which in turn made a 
gallant advance, drove Archer back, followed across the 
run, and captured General Archer and one thousand of his 
men. The other two brigades of Pender's division, Petti- 
grew's and Brockenbrough's, were put in on the right of 
Archer's men. During the severe engagement on his 
right the advance of the Confederate infantry got in so 
close along the railroad cut that General Reynolds, in 
efforts to extricate his right, was shot, when the right, 
still under severe pressure, was forced to retire towards 
Seminary Ridge. Hall's battery, severely cripjDled, suc- 
ceeded in getting away as the right retired. 

Doubleday's other divisions came up about the moment 
General Reynolds was killed. The Second (Robinson's) 
and Third (Rowley's) Divisions deployed on the right 
and left. Cooper's battery of four three-inch guns 
followed the left division. At the same time Hill 
reinforced by his division under Pender, Thomas's bri- 
gade on his left. Lane, Scales, and Perrin to the right. 
These restored the Confederate right, overlapping the 
Federal left ; at the same time Thomas's brigade made 
successful battle on the left, pushing off Wadsworth's 
right and Hall's battery, when the two brigades of the 



GETTYSBURG FIRST DAY. 355 

Second Division (Robinson's) were sent to their support, 
but were, in turn, forced back towards Seminary Kidge. 
The Confederate sharp-shooters cut down the horses of 
one of Hall's guns and forced him to drop it. Hill 
advanced Pegram's and Mcintosh's artillery to Mc- 
Pherson's Ridge, forcing the entire Union line back to 
Seminary Ridge. General Doubleday, anticipating such 
contingency, had ordered trenches made about Semi- 
nary Ridge, and sent his three other batteries under 
Colonel Wainwright to that point. He formed his line 
along the ridge and occupied the trenches by part of his 
infantry. At this period Ewell's divisions under Rodes 
approached against Doubleday 's right. 

General Howard, upon his first approach to the battle, 
marched the Eleventh Corps to Cemetery Hill, and 
there posted it until called upon by General Doubleday 
for assistance. To meet the call he ordered his divisions 
under Generals Barlow and Schurz to Doubleday's right, 
to occupy a prominent point at the north end of Semi- 
nary Ridge, reserving his division under Steinwehr and 
part of his artillery on Cemetery Hill. 

As the divisions of the Eleventh Cor23S approached the 
Confederate left, Rodes's division of Ewell's corps ad- 
vanced. The Federals then stood across the Cashtown 
road, their left in advance of the Seminary, their right 
thrown or standing more to the rear. Rodes was in season 
to sweep the field of approach to the high point intended 
to be occupied by the divisions sent by Howard, and came 
in good position to enfilade Robinson's division of the 
First Corps. As Rodes approached he was threatened by 
Buford's cavalry, but, finding cover under woodland, he 
made advance by three brigades in line till he came to 
the point of view which gave him command of that end 
of the field in elevated position, and in plunging fire down 
Robinson's line and in advance of the divisions sent by 
General Howard to occupy that point. While posting 



356 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

his infantry, E-odes ordered Carter's battery of artillery 
into action against Robinson's lines stretched out and 
engaged against Hill's corps. At that moment the 
divisions of the Eleventh Cor2:ts were not in full front 
of E.odes, so that his fire upon Robinson's line was 
something of a surprise, as well as most discomfiting. 
The divisions and artillery of the Eleventh came to the 
front, however, almost simultaneously with Robinson's 
necessitated change of right front rearward towards Rodes. 

These changes and dispositions gave Hill opportunity to 
press on by his front, when Doubleday was obliged to call 
for help, and Schurz called for support on his right. Cos- 
ter's brigade was sent from Steinwehr's reserve, and Bu- 
ford's cavalry was ordered to brace as far as practicable 
the centre of the First Corps, and another battery was 
sent to Schurz's division. At 2.45 another call for help 
by the First Corps was received, and General Schurz was 
asked to answer it if he could by a regiment or more. 
Calls were sent to hurry Slocum's (Twelfth) corps, some 
miles away, but then Ewell was swinging his division 
under Early into line nearer to Gettysburg, Gordon's bri- 
gade and Jones's battery coming in in good time to make 
strong Rodes's left, and Hill's corps had overlapped the 
left of the First Corps, so that General Howard found 
himself forced to command a steady, orderly retreat to 
Cemetery Hill. 

The Confederates pushed rapidly on, particularly the 
fresher troops of Ewell, cleared the field, and followed 
on through the streets of Gettysburg at four o'clock. The 
retreat began and continued in good order till they passed 
Gettysburg, when the ranks became so scattered tliat the 
final march was little better than ^^ Sauve qui peut^ 

As the troops retreated through Gettysburg, General 
Hancock rode upon the field, and under special assignment 
assumed command at three o'clock. As the retreating- 
troops arrived, Wadsworth's division on the right, the 



GETTYSBURG — FIRST DAY. 357 

Eleventh Corps across the Baltimore pike, the balance 
of the First under Doubleday on the left of the Eleventh, 
General Howard and others assisted in forming the new 
line. 

The total effectives of the First and Eleventh Corps, 
according to the consolidated moving report of June 30, 
was 19,982. From the latest returns of General Lee's 
army, an average estimate of his four divisions gave his 
total as 25,252. Part of the reserve division of the 
Eleventh Corps was not engaged, but Buford had two 
brigades of cavalry, and so the foregoing may be a 
fair estimate of the forces engaged, less the reserve on 
Cemetery Hill. 

At Cashtown, General Lee found that General Hill had 
halted his division under R. H. Anderson and his reserve 
artillery. He had General Anderson called, who subse- 
quently wrote me of the interview as follows : 

"About twelve o'clock I received a message notifying me that 
General Lee desired to see me. I found General Lee intently lis- 
tening to the fire of the guns, and very much disturbed and de- 
pressed. At length he said, more to himself than to me, ' I cannot 
think what has become of Stuart. I ought to have heard from him 
long before now. He may have met with disaster, but I hope not. 
In the absence of reports from him, I am in ignorance as to what 
we have in front of us here. It may be the whole Federal army, 
or it may be only a detachment. If it is the whole Federal force, 
we must fight a battle here. If we do not gain a victory, those 
defiles and gorges which we passed this morning will shelter us 
from disaster.' " 

He ordered Anderson forward, and rode on to Seminary 
Ridge in time to view the closing operations of the engage- 
ment. The Union troops were in disorder, climbing Cem- 
etery Heights, the Confederates following through the 
streets of Gettysburg. Two other divisions of Confed- 
erates were up soon after, E. Johnson's of the Second and 
R. H. Anderson's of the Third Corps. 

After a long wait I left orders for the troops to follow 



358 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the trains of the Second Corps, and rode to find General 
Lee. His head-quarters were on Seminary Ridge at the 
crossing of the Cashtown road. Anderson's division was 
then filed off along the ridge, resting. Johnson's had 
marched to report to the corps commander. Dismount- 
ing and passing the usual salutation, I drew my glasses 
and made a studied view of the position upon which the 
enemy was rallying his forces, and of the lay of the land 
surrounding. General Lee was engaged at the moment. 
He had announced beforehand that he would not make 
aggressive battle in the enemy's country. After the sur- 
vey and in consideration of his plans, — noting movements 
of detachments of the enemy on the Emmitsburg road, 
the relative positions for manoeuvre, the lofty perch of 
the enemy, the rocky slopes from it, all marking the posi- 
tion clearly defensive, — I said, "We could not call the 
enemy to position better suited to our plans. All that we 
have to do is to file around his left and secure good ground 
between him and his capital." This, when said, was 
thought to be the opinion of my commander as much as 
my own. I was not a little surprised, therefore, at his 
impatience, as, striking the air with his closed hand, he 
said, " If he is there to-morrow I will attack him." 
In his official account, General Lee reported, — 

'■ ' It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far 
from our base unless attacked. But coming unexpectedly upon 
the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with 
our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous." 

When he rode away from me in the forenoon he made 
no mention of his absent cavalry, nor did he indicate 
that it was not within call. So I was at a loss to under- 
stand his nervous condition, and supported the suggestion 
so far as to say, "If he is there to-morrow it will be 
because he wants you to attack," and queried, " If that 
height has become the objective, why not take it at once? 



GETTYSBURG FIRST DAY. 359 

We have forty thousand men, less the casualties of the 
day ; he cannot have more than twenty thousand." Then 
it was that I heard of the wanderings of the cavalry and 
the cause of his uneven temper. So vexed was he at the 
halt of the Imboden cavalry at Hancock, in the opening 
of the caynpaign, that he was losing sight of Pickett's bri- 
gades as a known quantity for battle. His manner sug- 
gested to me that a little reflection would be better than 
further discussion, and right soon he suggested to the 
commander of the Second Corps to take Cemetery Hill if 
he thought it practicable, but the subordinate did not 
care to take upon himself a fight that his chief would 
not venture to order.* 

The following circular orders were sent the command- 
ers of columns of the First Corps : 

''He AD- QUARTERS FiRST ARMY CORPS, 

"Near Gettysburg, July 1, 5.30 p.m. 
"Colonel, — The commanding general desires you to come on 
to-niglit as fast as you can without distressing your men and ani- 
mals. Hill and Ewell have sharply engaged the enemy, and you 
will be needed for to-morrow's battle. Let us know where you 
will stop to-night. 

" Eespectfully, 

"G. M. Sorrel, 
"Colonel Walton, "^. A. General. 

" Chief of Artillery.''^ 

* From General Lee's official report : "... It was ascertained from 
the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army 
formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that 
army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without 
information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy 
had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the 
four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and 
bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General 
Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, 
if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the 
arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten 
forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched 
from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains 
of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late 
hour. . . ." 



360 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

At 12.15 of the afternoon of the 1st, General Halleck 
sent a cipher despatch to General Meade approving his 
tactics, but asking, as to his strategy, "Are you not too far 
east, and may not Lee attempt to turn your left and cut 
you off from Frederick ?" 

In this connection may be noted the plan that General 
Meade had mapped in his own mind and given to some of 
his generals for battle to be formed behind Pipe Creek, a 
position that would have met the views of General Hal- 
leck, as well as his own, covering Washington and Balti- 
more under close lines that could not be turned. At 
Gettysburg the Confederates had comparatively an open 
field. 

Reports coming in to head-quarters about six o'clock 
that the enemy was in some force off our right towards 
Fairfield, General Lee ordered General Anderson to jDut 
one of his brigades out on the right as picket-guard. 
Wilcox's brigade and Ross's battery were marched and 
posted near Black Horse Tavern. 

Nothing coming from the centre troops about Cemetery 
Hill, General Lee ordered the Second Corps, after night, 
from his left to his right, for work in that direction, but 
General Ewell rode over and reported that another point — 
Gulp's Hill — had been found on his left, which had com- 
manding elevation over Cemetery Hill, from which the 
troops on the latter could be dislodged, by artillery, and 
was under the impression that his troops were in posses- 
sion there. That was accredited as reported and approved, 
and the corps commander returned, and ordered the hill 
occupied if it had not been done. But the officer in charge 
had waited for specific orders, and when they were re- 
ceived he had made another reconnoissance. It was then 
twelve o'clock. By the reconnoissance it was found that 
the enemy was there, and it was thought that this should 
be reported, and further orders waited. 

General E well's troops and trains passed the junction 



GETTYSBUKG FIEST DAY. 3b^ 

of the roads at four o'clock. The train was fourteen miles 
long. It was followed by the troops of the First Corps 
that had been waiting all day. After night the Washing- 
ton Artillery and McLaws's division camped at Marsh 
Run, four miles from Gettysburg. Here is Hood's account 
of his march : 

''While lying in camp near Chambersburg information was 
received that Hill and Ewell were about to come into contact with 
the enemy near Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaws's 
division, were at once put in motion upon the most direct road to 
that point, which we reached after a hard march at or before sun- 
rise on July 2. So imperative had been our orders to hasten for- 
ward with all possible speed that on the march my troops were 
allowed to halt and rest only about two hours during the night 
from the 1st to the 2d of July." 

When I left General Lee, about seven o'clock in the 
evening, he had formed no plans beyond that of seizing 
Gulp's Hill as his point from which to engage, nor given 
any orders for the next day, though his desperate mood 
was painfully evident, and gave rise to serious apprehen- 
sions. He had heard nothing of the movements of the 
enemy since his crossing the Potomac, except the report of 
the scout. His own force on the field was the Second 
Corps, Rodes's, Early's, and E. Johnson's divisions from 
right to left through the streets of Gettysburg around 
towards Gulp's Hill ; on Rodes's right, Pender's division 
of the Third ; on Seminary Ridge, R. H. Anderson's 
division of the Third (except Wilcox's brigade at Black 
Horse Tavern) ; behind Seminary Ridge, Heth's division 
of the Third ; on the march between Cashtown and 
Greenwood, the First Corps. 



CHAPTER XXVII. 

GETTYSBUEG SECOND DAY. 

The Confederate Commander reviews the Field and decides on Plan of 
Battle— Positions on the Morning of July 2— Night March of the Fed- 
eral Sixth Corps— It was excelled by Law's Brigade of Confederates 
— The Battle was opened after Mid-day — General Hood appeals for 
Permission to turn the Federal Left — Failure to make the Flanking 
Movement by the Confederate Right was a Serious Mistake— Hood, in 
his usual Gallant Style, led his Troops forward among the Rocks— Des- 
perate Charges against an Earnest Adversary — Hood wounded — 
General Law succeeds him in command of the Division — " Little 
Round Top" an Important Point— " The Citadel of the Field"— It 
•was a Fight of Seventeen Thousand Confederates against twice their 
Number— Quiet along the Lines of other Confederate Commands — " A 
Man on the Left who didn't care to make the Battle win" — Evidence 
against the Alleged Order for " Battle at Sunrise"— The " Order" to 
Ewell was Discretionary — Lee had lost his Balance. 

The stars were shining brightly on the morning of the 
2d when I reported at General Lee's head-quarters and 
asked for orders. After a time Generals McLaws and 
Hood, with their staffs, rode up, and at sunrise their com- 
mands filed off the road to the right and rested. The 
Washington Artillery was with them, and about nine 
o'clock, after an all-night march, Alexander's batteries 
were up as far as Willoughby's Run, where he jDarked 
and fed, and rode to head-quarters to report. 

As indicated by these movements, General Lee was not 
ready with his plans. He had not heard from his cavalry, 
nor of the movements of the enemy further than the 
information from a despatch captured during the night, 
that the Fifth Corps was in camp about five miles from 
Gettysburg, and the Twelfth Corps was reported near 
Gulp's Hill. As soon as it was light enough to see, how- 
ever, the enemy was found in position on his formidable 
heights awaiting us. 

362 



GETTYSBURG SECOND DAY. 363 

The result of efforts during the night and early morn- 
ing to secure Gulp's Hill had not been reported, and Gen- 
eral Lee sent Golonel Venable of his staff to confer with 
the commander of the Second Gorps as to opportunity to 
make the battle by his left. He was still in doubt whether 
it would be better to move to his far-off right. About nine 
o'clock he rode to his left to be assured of the position 
there, and of the general temper of affairs in that quar- 
ter. After viewing the field, he held conference with the 
corps and division commanders. They preferred to ac- 
cept his judgment and orders, except General Early, who 
claimed to have learned of the topographical features of 
the country during his march towards York, and recom- 
mended the right of the line as the point at which strong 
battle should be made. About ten o'clock General Lee 
returned to his head-quarters, but his engineer who had 
been sent to reconnoitre on his right had not come back. 
To be at hand for orders, I remained with the troops at 
his head-quarters. The infantry had arms stacked ; the 
artillery was at rest. 

The enemy occupied the commanding heights of the 
city cemetery, from which point, in irregular grade, the 
ridge slopes southward two miles and a half to a bold 
outcropping height of three hundred feet called Little 
Round Top, and farther south half a mile ends in the 
greater elevation called Round Top. The former is 
covered from base to top by formidable boulders. From 
the cemetery to Little Round Top was the long main front 
of General Meade's position. At the cemetery his line 
turned to the northeast and east and southeast in an ellip- 
tical curve, with his right on Gulp's Hill. 

At an early hour of the 2d the Union army was posted : 
the Twelfth Gorps at Gulp's Hill, extending its left to 
Wadsworth's division of the First ; on Wadsworth's left 
the Eleventh Gorps ; on the left of the Eleventh the other 
troops of the First ; on their left the Second, and left of 



364 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

that to Little Eoimd Top the Third Corps; the Fifth 
Corps stood in reserve across the bend from the right of 
the Twelfth to the left of the Second Corps. Thus there 
was formed a field of tremendous power upon a convex 
curve, which gave the benefit of rapid concentration at 
any point or points. The natural defences had been im- 
proved during the night and early morning. The Sixth 
Corps was marching from Manchester, twenty-two miles 
from Gettysburg. Its first order, received near Manches- 
ter before night of the 1st, was to march for Taney town, 
but after passing the Baltimore pike the orders were 
changed, directing a prompt march to Gettysburg. The 
march has been variously estimated from thirty to thirty- 
five miles, but the distance from Manchester via Taney- 
town to Gettysburg is only twenty-nine miles, and as the 
ground for which the corps marched was three miles east 
of Gettysburg, the march would have been only twenty- 
six miles via Taneytown ; as the corps marched back and 
took the Baltimore pike, some distance must have been 
saved. It was on the field at three o'clock of the afternoon, 
— the Union cavalry under General Pleasonton in reach. 

The Confederate left was covering the north and east 
curve of the enemy's line, Johnson's division near Gulp's 
Hill, Early's and Kodes's extending the line to the right 
through Gettysburg ; Pender's division on the right of 
Rodes's ; the other divisions of the Third Corps resting 
on Seminary Ridge, with McLaws's division and Hood's 
three brigades near general head-quarters; Pickett's 
brigades and Law's of Hood's division at Chambersburg 
and New Guilford, twenty-two and twenty-four miles 
away. Law had received orders to join his division, and 
was on the march. The cavalry was not yet heard from. 
The line so extended and twisted about the rough ground 
that concentration at any point was not possible. 

It was some little time after General Lee's return from 
his ride to the left before he received the reports of the 



GETTYSBURG SECOND DAY. 6k^. 

reconnoissance ordered from his centre to his right. His 
mind, previously settled to the purj^ose to fight where the 
enemy stood, now accepted the explicit plan of making 
the opening on his right, and to have the engagement 
general. He ordered the commander of the Third Corps 
to extend the centre by Anderson's division, McLaws's 
and Hood's divisions to extend the deployment to his 
right. Heth's division of the Third was drawn nearer 
the front, and notice of his plans was sent the commander 
of the Second Corps. 

At the intimation that the battle would be opened on 
the right by part of the First Corps, Colonel Alexander was 
asked to act as director of artillery, and sent to view the 
field in time to assign the batteries as they were up. It 
was eleven o'clock when General Lee's order was issued, 
but he had ordered Law's brigade to its division, and a 
wait of thirty minutes was necessary for it to get up. 
Law had received his orders at three in the morning, and 
had marched twenty-three miles. The battle-ground was 
still five miles off by the route of march, but Law com- 
pleted his march of twenty-eight miles in eleven hours, — 
the best marching done in either q,rmy to reach the field 
of Gettysburg. 

The battle was to be opened on the right by two di- 
visions of the First Corps, supported on their left by four 
of the brigades of Anderson's division ; the opening to be 
promptly followed on Lee's left by the Second Corps, and 
continued to real attack if the oj)portunity occurred ; the 
Third (centre) Corps to move to severe threatening and 
take advantage of opportunity to attack ; the movements of 
the Second and Third Corps to be prompt, and in close, 
severe co-operation, so as to prevent concentration against 
the battle of the right. The little cavalry that was with 
the army was kei)t on the extreme left. Not so much 
as one trooper was sent us. 

General Lee ordered his reconnoitring officer to lead 



ob FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the troops of the First Corps and conduct them by a 
route concealed from view of the enemy. As I was re- 
lieved for the time from the march, I rode near the middle 
of the line. General Lee rode with me a mile or more.' 
General Anderson marched by a route nearer the enemy's 
line, and was discovered by General Sickles, who com- 
manded the Third Corps, the left of the Union line. A 
little uncomfortable at his retired position, and seeing that 
the battle was forming against him. General Sickles thought 
to put the Third Maine Regiment and the Berdan Sharp- 
shooters on outpost in a bold woodland cover, to develop 
somewhat of the approaching battle, and presently threw 
his corps forward as far as the Peach Orchard, half a mile 
forward of the position assigned to it in the general line. 
The Tenth Alabama Regiment was sent against the out- 
post guard, and, reinforced by the Eleventh Regiment, 
drove it back, and Anderson's division found its place in 
proper line. 

General Birney's account of the affair at the outpost 
puts it at twelve o'clock, and the signal accounts, the only 
papers dated on the field, reported, — 

^'The enemy's skirmiahers advancing from the west one mile 
from here — 11.45." 

And presently, — 

'^The rebels are in force ; our skirmishers give way — 12.55." 

There is no room for doubt of the accuracy of these re- 
ports, which go to show that it was one o'clock in the 
afternoon when the Third Corps, upon which the First 
Corps was to form, was in position. 

Under the conduct of the reconnoitring officer, our 
march seemed slow, — there were some halts and counter- 
marches. To save time, I ordered the rear division to 
double on the front, and we were near the affair of Ander- 
son's regiments with the outpost guard of Sickles. Ander- 



GETTYSBURG — SECOND DAY. 367 

son's division dej)loyed, — Wilcox's, Perry's, Wright's, 
Posey's, and Malione's brigades from right to left. 

General Hood was ordered to send his select scouts in 
advance, to go through the woodlands and act as vedettes, 
in the absence of cavalry, and give information of the 
enemy, if there. The double line marched up the slope 
and deployed, — McLaws on the right of Anderson, Hood's 
division on his right, McLaws near the crest of the pla- 
teau in front of the Peach Orchard, Hood spreading and 
enveloping Sickles's left. The former was readily adjusted 
to ground from which to advance or defend. Hood's 
front was very rugged, with no field for artillery, and very 
rough for advance of infantry. As soon as he passed the 
Emmitsburg road, he sent to report of the great advantage 
of moving on by his right around to the enemy's rear. 
His scouting parties had reported that there was nothing 
between them and the enemy's trains. He was told that 
the move to the right had been proposed the day before 
and rejected ; that General Lee's orders were to guide my 
left by the Emmitsburg road. 

In our immediate front were the divisions of the Third 
Corps under Generals Humphreys and Birney, from right 
to left, with orders for supports of the flanks by divisions 
of the Second and Fifth Corps. The ground on the left 
of Birney's division was so broken and obstructed by 
boulders that his left was dropped off to the rear, forming a 
broken line. In rear of the enemy, and between his lines 
and Little Round Top, was a very rough elevation of 
eighty feet formed by upheavals that left open passage 
deep down Devil's Den. Smith's battery was on Birney's 
left, Winslow's between the right and next brigade. Other 
batteries in position were Clark's, Ames's, Randolph's, 
Seeley's, and Turnbull's. 

As McLaws's division came up on line, Barksdale's bri- 
gade was in front of a battery about six hundred yards 
off. He appealed for permission to charge and capture it, 



368 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

but was told to wait. On liis right was Kershaw's bri- 
gade, the brigades of Semmes and Wofford on the second 
line. Hood's division was in two lines, — Law's and Rob- 
ertson's brigades in front, G. T. Anderson's and Ben- 
ning's in the second line. The batteries were with the 
divisions, — four to the division. One of G. T. Anderson's 
regiments was put on picket down the Emmitsburg road. 

General Hood appealed again and again for the move 
to the right, but, to give more confidence to his attack, he 
was reminded that the move to the right had been care- 
fully considered by our chief and rejected in favor of his 
present orders. 

The opportunity for our right was in the air. General 
Halleck saw it from Washington. General Meade saw 
and was apprehensive of it. Even General Pendleton 
refers to it in favorable mention in his official report. 
Failing to adopt it. General Lee should have gone with 
us to his right. He had seen and carefully examined 
the left of his line, and only gave us a guide to show the 
way to the right, leaving the battle to be adjusted to 
formidable and difficult grounds without his assistance. 
If he had been with us, General Hood's messengers 
could have been referred to general head-quarters, but to 
delay and send messengers five miles in favor of a move 
that he had rejected would have been contumacious. The 
opportunity was with the Confederates from the assem- 
bling on Cemetery Hill. It was inviting of their pre- 
conceived plans. It was the object of and excuse for the 
invasion as a substitute for more direct effi)rts for the 
relief of Vicksburg. Confederate writers and talkers 
claim that General Meade could have escaped without 
making aggressive battle, but that is equivalent to con- 
fession of the inertia that failed to grasp the opportunity. 

Beaten in the battle of the 1st, dislodged of position, 
and outgeneralled, the Union army would have felt the 
want of spirit and confidence important to aggressive 



GETTYSBURG — SECOND DAY. 369 

battle ; but the call was in the hands of the Confederates, 
and these circumstances would have made their work 
more facile, while the Union commander would have felt 
the call to save his capital most imperative. Even as 
events passed it was thought helpful to the Union side 
to give out the report that General McClellan was at ^ 
hand and would command the army. 

Four of the brigades of Anderson's division were 
ordered to advance in echelon in support of my left. 

At three o'clock the artillery was ordered to open prac- 
tice. General Meade was then with General Sickles dis- 
cussing the feasibility of withdrawing his corps to the 
position to which it was originally assigned, but the oj)en- 
ing admonished him that it was too late. He had just sent 
a cipher telegram to inform General Halleck, commander- 
in-chief, that in the event of his having no opportunity to 
attack, and should he find the Confederates moving to in- 
terpose between him and Washington, he would fall back 
on his supplies at Westminster.* But my right division 
was then nearer to Westminster, and our scouting parties 
of infantry were within rifle range of the road leading to 
that point and to Washington. So it would have been 
convenient, after holding our threatening attitude till 
night, to march across his line at dark, in time to draw 
other troops to close connection before the next morning. 

Prompt to the order the combat opened, followed by 
artillery of the other corps, and our artillerists measured 
up to the better metal of the enemy by vigilant work. 
Hood's lines were not yet ready. After a little practice 
by the artillery, he was properly adjusted and ordered to 
bear down upon the enemy's left, but he was not prompt, 
and the order was repeated before he would strike down.f 

In his usual gallant style he led his troops through the 
rocky fastnesses against the strong lines of his earnest 



* Report of Committee, vol. i. p. 488. f His account. 

24 



370 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

adversary, and encountered battle that called for all of his 
power and skill. The enemy was tenacious of his strong 
ground ; his skilfully-handled batteries swept through the 
passes between the rocks ; the more deadly fire of infantry 
concentrated as our men bore upon the angle of the 
enemy's line and stemmed the fiercest onset, until it 
became necessary to shorten their work by a desperate 
charge. This pressing struggle and the cross-fire of our 
batteries broke in the salient angle, but the thickening 
fire, as the angle was pressed back, hurt Hood's left and 
held him in steady fight. His right brigade was drawn 
towards Round Top by the heavy fire pouring from that 
quarter, Benning's brigade was pressed to the thickening 
line at the angle, and G. T. Anderson's was put in support 
of the battle growing against Hood's right. 

I rode to McLaws, found him ready for his opportunity, 
and Barksdale chafing in his wait for the order to seize 
the battery in his front. Kershaw's brigade of his right 
first advanced and struck near the angle of the enemy's 
line where his forces were gathering strength. After ad- 
ditional caution to hold his ranks closed, McLaws ordered 
Barksdale in. With glorious bearing he sprang to his 
work, overriding obstacles and dangers. Without a pause 
to deliver a shot, he had the battery. Kershaw, joined by 
Semmes's brigade, responded, and Hood's men, feeling the 
impulsion of relief, resumed their bold fight, and presently 
the enemy's line was broken through its length. But 
his well-seasoned troops knew how to utilize the advan- 
tage of their grounds and put back their dreadful fires 
from rocks, depressions, and stone fences, as they went 
for shelter about Little Bound Top. 

That point had not been occupied by the enemy, nor 
marked as an important feature of the field. The broken 
ranks sought shelter under its rocks and defiles as birds fly 
to cover. General Hood fell seriously hurt, and General 
Law succeeded to command of the division, but the well- 



GETTYSBURG SECOND DAY. 371 

seasoned troops were not in need of a close guiding hand. 
The battle was on, and they knew how to press its hottest 
contention. 

General Warren, chief engineer of the Federal army, 
was sent at the critical moment to Little Kound Top, and 
found that it was the citadel of the field. He called for 
trooj^s to occupy it. The Fifth Corps (Sykes's) was hur- 
ried to him, and General Hancock sent him Caldwell's 
division of the Second Corps. At the Brick House, away 
from his right. General Sickles had a detachment that had 
been reinforced by General Hancock. This fire drew 
Anderson's brigade of direction (Wilcox) a little off from 
support of Barksdale's left. General Humphreys, seeing 
the opportunity, rallied such of his troops as he could, 
and, reinforced by Hays's division (Willard's brigade) of 
Hancock's corps, came against Barksdale's flank, but the 
latter moved bravely on, the guiding spirit of the battle. 
Wright's Georgia and Perry's Florida brigades were 
drawn in behind Wilcox and thrown against Humphreys, 
pushing him off and breaking him up. 

The fighting had by this time become tremendous,* and 
brave men and officers were stricken by hundreds. Posey 
and Wilcox dislodged the forces about the Brick House. 

General Sickles was desperately wounded ! 

General Willard was dead ! 

General Semmes, of McLaws's division, was mortally 
wounded ! 

Our left relieved, the brigades of Anderson's division 
moved on with Barksdale's, passed the swale, and moved 
up the slope. Caldwell's division, and presently those of 
Ayres and Barnes of the Fifth Corps, met and held our 
strongest battle. While thus engaged. General Sykes 
succeeded in putting Vincent's and Weed's brigades and 
Hazlett's battery on the summit of Little Round Top, but 
presently we overreached Caldwell's division, broke it off, 
and pushed it from the field. Of his brigade commanders, 



372 FK03I MANASSAS TO APPO^.IATTOX. 

Zook was killed, and Brooke and Cross were wounded, 
the latter mortally. General Hancock reported sixty per 
cent, of his men lost. On our side, Barksdale was down 
dying, and G. T. Anderson wounded. 

We had carried Devil's Den, were at the Round Tops 
and the Wheat-Field, but Ayres's division of regulars and 
Barnes's division were holding us in equal battle. The 
struggle throughout the field seemed at its tension. The 
brigades of R. H. Anderson's division could hold off other 
troops of Hancock's, but were not strong enough to step to 
the enemy's lines. When Caldwell's division was pushed 
away, Ayres's flank and the gorge at Little Bound Top 
were only covered by a sharp line of picket men behind 
the boulders. If we could drive in the sharp-shooters and 
strike Ayres's flank to advantage, we could dislodge his 
and Barnes's divisions, occupy the gorge behind Sykes's 
brigades on Bound Top, force them to retreat, and lift 
our desperate fighters to the summit. I had one brigade 
— Wofford's — that had not been engaged in the hottest 
battle. To urge the troops to their reserve power in the 
precious moments, I rode with WofPord. The rugged 
field, the rough plunge of artillery fire, and the piercing 
musket-shots delayed somewhat the march, but Alexander 
dashed up with his batteries and gave new spirit to the 
worn infantry ranks. By a fortunate strike upon Ayres's 
flank we broke his line and pushed him and Barnes so 
closely that they were obliged to use most strenuous efforts 
to get away without losing in prisoners as well as their 
killed and wounded. We gained the Wheat-Field, and 
were so close upon the gorge that our artillery could no 
lono-er venture their fire into it. We were on Little 
Round Top grappling for the crowning point. The bri- 
gade commanders there, Vincent and Weed, were killed, 
also the battery commander, Hazlett, and others, but their 
troops were holding to their work as firmly as the mighty 
boulders that helped them. General Meade thought that 



GETTYSBURG SECOND DAY. 373 

the Confederate army was working on my part of the 
field. He led some regiments of the Twelfth Corps and 
posted them against us, called a division of Newton's corj)s 
(First) from beyond Hancock's, and sent Crawford's divi- 
sion, the last of the Fifth Corps, splitting through the 
gorge, forming solid lines, in places behind stone fences, 
and making steady battle, as veterans fresh in action know 
so well how to make. While Meade's lines were growing 
my men were dropjiing ; we had no others to call to their 
aid, and the weight against us was too heavy to carry. 
The extreme left of our lines was only about a mile from us 
across the enemy's concentric position, which brought us 
within hearing of that battle, if engaged, and near enough 
to feel its swell, but nothing was heard or felt but the 
clear ring of the enemy's fresh metal as he came against 
us. No other part of our army had engaged ! My seven- 
teen thousand against the Army of the Potomac ! The 
sun was down, and with it went down the severe battle. 
I ordered recall of the troops to the line of Plum Run 
and Devil's Den, leaving picket lines near the foot of the 
Round Tops. My loss was about six thousand, Meade's 
between twelve and fourteen thousand ; but his loss in 
general and field officers was frightful. When General 
Humphreys, who succeeded to Barksdale's brigade, was 
called back to the new line, he thought there was some 
mistake in the orders, and only withdrew as far as a cap- 
tured battery, and when the order was repeated, retired 
under protest. 

General Stuart came down from Carlisle with his 
column of cavalry late in the afternoon of the 2d. As 
he approached he met a cavalry force of the enemy 
moving towards the Confederate left rear, and was suc- 
cessful in arresting it. He was posted with Jenkins's 
three thousand cavalry '•' on the Confederate left. 

* In his official report he puts Jenkins's force at the opening cam- 
paign at three thousand eight hundred. 



374 . FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Notwithstanding the supreme order of the d^y for gen- 
eral battle, and the reinforcement of the cavalry on our 
left, the Second and Third Corps remained idle during 
all of the severe battle of the Confederate right, except 
the artillery, and the part of that on the extreme left 
was only in practice long enough to feel the superior metal 
of the enemy, when it retired, leaving a battery of four 
guns in position. General Early failed to even form 
his division in battle order, leaving a brigade in position 
remote from the line, and sending, later, another to be 
near Stuart's cavalry. The latter returned, however, 
before night. 

At eight o'clock in the evening the division on our ex- 
treme left, E. Johnson's, advanced. The brigades were J. 
M. Jones's, Nicholls's, Steuart's, and Walker's. Walker's 
was detached, as they moved, to look for a detachment of 
the enemy reported threatening the far away left. When 
the three brigades crossed Rock Creek it was night. The 
enemy's line to be assaulted was occupied by Greene's 
brigade of the Twelfth Corps. It was reinforced by 
three regiments of Wadsworth's division and three from 
the Eleventh Corps. After brave attack "and defence, 
part of the line was carried, when the fight, after a 
severe fusillade between the infantry lines, quieted, and 
Walker's brigade returned to the division. Part of the 
enemy's trenches, east of the point attacked (across a 
swale), vacated when the corps moved over to the left. 
General Johnson failed to occupy. 

Before this, General Rodes discovered that the enemy, 
in front of his division, was drawing off his artillery and 
infantry to my battle of the right, and suggested to 
General Early that the moment had come for the divi- 
sions to attack, and drew his forces from entanglements 
about the streets to be ready. After E. Johnson's fight 
on our extreme left, General Early ordered two brigades 
under General Harry T. Hays to attack. Hays had with 



GETTYSBURG SECOND DAY. 375 

liis Louisiana brigade Hoke's North Carolina brigade 
under Colonel Avery. He made as gallant a fight as 
was ever made. Mounting to the top of the hill, he 
captured a battery, and pushed on in brave order, taking 
some prisoners and colors, until he discovered that his two 
brigades were advancing in a night affair against a grand 
army, when he found that he was fortunate in having 
night to cover his weakness, and withdrew. The gallant 
Colonel Avery, mortally wounded and dying, wrote on a 
slij) of paper, " Tell father that I died ivith my face to the 
enemy. '' When Rodes was prepared. Hays had retired, 
and the former did not see that it was part of the order 
for general engagement to j^ut his division in night attack 
that could not be supported. 

Thus the general engagement of the day was dwarfed 
into the battle of the right at three o'clock, that on the 
left at eight by a single division, and that nearer the 
centre at nine o'clock by two brigades. 

There was a man on the left of the line who did not 
care to make the battle win. He knew where it was, had 
viewed it from its earliest formation, had orders for his 
part in it, but so withheld part of his command from it as 
to make co-operative concert of action impracticable. He 
had a pruriency for the honors of the field of Mars, was 
eloquent, before the fires of the bivouac and his chief, of 
the glory of war's gory shield ; but when its envied laurels 
were dipping to the grasp, when the heavy field called 
for bloody work, he found the placid horizon, far and 
away beyond the cavalry, more lovely and inviting. He 
wanted command of the Second Corps, and, succeeding to 
it, held the honored position until General Lee found, at 
last, that he must dismiss him from field service. 

General Lee ordered Johnson's division of his left, oc- 
cupying part of the enemy's trenches about Gulp's Hill, 
to be reinforced during the night of the 2d by two brigades 
of Rodes's division and one of Early's division. Why the 



376 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

other brigades of those divisions were not sent does not 
appear, but it does appear that there was a place for them 
on Johnson's left, in the trenches that were vacated by 
the Federal Twelfth Corps when called over to reinforce 
the battle of Meade's left. Gulp's Hill bore the same re- 
lations to the enemy's right as Little Round Top did to 
his left. General Fitzhugh Lee quotes evidence from 
General Meade that had Gulp's Hill been occupied, in 
force, by Gonfederates, it would have compelled the with- 
drawal of the Federal troops.* 

General Meade, after the battle of his left, ordered the 
divisions of his Twelfth Gorps back to their trenches, to 
recover the parts occupied by the Gonfederate left. It 
was night when the First Division approached. General 
Ruger, commanding, thought to feel his way through the 
dark by a line of skirmishers. He found the east end of 
his trenches, across the swale, unoccupied, and took pos- 
session. Pressing his adventure, he found the main line of 
his works occupied by the Gonfederates in force, and dis- 
posed his command to wait for daylight. The Second Di- 
vision came during the night, when General Williams, 
commanding the corjDS, posted it on the left of the First, 
and the division commanders ordered batteries in proper 
positions. 

During the night, General Meade held a council, which 
decided to fight it out. So it began to look as if the vicis- 
situdes of the day had so worked as to call General Meade 
from defensive to aggressive battle for Gulp's Hill. But 
the Gonfederates failed to see the opportunity and force 
the issue as it was presented. 

In General Meade's evidence before the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, he puts his Ijsses of the first 
and second days at twenty thousand, and assigns two- 
thirds of these to the battle of the 2d. As the fighting 

•^ General Lee, by Fitzhugh Lee (note), p. 299. 



GETTYSBURG SECOND DAY. 377 

against the three brigades of our left after niglit, and two 
brigades, later in the night, from our centre, could not 
have been very severe, I claim that his loss in the battle 
of his left was from twelve to fourteen thousand. 

As events of the battle of the 2d passed, it seems 
fair to claim that with Pickett's brigades present at the 
moment of Wofford's advance for the gorge at Little 
Round Top, we could have had it before Crawford was 
there. 

Under ordinary circumstances this account of the sec- 
ond day, made from the records, would be complete and 
conclusive ; but the battle of Gettysburg, which may be 
called the epitome of the war, has been the subject of 
many contentions of words. Knights of the quill have 
consumed many of their peaceful hours in publishing, 
through books, periodicals, and newspapers, their plans 
for the battle, endeavoring to forestall the records and to 
find a scapegoat, and their representations may be given, 
though they do not deserve it, a word of reply. 

General W. N. Pendleton led off when making a lec- 
turing tour through the South for a memorial church for 
General Lee. He claims that he made a reconnoissance 
on the afternoon of the 1st of July, and that upon his 
reporting it. General Lee ordered General Longstreet to 
attack at sunrise the next day. He did not venture to 
charge that the Secondhand Third Corps, that were on the 
field and had had a good night's rest, were part of the 
command ordered for the early battle, for the commanders, 
both Virginians, and not under the political ban, could 
have brought confusing evidence against him ; nor did he 
intend to put General Lee in the anomalous position, 
inferentially, of ordering part of the First Corps — that 
should march through the night and all night — to make 
the battle alone. The point of battle was east of the 
Emmitsburg road ; to find it, it was necessary to cross 
that road, but General Sickles was moving part of his 



378 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

corps over the road during that afternoon, and rested 
there the latter part of the day and during the night. So, 
to make the reconnoissance, General Pendleton passed the 
Union troops in Confederate uniform — he was military in 
his dress — and found the point of battle. Giving him 
credit, for the moment, for this delicate work and the 
mythical order, let us find the end to which it would lead. 

The only troops that could come under the order were 
McLaws's division, part of Hood's, and the artillery, — 
about ten thousand men. These, after a hurried all-night's 
march, reached General Lee's head-quarters about sunrise 
of the 2d, and by continued forced march could have 
reached the point of battle, about five miles away, by seven 
o'clock, where they would have encountered a division of 
the Third Corps (Birney's) ; presently the Second and 
Fifth Corps under Hancock and Sykes ; then the First, 
Eleventh, and Twelfth under Newton, Howard, and Slo- 
cum ; then the balance of the Third coming in on our 
rear along the Emmitsburg road, — making sixty thou- 
sand men and more. There w^as reason to be proud of 
the prowess of the troops of the First Corps, but to credit 
a part of it with success under the circumstances was not 
reasonable. 

That tlie^ Confederate Second Corps did not have orders 
for the alleged sunrise battle is evidenced by the report of 
its commander, who, accounting for his work about Culj^'s 
Hill during the night of the 1st and morning of the 2d, 
reported of the morning, " It was now daylight, and too 
late," meaning that it was too late for him to attack and 
carry that hill, as General Lee had authorized and ex- 
pected him to do during the night before. If he had been 
ordered to take part in the sunrise battle, he would have 
been in the nick of time. That the Third Corps was not 
to be in it is evidenced by the position of the greater part 
of it on Seminary Ridge until near noon of the 2d. So 
General Lee must have ordered a position carried, at sun- 



GETTYSBURG — SF'JOND DAY. 379 

rise, by ten thousand men, after it had gathered strength 
all night, — a position that he would not assault on the 
afternoon of the 1st with forty thousand men, lest they 
should encounter " overwhelming numbers." * 

As the other corps, after receiving their orders for the 
afternoon battle of the 2d, failed to engage until after 
nightfall, it is not probable that they would have found 
the sunrise battle without orders. 

General Pendleton's official report is in conflict with 
his memorial lecture. In the former he makes no refer- 
ence to the sunrise-battle order, but mentions a route by 
which the left of the enemy could be turned. 

Letters from the active members of General Lee's staff 
and from his military secretary, General A. L. Long, show 
that the sunrise battle was not ordered, and a letter from 
Colonel Fairfax shows that the claim that it was so 
ordered was set up after General Lee's death.f 

* His official report. 

t Following are the essential portions of the letters referred to, af- 
fording unquestionable and overwhelming testiaiony against the claim 
that General Longstreet was ordered to give battle " at sunrise" : 

"Norfolk, Va., April 28, 1875. 
" Dear General, — ... I can only say that I never before heard of 
the ' sunrise attack' you were to have made, as charged by General Pen- 
dleton. If sucli an order was given you I never knew of it, or it has 
strangely escaped my memory. I think it more than probable that if 
General Lee had had your troops available the evening previous to the 
day of whicli you speak, he would have ordered an early attack, but 
this does not touch the point at issue. I regard it as a great mistake on 
the part of those who, perhaps because of political differences, now 
undertake to criticise and attack your war record. Such conduct is 
most ungenerous, and I am sure meets the disapprobation of all good 
Confederates with whom I have had the pleasure of associating in the 
daily walks of life. 

" Yours, very respectfully, 

"W.H.Taylor." 

" University op Virginia, May 11, 1875. 
" General James Longstreet : 

" Dear General, — ... I did not know of any order for an attack 
on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can I l^elieve any such order was 
issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2d of July I was sent by 



380 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

In a published account, General Long mentions my 
suggestion on the afternoon of the 1st for the turning 



Geueral Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the ad- 
vantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (Colonel Mar- 
shall had been sent with a similar order on the night of the 1st.) Gen- 
eral Ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as 
to see with him the exact position of tilings. Befoi'e he got through the 
examination of the enemy's position, General Lee came himself to Gen- 
eral Ewell's lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General 
Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should 
move all tlie troops around on the right and attack on that side. I do 
not think that the errand on whicli I was sent by the commanding gen- 
eral is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion 
of the army. 

" Yours, very truly, 

" Charles S. Venable." 

" Baltimore, Md., May 7, 1875. 
" Dear General, — ... I have no personal recollection of the order 
to which you refer. It certainly was not conveyed by me, nor is there 
anything in General Lee's official report to show the attack on the 2d 
was expected by him to begin earlier, except that he notices that there 
was not proper concert of action on that day. . . . 

"Respectfully, 

" Charles Marshall." 

" Big Island, Bkdford, Va., May 31, 1875. 
"Dear General, — ... I do not recollect of hearing of an order to 
attack at sunrise, or at any other designated hour, pending the opera- 
tions at Gettysburg during the first three days of July, 1863. . . . 

" Yours truly, 

'"A.L.Long." 

"Freestone P. O., Prince William County, Va., 

"November 12, 1877. 
" My DEAR General LoNGSTREET,— . . . The winter after the death 
of General Lee I was in Lexington, visiting my sons at the V. M. I. 
General Pendleton called to see me at the hotel. General Custis Lee 
was in my room wlien he came in. After General Lee left. General Pen- 
dleton asked me if General Longstreet was not ordered to attack on the 
2d of July at Gettysburg at six o'clock in the morning, and did not attack 
until four o'clock in the evening. I told him it was not possible. When 
he left me I was under the impression I had convinced liim of his mis- 
taken idea. I told General Pendleton that you and General Lee were 
together the greater part of the day up to about three o'clock or later ; 
that you separated at the mouth of a lane not long thereafter. You 
said to me, ' Those troops will be in position by the time you get there ; 
tell General Hood to attack.' When I gave the order to General Hood 
he was standing within a step or two of his line of battle. I asked him 



GETTYSBURG SECOND DAY. 381 

march around the enemy's left, which he says, after con- 
sideration, was rejected.* 

Colonel Taylor claims that the attack by the Confed- 
erate right should have been sooner, and should have met 
the enemy back on his first or original line, and before 
Little Round Top was occupied. But Little Round Top 
was not occupied in force until after my battle opened, 
and General Sickles's advance to his forward lines was 
made in consequence of the Confederate threatening, and 
would have been sooner or later according as that threat- 
ening was made. He calls the message of General Lee to 
General Ewell on the afternoon of the 1st an order. Gen- 
eral Lee says, — 

''The strong position wliicli the enemy had assumed could not 
be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, 
exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming num- 
bers of fresh trooj)S. General Ewell was thereupon instructed to 
carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable." 

It is the custom of military service to accept instruc- 
tions of a commander as orders, but when they are coupled 
with conditions that transfer the responsibility of battle 
and defeat to the subordinate, they are not orders, and 
General Ewell was justifiable in not making attack that 
his commander would not order, and the censure of his 
failure is unjust and very ungenerous. 

to please delay his attack until I could communicate to General Long- 
street that he can turn the enemy, — pointing to a gorge in the moun- 
tain, where we would be slieltered from his view and attack by his cav- 
alry. General Hood slapped me on the knee and said, ' I agree with 
you,— bring General Longstreet to see for himself.' When I reported 
to you, your auswer was, 'It is General Lee's order ; the time is up,— 
attack at once.' I lost no time in repeating the same to General Hood, 
and remained witli him to see the attack, which was made instantly. 
We had a beautiful view of the enemy's left from Hood's position, which 
was close up to him. He gave way quickly. General Hood charged, 
and I spurred to report to you ; found you with hat in hand cheering 
on General McLaws's division. . . . 

" Truly your friend, 

" John W. Fairfax." 
* "Four Years with General Lee." 



382 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The Virginia writers have been so eager in their search 
for a flaw in the conduct of the battle of the First Corps 
that they overlook the only point into which they could 
have thrust their pens. 

At the opening of the fight, General Meade was with 
General Sickles discussing the feasibility of moving the 
Third Corps back to the line originally assigned for it, 
but the discussion was cut short by the opening of the 
Confederate battle. If that opening had been delayed 
thirty or forty minutes the corps would have been drawn 
back to the general line, and my first deployment would 
have enveloped Little Kound Top and carried it before it 
could have been strongly manned, and General Meade 
would have drawn off to his line selected behind Pipe 
Creek. The point should have been that the battle was 
opened too soon. 

Another point from which they seek comfort is that 
Sedgwick's corps (Sixth) was not up until a late hour of 
the 2d, and would not have been on the field for an ear- 
lier battle. But Sedgwick was not engaged in the late 
battle, and could have been back at Manchester, so far as 
the afternoon battle was concerned. And they harp a 
little on the delay of thirty minutes for Law's brigade to 
join its division. But General Lee called for the two 
divisions, and had called for Law's brigade to join his 
division. It was therefore his order for the division that 
delayed the march. To have gone without it would have 
justified censure. As we were not strong enough for the 
work with that brigade, it is not probable that we could 
have accomplished more without it. 

Colonel Taylor says that General Lee urged that the 
march of my troops should be hastened, and was chafed 
at their non-appearance. Not one word did he utter to 
me of their march until he gave his orders at eleven 
o'clock for the move to his right. Orders for the troops 
to hasten their march of the 1st were sent without even a 



GETTYSBURG — SECOND DAY. 383 

suggestion from him, but upon his announcement that he 
intended to fight the next day, if tlie enemy was there.* 

* Upon the various matters of this momentous day, which have been 
subject of controversy, the following testimony from J. S. D. Cullen is 
interesting and important : 

" Richmond, Va., May 18, 1875. 
"General James Longstreet : 

"Dear General, — ... It was an astounding announcement to the 
survivors of the First Army Corps that the disaster and failure at Get- 
tysburg was alone and solely due to its commander, and that had he 
obeyed the orders of the commander-in-chief Meade's army would 
have been beaten before its entire force had assembled, and its final 
discomfiture thereby made certain. It is a little strange that these 
charges were not made while General Lee was alive to substantiate or 
disprove them, and that seven years or more were permitted to pass by 
in silence regai'ding them. You are fortunate in being able to call upon 
the adjutant-general and the two confidential officers of General Lee's 
staff for their testimony in the case, and I do not think that you will 
have any reason to fear their evidence. They knew every order that 
was issued for that battle, when and where attacks were to be made, 
who were slow in attacking, and who did not make attacks that were 
expected to be made. I hope, for the sake of history and for your brave 
military record, that a quietus will at once be put on this subject. I 
distinctly remember the appearance in our head-quarters camp of the 
scout who brought from Frederick the first account that General Lee 
had of the definite whereabouts of the enemy ; of the excitement at 
General Lee's head-quarters among couriers, quartermasters, commis- 
saries, etc., all betokening some early movement of the commands de- 
pendent upon the news brought by the scout. Tiiat afternoon General 
Lee was walking with some of us in the road in front of his head-quar- 
ters, and said, ' To-morrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg 
as we expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General 
Meade is after.' Orders had then been issued to the corps to move at 
sunrise on the morning of the next day, and promptly at that time the 
corps was put on the road. The troops moved slowly a short distance 
when they were stopped by Ewell's wagon-trains and Johnson's division 
turning into the road in front of them, making their way from some 
point north to Cashtown or Gettysburg. How many hours we were de- 
tained I am unable to say, but it must have been many, for I remember 
eating a lunch or dinner before moving again. Being anxious to see 
you, I rode rapidly by the troops (who, as soon as they could get into 
the road, pushed hurriedly by us also), and overtook you about dark at 
the hill this side of Gettysburg, about half a mile from the town. You 
had been at the front with General Lee, and were returning to your 
camp, a mile or two back. I spoke very exultingly of the victory we 
were thought to have obtained that day, but was surprised to find that 
you did not take the same cheerful view of it that I did, and presently 
you renaarked that it would have been better had we not fought than to 



384 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX, 

That he was excited and off his balance was evident on 
the afternoon of the 1st, and he labored under that op- 
pression until enough blood was shed to appease him. 



have left undoue what we did. You said tliat the enemy were left oc- 
cupying a position that it would take the whole army to drive them 
from and then at a great sacrifice. We soon reached the camp, three 
miles, perhaps, from Gettysburg, and found the column near by. Orders 
were issued to be ready to march at ' daybreak,' or some earlier hour, 
next morning. About three o'clock in the morning, while the stars 
were shining, you left your head-quarters and rode to General Lee's, 
where I found you sitting with him after sunrise looking at the enemy 
on Cemetery Hill. ..." 

" I am yours, very truly, 

'' J. S. D. CULLEN." 



CHAPTER XXVIII. 

GETTYSBUEG — THIRD DAY. 

The Stroke of Arms that shook the Continent— Longstreet opposed the 
Attack as planned and made — The Confederate Column of Assault — 
It was weak in Numbers but strong in Spirit — Tremendous Artillery- 
Combat begins the Day's Fighting— Charge of Generals Pickett, Trim- 
ble, and Pettigrew — Armistead falls by the Side of the Federal Guns — 
The Federal Cavalry Charge of General Farnsworth— The Com- 
mander falls with Five Mortal Wounds — Could the Assaulting Column 
have been safely augmented from Longstreet's Right ?— Testimony 
as to that Point — Whei'e rested the Responsibility for Disaster?— Criti- 
cism of the Battle as a whole — Cemetery Hill stronger than Marye's 
Hill at Fredericksburg— Controverted Points— Casualties of the Three 
Days' Fight— Organization of the Forces engaged. 

General Lee has reported of arrangeraents for the 
day,— 

''The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by 
Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during 
the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, 
and General Ewell was ordered to attack the enemy's right at 
the same time. The latter during the night reinforced General 
Johnson with two brigades from Eodes's and one from Early's 
division." * 

This is disingenuous. He did not give or send me 
orders for the morning of the third day, nor did he rein- 
force me by Pickett's brigades for morning attack. As his 
head-quarters were about four miles from the command, I 
did not ride over, but sent, to report the work of the 
second day. In the absence of orders, I had scouting 
parties out during the night in search of a way by which 
we might strike the enemy's left, and push it down towards 
his centre. I found a way that gave some promise of re- 
sults, and was about to move the command, when he rode 

* Rebellion Record. 

25 385 



386 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

over after sunrise and gave his orders. His plan was to 
assault the enemy's left centre by a column to be com- 
posed of McLaws's and Hood's divisions reinforced by 
Pickett's brigades.* I thought that it would not do ; that 
the point had been fully tested the day before, by more 
men, when all were fresh ; that the enemy was there look- 
ing for us, as we heard him during the night putting up 
his defences; that the divisions of McLaws and Hood 
were holding a mile along the right of my line against 
twenty thousand men, who would follow their withdrawal, 
strike the flank of the assaulting column, crush it, and get 
on our rear towards the Potomac River ; that thirty thou- 
sand men was the minimum of force necessary for the 
work ; that even such force would need close co-operation 
on other parts of the line ; that the column as he pro- 
posed to organize it would have only about thirteen thou- 
sand men (the divisions having lost a third of their num- 
bers the day before) ; that the column would have to 
march a mile under concentrating battery fire, and a thou- 
sand yards under long-range musketry ; that the condi- 
tions were different from those in the days of Napoleon, 
when field batteries had a range of six hundred yards 
and musketry about sixty yards. 

He said the distance was not more than fourteen hundred 
yards. General Meade's estimate was a mile or a mile 
and a half (Captain Long, the guide of the field of Get- 
tysburg in 1888, stated that it was a trifle over a mile). 
He then concluded that the divisions of McLaws and 
Hood could remain on the defensive line ; that he would 
reinforce by divisions of the Third Corps and Pickett's 
brigades, and stated the point to which the march should 
be directed. I asked the strength of the column. He 
stated fifteen thousand. Opinion was then expressed that 
the fifteen thousand men who could make successful as- 

* " Four Years with General Lee," W. H. Taylor, page 103. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 387 

sault over that field had never been arrayed for battle ; 
but he was imj^atient of listening, and tired of talking, 
and nothing was left but to proceed. General Alexander 
was ordered to arrange the batteries of the front of the 
First and Third Corps, those of the Second were suj)posed 
to be in position ; Colonel Walton was ordered to see that 
the batteries of the First were supplied with ammunition, 
and to prepare to give the signal-guns for the 023ening 
combat. The infantry of the Third Corps to be assigned 
were Heth's and Pettigrew's divisions and Wilcox's bri- 
gade. 

At the time of the conversation and arrangement of the 
assault by the Confederate right, artillery fire was heard 
on our extreme left. It seems that General Lee had sent 
orders to General Ewell to renew his battle in the morn- 
ing, which was intended, and directed, as a co-operation of 
the attack he intended to order on his right, but General 
Ruger, anticipating, opened his batteries against Ewell 
at daylight. The Union divisions — Ruger's and Gary's — 
were on broken lines, open towards the trenches held by 
the Confederates, so that assault by our line would expose 
the force to fire from the enemy's other line. Ruger had 
occupied the trenches left vacant on his right, and Gary 
reached to his left under Greene, who held his line against 
the attack of the day before. It seems that the Con- 
federates failed to bring artillery up to their trenches, and 
must make their fight with infantry^ while on the Union 
side there were some fifteen or twenty guns playing, and 
many more at hand if needed. 

As the Union batteries opened, Johnson advanced and 
assaulted the enemy's works on his righ^ towards the centre 
and the adjacent front of the new line, and held to that at- 
tack with resolution, putting in fresh troops to help it from 
time to time. Ruger put two regiments forward to feel the 
way towards Johnson's left. They got into hot engage- 
ment and were repulsed ; Johnson tried to follow, but was 



\. 



388 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

in turn forced back. He renewed his main attack again, 
but unsuccessfully, and finally drew back to the trenches. 
Ruger threw a regiment forward from his left which gained 
the stone wall; his division was then advanced, and it 
recovered the entire line of trenches. 

While this contention was in progress the troops ordered 
for the column of assault were marching and finding posi- 
tions under the crest of the ridge, where they could be 
covered during the artillery combat. Alexander put a 
battery of nine guns under the ridge and out of the 
enemy's fire to be used with the assaulting column. 

General Lee said that the attack of his right was not 
made as early as expected, — which he should not have said. 
He knew that I did not believe that success was possible ; 
that care and time should be taken to give the troops the 
benefit of positions and the grounds ; and he should have 
put an officer in charge who had more confidence in his 
plan. Two-thirds of the troops were of other commands, 
and there was no reason for putting the assaulting forces 
under my charge. He had confidence in General Early, 
who advised in ftivor of that end of the line for battle. 
Knowing my want of confidence, he should have given the 
benefit of his presence and his assistance in getting the 
troops up, posting them, and arranging the batteries ; but 
he gave no orders or suggestions after his early designa- 
tion of the point for which the column should march. 
Fitzhugh Lee claims evidence that General Lee did not 
even appear on that part of the field while the troops were 
being assigned to position. 

As the commands reported, Pickett was assigned on the 
right, Kemper's and Garnett's brigades to be supported 
by Armistead's ; Wilcox's brigade of the Third Corps in 
echelon and guarding Pickett's right ; Pettigrew's di- 
vision on Pickett's left, supported by the brigades of 
Scales and Lane, under command of General Trimble. 
The brigades of Pettigrew's division were Archer's, Pet- 




Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery, First Corps. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 389 

tigrew's, Brockenbrough's, and Davis's. (General Archer 
having been taken prisoner on the 1st, his brigade was 
under command of Colonel Fry ; General Scales being 
wounded on the same day, his brigade was commanded 
by Colonel Lowrance.) The ridge upon which the com- 
mands were formed was not parallel to that upon which 
the enemy stood, but bending west towards our left, while 
the enemy's line bore northwest towards his right, so that 
the left of the assaulting column formed some little dis- 
tance farther from the enemy's line than the right. To 
put the troops under the best cover during the artillery 
combat they were thus posted for the march, but directed 
to spread their steps as soon as the march opened the 
field, and to gain places of correct alignment. 

Meanwhile, the energy's artillery on his extreme right 
was in practice more or less active, but its meaning was 
not known or reported, and the sharp-shooters of the 
command on the right had a lively fusillade about eleven 
o'clock, in which some of the artillery took part. The 
order was that the right was to make the signal of battle. 
General Lee reported that his left attacked before due 
notice to wait for the opening could be given, which was 
a mistake, inasmuch as the attack on his left was begun 
by the Federals, which called his left to their work. 
General Meade was not apprehensive of that part of the 
field, and only used the two divisions of the Twelfth 
Corps, Shaler's brigade of the Sixth, and six regiments of 
the First and Eleventh Corps in recovering the trenches 
of his right, holding the other six corps for the battle of v^ 
his centre and left. He knew by the Confederate troops ^ 
on his right just where the strong battle was to be. 

The director of artillery was asked to select a position 
on his line from which he could note the effect of his 
practice, and to advise General Pickett when the enemy's 
fire was so disturbed as to call for the assault. General 
Pickett's was the division of direction, and he was ordered 



390 FROM MAIS^ASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

to have a staff-officer or courier with the artillery director 
to bear notice of the moment to advance. 

The little affair between the skirmish lines quieted in a 
short time, and also the noise on our extreme left. The 
quiet filing of one or two of our batteries into position 
emphasized the profound silence that prevailed during 
our wait for final orders. Strong battle was in the air, 
and the veterans of both sides swelled their breasts to 
gather nerve and strength to meet it. Division com- 
manders were asked to go to the crest of the ridge and 
take a careful view of the field, and to have their officers 
there to tell their men of it, and to prepare them for the 
sight that was to burst upon them as they mounted the 
crest. 

Just then a squadron of Union cavalry rode through 
detachments of infantry posted at intervals in rear of my 
right division. It was called a charge, but was probably 
a reconnoissance. 

Colonel Black had reported with a hundred of the First 
South Carolina Cavalry, not all mounted, and a battery 
of horse artillery, and was put across the Emmitsburg 
road, supported by infantry, in front of Merritt's brigade 
of cavalry. 

When satisfied that the work of preparation was all 
that it could be with the means at hand, I wrote Colonel 
Walton, of the Washington Artillery, — 

^'Head-quarters, July 3, 1863. 
'^ Colonel,— Let the batteries open. Order great care and 
precision in firing. When the batteries at the Peach Orchard 
cannot be used against the point we intend to attack, let them 
open on the enemy's on the rocky hill. 

''Most respectfully, 

"James Longstreet, 
' ' Lieutenant- General, Commanding. ' ' 

At the same time a note to Alexander directed that 
Pickett should not be called until the artillery practice 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 391 

indicated fair opportunity. Then I rode to a woodland 
hard by, to lie down and study for some new thought 
that might aid the assaulting column. In a few minutes 
report came from Alexander that he would only be able to 
judge of the effect of his fire by the return of that of the 
enemy, as his infantry was not exposed to view, and the 
smoke of the batteries would soon cover the field. He 
asked, if there was an alternative, that it be carefully 
considered before the batteries opened, as there was not 
enough artillery ammunition for this and another trial if 
this should not prove favorable. 

He was informed that there was no alternative ; that I 
could find no way out of it ; that General Lee had con- 
sidered and would listen to nothing else ; that orders had 
gone for the guns to give signal for the batteries ; that he 
should call the troops at the first opportunity or lull in 
the enemy's fire. 

The signal-guns broke the silence, the blaze of the second 
gun mingling in the smoke of the first, and salvoes rolled 
to the left and repeated themselves, the enemy's fine metal 
spreading its fire to the converging lines, ploughing the 
trembling ground, plunging through the line of batteries, 
and clouding the heavy air. The two or three hundred 
guns seemed proud of their undivided honors and organ- 
ized confusion. The Confederates had the benefit of 
converging fire into the enemy's massed position, but the 
superior metal of the enemy neutralized the advantage of 
position. The brave and steady work progressed. 

Before this the Confederates of the left were driven 
from their captured trenches, and hope of their effective 
co-operation with the battle of the right was lost, but no 
notice of it was sent to the right of the battle. They made 
some further demonstrations, but they were of little effect. 
Merritt's brigade of cavalry was in rear of my right, 
threatening on the Emmitsburg road. Farnsworth's bri- 
gade took position between Merritt's and close on my right 



392 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

rear. Infantry regiments and batteries were broken off 
from my front line and posted to guard on that flank and 
rear. 

Not informed of tlie failure of the Confederates on the 
left and the loss of their vantage-ground, we looked with 
confidence for them to follow the orders of battle. 

General Pickett rode to confer with Alexander, then to 
the ground upon which I was resting, where he was soon 
handed a slip of paper. After reading it he handed it to 
me. It read : 

''If you are coming at all, come at once, or I cannot give you 
proper support, but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all. At 
least eighteen guns are still firing from the cemetery itself. 

''Alexander." 

Pickett said, " General, shall I advance ?" 
The effort to speak the order failed, and I could only 
indicate it by an affirmative bow. He accepted the duty 
with seeming confidence of success, leaped on his horse, 
and rode gayly to his command. I mounted and spurred 
for Alexander's post. He reported that the batteries he 
had reserved for the charge with the infantry had been 
spirited away by General Lee's chief of artillery ; that the 
ammunition of the batteries of position was so reduced 
that he could not use them in proper suj^port of the in- 
fantry. He was ordered to stop the march at once and 
fill up his ammunition-chests. But, alas ! there was no 
more ammunition to be had. 

The order was imperative. The Confederate commander 
had fixed his heart upon the work. Just then a num- 
ber of the enemy's batteries hitched up and hauled off, 
which gave a glimpse of unexpected hope. Encour- 
aging messages were sent for the columns to hurry on, 
— and they were then on elastic springing step. The 
officers saluted as they passed, their stern smiles express- 
ing confidence. General Pickett, a graceful horseman, sat 




■i4/y-c^ 



^^c^A:^^^ 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 393 

lightly in the saddle, his brown locks flowing quite over 
his shoulders. Pettigrew's division spread their steps and 
quickly rectified the alignment, and the grand march 
moved \)ravely on. As soon as the leading columns 
opened the way, the supports sprang to their alignments. 
General Trimble mounted, adjusting his seat and reins 
with an air and grace as if setting out on a pleasant after- 
noon ride. When aligned to their places solid march was 
made down the slope and past our batteries of position. 

Confederate batteries put their fire over the heads of the 
men as they moved down the slope, and continued to draw 
the fire of the enemy until the smoke lifted and drifted to 
the rear, when every gun was turned upon the infantry 
columns. The batteries that had been drawn off were re- 
placed by others that were fresh. Soldiers and officers 
began to fall, some to rise no more, others to find their 
way to the hospital tents. Single files were cut here and 
there, then the gaps increased, and an occasional shot tore 
wider openings, but, closing the gaps as quickly as made, 
the march moved on. The divisions of McLaws and 
Hood were ordered to move to closer lines for the enemy 
on their front, to spring to the charge as soon as the breach 
at the centre could be made. The enemy's right over- 
reached my left and gave serious trouble. Brockenbrough's 
brigade went down and Davis's in impetuous charge. The 
general order required further assistance from the Third 
Corps if needed, but no support appeared. General Lee 
and the corps commander were there, but failed to order 
help. 

Colonel Latrobe was sent to General Trimble to have 
his men fill the line of the broken brigades, and bravely 
they repaired the damage. The enemy moved out against 
the supporting brigade in Pickett's rear. Colonel Sorrel 
was sent to have that move guarded, and Pickett was 
drawn back to that contention. McLaws was ordered to 
press his left forward, but the direct fire of infantry and 



394 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

cross-fire of artillery was telling fearfully on the front. 
Colonel Fremantle ran up to offer congratulations on the 
apparent success, but the big gaps in the ranks grew until 
the lines were reduced to half their length. I called 
his attention to tlie broken, struggling ranks. Trimble 
mended the battle of the left in handsome style, but on 
the right the massing of the enemy grew stronger and 
stronger. Brigadier Garnett was killed, Kemper and 
Trimble were desperately wounded ; Generals Hancock 
and Gibbon were wounded. General Lane succeeded 
Trimble, and with Pettigrew held the battle of the left 
in steady ranks. 

Pickett's lines being nearer, the impact was heaviest 
upon them. Most of the field ofiicers were killed or 
wounded. Colonel Whittle, of Armistead's brigade, who 
had been shot through the right leg at Williamsburg 
and lost his left arm at Malvern Hill, was shot through 
the right arm, then brought down by a shot through his 
left leg. 

General Armistead, of the second line, spread his steps 
to supply the places of fallen comrades. His colors cut 
down, with a volley against the bristling line of bayonets, 
he put his cap on his sword to guide the storm. The 
enemy's massing, enveloping numbers held the struggle 
until the noble Armistead fell beside the wheels of the 
enemy's battery. Pettigrew was wounded, but held his 
command. 

General Pickett, finding the battle broken, while the 
enemy was still reinforcing, called the troops off. There 
was no indication of panic. The broken files marched 
back in steady step. The effort was nobly made, and 
failed from blows that could not be fended. Some of the 
files were cut off from retreat by fire that swept the field 
in their rear. Officers of my staff, sent forward with 
orders, came back with their saddles and bridles in their 
arms. Latrobe's horse was twice shot. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 395 

Looking confidently for advance of the enemy through 
our 023en field, I rode to the line of batteries, resolved to 
hold it until the last gun was lost. As I rode, the shells 
screaming over my head and ploughing the ground under 
my horse, an involuntary appeal went up that one of them 
might take me from scenes of such awful responsibility ; 
but the storm to be met left no time to think of one's self. 
The battery officers were prepared to meet the crisis, — 
no move had been made for leaving the field. My old 
acquaintance of Sharpsburg experience, Captain Miller, 
was walking up and down behind his guns, smoking his 
pipe, directing his fire over the heads of our men as fast 
as they were inside of the danger-line ; the other officers 
equally firm and ready to defend to the last. A body of 
skirmishers put out from the enemy's lines and advanced 
some distance, but the batteries opened severe fire and 
drove it back. Our men passed the batteries in quiet 
walk, and would rally, I knew, when they reached the 
ridge from which they started. 

General Lee was soon with us, and with staff'-officers 
and others assisted in encouraging the men and getting 
them together. 

As the attack failed. General Kilpatrick put his cavalry 
brigade under General Farnsworth on the charge through 
the infantry detachment in rear of my right division. 
The regiments of G. T. Anderson's brigade had been 
posted at points in rear as guards against cavalry, and the 
First Texas, Fourth and Fifteenth Alabama, and Bach- 
man's and Reilly's batteries were looking for that adven- 
ture. Farnsworth had a rough ride over rocks and stone 
fences, but bore on in spite of all, cutting and slashing 
when he could get at the skirmishers or detachments. He 
made a gallant ride along the rear of our right, but 
was obliged to come under the infantry and artillery fire 
at several points. He fell, pierced, it is said, by five 
mortal wounds. Calls for him to surrender were made, 



396 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

but the cavalry were not riding for that. The command 
lost heavily, but claimed captives equal to their loss. 

Kil|)atrick's mistake was in not putting Farnsworth in 
on Merritt's left, where he would have had an open ride, 
and made more trouble than was ever made by a cavalry 
brigade. Had the ride been followed by prompt advance 
of the enemy's infantry in line beyond our right and 
pushed with vigor, they could have reached our line of 
retreat. General Meade ordered his left, but delay in 
getting the orders and preparing to get through the rough 
grounds consumed time, and the move was abandoned. 
The Fifth and Sixth Corps were in convenient position, 
and would have had good ground for marching after get- 
ting out of the rocky fastnesses of Round Top. 

As we had no cavalry on our right, the Union cavalry 
was held on their right to observe the Confederates under 
Stuart, except Kilpatrick's division (and Custer's brigade 
of that division was retained on their right). A little 
while after the repulse of our infantry column, Stuart's 
cavalry advanced and was met by Gregg's, and made one 
of the severest and most stubborn fights of cavalry on 
record. General Wade Hampton was severely wounded. 
The Union forces held the field. 

When affairs had quieted a little, and apprehension of 
immediate counter-attack had passed, orders were sent the 
divisions of McLaws and Hood to draw back and occupy 
the lines from which they had advanced to engage the 
battle of the second. Orders sent Benning's brigade by 
the division staff were not understood, and Benning, under 
the impression that he was to relieve jDart of McLaw^'s 
division, which he thought was to be sent on other service, 
ordered the Fifteenth Georgia Regiment to occupy that 
position. When he received the second order he sent for 
his detached regiment. Meanwhile, the enemy was feeling 
the way to his front, and before Colonel DuBose received 
his second order, the enemy was on his front and had 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 397 

passed his right and left flanks. The moment he received 
the final order, Colonel DuBose made a running fight and 
escaped with something more than half his men. 

In regard to this, as to other battles in which the First 
Cori^s was concerned, the knights of peaceful later days 
have been busy in search of points on which to lay charges 
or make innuendoes of want of conduct of that corps. 
General Early has been a j^icturesque figure in the combi- 
nation, ready to champion any reports that could throw a 
shadow over its record, but the charge most pleasing to 
him was that of treason on the part of its commander. 
The subject was lasting, piquant, and so consoling that 
one is almost inclined to envy the comfort it gave him in 
his latter days. / 

Colonel Taylor and members of the staff claim that 
General Lee ordered that the divisions of McLaws and 
Hood should be a part of the assaulting column. Of this 
General Lee says, — 

'^General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the 
high, rocky hill on the enemy's extreme left, from which his 
troops could be attacked from reverse as they advanced. His 
operations had been embarrassed the day previously from the 
same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank 
and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was there- 
fore reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, 
to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. 
General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of the com- 
mand, to afford General Longstreet further assistance if required, 
and to avail himself of any success that might be gained." 

Colonel Taylor says, — 

' ' As our extreme right was comparatively safe, being well 
posted, and not at all threatened, one of the divisions of Hood 
and McLaws, and a greater part of the other, could be moved out 
of the lines and be made to take part in the attack." 

On this point I offer the evidence of General Warren 
before the Committee of Investigation : 



398 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

" General Meade had so arranged his troops on our left during 
the third day that nearly one-half of our army was in reserve iu 
that position. It was a good, sheltered position, and a convenient 
one from which to reinforce other points of the line, and when the 
repulse of the enemy took place on that day, General Meade in- 
tended to move forward all the forces he could get in hand and 
assault the enemy in line. He ordered the advance of the Fifth 
Corps, but it was carried so slowly that it did not amount to much, 
if anything." 

General Hancock's evidence on that point is : 

"General Meade told me before the fight that if the enemy at- 
tacked me, he intended to put the Fifth and Sixth Corps on the 
enemy's flank." 

From which it is evident that the withdrawal of the di- 
visions of my right, to be put in the column of assault, 
would have been followed by those corps swinging around 
and enveloping the assaulting columns and gaining Lee's 
line of retreat. 

Colonel Venable thinks it a mistake to have put Hetli's 
division in the assaulting column. He says, — 

*' They were terribly mistaken about Heth's division in this 
planning. It had not recuperated, having suffered more than was 
reported on the first day," 

But to accept for the moment Colonel Taylor's prem- 
ises, the two divisions referred to would have swelled the 
columns of assault to twenty-three thousand men. We 
were alone in the battle as on the day before. The enemy 
had seventy-five thousand men on strong ground, with 
well-constructed defences. The Confederates would have 
had to march a mile through the blaze of direct and 
cross fire and break up an army of seventy-five thousand 
well-seasoned troops, well defended by field-works ! 

A rough sketch of the positions of the forces about my 
right and rear will help to show if it " was comparatively 
safe, and not at all threatened." 



GETTYSBURC 



-THIRD DAY. 



399 



Jl^^NCOCK Litt/g^ 







General Gibbon's testimony in regard to the assaulting 
columns of the 3d : 

"I was wounded about the time I suppose the enemy's second 
line got into our batteries, — probably a little before that. As 
described to me afterwards, the result, I think, will carry out my 
idea in regard to it, because the enemy broke through, forced 
back my weakest brigade under General Webb, got into our bat- 
teries, and the men were so close that the officers on each side were 
using their pistols on each other, and the men frequently clubbed 
their muskets, and the clothes of men on both sides were burned 
by the powder of exploding cartridges. An officer of my staff, 
Lieutenant Haskell, had been sent by me, just jjreviously to the 
attack, to General Meade with a message that the enemy were 
coming. He got back on the tof) of the hill hunting for me, and 
was there when this brigade was forced back, and, without wait- 
ing orders from me, he rode off to the left and ordered all the 
troops of the division there to the right. As they came up helter- 
skelter, everybody for himself, with their officers among them, 
they commenced firing upon these rebels as they were coming 
into our lines." 

Had the column been augmented by the divisions of 
my right, it is probable that its brave men would have 
penetrated far enough to reach Johnson's Island as i^ris- 
oners ; hardly possible that it could have returned to 
General Lee by any other route. 

When engaged collecting the broken files after the re- 
pulse, General Lee said to an officer who was assisting, 
*' It is all my fault." 



400 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

A letter from Colonel W. M. Owen assures me that 
General Lee repeated this remark at a roadside fire of 
the Washington Artillery on the 5th of July. A letter 
from General Lee during the winter of 1863-64 repeated 
it in substance. 

And here is what Colonel T. J. Goree, of Texas, has to 
say upon the subject : 

'^Iwas present, however, just after Pickett's repuLse, when 
General Lee so magnanimously took all the blame of the disaster 
upon himself. Another important circumstance, which I dis- 
tinctly remember, was in the winter of 1863-64, when you sent 
me from East Tennessee to Orange Court-House with some de- 
spatches to General Lee. Upon my arrival there. General Lee 
asked me into his tent, where he was alone, with two or three 
Northern papers on the table. He remarked that he had just 
been reading the Northern reports of the battle of Gettysburg ; 
that he had become satisfied from reading those reports that if he 
had permitted you to carry out your plan, instead of making the attack 
on Cemetery Sill, he would have been successful.^ ^ 

Further testimony to this effect comes from another 
source : 

^'In East Tennessee, during the winter of 1863-64, yon called 
me into your quarters, and asked me to read a letter jjist received 
from General Lee in which he used the following words : ' Oh, 
general, had I hut followed your advice, instead of pursuing the 
course that I did, how different all icould have been P You wished 
me to bear this language in mind as your correspondence might 

be lost. 

''Erasmus Taylor. 
" Orange County, Va." 

A contributor to Blackwood'' s Ifagazine reported, — 

''But Lee's inaction after Fredericksburg was, as we have 
called it, an unhajipy or negative blunder. Undoubtedly the great- 
est positive blunder of which he was ever guilty was the unneces- 
sary onslaught which he gratuitously made against the strong 
position into which, by accident, General Meade fell back at Get- 
tysburg, We have good reason for saying that during the five 
years of calm reflection which General Lee passed at Lexington, 
after the conclusion of the American war, his maladroit manipu- 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 401 

lation of the Confederate army during the Gettysburg campaign 
was to him a matter of ceaseless self reproach. 

" ' If,' said he, on many occasions, '■ I had taken General T.'ong- 
street's advice on the eve of the second day of the battlf; of Get- 
tysburg, and filed off the left corps of my army behind the right 
corps, in the direction of Washington and Baltimore, along the 
Emmitsburg road, the Confederates would to-day be a free 
people.' " * 

It should be stated that kindest relations were main- 
tained between General Lee and myself until interrupted 
by politics in 1867. 

It is difficult to reconcile these facts with the reports 
put out after his death by members of his family and of 
his staff, and post-bellum champions, that indicate his later 
efforts to find points by which to so work up public opin- 
ion as to shift the disaster to my shoulders. 

Some of the statements of the members of the staff 
have been referred to. General Fitzhugh Lee claims evi- 
dence that General Lee said that he would have gained 
the battle if he had had General Jackson with him. But 
he had Jackson in the Sharpsburg campaign, which was 
more blundering than that of Gettysburg.f In another 
account Fitzhugh Lee wrote of General Lee, — 

''He told the father of the writer, his brother, that he was con- 
trolled too far by the great confidence he felt in the fighting 
qualities of his people, and by assurances of most of his higher 
officers." 

* Eclectic Magazine, May, 1872. 

t At Sharpsburg, General Jackson left the field at seven o'clock in the 
morning and did not return until four o'clock in the afternoon, when he 
was ordered with his command and the cavalry to turn and strike down 
against tlie Union right. He started to execute the order, then gave it 
up without even asking permission. He made a brave and gallant fight 
in the morning, losing 1601 officers and men. But D. H. Hill was there 
from the first to the last gun, losing from his division 1872 officers and 
men. Jackson had the greater part of two divisions. But Hill was not a 
Virginian, and it would not do to leave the field for refreshments. The 
figures include Jackson's losses at Harper's Ferry and Sharpsburg; 
Hill's at South Mountain and Sharpsburg. 

26 



402 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

No assurances were made from officers of the First 
Corps, but rather objections. Tlie only assurances that 
have r';':'me to light, to be identified, are those of General 
Early, \\"ho advised the battle, but fi^om the other end of 
the line from his command, which should have given 
warning that it did not come from the heart of a true 
soldier. 

And this is the epitome of the Confederate battle. The 
army when it set out on the campaign was all that could 
be desired, (except that the arms were not all of the most 
approved pattern), but it was despoiled of two of its finest 
brigades, Jenkins's and Corse's of Pickett's division, and 
was fought out by detail. The greatest number engaged 
at any one time was on the first day, when twenty-six 
thousand engaged twenty thousand of the First and part 
of the Eleventh Corps. On the afternoon of the second 
day about seventeen thousand were engaged on the right, 
and at night about seven thousand on the left; then 
later at night about three thousand near the centre. On 
the third day about twelve thousand were engaged at day- 
light and until near noon, and in the afternoon fifteen 
thousand, — all of the work of the second and third days 
against an army of seventy thousand and more of veteran 
troops in strong jDOsition defended by field-works. 

General Lee was on the field from about three o'clock 
of the afternoon of the first day. Every order given 
the troops of the First Corps on that field up to its 
march on the forenoon of the 2d was issued in his pres- 
ence. If the movements were not satisfactory in time and 
speed of moving, it was his power, duty, and privilege 
to apply the remedy, but it was not a part of a com- 
mander's duty or privilege to witness things that did not 
suit him, fail to apply the remedy, and go off and 
grumble with his staff-officers about it. In their efforts to 
show culpable delay in the movements of the First Corps 
on the 2d, some of the Virginia writers endeavor to show 



GETTYSBURG THIED DAY. 403 

that General Lee did not even give me a guide to lead the 
way to the field from which his battle was to be opened. 
He certainly failed to go and look at it, and assist in se- 
lecting the ground and preparing for action. 

Fitzhugh Lee says of the second day, " Longstreet was 
attacking the Marye's Hill of the position." * At Fred- 
ericksburg, General Burnside attacked at Marye's Hill in 
six or more successive assaults with some twenty or thirty 
thousand against three brigades under McLaws and Ran- 
som and the artillery ; he had about four hundred yards 
to march from his covered ways about Fredericksburg to 
Marye's Hill. When his last attack was repulsed in 
the evening, he arranged and gave his orders for the at- 
tack to be renewed in the morning, giving notice that he 
would lead it with the Ninth Corps, but upon reports of 
his officers abandoned it. General Lee's assaulting col- 
umns of fifteen or twenty thousand had a march of a mile 
to attack double their numbers, better defended than were 
the three brigades of Confederates at Marye's Hill that 
drove back Burnside. The enemy on Cemetery Hill was 
in stronger position than the Confederates at Marye's 
Hill. 

Fitzhugh Lee writes in the volume already quoted, — 

''Over the splendid scene of human courage and human sacri- 
fice at Gettysburg there arises in the South an apparition, like 
Banquo's ghost at Macbeth' s banquet, which says the battle was 
lost to the Confederates because some one blundered." 

Call them Banquo, but their name is Legion. Weird 
spirits keep midnight watch about the great boulders, 
while unknown comrades stalk in ghostly ranks through 
the black fastnesses of Devil's Den, wailing the lament, 
" Some one blundered at Gettysburg ! Woe is me, whose 
duty was to die !" 

*" General Lee," by Fitzhugh Lee. Marye's Hill was the strong- 
hold at Fredericksburg. 



404 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Fitzliugli Lee makes his plans, orders, and movements 
to suit his purpose, and claims that they would have given 
Gettysburg to the Confederates, but he is not likely to 
convince any one outside of his coterie that over the 
heights of Gettysburg was to be found honor for the 
South. 

General Meade said that the suggestion to work towards 
his line of communication was sound "military sense." 
That utterance has been approved by subsequent fair 
judgment, and it is that potent fact that draws the spiteful 
fire of latter-day knights. 

Forty thousand men, unsupported as we were, could 
not have carried the position at Gettysburg. The enemy 
was there. Officers and men knew their advantage, and 
were resolved to stay until the hills came down over them. 
It is simply out of the question for a lesser force to march 
over broad, ojDcn fields and carry a fortified front occupied 
by a greater force of seasoned troops. 

Referring to the proposed move around the Union left 
to cut the line of communication, a parallel in the Franco- 
German war is appropriate. When the manoeuvres of 
the campaign had pushed Marshal MacMahon's army 
back to the road between Paris and Metz, the latter forti- 
fied and occupied by the army under Marshal Bazaine, 
MacMahon hesitated between Paris and Metz, and was 
manoeuvred out of position to a point north of the line. 
Von Moltke seized the opportunity and took position on 
the line, which gave him shorter routes east and west. So 
that MacMahon, to reach either point, must pass the Ger- 
man forces under Von Moltke. He made a brave effort 
to reach Metz, and Von Moltke, to maintain his advan- 
tage, was called to skilful manoeuvre and several gallant 
affairs, but succeeded in holding his advantage that must 
call MacMahon to general engagement or surrender. Out- 
generalled, and with a demoralized army, he thought the 
latter his proper alternative. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 405 

The relative conditions of the armies were similar. The 
Union army, beaten at Fredericksburg and Chancellors- 
ville, and drawn from its aggressive campaign to defen- 
sive work in Pennsylvania, had met disaster in its battle 
of the 1st. If it had been outgeneralled, and dislodged 
of position without further attack, it would have been in 
poor condition to come in aggressive battle against its 
adversary in well-chosen defensive grounds. 

Again, in our own war, when the Union army carried 
the Confederate works west of Petersburg on the 2d of 
April, 1865, General Meade got his army together and 
was about to march east to finish his work by the capture 
of Petersburg. General Grant objected, — that the Con- 
federates would retreat during the night ; at Petersburg 
he would be behind them ; in his then position he would 
be alongside of them, and have an even start, with better 
prospect to strike across their march and force them to 
general battle or surrender ; and he ordered arrangements 
for the march west at daylight. 

Even Napoleon Bonaparte, the first in the science and 
greatest in the execution of the art of war, finally lost 
grasp of his grandest thought: 

" In war men are nothing ; a man is everything."* 

The Confederate chief at Gettysburg looked something 
like Napoleon at Waterloo. 

Fitzhugh Lee quotes evidence of Governor Carroll, of 
Maryland, that General Lee said, " Longstreet is the 
hardest man to move in my army." 

It does not look like generalship to lose a battle and a 
cause and then lay the responsibility upon others. He held 
command and was supported by his government. If his 
army did not suit him, his word could have changed it in 
a minute. If he failed to apply the remedy, it was his 

* Vide "The French under the First and Last Bonaparte;" the 
Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia under Stonewall Jack- 
son in 1862, in the Valley of Virginia, and J. A. Early in 1864. 



406 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

fault. Some claim that his only fault as a general was 
his tender, generous heart. But a heart in the right 
place looks more to the cause intrusted to its care than 
for hidden ways by which to shift its resjDonsibility 
to the shoulders of those whose lives hang upon his 
word. 

When he set out on his first campaign (Chickahominy) 
with the army, the key of the campaign was intrusted to 
General Jackson, who named the hour for the opening 
and failed to meet his own appointment. At the time 
he appointed, A. P. Hill's, D. H. Hill's, and Long- 
street's commands were in position waiting. About 
eight hours after his time he was up, but deliberately 
marched past the engagement and went into camp, a mile 
or more behind the hot battle. He remained in his camp 
next morning, and permitted the enemy, dislodged of his 
position of the day before, to march by him to a strong- 
position at Gaines's Mill. .When his column reached that 
position, his leading division (D. H. Hill's) engaged the 
enemy's right without orders. He called the division off 
and put his command in position to intercept the enemy's 
retreat towards the Pamunkey, from which he was after- 
wards called to his part in the general engagement. The 
next day he had the cavalry and part of his infantry in 
search of the enemy's next move. At my^head-quarters 
were two clever young engineers who were sent to find 
what the enemy was about. They were the first to report 
the enemy's retreat towards James River. Orders were 
given for Jackson to follow on the direct line of retreat, 
also Magruder and Huger. My command was ordered 
around through the outskirts of Richmond by the Darby- 
town road to interpose between McClellan's army and the 
James River, about twenty miles ; the other troops march- 
ing by routes of about nine miles. We were in j^osition 
on the evening of the 29th of June, and stood in front of 
the enemy all of the 30th, fighting a severe battle in the 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 407 

afternoon. Magrucler and Huger got up after night, and 
Jackson on the morning of the 1st. After the battle of 
the 1st, Jackson, Magruder, and Huger were ordered in 
direct pursuit along the route of retreat, my command by 
the longer route of Nance's Store. Jackson's column 
and mine met on the evening of the 3d near Westover, 
the enemy's new position. 

At the Second Manassas my command relieved the 
pressure against Jackson. He called on me for relief by 
a route that would have taken an hour or an hour and a 
half. A way was found by which he was relieved in 
about thirty minutes. When relieved, he left the battle 
on my hands. I was at Sharpsburg all day ; Jackson 
only about two and a half hours. At Fredericksburg, 
anticipating the move against him, half of my command 
was ordered to swing off from my right and join in his 
battle. 

But General Lee's assertion seems to refer to the opera- 
tions at Gettysburg, after Jackson had found his Happy 
Home. Let us see how far this assertion is supported by 
events. General Lee reported, — 

"The advance of the enemy to the latter place (Gettysburg) 
was unknown, and, the weather being inclement, the march was 
conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops." 

When, on the forenoon of the 2d, he decided upon his 
plan, the Second Corps was deployed in the immediate front 
of the enemy's line on our left, except two brigades sent 
off by General Early. One division of the Third was 
close on the right of the Second, all within thirty minutes' 
march of the enemy's lines. Two divisions of the Third 
Corps and two of the First were on Seminary Ridge. 
When the order was announced the divisions on Seminary 
Ridge had to find their positions and deploy to the right. 
By the route ordered for the march it was five or six miles 
to the point at which the battle was to be opened. The 



408 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

trooj^s of the Third had a shorter route. The march of 
the First was made in time for prompt deployment on the 
right of the Third. 

We were left to our own resources in finding ground 
upon which to organize for battle. The enemy had 
changed position somewhat after the march was ordered, 
but as we were not informed of his position before the 
march, we could not know of the change. The Confed- 
erate commander did not care to ride near us, to give in- 
formation of a change, to assist in preparing for attack, 
nor to inquire if new and better combinations might be 
made. 

Four brigades of the right of the Third Corps were as- 
signed as part of my command. The engagement was to 
be general. My artillery combat was opened at three p.m., 
followed in half an hour by the infantry, and I made pro- 
gressive battle until sundown. A division of the Second 
Corps attacked on our left at nightfall, and later two bri- 
gades. Other parts of the Second and Third Corps did 
not move to the battle. 

On the od I was ordered to organize the column of as- 
sault, the other corps to co-operate and assist the battle. 
There was an affair on the Confederate left before the as- 
saulting columns were organized, brought on by attack of 
the enemy. The assaulting force marched at one p.m. Its 
work has been described, but it is important to note that 
neither of the other corps took part in the battle while 
the Southern chief stood in view of the attack and near 
the rear of those corps. So it looks as if the commander 
of the First Corps was easier to move than any one in his 
army, rather than harder, and his chief left him to fight 
the battles alone. 

After the retreat, and when resting on the south banks 
of the Eapidan, reading of the progress of the march 
of General Rosecrans's army towards Georgia, it seemed 
sinful to lie there idle while our comrades in the West 




WILLIAM BLAKE. 

Volunteered in the Eighteenth Mississippi at the age of sixteen. Lost a leg at Gettysburg. 



GETTYSBURG THIED DAY. 409 

were so in need of assistance, and I wrote the Secretary 
of War suggesting that a detachment should be sent West 
from the idle army. General Lee objected, but the sug- 
gestion was ordered to be executed. In this instance the 
subordinate was easier to move than his chief, though the 
interests of the cause depended largely on the movement 
of the latter. 

The forces engaged at Gettysburg were : 

Confederate. — According to the latest official accounts, 
the Army of Northern Virginia, on the 31st of May, 
numbered 74,468. The detachments that joined numbered 
6400, making 80,868. Deducting the detachments left 
in Virginia, — Jenkins's brigade, Pickett's division, 2300 ; 
Corse's brigade, Pickett's division, 1700 ; detachments 
from Second Corps and of cavalry, 1300, in all 5300, — 
leaves the actual aggregate 75,568. 

Union. — According to the reports of the 30th of June, 
and making allowance for detachments that joined in the 
interim in time to take part in the battle, the grand ag- 
gregate was 100,000 * officers and men. 

The Confederates lost many men after the battle, and 
before they recrossed the Potomac, from the toils of the 
march and the continuous and severe harassment of the 
enemy's cavalry, which followed closely and in great force. 

The casualties were : 



CONFEDERATE.-)- 

First Corps 7,539 

Second Corps 5,937 

Third Corps 6,735 

Cavalry 1,426 

Aggregate 21,637 

* General Meade's monthly return for June 30 shows 99,131 " present 
for duty, equipped." The Comte de Paris estimates the force actually 
on the field, including the Sixth Corps, which was in reserve, at 
82,000. 

t Rebellion Record, vol. xxvii. 



410 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 



UNION.* 

First Corps 6,059 

Second Corps 4,369 

Third Corps 4,211 

Fiftli Corps 2,187 

Sixth Corps 242 

Eleventh Corps 3,801 

Twelfth Corps 1,082 

Cavalry 1,094 

Staff 4 

Aggregate 23,049 

The organization of the contending armies at Gettys- 
burg was as follows : 

Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee, 
commanding. 

First Army Corps, Lieutenant-General James Longstreet. 

McLaws's Division, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws -.—Kershaiv^s Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. J. B. Kershaw ; 2d S. C, Col. J. D. Kennedy, Lieut.- 
Col. F. Gaillard ; 3d S. C, Maj. R. C. Maffett, Col. J. D. Nance ; 7th 
S. C, Col. D. Wyatt Aiken ; 8th S. C, Col. J. W. Henagan ; 15th S. C, 
Col. W. D. De Saussure, Maj. William M. Gist ; 3d S. C. Battn., Lieut.- 
Col. W. G. Rice. Barksdale^ s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Barksdale, 
Col. B. G. Humphreys ; 13th Miss., Col. J. W. Carter ; 17th Miss., Col. 
W. D. Holder, Lieut.-Col. John C. Fiser ; 18th Miss., Col. T. M. Griffin, 
Lieut.- Col. W. H. Luse ; 21st Miss., Col. B. G. Humphreys, Semmes^s 
Brigade,t Brig.-Gen. P. J. Semmes, Col. Goode Brj^an ; 10th Ga., Col. 
John B. Weeras ; oOth Ga., Col. W. R. Manning ; 51st Ga., Col. E. Ball ; 
53d Ga., Col. James P. Simms. Wofford^s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. W. T. 
WofTord ; 16th Ga., Col. Goode Bryan ; 18th Ga., Lieut.-Col. S. Z. Ruff"; 
24th Ga., Col. Robert McMillan ; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. Luther 
^. Glenn ; Phillips (Ga.) Legion, Lieut.-Col. E. S. Barclay. Artillery, 
Col. H. C. Cabell ; 1st N. C. Art., Batt. A, Capt. B. C. Manly ; Pulaski 
(Ga.) Art., Capt. J. C. Eraser, Lieut. W. J. Furlong ; Isfc Richmond 
Howitzers, Capt. E. S. McCarthy ; Troup (Ga.) Art., Capt. H. H. Carl- 
ton, Lieut. C. W. Motes. 

Pickett's Division, Maj.-Gen. George E. Pickett '.—GarneWs Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. R. B. Garnett, Maj. C. S. Peyton ; 8th Va., Col. Eppa 
Hunton ; 18th Va., Lieut.-Col. H. A. Carrington ; 19th Va., Col. Henry 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxxvii. part i. p. 187. 

t No reports on file for this brigade. Bryan was in command July 7, 
and was probably Semmes's immediate successor. Tlie commanders of 
the Tenth, Fifty-first, and Fifty-third Georgia are given as reported for 
June 22 and July 31. Manning reported in connnand of Fiftieth Georgia, 
June 22. No commander reported on return for July 31. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 411 

Gantt, Lieut.-Col. John T. Ellis ; 28th Va., Col. R. C. Allen, Lieut.-Col. 
William Watts ; 56th Va., Col. W. D. Stuart, Lieut.-Col. P. P. Slaughter. 
Kemper'' s Brigade^ Brig.-Gen. J. L. Kemper, Col. Joseph Mayo, Jr. ; 1st 
Va., Col. Lewis B. Williams, Lieut.-Col. F. G. Skinner; 3d Va., Col. 
Joseph Mayo, Jr., Lieut.-Col. A. D. Callcote ; 7th Va., Col. W. T. Patton, 
Lieut.-Col. C. C. Flowerree ; 11th Va., Maj. Kirkwood Otey ; 24th Va., 
Col. William R. Terry. Armistead's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. L. A. Armi- 
stead. Col. W. R. Aylett ; 9th Va., Maj. John C. Owens ; 14th Va., Col. 
James G. Hodges, Lieut.-Col. William White ; 38th Va., Col. E. C. 
Edmonds, Lieut.-Col. P. B. Whittle ; 53d Va., Col. W. R. Aylett ; 57th Va., 
Col. John Bowie Magruder. Artillery, Maj. James Bearing ; Fauquier 
(Va.) Art., Capt. R. M. Stribling ; Hampden (Va.) Art., Capt. W. H. 
Caskie ; Richmond Fayette Art., Capt. M. C. Macon ; Virginia Batt., 
Capt. Joseph G. Blount. 

Hood's Division, Maj.-Gen. John B. Hood, Brig.-Gen. E. M. Law :— 
Law^s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. E. M. Law, Col. James L. Sheffield ; 4th Ala., 
Lieut.-Col. L. H. Scruggs ; 15th Ala., Col. William C. Gates, Capt. B. A. 
Hill ; 44th Ala., Col. William F. Perry ; 47th Ala., Col. James W. Jack- 
son, Lieut.-Col. M. J. Bulger, Maj. J. M. Campbell ; 48th Ala., Col. 
James L. Sheffield, Capt. T. J. Eubanks. Robertson'' s Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. J. B. Robertson ; 3d Ark., Col. Van H. Manning, Lieut.-Col. R. S. 
Taylor ; 1st Tex., Lieut.-Col. P. A. Work ; 4th Tex., Col. J. C. G. Key, 
Maj. J. P. Bane ; 5th Tex., Col. R. M. Powell, Lieut.-Col. K. Bryan, Maj. 
J. C. Rogers. Anderson's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George T. Anderson, 
Lieut.-Col. William Luffinan ; 7th Ga., Col. W. W. White ; 8th Ga., Col. 
John R. Towers ; 9th Ga., Lieut.-Col. John C. Mouuger, Maj. W. M. 
Jones, Capt. George Hillyer ; 11th Ga., Col. F. H. Little, Lieut.-Col. Wil- 
liam Luffinan, Maj. Henry D. McDaniel, Capt. William H. Mitchell ; 
59th Ga., Col. Jack Brown, Capt. M. G. Bass. Benning's Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen, Henry L. Benning ; 2d Ga., Lieut.-Col. William T. Harris, Maj. W. 
S. Shepherd ; 15th Ga., Col. D. M. DuBose ; 17th Ga., Col. W. C. Hodges ; 
20th Ga., Col. John A. Jones, Lieut.-Col. J. D. Waddelh Artillery, Maj. 
M. W. Henry ; Branch (N. C.) Art., Capt. A. C. Latham ; German (S.C.) 
Art., Capt. William K. Bachman ; Palmetto (S. C.) Light Art., Capt. 
Hugh R. Garden ; Rowan (N. C.) Art., Capt. James Reilly. • 

Artillery Reserve, Col. J. B. Walton -.—Alexander' s Battalion, 
Col. E. P. Alexander ; Ashland (Va.) Art., Capt. P. Woolfolk, Jr., Lieut. 
James Woolfolk ; Bedford (Va.) Art., Capt. T. C.Jordan ; Brooks (S. C.) 
Art., Lieut. S. C. Gilbert ; Madison (La.) Light Art., Capt. George V. 
Moody ; Va. Batt., Capt. W. W. Parker ; Va. Batt., Capt. O. B. Taylor. 
Washington {La.) Artillery, Maj. B. F. Eshleman ; First Co., Capt. C. W. 
Squii;es ; Second Co., Capt. J. B. Richardson ; Third Co., Capt. M. B. 
Miller ; Fourth Co., Capt. Joe Norcom, Lieut. H. A. Battles. 

Second Army Corps, Lieutenant-General Richard S. Ewell. 
Escort, Randolph's Company Virginia Cavalry, Capt. William F. 
Randolph. 

Early's Division, Maj.-Gen. Jubal A. Early -.—Hays's Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Harry T. Hays ; 5th La., Maj. Alexander Hart, Capt! T, H. 
Biscoe ; 6th La., Lieut.-Col. Joseph Hanlon ; 7th La., Col. D. B. Pena ; 



412 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

8th La., Col. T. D. Lewis, Lieut.-Col. A. de Blanc, Maj. G. A. Lester ; 9th 
La., Col. Leroy A. Stafford. Smith's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Smith ; 
31st Va., Col. John S. Hoffman ; 49th Va., Lieut.-Col. J. Catlett Gibson ; 
52d Va., Lieut.-Col. James H. Skinner. Hoke'' s Brigade, Col. Isaac E. 
Avery, Col. A. C. Godwin ; 6th N. C, Maj. S. McD. Tate ; 21st N. C, 
Col. iv. W. Kirkland ; 57th N. C, Col. A. C. Godwin. Gordon's Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. J. B. Gordon ; 13th Ga., Col. James M. Smith ; 26th Ga., Col. 
E. N. Atkinson ; 31st Ga., Col. Clement A. Evans ; 38th Ga., Capt. Wil- 
liam L. McLeod ; 60th Ga., Capt. W. B. Jones ; 61st Ga., Col. John H. 
Lamar. Artillery, Lieut.-Col, H. P. Jones ; Charlottesville (Va.) Art., 
Capt. James McD. Carrington ; Courtney (Va.) Art., Capt. W. A. Tan- 
ner ; Louisiana Guard Art., Capt. C. A. Green ; Staunton (Va.) Art., 
Capt. A. W. Garber. 

Johnson's Division, Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson : — Steuart's Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. George H. Steuart ; 1st Md. Battn. Inf., Lieut.-Col. J. 
R. Herbert, Maj. W. W. Goldsborough, Capt. J. P. Crane ; 1st N. C, Lieut. 
Col. H. A. Brown ; 3d N. C, Maj. W. M. Parsley ; 10th Va., Col. E. T. 
H. Warren ; 23d Va., Lieut.-Col. S. T. Walton ; 37th Va., Maj. H. C. 
Wood. Stonewall Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James A. Walker ; 2d Va., Col. 
J. Q. A. Nadenbousch ; 4th Va., Maj. William Terry ; 5th Va., Col. J. H. 
S. Funk ; 27th Va., Lieut.-Col. D. M. Shriver ; 33d Va., Capt. J. B. Gol- 
laday. Nicholls's Brigade,* Col. J. M. Williams ; 1st La., Capt. E. D. 
Willett ; 2d La., Lieut.-Col. R. E. Burke ; 10th La., Maj. T. N. Powell ; 
14th La., Lieut.-Col. David Zable ; 15th La., Maj. Andrew Brady. 
Jones's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. John M. Jones, Lieut.-Col. R. jfe:. Dungan ; 
21st Va., Capt. W. P. Moseley ; 25th Va., Col. J. C. Higginbotham, Lieut.- 
Col. J. A Robinson ; 42d Va., Lieut.-Col. R. W. Withers, Capt. S. H. 
Saunders ; 44th Va., Maj. N. Cobb, Capt. T. R. Buckner ; 48th Va., Lieut.- 
Col. R. H. Dungan, Maj. Oscar White ; 50th Va., Lieut.-Col. L. H. N. 
Salyer. Artilleri/, Maj. J. W. Latimer, Capt. C. I. Raine ; 1st Md. Batt., 
Capt William F. Dement ; Alleghany (Va.) Art., Capt. J. C. Carpenter ; 
Chesapeake (Md.) Art., Capt. William D. Brown ; Lee (Va.) Batt., Capt. 
C. I. Raine, Lieut. William W. Hardwicke. 

RoDES's Division, Maj.-Gen. R. E. Rodes '.—Daniel's Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Junius Daniel ; 32d N. C, Col. E. C. Brabble ; 43d N. C, Col. T. S. 
Kenan, Lieut.-Col. W. G. Lewis ; 45th N. C, Lieut.-Col. S. H. Boyd, 
Maj. John R. Winston, Capt. A. H. Gallaway, Capt. J. A. Hopkins ; 53d 
N. C, Col. W. A. Owens ; 2d N. C. Battn., Lieut.-Col. H. L. Andrews, 
Capt.'Van Brown. Doles's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George Doles ; 4th Ga,, 
Lieut.-Col. D. R. E. Winn, Maj. W. H. Willis ; 12th Ga., Col. Edward 
Willis; 21st Ga., Col. John T. Mercer; 44th Ga., Col. S. P. Lumpkin, 
Maj. W. H. Peebles. Iverson's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alfred Iverson ; 5th 
N. C.,t Capt. Speight B. West, Capt. Benjamin Robinson ; 12th N. C, 



* The regimental commanders are given as reported for June 14. 

t The four captains present (West, Robinson, James M. Taylor,Thomas 
N. Jordan) were reported as wounded July 1 ; Robinson and Taylor as 
having rejoined July 2, but it does not appear who commanded during 
Robinson's absence. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 413 

Lieut-Col. W. S. Davis ; 20th N. C.,* Lieut.-Col. Nelson Slough, Capt. 
Lewis T. Hicks ; 23d N. C.,t Col. D. H. Christie, Capt. William H. 
Johuston. Ramseur^s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. S. D. Ramseur ; 2d N. C, 
Maj. D. W. Hurtt, Capt. James T. Scales ; 4th N. C, Col. Bryan Grimes ; 
14th N. C, Col, R. Tyler Bennett, Maj. Joseph H. Lambeth ; 30th N. C, 
Col. Francis M. Parker, Maj. W. W. Sillers. O'JVeaVs Brigade, Col. E. 
A. O'Neal; 3d Ala., Col. C. A. Battle ; 5th Ala., Col. J. M. Hall ; 6th 
Ala., Col. J. N. Lightfoot, Capt. M. L. Bowie ; 12th Ala., Col. S. B. 
Pickens ; 26th Ala., Lieut.-Col. John C. Goodgame. Artillery, Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas H. Carter ; Jeff Davis (Ala.) Art., Capt. W. J. Reese ; King 
William (Va.) Art., Capt. W. P. Carter ; Morris ( Va.) Art., Capt. R. C. 
M. Page ; Orange (Va.) Art., Capt. C. W. Fry. Artillery Reserve, Col. J. 
Thompson Brown ; 1st Va. Art., Capt. Willis J. Dance ; 2d Richmond 
(Va.) Howitzers, Capt. David Watson ; 3d Richmond (Va.) Howitzers, 
Capt. B. H. Smith, Jr. ; Powhatan (Va.) Art., Lieut. John M. Cunning- 
ham ; Rockbridge (Va.) Art., Capt. A. Graham ; Salem ( Va.) Art., Lieut. 
C. B. Griffin ; Nelson's Battn., Lieut.-Col. William Nelson ; Amherst 
(Va.) Art., Capt. T. J. Kirkpatrick ; Fluvanna (Va.) Art., Capt. J. L. 
Massie ; Ga. Batt., Capt. John Milledge, Jr. 

Third Army Corps, Lieutenant-General Ambrose P. Hill. 

Anderson's Division, Maj.-Gen, R. H. Anderson: — Wilcox^s Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox ; 8th Ala., Lieut.-Col. Hilary A. 
Herbert ; 9th Ala., Capt. J. H. King ; 10th Ala., Col. William H. Forney, 
Lieut.-Col. James E. Shelley ; 11th Ala., Col. J. C. C. Sanders, Lieut.-Col. 
George E. Tayloe ; 14th Ala., Col. L. Pinckard, Lieut.-Col. James A. 
Broome. Mahone's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Mahone ; 6th Va., Col. 
George T. Rogers ; 12th Va., Col. D. A. Weisiger ; 16th Va., Col. Joseph 
H. Ham ; 41st Va., Col. William A. Parham ; 61st Va., Col. V. D. Groner. 
Wright' s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A.R.Wright, Col. William Gibson ; 3d Ga., 
Col. E. J. Walker ; 22d Ga., Col. Joseph Wasden, Capt. B. C. McCurry ; 
48th Ga., Col. William Gibson, Capt. M. R. Hall ; 2d Ga. Battn., Maj. 
George W. Ross, Capt. Charles J. Moflfett. Berry's Brigade, Col. David 
Lang ; 2d Fla., Maj. W. R. Moore ; 5th Fla., Capt. R. N. Gardner ; 8th 
Fla., Col. David Lang. Posey's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Carnot Posey ; 12th 
Miss., Col. W. H. Taylor ; 16th Miss., Col. Samuel E. Baker ; 19th Miss., 
Col. N. H. Harris ; 48th Miss., Col. Joseph M. Jayne. Artillei-y (Sumter 
Battalion), Maj. John Lane ; Co. A, Capt. Hugh M. Ross ; Co. B, Capt. 
George M. Patterson ; Co. C, Capt. John T. Wingfleld. 

Heth's Division, Maj.-Gen. Henry Heth, Brig.-Gen. J. J, Pettigrew : 
— First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Pettigrew, Col. J. K. Marshall ; 11th 
N. C, Col. Collett Leventhorpe ; 26th N. C, Col. Henry K. Burgwyn, 
Jr., Capt, H. C, Albright ; 47th N. C, Col, G. H, Faribault ; 52d N. C, 
Col, J, K, Marshall, Lieut.-Col, Marcus A. Parks, Second Brigade, Col, 

* Lieutenant-Colonel Slough and Major John S, Brooks reported as 
wounded at four p.m., July 1. 

t Colonel Christie, Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Johnston, Major C. C. 
Blacknall, and the senior captain (Abner D. Pearce) reported as 
wounded early in the fight, July 1, 



414 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

J. M. Brockenbrough ; 40th Va., Capt. T. E. Betts, Capt. R. B. Davis ; 
47th Va., Col. Robert M. Mayo ; 55th Va., Col. W. S. Christian ; 22d Va. 
Battn., Maj. John S. Bowles. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James J. Ar- 
cher, Col. B. D. Fry, Lieut.-Col. S. G. Shepard ; 13th Ala., Col. B. D. 
Fry ; 5th Ala. Battn., Maj. A. S. Van de Graatt" ; 1st Tenn. (provisional 
army), Maj. Felix G. Buchanan ; 7th Tenn., Lieut.-Col. S. G. Shepard ; 
14th Tenn., Capt. B. L. Phillips. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph R. 
Davis ; 2d Miss., Col. J. M. Stone ; 11th Miss., Col. F. M. Green ; 42d 
Miss., Col. H. R. Miller ; 55th N. C, Col. J. K. Connally. Artillery, 
Lieut.-Col. John J, Garnett ; Donaldsonville (La.) Art., Capt. V. Mau- 
rin ; Huger (Va.) Art., Capt. Joseph D. Moore ; Lewis (Va.) Art., Capt. 
John W. Lewis ; Norfolk Light Art. Blues, Capt. C. R. Grandy. 

Pender's Division, Maj.-Gen. William D. Pender, Maj. -Gen. I. R. 
Trimble, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane : — First Brigade, Col. Abner Per- 
rin ; 1st S. C. (provisional army), Maj. C. W. McCreary ; 1st S. C. Rifles, 
Capt. William M. Hadden ; 12th S. C., Col. John L. Miller ; 13th S. C, 
Lieut.-Col. B. T. Brockman ; 14th S. C, Lieut.-Col. Joseph N. Brown. 
Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. James H. Lane, Col. C. M. Avery ; 7th 
N. C, Capt. J. McLeod Turner, Capt. James G. Harris ; 18th N. C, Col. 
John D. Barry ; 28th N. C, Col. S. D. Lowe, Lieut.-Col. W. H. A. Speer ; 
33d N. C, Col. C. M. Avery ; 37th N. C, Col. W. M. Barbour. Third 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Edward L. Thomas ; 14th, 35th, 45th, and 49th Ga., 
Col. S. T. Player. Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. M. Scales, Lieut.-Col, 
G. T. Gordon, Col. W. Lee J. Lowrance ; 13th N. C, Col. J. H. Hyman, 
Lieut.-Col. H. A. Rogers ; 16th N. C, Capt. L. W. Stowe ; 22d N. C, 
Col. James Conner ; 34th N. C, Col. William Lee J. Lowrance, Lieut.- 
Col. G. T. Gordon ; 38th N. C, Col. W. J. Hoke, Lieut.-Col. John Ash- 
ford. Artillery, Maj. William T. Poague ; Albemarle (Va.) Art., Capt. 
James W. Wyatt ; Charlotte (N. C.) Art., Capt. Joseph Graham ; Madi- 
son (Miss.) Light Art., Capt. George Ward ; Virginia Batt., Capt. J. V. 
Brooke. 

Artillery Reserve, Col. R. Lindsay Walker :—3fcIntosh^s Battal- 
ion, Maj. D. G. Mcintosh ; Danville (Va.) Art., Capt. R. S. Rice ; Harda- 
way (Ala.) Art., Capt. W. B. Hurt ; 2d Rockbridge (Va.) Art., Lieut. 
Samuel Wallace ; Virginia Batt., Capt. M. Johnson. Fegram^s Battal- 
ion, Maj. W. J. Pegram, Capt. E. B. Brunson ; Crenshaw (Va.) Batt. ; 
Fredericksburg (Va.) Art., Capt. E. A. Marye ; Letcher (Va.) Art., Capt. 
T. A. Brander ; Pee Dee (S. C.) Art., Lieut. WiUiam E. Zimmerman ; 
Purcell (Va.) Art., Capt. Joseph McGraw. 

Cavalry. 

Stuart's Division, Maj.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart •.—IIa7npfon''s Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Wade Hampton, Col. L. S. Baker ; 1st N. C, Col. L. S. Baker ; 
1st and 2d S. C. ; Cobb's (Ga.) Legion, Jeff Davis Legion, Phillips (Ga.) 
Legion. Robertson'' s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Beverly H. Robertson ;* 4th 
N. C, Col. D. D. Ferebee ; 5th N. C. Fitzhugh Lee' s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
Fitzhugh Lee ; 1st Md. Battn.,t Maj. Harry Gilmor, Maj. Ridgely Brown ; 

* Commanded his own and W. E, Jones's brigade, 
t Serving with Ewell's corps. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 415 

1st Va., Col. James H. Drake ; 2d Va., Col. T. T. Munford ; 3d Va., Col. 
Thomas H. Owen ; 4tli Va., Col. William C. Wickham ; 5tli Va., Col. T. 
L. Rosser. Jenkins's Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. G. Jenkins, Col. M. J. Fer- 
guson ; 14th, 16th, and 17th Va. ; 34th Va. Battn., Lieut.-Col. V. A. 
Witcher ; 36th Va. Battn. ; Jackson's ( Va.) Batt., Capt. Thomas E. Jack- 
son. Jones'' s Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William E. Jones ; 6th Va., Maj. C. E. 
Flournoy ; 7th Va., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Marshall ; 11th Va., Col. L. L. 
Lomax. W. H. F. Lee's Brigade, Col. J. R Chambliss, Jr. ; 2d N. C. ; 
9th Va., Col. R L. T. Beale ; 10th Va., Col. J. Lucius Davis ; 13th Va. 
Stuarfs Horse Artillery, Maj. R. F. Beckham ; Breathed's (Va.) Batt., 
Capt. James Breathed ; Chew's (Va.) Batt., Capt. R. P. Chew ; Griffin's 
(Md.) Batt., Capt. W. H. Griffin ; Hart's (S. C.) Batt., Capt. J. F. Hart ; 
McGregor's (Va.) Batt., Capt. W. M. McGregor ; Moorman's (Va.) Batt., 
Capt. M. N. Moorman. 

Imboden's Command,* Brig.-Gen. J. D. Imboden ; 18th Va. Cav., Col. 
George W. Imboden ; 62d Va. Inf. (mounted). Col. George H. Smith ; 
Virginia Partisan Rangers, Capt. John H. McNeill ; Virginia Batt., Capt. 
J. H. McClanahan. 

Artillery,! Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton. 

Army of the Potomac, Major-General George G. Meade, U. S. 
Army, commanding. 

General Head-quarters : — Command of the Provost- Marshal-Gen- 
eral, Brig.-General Marsena R Patrick ; 93d N. Y.,t Col. John S. 
Crocker ; 8th U. S. (8 cos.),t Capt. Edwin W. H. Reed ; 2d Pa. Cav., Col. 
R Butler Pr-ce ; 6th Pa. Cav., Cos. E and I, Capt. James Starr ; Regular 
Cav. (detachments from 1st, 2d, 5th, and 6th Regiments). 

Signal Corps, Capt. Lemuel B. Norton. 

Guards and Orderlies, Oneida (N. Y^) Cav., Capt. Daniel P. Mann. 

Artillery,^ Brig.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt. 

Engineer Brigade, || Brig.-Gen. Henry W. Benham :— 15th N. Y. 
(3 COS.), Maj. Walter L. Cassin ; 50th N. Y., Col. William H. Pettes ; 
U. S. Battn., Capt. George H. Mendell. 

First Army Corps, 1[ Major-General Abner Doubleday, Major- 
General John Newton. General Head-quarters, 1st Me. Cav., 
Co. L, Capt. Constantine Taylor. 
First Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth : — First Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen. Solomon Meredith, Col. William W. Robinson ; 19th Ind., 

* Mounted. 

t See battalions attached to corps and cavalry. % Not engaged. 

I See artillery brigades attached to army corps and the reserves. 

II Not engaged. With exception of the regular battalion, it was, July 
1, and while at Beaver Dam Creek, Md., ordered to Washington, D. C, 
where it arrived July 3. 

T[ Major-General John F. Reynolds, of this corps, was killed July 1, 
while in command of the left wing of the army; General Doubleday 
commanded the corps July 1, and General Newton, who was assigned 
to that command on the 1st, superseded him July 2. 



416 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Col. Samuel J. Williams ; 24tli Mich., Col. Henry A. Morrow, Capt. Al- 
bert M. Edwards ; 2d Wis., Col. Lucius Fairchild, Maj. John Mansfield, 
Capt. George H. Otis ; 6th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Rufus R. Dawes ; 7th Wis., 
Col. William W. Robinson, Maj. Mark Finuicum. Second Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler ; 7th Ind., Col. Ira G. Grover ; 76th N. Y., 
Maj. Andrew J. Grover, Capt. John E. Cook ; 84th N. Y. (14th Militia), 
Col. Edward B. Fowler ; 95th N. Y., Col. George H. Biddle, Maj. Ed- 
ward Pye ; 147th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Francis C. Miller, Maj. George Har- 
ney ; 56th Pa. (9 cos.), Col. J. William Hofmann. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson :—i^Jrsi! Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen, Gabriel R. Paul, Col. Samuel H. Leonard, Col. Adrian R. 
Root, Col. Richard Coulter, Col. Peter Lyle ; 16th Me., Col. Charles 
W. Tilden, Maj. Archibald D. Leavitt ; 13th Mass., Col. Samuel H. 
Leonard, Lieut.-Col. N. Walter Batchelder ; 94th N. Y., Col. Adrian R. 
Root, Maj. Samuel A. Moffett ; 104th N. Y., Col. Gilbert G. Prey ; 107th 
Pa., Lieut.-Col. James MacThomson, Capt. Emanuel D. Roath. Second 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter ; 12th Mass., Col. James L. Bates, 
Lieut.-Col. David Allen, Jr. ; 83d N. Y. (9th Militia), Lieut.-Col. Joseph 
A. Moesch ; 97th N. Y., Col. Charles Wheelock, Maj. Charles North- 
rup; 11th Pa.,* Col. Richard Coulter, Capt. Benjamin F. Haines, Capt. 
John V. Overmyer, 88th Pa., Maj. Benezet F. Foust, Capt. Henry White- 
side ; 90th Pa., Col. Peter Lyle, Maj. Alfred J. Sellers. 

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, Maj. -Gen. Abner 
Doubleday : — First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, Col. Chap- 
man Biddle ; 80th N. Y. (20th Militia), Col. Theodore B. Gates ; 121st 
Pa., Maj. Alexander Biddle, Col. Chapman Biddle ; 142d Pa., Col. 
Robert P. Cummins, Lieut.-Col. A. B. McCalmont ; 151st Pa., Lieut.- 
Col. George F. McFarland, Capt. Walter L. Owens, Col. Harrison 
Allen. Second Brigade, Col. Roy Stone, Col. Langhorne Wister, Col. 
Edmund L. Dana; 143d Pa., Col. Edmund L. Dana, Lieut.-Col. John 
D. Musser ; 149th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Walton Dwight, Capt. James Glenn ; 
150th Pa., Col. Langhorne Wister, Lieut.-Col. H. S. Huidekoper, Capt. 
Cornelius C. Widdis. Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. George J. Stannard, 
Col. Francis V. Randall ; 12th Vt.,t Col. Asa P. Blunt; 13th Vt., Col. 
Francis V. Randall, Maj. Joseph J. Boynton, Lieut.-Col. William D. 
Munson ; 14th Vt., Col. William T. Nichols; 15th Vt.,t Col. Redfield 
Proctor; 16th Vt., Col. Wheelock G. Veazey. Artillery Brigade, Col. 
Charles S. Wainwright ; Me. Light, 2d Batt. B, Capt. James A. Hall ; 
Me. Light, 5th Batt. E, Capt. Greenleaf T. Stevens, Lieut. Edward N. 
Whittier ; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. L,t Capt. Gilbert H. Reynolds, Lieut. 
George Breck ; 1st Pa. Light, Batt. B, Capt. James H. Cooper ; 4th U. S., 
Batt. B, Lieut. James Stewart. 

* Transferred, in the afternoon of July 1, to the First Brigade. 

t Guarding trains, and not engaged in the battle. 

% Battery E, First New York Light Artillery, attached. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 417 

Second Army Corps,* Major-General Winfield S. Hancock, 
Brigadier-General John Gibbon. Oeneral Head-quarters, 6th 
N. Y. Cav., Cos. D and K, Capt. Riley Johnson. 

First Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell : — First Brigade, Col. 
Edward E. Cross, Col. H. Boyd McKeen ; 5th N. H., Lieut.-CoL Charles 
E. Hapgood ; 61st N. Y., Lieut.-Col. K. Oscar Broady ; 81st Pa., Col. H. 
Boyd McKeen, Lieut.-Col. Amos Stroh ; 148th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Robert 
McFarlane. Second Brigade, Col. Patrick Kelly ; 28th Mass., Col. R. 
Byrnes; 63d N. Y. (2 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Ricliard C. Bentley, Capt. 
Thomas Touhy ; 69th N. Y. (2 cos.), Capt. Richard INIorouey, Lieut. 
James J. Smith ; 88th N. Y. (2 cos.), Capt. Denis F. Burke ; 116th Pa. 
(4 COS.), Maj. St. Clair A. Mulholland. TViwcZ i?r/^ac?e, Brig.-Gen. Sam- 
uel K. Zook, Lieut.-Col. John Fraser ; 52d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. C. G. Freu- 
denberg, Capt. William Scherrer ; 57tli N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Alford B. 
Chapman ; 66th N. Y., Col. Orlando H. Morris, Lieut.-Col. John S. 
Hammell, Maj. Peter Nelson ; 140th Pa., Col. Richard P. Roberts, Lieut.- 
Col. John Fraser. Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke ; 27th Conn. 
(2 COS.), Lieut.-Col. Henry C. Merwin, Maj. James H. Coburn ; 2d Del., 
Col. William P. Baily, Capt. Charles H. Christman ; 64th N. Y., Col. 
Daniel G. Bingham, Maj. Leman W. Bradley ; 53d Pa., Lieut.-Col. Rich- 
ards McMichael ; 145th Pa. (7 COS.), Col. Hiram L. Brown, Capt. John 
W. Reynolds, Capt. Moses W. Oliver. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, Brig.-Gen. William Har- 
row : — First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. William Harrow, Col. Francis E. 
Heath ; 19th Me., Col. Francis E. Heath, Lieut.-Col. Henry W. Cun- 
ningham. ; 15th Mass., Col. George H. Ward, Lieut.-Col. George C. Jos- 
lin ; 1st Minn.,t Col. William Colvill, Jr., Capt. Nathan S. Messick, Capt. 
Henry C. Coates ; 82d N. Y. (2d Militia), Lieut.-Col. James Huston, 
Capt. John Darrow. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander S.Webb; 
69th Pa., Col. Dennis O'Kane, Capt. William Davis ; 71st Pa., Col. Rich- 
ard Penn Smith ; 72d Pa., Col. DeWitt C. Baxter, Lieut.-Col. Theodore 
Hesser ; 106th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William L. Curry. Third Brigade, Col. 
Norman J. Hall ; 19th Mass., Col. Arthur F. Devereux ; 20th Mass., Col. 
Paul J. Revere, Lieut.-Col. George N. Maey, Capt. Henry L. Abbott ; 
7th Mich., Lieut.-Col. Amos E. Steele, Jr., Maj. Sylvanus W. Curtis ; 
42d N. Y., Col. James E. Mallon ; 59th N. Y. (4 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Max 
A. Thoman, Capt. William McFadden. Unattached, Mass. Sharp- 
shooters, 1st Co., Capt. William Plumer, Lieut. Emerson L. Bicknall. 

* After the death of General Reynolds, General Hancock was assigned 
to the command of all the troops on the field of battle, relieving Gen- 
eral Howard, who had succeeded General Reynolds. General Gibbon, 
of the Second Division, assumed command of the corps. These assign- 
ments terminated on the evening of July 1. Similar changes in com- 
manders occurred during the battle of the 2d, when General Hancock 
was put in command of the Third Corps, in addition to that of his own. 
He was wounded on the 3d, and Brigadier-General William Hays was 
assigned to the copimand of the corps. 

t 2d Company Minnesota Sharp-shooters attached. 

27 



418 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays : — First Brigade, Col. 
Samuel S. Carroll; 14tli Ind., Col. John Coons; 4th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. 
Leonard W. Carpenter ; 8th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Franklin Sawyer ; 7tli W. 
Va., Lieut. Col. Jonathan H. Lockwood. Second Brigade, Col. Tliomas 
A. Smyth, Lieut.-Col. Francis E. Pierce ; 14tli Conn., Maj. Theodore G. 
Ellis ; 1st Del., Lieut.-Col. Edward P. Harris, Capt. Tiiomas P. Hizar, 
Lieut. William Smith, Lieut. John T. Dent ; 12th N. J., Maj. John T. 
Hill ; 10th N. Y. (Battn.), Maj. George F. Hopper ; 108th N. Y., Lieut.- 
Col. Francis E. Pierce. Third Brigade, Col. George L. Willard, Col. 
Eliakim Sherrill, Lieut.-Col. James M. Bull ; 39th N. Y. (4 cos.), Maj. 
Hugo Hildebrandt; 111th N. Y., Col. Clinton D. McDougall, Lieut.- 
Col. Isaac M. Lusk, Capt. Aaron P. Seeley ; 125th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. 
Levin Crandell ; 126th N. Y., Col. Eliakim Sherrill, Lieut.-Col. James 
M. Bull. Artillery Brigade, Capt. John G. Hazard ; 1st N. Y. Light, 
Batt. B,* Lieut. Albert S. Sheldon, Capt. James McKay Rorty, Lieut. 
Robert E. Rogers ; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. A, Capt. William A. Arnold ; 
1st R. I. Light, Batt. B, Lieut. T. Fred. Brown, Lieut. Walter S. Per- 
rin ; 1st U. S., Batt. I, Lieut. George A. Woodruff, Lieut. Tully Mc- 
Crea ; 4th U. S., Batt. A, Lieut. Alonzo H. Gushing, Sergt. Frederick 
Fuger. 

Third Army Corps, Major-General Daniel E. Sickles, Major- 
General David B. Birney. 

First Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Hobart 
Ward : — First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Charles K. Graham, Col. Andrew H. 
Tippin ; 57th Pa. (8 cos.). Col. Peter Sides, Capt. Alanson H. Nelson ; 63d 
Pa., Maj. John A. Danks ; 68th Pa., Col. Andrew H. Tippin, Capt. Mil- 
ton S. Davis(?), 105th Pa., Col. Calvin A. Craig ; 114th Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
Frederick F. Cavada, Capt. Edward R. Bowen ; 141st Pa., Col. Henry 
J. Madill. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward, Col. Hiram 
Berdan ; 20th Ind., Col. John Wheeler, Lieut.-Col. William C. L. Tay- 
lor ; 3d Me., Col. Moses B. Lakeman ; 4th Me., Col. Elijah Walker, Capt. 
Edwin Libby ; 86th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Benjamin L. Higgins ; 124th N. 
Y., Col. A. Van Home Ellis, Lieut.-Col. Francis M. Cummins ; 99th Pa., 
Maj. John W. Moore ; 1st U. S. Sharp-shooters, Col. Hiram Berdan, 
Lieut.-Col. Caspar Trepp ; 2d U. S. Sharp-shooters (8 cos.), Maj. Homer 
R. Stoughton. Third Brigade, Col. P. Regis de Trobrland ; 17th Mo., 
Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Merrill ; 3d Mich., Col. Byron R. Pierce, Lieut.- 
Col. Edwin S. Pierce ; 5th Mich., Lieut.-Col. John Pulford ; 40th N. Y., 
Col. Thomas W. Egan; 110th Pa. (6 cos.), Lieut.-Col. David M. Jones, 
Maj. Isaac Rogers. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys : — First Bri- 
gade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Carr ; 1st Mass., Lieut.-Col. Clark B. Bald- 
win ; 11th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Porter D. Tripp; 16th Mass., Lieut.-Col. 
Waldo Merriam, Capt. Matthew Donovan ; 12th Mass., Capt. John 
F. Langley ; 11th N. J., Col. Robert McAllister, Capt. Luther Martin, 

* Transferred from Artillery Reserve, July 1 ; Fourteenth New York 
Battery attached. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 419 

Lieut. John Schoonover, Capt. William H. Lloyd, Capt. Samuel T. 
Sleeper; 26th Pa., Maj. Robert L. Bodiue ; 84th Pa.,* Lieut.-Col. Mil- 
ton 0pp. Second Brigade, Col. William R, Brewster ; 70th N. Y., 
Col. J. Egbert Farnum ; 71st N. Y., Col. Henry L. Potter ; 72d N. Y., 
Col. John S. Austin, Lieut.-Col. John Leonard ; 73d N. Y., Maj. Mi- 
chael W. Burns ; 74th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Thomas Holt ; 120th N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Cornelius D. Westbrook, Maj. John R. Tappen. Third Bri- 
gade, Col. George C. Burling ; 2d N. H., Col. Edward L. Bailey ; 5th 
N. J., Col. William J. Sewell, Capt. Thomas C. Godfrey, Capt. Henry H. 
Woolsey ; 6th N. J., Lieut.-Col. Stephen R. Gilkyson ; 7th N. J., Col. 
Louis R. Francine, Maj. Frederick Cooper ; 8th N. J., Col. John Ramsey, 
Capt. John G. Langston ; 115th Pa., Maj. John P. Dunne. ArtiUery 
Brigade, Capt. George E. Randolph, Capt. A. Judson Clark ; N.J. Light, 
2d Batt., Capt. A. Judson Clark, Lieut. Robert Sims ; 1st N. Y. Light, 
Batt. D, Capt. George B. Winslovv ; N. Y. Light, 4th Batt., Capt. James 
E. Smith ; 1st R. I. Light, Batt. E, Lieut. John K. Bucklyn, Lieut. Ben- 
jamin Freeborn ; 4th U. S., Batt. K, Lieut. Francis W. Seeley, Lieut. 
Robert James. 

Fifth Army Corps, Major-General George Sykes. General 
Head-quarters, 12th N. Y. Inf., Cos. D and E, Capt. Henry W. Rider ; 
17th Pa. Cav., Cos. D and H, Capt. William Thompson. 

First Division, Brig.-Gen. James Barnes : — First Brigade, Col. Wil- 
liam S. Tilton ; 18th Mass., Col. Joseph Hayes; 22d Mass., Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas Sberwin, Jr. ; 1st Mich., Col. Ira C. Abbott, Lieut.-Col. William 
A. Throop ; 118th Pa., Lieut.-Col. James Gwyn. Second Brigade, Col. 
Jacob B. Sweitzer; 9th Mass., Col. Patrick R. Guiney ; 32d Mass., Col. 
G. L. Prescott ; 4th Mich., Col. Harrison H. Jeffords, Lieut.-Col. George 
W. Lumbard ; 62d Pa., Lieut.-Col. James C. Hull. Third Brigade, Col. 
Strong Vincent, Col. James C. Rice ; 20th Me., Col. Joshua L. Cham- 
berlain ; 16th Mich., Col. Norval E. Welch ; 44th N. Y., Col. James C. 
Rice, Lieut.-Col. Freeman Conner ; 83d Pa., Capt. Orpheus S.Woodward. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ay res : — First Brigade, Col. 
Hannibal Day ; 3d U. S. (6 cos.), Capt. Henry W. Freedley, Capt. Rich- 
ard G. Lay ; 4th U. S. (4 cos.), Capt. Julius W. Adams, Jr. ; 6th U. S. (5 
COS.), Capt. Levi C. Bootes ; 12th U. S. (8 cos.), Capt. Thomas S. Dunn ; 
14th U. S. (8 COS.), Maj. Grotius R. Giddings. Second Brigade, Col. Sid- 
ney Burbank ; 2d U. S. (6 cos.), Maj. Arthur T. Lee, Capt. Samuel A. 
McKee ; 7th U. S. (4 cos.), Capt. David P. Hancock ; 10th U. S. (3 cos.), 
Capt. William Clinton ; 11th U. S. (6 cos.), Maj. De Lancey Floyd-Jones ; 
17th U. S. (7 COS.), Lieut.-Col. J. Durell Greene. Third Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Stephen H. Weed, Col. Kenner Garrard ; 140th N. Y., Col. Patrick 
H. O'Rorke, Lieut.-Col. Louis Ernst ; 146th JST. Y., Col. Kenner Garrard, 
Lieut.-Col. David T. Jenkins ; 91st Pa., Lieut.-Col. Joseph H. Sinex ; 
155th Pa., Lieut.-Col. John H. Cain. 

Third DivisiON,t Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford : — First Brigade, 

* Guarding corps trains, and not engaged in the battle. 
t Joined corps June 28. The Second Brigade left in the Department 
of Washington. 



420 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Col, William McCandless ; 1st Pa. Reserves (9 cos.), Col. William C. 
Talley ; 2d Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. George A. Woodward ; 6th Pa. Re- 
serves, Lieut.-Col. Wellington H. Eut ; 13th. Pa. Reserves, Col. Charles 
F. Taylor, Maj. William R. Hartshorne. Third Brigade^ Col. Joseph 
W. Fisher ; 5th Pa. Reserves, Lieut.-Col. George Dare ; 9th Pa. Reserves, 
Lieut.-Col. James McK. Snodgrass ; 10th Pa. Reserves, Col. Adoniram 
J. Warner ; 11th Pa. Reserves, Col. Samuel M. Jackson ; 12th Pa. Re- 
serves (9 COS.), Col. Martin D. Hardin. Artillery Brigade, Capt. Augus- 
tus P. Martin; Mass. Light, 3d Batt. C, Lieut. Aaron F. Walcott ; 1st 
N. Y. Light, Batt. C, Capt. Almont Barnes ; 1st Ohio Light, Batt. L, 
Capt. Frank C. Gibbs ; 5th U. S., Batt. D, Lieut. Charles E. Hazlett, 
Lieut. Benjamin F. Rittenhouse ; 5th U. S., Batt. I, Lieut. Malbone F. 
Watson, Lieut. Charles C. MacConnell. 

Sixth Army Corps, Major-General, John Sedowick. General 
Head-quarters, 1st N. J. Cav., Co. L, 1st Pa. Cav., Co. H, Capt. Wil- 
liam S. Craft. 

First Division, Brig. -Gen. Horatio G. Wright :— Provost Guard, 4th 
N, J. (3 COS.), Capt. William R. Maxwell. First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. A. 
T. A. Torbert ; 1st N. J., Lieut.-Col. William Henry, Jr. ; 2d N. J., Lieut.- 
Col. Charles Wiebecke ; 3d N. J., Col. Edward L. Campbell ; 15th N. J., 
Col. William H. Penrose, Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joseph J. Bart- 
lett ;* 5th Me., Col. Clark S. Edwards ; 121st N. Y., Col. Emory Upton ; 
95th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Edward Carroll ; 96th Pa., Maj. William H. Lessig. 
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. David A. Russell ; 6tli Me., Col. Hiram Burn- 
ham ; 49th Pa. (4 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Thomas M. Hulings ; 119th Pa., Col. 
Peter C. Ellmaker ; 5th Wis., Col. Thomas S. Allen. 

Second Division,! Brig.-Gen. Albion P. Howe -.—Second Brigade, 
Col. Lewis A. Grant ; 2d Vt., Col. James H. Walbridge ; 3d Vt., Col. 
Thomas O. Seaver ; 4th Vt., Col. Charles B. Stoughton ; 5th Vt., Lieut.- 
Col. John R. Lewis; 6th Vt., Col. Elisha L. Barney. Third Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Neill ; 7th Me. (6 cos.), Lieut.-Col. Selden Con- 
nor ; 33d N. Y. (detachment), Capt. Henry J. Gifford ; 43d N. Y., Lieut.- 
Col. John Wilson; 49th N. Y., Col. Daniel D. Bidwell ; 77th N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Winsor B. French ; 61st Pa., Lieut.-Col. George F. Smith. 

Third Division, Maj.-Gen. John Newton, J Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton: 
—First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler ; 65th N. Y., Col. Joseph 
E. Hamblin ; 67th N. Y., Col. Nelson Cross ; 122d N. Y., Col. Silas Titus ; 
23d Pa., Lieut.-Col. John F. Glenn ; 82d Pa., Col. Isaac C. Bassett. Sec- 
ond Brigade, Col. Henry L. Eustis ; 7th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Franklin P. 
Harlow ; Tenth Mass., Lieut.-Col. Joseph B. Parsons ; 37th Mass., Col. 
Oliver Edwards ; 2d R. I., Col. Horatio Rogers, Jr. Third Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton, Col. David J. Nevin ; 62d N. Y., Col. David 
J. Nevin, Lieut.-Col. Theodore B. Hamilton ; 93d Pa., Maj. John I. 
Nevin ; 98th Pa., Maj. John B. Kohler ; 102d Pa.,§ Col. John W. Pat- 

* Also in command of the Third Brigade, Third Division, on July 3. 
t No First Brigade in division. J See foot-note (Tf), p. 415. 

^ Guarding wagon-train at Westminster, and not engaged in the 
battle. 



GETTYSBURG! THIRD DAY. 421 

terson ; 139th Pa., Col. Frederick H. Collier, Lieut.-Col. William H. 
Moody. Artillery Brigade, Col. Charles H. Tompkins ; Mass. Light, 
1st Batt. (A), Capt. William H. McCartney ; N. Y. Light, 1st Batt., 
Capt. Andrew Cowan ; N. Y. Light, 3d Batt., Capt. William A. Ham ; 
1st R. I. Light, Batt. C, Capt. Richard Waterman ; 1st R. I. Light, 
Batt. G, Capt. George W. Adams ; 2d U. S., Batt. D, Lieut. Edward B. 
Williston ; 2d U. S., Batt. G, Lieut. John H. Butler ; 5th U. S., Batt. 

F, Lieut. Leonard Martin. 

Eleventh Army Corps,* Major-General Oliver O. Howard. 
General Head-quarters, 1st Ind. Cav., Cos. I and K, Capt. Abrani 
Sharra ; 8th N. Y. Inf. (1 co.), Lieut. Herman Foerster. 

First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow, Brig.-Gen. Adelbert 
Ames: — First Brigade, Col. Leopold von Gilsa ; 41st N. Y. (9 cos.), 
Lieut.-Col. Detleo von Einsiedel ; 54th Nl- Y., Maj. Stephen Kovacs, 
Lieut. Ernst Poth(?) ; 68th N. Y., Col. Gotthilf Bourry ; 153d Pa., Maj. 
John F. Frueauff. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Adelbert Ames, Col. 
Andrew L. Harris ; 17th Conn., Lieut.-Col. Douglas Fowler, Maj. Allen 

G. Brady ; 25th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Jeremiah Williams ; Capt. Nathaniel 
J. Manning, Lieut. William Maloney, Lieut. Lsrael White ; 75th Ohio, 
Col. Andrew L. Harris, Capt. George B. Fox ; 107th Ohio, Col. Seraphim 
Meyer, Capt. John M. Lutz. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr : — First Bri- 
gade, Col. Charles R. Coster ; 134th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Allan H. Jack- 
son ; 154th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. D. B. Allen ; 27th Pa., Lieut.-Col. Lorenz 
Cantador ; 73d Pa., Capt. D. F. Kelley. Second Brigade, Col. Orland 
Smith ; 33d Mass., Col. Adin B. Underwood ; 136th N. Y., Col. James 
Wood, Jr. ; 55th Ohio, Col. Charles B. Gambee ; 73d Ohio, Lieut.-Col. 
Richard Long. 

Third Division, Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz -.—First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
Alex. Schimmelfennig, Col. George von Amsberg ; 82d 111., Lieut.-Col. 
Edward S. Salomon ; 45th N. Y., Col. George von Amsberg ; Lieut.-Col. 
Adolphus Dobke ; 157th N. Y., Col. Philip P. Brown, Jr. ; 61st Ohio, 
Col. Stephen J. McGroarty ; 74th Pa., Col. Adolph von Hartung ; 
Lieut.-Col. Alexander von Mitzel, Capt. Gustav Schleiter, Capt. Henry 
Krauseneck. Second Brigade, Col.W. Krzyzanowski ; 58th N. Y., Lieut.- 
Col. August Otto, Capt. Emil Koenig ; 119th N. Y., Col. John T. Lock- 
man, Lieut.-Col. Edward F. Lloyd ; 82d Ohio, Col. James S. Robinson, 
Lieut.-Col. David Thomson ; 75th Pa., Col. Francis Mahler, Maj. August 
Ledig; 26th Wis., Lieut.-Col. Hans Boebel, Capt. John W. Fuchs. Artil- 
lery Brigade, Maj. Thomas W. Osborn ; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. I, Capt. 
Michael Wiedrich ; N. Y. Light, 13th Batt., Lieut. William Wheeler ; 1st 
Ohio Light, Batt. I., Capt. Hubert Dilger ; 1st Ohio Light, Batt. K, 

* During the interval between the death of General Reynolds and the 
arrival of General Hancock, on the afternoon of July 1, all the troops 
on the field of battle were commanded by General Howard, General 
Schurz taking command of the Eleventh Corps, and General Schim- 
melfennig of the Third Division. 



422 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Capt. Lewis Heckman ; 4th U. S., Batt. G, Lieut. Bayard Wilkeson, 
Lieut. Eugene A. Bancroft. 

Twelfth Army Corps, Ma jor-General Henry W. Slocum,* Briga- 
dier-General Alpheus S. Williams. Provost Quard, 10th Me. 
(4 COS.), Capt. John D. Beardsley. 

First Division, Brig.-Geu. Alpheus S. 'Williams, Brig.-Geu. Thomas 
H. Ruger :— First Brigade, Col. Archibald L. McDougall ; 5th Conn., 
Col. W. W. Packer; 20th Conn., Lieut.-Col. William B. Wooster ; 3d 
Md., Col. Jos. M. Sudsburg ; 123d N. Y., Lieut.-Col. James C. Rogers, 
Capt. Adolphus H. Tanner ; 145th N. Y.. Col. E. L. Price ; 46th Pa., Col. 
James L. Selfridge. Second Brigade,-^ Brig.-Gen. Henry H. Lockwood ; 
1st Md., Potomac Home Brigade, Col. William P. Maulsby ; 1st Md., 
Eastern Shore, Col. James Wallace ; 150th N. Y., Col. John H. Ketcham. 
Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Ruger, Col. Silas Colgrove ; 27th 
Ind., Col. Silas Colgrove, Lieut.-Col. John R. Fesler ; 2d Mass., Lieut. 
Col. Charles R. Mudge, Maj. Charles F. Morse ; 13th N. J., Col. Ezra A. 
Carman; 107th N. Y., Col. Nirom M. Crane; 3d Wis., Col. William 
Hawley. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John W. QeSiYy -.—First Brigade, Col. 
Charles Candy ; 5th Ohio, Col. John H. Patrick ; 7th Ohio, Col. William 
R. Creighton ; 29th Ohio, Capt. Wilbur F. Stevens, Capt. Edward Hayes ; 
66th Ohio, Lieut.-Col. Eugene Powell ; 28th Pa., Capt. John Flynn ; 147th 
Pa. (8 COS.), Lieut.-Col. Ario Pardee, Jr. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
Thomas L. Kane, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. ; 29th Pa., Col. William 
Rickards, Jr.; 109th Pa., Capt. F. L. Gimber ; 111th Pa., Lieut.-Col. 
Thomas M. Walker, Col. George A. Cobham, Jr. Third Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. George S. Greene ; 60th N. Y., Col. Abel Godard ; 78th N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Herbert von Hammerstein ; 102d N. Y., Col. James C. Lane, 
Capt. Lewis R. Stegman ; 137th N. Y., Col. David Ireland ; 149th N. Y., 
Col. Henry A. Barnum, Lieut.-Col. Charles B. Randall. Artillery Bri- 
gade, Lieut, Edward D. Muhlenberg ; 1st N. Y. Light, Batt. M, Lieut. 
Charles E. Winegar ; Pa. Light, Batt. E, Lieut. Charles A. Atwell ; 4th 
U. S., Batt. F, Lieut. Sylvanus T. Rugg ; 5th U. S., Batt. K, Lieut. 
David H. Kinzie. 

Cavalry Corps, Major-General Alfred Pleasonton. 

First Division, Brig.-Gen. John Buford -.—First Brigade, Col. Wil- 
liam Gamble ; 8th 111., Maj. John L. Beveridge ; 12th 111. (4 cos.), 3d 
Ind. (6 COS.), Col. George H. Chapman ; 8th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. William 
L. Markell. Second Brigade, Col. Thomas C. De^;^iu ; 6th N. Y., Maj, 
William E. Beardsley ; 9th N. Y., Col. William Sackett ; 17th Pa., Col, 
J. H. Kellogg ; 3d W. Va. (2 cos.), Capt. Seymour B. Conger. Reserve 
Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt ; 6th Pa., Maj. James H. Haseltine ; 

* Exercised command of the right wing of the army during a part of 
the battle. 

t Unassigned during progress of battle ; afterwards attached to First 
Division, as Second Brigade. 



GETTYSBUEG THIRD DAY. 423 

1st U. S., Capt. Richard S. C. Lord ; 2d U. S., Capt. T. F. Rodenbough ; 
5th U. S., Capt. Julius W. Mason ; 6th U. S., Maj. Samuel H. Starr, 
Lieut. Louis H. Carpenter, Lieut. Nicholas Nolan, Capt. Ira W. Claflin. 

Second Division, Brig.-Gen. David McM. Gregg -.—Head-quarters 
Ouard, 1st Ohio, Co. A, Capt. Noah Jones. First Brigade, Col. John B. 
Mcintosh ; 1st Md. (11 cos.), Lieut.-Col. James M. Deems ; Purnell 
(Md.) Legion, Co. A, Capt. Robert E. Duvall ; 1st Mass.,* Lieut.-Col. 
Greely S. Curtis ; 1st N. J., Maj. M. H. Beaumont ; 1st Pa., Col. John P. 
Taylor, 3d Pa., Lieut.-Col. E. S. Jones ; 3d Pa. Heavy Art., Section Batt. 
H,t Capt. W. D. Rank. Second Brigade,^ Col. Pennock Huey ; 2d N. Y., 
Lieut.-Col. Otto Harhaus ; 4th N. Y., Lieut.-Col. Augustus Pruyn ; 6th 
Ohio (10 COS.), Maj. William Stedman ; 8th Pa., Capt. William A. Cor- 
rie. Third Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg ; 1st Me. (10 cos.), Lieut.-Col. 
Charles H. Smith ; 10th N. Y., Maj. M. Henry Avery ; 4th Pa., Lieut.- 
Col. William E. Doster ; 16th Pa., Lieut.-Col. John K. Robison. 

Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick : — Head-quarters 
Guard, 1st Ohio, Co. C, Capt. Samuel N. Stanford. First Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth, Col. Nathaniel P. Richmond ; 5th N.Y., 
Maj. John Hammond ; 18th Pa., Lieut.-Col. William P. Brinton ; 1st Vt., 
Lieut.-Col. Addison W. Preston ; 1st W. Va. (10 cos.). Col. Nathaniel P. 
Richmond, Maj. Charles E. Capehart. Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. 
George A. Custer ; 1st Mich., Col. George H. Town ; 5th Mich., Col. Rus- 
sell A. Alger; 6th Mich., Col. George Gray; 7th Mich. (10 cos.). Col. 
William D. Mann. 

Horse Artillery : — First Brigade, Capt. James M. Robertson ; 9th 
Mich. Batt., Capt. Jabez J. Daniels ; 6th N. Y. Batt., Capt. Joseph W. 
Martin ; 2d U. S., Batts. B and L, Lieut. Edward Heaton ; 2d U. S., 
Batt. M, Lieut. A. C. M. Pennington, Jr. ; 4th U. S., Batt. E, Lieut. 
Samuel S. Elder. Second Brigade, Capt. John C. Tidball ; 1st U. S., 
Batts. E and G, Capt. Alanson M. Randol ; 1st U. S., Batt. K, Capt. 
William M. Graham ; 2d U. S., Batt. A, Lieut. John H. Calef ; 3d U. S., 
Batt. C, Lieut. William D. Fuller.^ 

Artillery Reserve, Brig.-Gen. Robert O. Tyler, Capt. James M. 
Robertson. Head-quarters Guard, 32d Mass. Inf., Co. C, Capt. Josiah 
C. Fuller. First Regular Brigade, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom ; 1st U. S., 
Batt. H, Lieut. Chandler P. Eakin, Lieut. Philip D. Mason ; 3d U. S., 
Batts. F and K, Lieut. John G. Turnbull ; 4th U. S., Batt. C, Lieut. 
Evan Thomas ; 5th U. S., Batt. C, Lieut. Gulian V. Weir. First Volun- 
teer Brigade, Lieut.-Col. Freeman McGilvery ; Mass. Light, 5th Batt. 
(E),|| Capt. Charles A. Phillips; Mass. Light, 9th Batt., Capt. John Bige- 
low, Lieut. Richard S. Milton; N. Y. Light, 15th Batt., Capt. Patrick 
Hart ; Pa. Light, Batts. C and F, Capt. James Thompson. Second Vol- 
unteer Brigade, Capt. Elijah D. Taft ; 1st Conn. Heavy, Batt. B,f Capt. 
Albert F. Brooker ; 1st Conn. Heavy, Batt. M,iy Capt. Franklin A. Pratt ; 

* Served with the Sixth Army Corps, and on the right flank. 

t Serving as light artillery. 

X At Westminster, etc., and not engaged in the battle. 

§ With Huey's Cavalry Brigade, and not engaged in the battle. 

II Tenth New York Battery attached. \ Not engaged. 



424 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Coun. Light, 2dBatt., Capt. John W. Sterling ; N. Y. Light, 5th Batt., 
Capt. Elijali D. Taft. Third Volunteer Brigade, Capt. James F. Hun- 
tington ; N. H. Light, 1st Batt., Capt. Frederick M. Edgell ; 1st Ohio 
Light, Batt. H, Lieut. George W. Norton ; 1st Pa. Light, Batts. F and 
G, Capt. R. Bruce Ricketts ; W. Va. Light, Batt. C, Capt. Wallace Hill. 
Fourth Volunteer Brigade, Capt. Robert H. Fitzhugh ; Me. Light, 6th 
Batt. (F), Lieut. Edwin B. Dow ; Md. Light, Batt. A, Capt. James H. 
Rigby ; N. J. Light, 1st Batt., Lieut. Augustus N". Parsons; IstN.Y. 
Light, Batt. G, Capt. Nelson Ames; IstN.Y. Light, Batt. K,* Capt. 
Robert H. Fitzhugh. Train Guard, 4th N. J. Inf. (7 cos.), Maj. Charles 
Ewing. 

Pennsylvania Volunteers and Militia. 

Called into Service during the Gettysburg Campaign.^ 

Emergency Militia. — Ind. Co. Cav. (Murray Troop), Capt. Frank A. 
Murray ; Ind. Co. Cav. (First Philadelphia City Troop), Capt. Samuel 
J. Randall ; Ind. Co. Cav. (Luzerne Rangers), Capt. Henry H. Brown ; 
Ind. Co. Cav. (Wissahickon Cav.), Capt. Samuel W. Comly ; Ind. Co. 
Cav. (Continental Troop), Capt. Alban H. Myers ; Ind. Co. Cav. (Curtin 
Horse Guards), Capt. John W. Jones ; Ind. Batt., Capt. E. Spencer 
Miller; Ind. Batt., Capt. Henry D. Landis ; 20th Inf., Col. William B. 
Thomas; 26th Inf., Col. William W. Jennings; 27th Inf., Col. Jacob 
G. Frick ; 28th Inf., Col. James Chamberlin ; 29th Inf., Col. Joseph W. 
Hawley ; 30th Inf., Col. William N. Monies ; 31st Inf., Col. John New- 
kumet; 33d Inf. (Blue Reserves), Col. William W. Taylor ; Ind. Battn. 
Inf., Lieut. -Col. Robert Litzinger ; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. John Spear; 
Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. William B. Mann ; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. James B. 
German. 

Ninety-Days' Militia. — 1st Battn. Cav., Lieut.-Col. Richard F. Mason ; 
Ind. Co, Cav., Capt. James M. Bell ; Ind. Co. Cav., Capt. William B. 
Dick ; Ind. Co. Cav. (Dana Troop), Capt. R. W. Hammell ; Ind. Batt., 
Capt. Joseph M. Knap ; Ind. Batt., Capt. Benoni Frishmuth ; Ind. 
Batt., Capt. W. C. Ermentrout ; Ind. Batt. (2d Keystone Batt.), Capt. 
Edward Fitzki ; Ind. Batt. (Chester Co. Art.), Capt. George R. Guss ; 
32d Inf. (Gray Reserves), Col. Charles S. Smith ; 34th Inf., Col. Charles 
Albright ; 35th Inf., Col. Henry B. McKean ; 36th Inf., Col. Henry C. 
Alleman ; 37th Inf., Col. John Trout ; 38th Inf., Col. Melchior H. Horn ; 
39th Inf., Col. James Nagle ; 40th Inf. (1st Coal Regt.), Col. Alfred Day ; 
41st Inf., Col. Edward R. Mayer ; 42d Inf., Col. Charles H. Hunter ; 4'3d 
Inf., Col. William W. Stott ; 44th Inf. (Merchants' Regt.), Col. Enos 
Woodward ; 45th Inf., Col. James T. Clancy ; 46th Inf., Col. John J. 
Lawrence ; 47th Inf., Col. James P. Wickersham ; 48th Inf., Col. John 
B. Embich ; 49th Inf. (2d Corn Exchange), Col. Alexander Murphy ; 

* Eleventh New York Battery attached. 

t The emergency militia and the six months' volunteers were mus- 
tered into the United States service, and the ninety -days' militia into 
the State service. Under act of Congress approved April 12, 1866, the 
State was reimbursed by the United States for money expended in pay- 
ment of the latter troops. 



GETTYSBURG THIRD DAY. 425 

50th Inf., Col. Emlen Franklin ; 51st Inf. (2d Coal Itegt.), Col. Oliver 
Hopkinson ; 52d luf. (2d Union League), Col. William A. Gray ; 53d 
Inf., Col. Henry Royer ; 54th Inf., Col. Thomas F. Gallagher ; 55th Inf., 
Col. Eobert B. McComb ; 56th Inf., Col. Samuel B. Dick ; 57th Inf., Col. 
James R. Porter ; 58th Inf., Col. George H. Bemus ; 59th Inf. (3d Union 
League), Col. George P. McLean ; 60th Inf., Col. William F. Small ; 
Ind. Battn. Inf., Lieut.-Col. John McKeage ; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. Joseph 
K. Ilelmbold ; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. Horace A. Beale ; Ind. Co. Inf., 
Capt. Benjamin T. Green; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. David Mitchel ; Ind. 
Co. Inf., Capt. Osboru E. Stephens; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. William F. 
Rich. 

Six Months' Volunteers.— 2Qi\\ Cav., Col. John E. Wynkoop ; 21st Cav., 
Col. William H. Boyd ; 22d Cav. (Battn.), Maj. B. Mortimer Morrow ; 
1st Battn. Cav., Lieut.-Col. Richard C. Dale ; Ind. Batt. (Park Batt.), 
Capt. Horatio K. Tyler ; Ind. Batt., Capt. W. H. Woodward ; Ind. 
Batt., Capt. Robert J. Nevin ; 1st Battn. Inf., Lieut.-Col. Joseph F. 
Ramsey ; 2d Battn. Inf., Lieut.-Col. John C. Lininger : 3d Battn. Inf., 
Lieut.-Col. T. Ellwood Zell ; Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. Samuel T. Griffith ; 
Ind. Co. Inf., Capt. William M. Schrock. 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

THE WAVE KOLLS BACK. 

Confederates retreat from Gettysburg — The Federals pursue— Crossing 
the Potomac under Difficulties — Kilpatrick's Cavalry Dash on Petti- 
grew's Command — General Lee thought to rest his Army in the 
Valley of Virginia, but Meade followed too fast— Engagements that 
harassed the Retreat— General Lee wished to be relieved of Com- 
mand, but President Davis would not consent to the Appointment of 
Joseph E. Johnston or General Beauregard. 

The armies rested on the " Fourth," — one under the 
bright laurels secured by the brave work of the day be- 
fore, but in profound sorrow over the silent forms of the 
host of comrades who had fallen during those three fate- 
ful days, whose blood bathed the thirsty fields of Get- 
tysburg, made classic by the most stupendous clash of 
conflict of that long and sanguinary war ; while gentle 
rain came to mellow the sod that marked the honored rest 
of friend and foe ; the other, with broken spirits, turned 
from fallen comrades to find safety away from the fields 
that had been so promising of ennobling fruits. The 
enemy had cast his lines on grounds too strong for lead 
and steel, and, exhausted alike of aggressive force and 
means of protracted defence, there was nothing left for 
the vanquished but to march for distant homeward lines. 

The cavalry left on the Blue Kidge joined the Con- 
federate left late on the afternoon of the 3d. Orders for 
retreat were issued before noon of the 4th, and trains of 
wounded and other impedimenta were put in motion by 
the Chambersburg and Fairfield routes, the army to march 
after night by the latter, — the Second Corps as rear-guard, 
the First to follow the Third and push on to secure the 
crossings of the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling 
Waters. It was daylight of the 5th when the road was 

426 



THE WAVE ROLLS BACK. 427 

open for the march of the First, and a later hour of the 
morning before the Second could follow. 

Pursuit was made by the enemy, led by cavalry and the 
Sixth Corps, and the rear-guard had to deploy near Fair- 
field to check it. Rain was helping us. Before the enemy 
could get through the mud and push his batteries over the 
boggy fields, our trains had reached the mountain gorge, 
and the rear-guard was on the march following. Direct 
pursuit of the solid ranks was changed to march down the 
east of the mountains, but the firmer broad road gave the 
Confederates easier march. Kilpatrick got his cavalry in 
on the wagon-trains and destroyed a number, but did 
not delay the march of the column. 

On this retreat the army, already crippled of its pride, 
was met by the dis23iriting news of another defeat at 
Vicksburg, which meant that the Mississippi was free to 
the Federals from its source to the Gulf. Diverting inci- 
dents occurred, but we were in poor mood for them. As 
we approached Hagerstown, two grotesque figures stepped 
into the road about a hundred yards in front of us, — one 
a negro of six feet and a hundred and eighty pounds, the 
other a white man of about five feet seven. The negro 
was dressed in full uniform of the Union infantry, the 
white man in travel-stained butternut dry-goods. The 
negro had a musket on his shoulder. Riding up to them, 
it was observed that the musket was at the cock-notch. 
The negro was reminded that it was unsoldier-like to have 
the gun at a cock, but said that he wanted to be ready to 
save and deliver his prisoner to the guard; it was his 
proudest capture during the march, and he wanted credit 
for it. The man was a recruit lately from abroad, and 
did not seem to care whether or not he was with his com- 
rades. However, there were doubts if he understood a 
word that was said. The uniform was a tight fit, and 
the shoes were evidently painful, but the black man 
said that he could exchange them. He was probably 



428 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the only man of the army who had a proud story to take 
home. 

The Union cavalry came severely upon our left flank 
at Hagerstown, forcing Stuart to call for infantry support. 
Parts of Semmes's and G. T. Anderson's brigades were 
sent, crossed the Antietam, and had uncomfortable expe- 
rience with the horse artillery near Funkstown. They had 
dire complaints to make of the way cavalrymen put them 
in columns of fours against batteries, when they could 
have advanced more rapidly and effectively in line of 
battle and saved half of their men lost. 

Halting for rest near Falling Waters, a sudden alarm 
was brought down the road by a cavalryman riding at 
speed, who reported all of the enemy's cavalry on a sweep- 
ing ride against us. The troops were thrown together to 
wait, but the cavalry charge proved to be a carriage-load 
of lady refugees. Some of the cavalry did get over upon 
the trains parked at Williamsport, but there were many 
wounded near there who could handle their muskets, 
many infantry up from Winchester, and some of Im- 
boden's cavalry, besides some batteries who held the 
ground, and Stuart eventually got up, when the enemy 
drew off. 

On the 6th and 7th the commands were up, and de- 
ployed their lines from Falling Waters to cover the bridge 
and ford at Williamsport. But the river was full, past 
fording at Williamsport, and a raiding party from Har- 
per's Ferry had partially destroyed the bridge at Falling 
Waters. Infantry trenches were made along the lines, 
batteries were put in position, and we were ready in a day 
or two to receive our successful adversary. He found 
some mud along his route, and was not up until the 12th, 
when he appeared and spread his lines along the Confed- 
erate front, but positions were changed, — he had the longer 
outer curve, while the Confederates were on the concen- 
trating inner lines. He made his field-works and other 



THE WAVE EOLLS BACK. 429 

arrangements, had some reinforcements since his battle, 
and was well organized. 

On the forenoon of the 13th, General Lee sent for me, 
and announced that the river was fordable and the bridge 
repaired, that the trains would be started at once, and the 
troops would follow when night could conceal the move. 
The First and Third Corps were to cross by the bridge, 
the Second by the ford. As the lines were comfortable, 
the roads heavy, it occurred to me that the hurried move 
during a single night would be troublesome ; suggestion 
was offered that the trains and wounded should move over 
during the night, and give us easy march the next night, 
but the waters on the other side were high, and only 
enough mills running to supply food from day to day, and 
the weather treacherous, so the general thought it better to 
hurry on. The march by the Williamsport crossing over 
the firm, broad turnpike was made without trouble. The 
route to the bridge was over a new road ; at the ends of 
the bridge were green willow poles to prevent the wheels 
cutting through the mud, but the soil underneath was wet 
and soggy under the long season of rain, and before night 
rain again began to fall. 

General Lee, worn by the strain of the past two weeks, 
asked me to remain at the bridge and look to the work 
of the night. And such a night is seldom experienced 
even in the rough life of the soldier. The rain fell in 
showers, sometimes in blinding sheets, during the entire 
night ; the wagons cut deep in the mud during the early 
hours, and began to " stall" going down the hill, and one 
or two of the batteries were " stalled" before they reached 
the bridge. The best standing points were ankle-deep in 
mud, and the roads half-way to the knee, puddling and 
getting worse. We could only keep three or four torches 
alight, and those were dimmed at times when heavy rains 
came. Then, to crown our troubles, a load of the wounded 
came down, missed the end of the bridge, and plunged 

27 



430 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the wagon into the raging torrent. Right at the end of 
the bridge the water was three feet deep, and the current 
swift and surging. It did not seem possible that a man 
could be saved, but every one who could get through the 
mud and water rushed to their relief, and Providence was 
there to bring tears of joy to the sufferers. The wagon 
was righted and on the bridge and rolled off to Virginia's 
banks. The ground under the poles became so puddled 
before daylight that they would bend under the wheels 
and feet of the animals until they could bend no farther, 
and then would occasionally slip to one side far enough to 
spring up and catch a horse's foot and throw him broad- 
side in the puddled mud. Under the trials and vexa- 
tions every one was exhausted of patience, the general and 
staff were ready for a family quarrel as the only relief for 
their pent-up trouble, when daylight came, and with it 
General Lee to relieve and give us opportunity for a little 
repose. 

The division of the Third Corps under General Petti- 
grew formed the rear of the infantry line, which was to 
be covered by Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. But the cavalry 
brigadier rode off and crossed the river, leaving, it is said, 
a squadron for the duty, and the squadron followed the 
example of the brigadier. The consequence was that 
when Kilpatrick's cavalry rode up it was taken to be the 
Confederates ordered for their rear-guard. Instead of 
friends, however. General Pettigrew found a foe. He was 
surprised by a dashing cavalry charge, was wounded, and 
died after a few days. Some artillery, three standards (of 
the Virginia infantry), and a large number of prisoners 
were taken. General Meade claimed two thousand. 

General Lee thought to occupy the gaps of the Blue 
Ridge by his cavalry, and rest his army in the Valley of 
Virginia, in threatening lines against Washington City, but 
found the Shenandoah River full and past fording, and 
before the tide began to recede General Meade crossed the 



THE WAVE KOLLS BACK. 431 

Potomac east of the Blue Ridge and began to occupy the 
gaps, which called for a southern march of the Confeder- 
ates. On the 19th my command was ordered to Millwood 
to secure, if possible, Ashby's Gap, but as the enemy's 
cavalry was on the opposite bank, and the waters were too 
high for us to get over, we marched on to Manassas, then 
for Chester Gap. As high up as Front Koyal the river 
was found past fording, but part of a pontoon bridge was 
at hand. General Corse, who had joined us, hurried and 
succeeded in getting his brigade over in time to occupy 
Chester Gap, and putting his regiment under Colonel 
Arthur Herbert in the west end of Manassas Gap. The 
balance of Pickett's men crossed by putting the arms and 
ammunition in the boats, the men swimming, and sent re- 
inforcements to General Corse and Colonel Herbert, when 
the enemy's cavalry withdrew. One bridge was laid and 
spliced, and the march southward was resumed. 

The next day another demonstration was made by the 
enemy's cavalry at Manassas Gap, but Hood's division 
was there and McLaws's was at the Chester Gap, where 
another heavy body of cavalry approached. An effort 
was made to get behind the latter by hidden lines of 
march, but the plan of catching cavalry with infantry was 
not successful, though General Wofford thought for a time 
that his trap was well laid. The march was continued, and 
the head of the column reached Culpeper Court-House 
on the 24th. Benning's brigade, left on guard at Gaines's 
Cross-Poads till the Third Corps could relieve him, was 
attacked by a strong cavalry force. On the approach of 
the Third Corps he thought to organize, with General A. 
P. Hill, another plan to entrap the cavalry in a thick 
wood, but the riders found little difficulty in getting away. 
General Ewell was detained a little, and found, upon ap- 
proaching Front Royal, that General Wright's brigade, 
left there to hold the gaps for him, was engaged in skir- 
mishing with the enemy's infantry. He reinforced the 



432 FROM MAIS^ASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

brigade, held the enemy back, then changed his march 
west, crossed the Blue Ridge at Thornton's Gaj), and 
ordered Early's division, that was not yet up, through the 
Valley by Strasburg. He reached Madison Court-House 
on the 29th. 

General Meade got his army together near Warrenton 
on the 31st of July, and ordered a detachment of artil- 
lery, cavalry, and infantry across the Rappahannock at 
Kelly's Ford and the railroad bridge. The command 
drove our cavalry back till it was reinforced by in- 
fantry, when the enemy was pushed back beyond Brandy 
Station. 

General Ewell was called down from Madison Court- 
House, behind the Bapidan, and the First and Third 
Corps were marched into position behind the river on the 
3d of August, leaving the cavalry at CuljDcper Court- 
House. 

General Lee suffered during the campaign from his old 
trouble, sciatica, and as soon as he found rest for his army 
applied to the authorities for a change of commanders. 
The President refused, pleading that he had no one to 
take his place. At the time he had two generals of his 
own choosing who were not in authority adequate to their 
rank, — Joseph E. Johnston, the foremost soldier of the 
South, who had commanded the army from its organiza- 
tion until he was wounded at Seven Pines, and G. T. 
Beauregard, the hero of Sumter and the first Bull Run, 
well equipped and qualified for high command. But the 
President was jealous of Johnston, and nourished prejudice 
against Beauregard. 



CHAPTER XXX. 

LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA. 

The Author reverts to the Perils and Opportunities in the West — Pro- 
poses to the Secretary of War to reinforce against Rosecrans from tlie 
Army of Northern Virginia — Makes Plan known to General Lee — 
The Move finally effected— Ditficulties of Transportation — A Round- 
about Route — General Longstreet narrowly escapes capture when 
seeking Bragg's Head-quarters — General Bragg assigns Longstreet to 
Command of the Left — Instructions for the Battle of Chickamauga — 
The Armies in Position — Federals in Command of Generals Rosecrans, 
Crittenden, McCook, and George H. Thomas. 

While the army was lying idle on the south bank of 
the Rapidan my mind reverted to affairs in the West, and 
especially to the progressive work of the Union army 
in Tennessee towards the northern borders of Georgia. 
Other armies of the South were, apparently, spectators, 
viewing those tremendous threatenings without thought 
of turning minds or forces to arrest the march of Rose- 
crans. 

To me the emergency seemed so grave that I decided to 
write the Honorable Secretary of War (excusing the in- 
formality under the privilege given in his request in 
May) expressing my opinion of affairs in that military 
zone. I said that the successful march of General Rose- 
crans's army through Georgia would virtually be the 
finishing stroke of the war ; that in the fall of Vicksburg 
and the free flow of the Mississippi River the lungs of the 
Confederacy were lost ; that the impending march would 
cut through the heart of the South, and leave but little 
time for the dissolution ; that to my mind the remedy was 
to order the Army of Northern Virginia to defensive work, 
and send detachments to reinforce the army in Tennessee ; 
to call detachments of other commands to the same ser- 
vice, and strike a crushing blow against General Rose- 

28 433 



434 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

crans before he could receive reinforcing help ; that our 
interior lines gave the opportunity, and it was only by the 
skilful use of them that we could reasonably hope to 
equalize our power to that of the better-equipped adver- 
sary; that the subject had not been mentioned to my 
commander, because like all others he was opposed to 
having important detachments of his army so far beyond 
his reach ; that all must realize that our affairs were lan- 
guishing, and that the only hope of reviving the waning 
cause was through the advantage of interior lines. 

A few days after the letter was despatched the subject 
happened up while discussing affairs with General Lee, 
when I felt warranted in expressing my views and re- 
lieving my mind of the serious apprehensions that haunted 
me. He inquired if I was willing to go West and take 
charge there. To that I consented, provided the change 
could be so arranged as to give me an opportunity, by 
careful handling of the troops before accepting battle, to 
gain their confidence ; providing, at the same time, that 
means could be arranged for further aggressive march in 
case of success. 

At that time the railway passing our camps on the 
Kapidan through Virginia and East Tennessee to Chatta- 
nooga was open and in good working order. General 
Bragg's army was near Chattanooga, General Buckner's in 
East Tennessee, near Knoxville, General Samuel Jones's 
army, or parts of an army, in Southwest Virginia. There 
was but one railway, — from Cincinnati via Louisville and 
Nashville to Chattanooga. On that road General Rose- 
crans was marching against General Bragg. On the 
direct route to East Tennessee over the Cumberland 
Mountains General Burnside was moving into East Ten- 
nessee against General Buckner's forces. 

A few days after the conversation with General Lee, he 
was called down to Richmond. In the course of a week 
he wrote, viz. : 



LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA. 435 

"[Confidential.] 

'^EiCHMOND, August 31, 1863. 
" Lieutenant- General J. Longsteeet, 

^^ Head- quarters Army of Northern Virginia: 
"General, — I have wished for several days past to return to 
the army, but have been detained by the President. He will not 
listen to my proposition to leave to-morrow. I hope you will use 
every exertion to prepare the army for offensive operations, and 
improve the condition of our men and animals. I can see nothing 
better to be done than to endeavor to bring General Meade out 
and use our efforts to crush his army while in its present con- 
dition. 

" Very respectfully and truly yours, 

"E. E. Lee, 

" GeneraV 

REPLY. 

" Head- QUARTERS, September 2, 1863. 
"General E. E. Lee, 

" Commanding: 

" General, — Your letter of the 31st is received. I have ex- 
pressed to Generals Ewell and Hill your wishes, and am doing 
all that can be done to be well prepared with my own command. 
Our greatest difficulty will be in preparing our animals. I do 
not see that we can reasonably hope to accomi)lish much by of- 
fensive operations, unless you are strong enough to cross the 
Potomac. If we advance to meet the enemy on this side he will 
in all probability go into one of his many fortified positions. 
These we cannot afford to attack. 

"I know but little of the condition of our affairs in the "West, 
but am inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great 
results is in Tennessee. If we could hold the defensive here with 
two corps and send the other to operate in Tennessee with that 
army, I think that we could accomplish more than by an advance 
from here. 

"I remain, general, very respectfully, 

' ' Your obedient servant, 

"James Longstreet, 

^ ' Lieutenant- General. ' ' 

General Lee next wrote to inquire as to the time neces- 
sary for the movement of my corps into Tennessee. As 



436 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

there were but two divisions, McLaws's and Hood's, and 
Alexander's batteries, two days was supposed to be ample 
time. The transportation was ordered by the quarter- 
master's department at Richmond, and the divisions were 
made ready to board the trains as soon as they could 
reach us. 

The success of the plan was thought from the first to 
depend upon its j)rompt and vigorous execution, and it 
was under those conditions that General Lee agreed to re- 
inforce the army in Tennessee, together with the assurance 
that vigorous pursuit, even to the Ohio River, should fol- 
low success. The onward march was repeatedly urged, 
not only in return for the use of part of the army, but to 
relieve General Lee of apprehension from the army in 
front of him ; but it was not until the 9th of September 
that the first train came to Orange Court-House to start 
with its load of troops. Meanwhile, General Buckner 
had left his post in East Tennessee and marched south to 
draw nearer the army under General Bragg about Chat- 
tanooga, leaving nothing of his command in East Ten- 
nessee except two thousand men at Cumberland Gap, 
under General Frazer, partially fortified. General Burn- 
side had crossed the mountains, and was not only in East 
Tennessee, but on that very day General Frazer surren- 
dered to him his command at Cumberland Gap without a 
fight. 

These facts were known to the Richmond authorities at 
the time of our movements, but not to General Lee or 
myself until the move was so far advanced as to prevent 
recall. So that we were obliged to make the circuit 
through the Carol inas to Augusta, Georgia, and up by the 
railroad, thence through Atlanta to Dalton and Ringgold. 
It was the only route of transit left us. There were two 
routes between Richmond and Augusta, one via Wilming- 
ton, the other through Charlotte, North Carolina, but only 
a single track from Augusta to Chattanooga. The gauges 



LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA. 437 

of the roads were not uniform, nor did the roads connect 
at the cities (except by drays and other such conveyances) . 
The roads had not been heavily worked before the war, 
so that their rolling stock was light and limited. 

Instead of two days of moving, it was not until the 25th 
that our artillery joined us near Chattanooga. Hood's 
division was first shipped, and three brigades, or the 
greater part of three, were landed at the railroad station, 
and joined General Bragg's army on the 18th and 19th 
of September, but that army had been manoeuvred and 
flanked out of Chattanooga, Buckner's out of East Ten- 
nessee, and both were together down below the borders of 
Georgia. 

As I left General Lee's tent, after bidding him good- 
by, he walked out with me to my horse. As my foot was 
in the stirrup he said again, " Now, general, you must 
beat those people out in the West." Withdrawing my 
foot to respectful position I promised, " If I live ; but I 
would not give a single man of my command for a fruit- 
less victory." He promised again that it should be so ; 
said that arrangements had been made that any success 
that we had would be followed ; that orders to that effect 
had been given ; that transportation was also ordered to 
be prepared, and the orders would be repeated. 

While the troops were in transit, Jenkins's South Caro- 
lina brigade was transferred to Hood's division, so that we 
had two South Carolina and four Georgia brigades of the 
two divisions, which gave us some little trouble in keeping 
our men on the cars passing by their homes. The people 
crowded every station to give us their all in most accept- 
able rations, and to cheer us with wishes for a happy issue. 

The train upon which I rode reached Catoosa about two 
o'clock of the afternoon of the 19th of September. That 
upon which our horses were came up at four o'clock. Only 
part of the staff of the corps was with me, and General 
Alexander was with his batteries far away in South Caro- 



438 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

lina. As soon as our horses could be saddled we started, 
Lieutenant-Colonels Sorrel and Manning and myself, to 
find the head-quarters of the commanding general. We 
were told to follow the main road, and did so, though there 
were many men coming into that road from our right 
bearing the wounded of the day's battle ; the firing was 
still heard off to the right, and wagons were going and 
coming, indicating our nearness to the field. Nothing 
else occurring to suggest a change of the directions given 
us, we followed the main road. 

It was a bright moonlight night, and the woodlands on 
the sides of the broad highway were quite open, so that 
we could see and be seen. After a time we were chal- 
lenged by an outlying guard, "Who comes there?" 
We answered, " Friends." The answer was not alto- 
gether satisfying to the guard, and after a very short 
parley we asked what troops they were, when the answer 
gave the number of the brigade and of the division. As 
Southern brigades were called for their commanders more 
than by their numbers, we concluded that these friends 
were the enemy. There were, too, some suspicious ob- 
structions across the road in front of us, and altogether 
the situation did not look inviting. The moon was so 
bright that it did not seem prudent to turn and ride back 
under the fire that we knew would be opened on us, so I 
said, loudly, so that the guard could hear, " Let us ride 
down a little way to find a better crossing." Riding a 
few rods brought us under cover and protection of large 
trees, sufficiently shading our retreat to enable us to ride 
quietly to the rear and take the road over which we had 
seen so many men and vehicles passing while on our first 
ride. 

We reached General Bragg's head-quarters at eleven 
o'clock, reported, and received orders, which he had pre- 
viously given other commanders, for attack early in the 
morning. Our bivouac was made near the general head- 



LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA. 439 

quarters, and we rode at daylight to find the troops. 
Hood's brigades that had arrived before us had been at 
work with the left of the army, which was assigned as my 
command. Lieutenant-General Polk was commanding 
the right wing. 

Two brigades of McLaws's division, Kershaw's and 
Humphreys's, came in the afternoon, and marched during 
the night and across the Chickamauga Kiver. 

The army had forced its way across the Chickamauga 
under severe skirmishes, little less than a battle, during 
the greater part of the 19th, and some of the commands 
had been engaged on the 18th working on the same plan. 

The written order giving the plan was issued on the 
18th. In general terms, it was to cross the Chickamauga, 
strike the enemy's left, and roll it back on his right by a 
wheel to the left so as to come in between the enemy and 
Chattanooga. The work had been so persistent and as- 
siduous during part of the 18th and all of the 19th, that 
General Rosecrans came to understand the plan as well 
as his adversary, and to arrange accordingly. 

With my instructions for the 20th the commanding 
general gave me a map showing prominent topographical 
features of the grounds from the Chickamauga Kiver to 
Mission Kidge, and beyond to the Lookout Mountain 
range. 

At early dawn I found the left wing. It was composed 
of Buckner's corps (Stewart's and Preston's divisions), a 
new division under General Bushrod B. Johnson, the 
division of General T. C. Hindman, and three of Hood's 
brigades. Buckner's corps had been cut in two. His 
division on the right of the left wing was under General 
Stewart, while Preston's division, on the extreme left, 
on the bank of the Chickamauga, was assigned, by the 
order for battle, as the pivot upon which the battle should 
wheel. The commands stood : Stewart's, Johnson's, Hind- 
man's, and Preston's divisions ; Hood's brigades in rear 



440 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

of Johnson's line. General Buckner reported his artillery 
as amounting to about thirty guns. Three batteries were 
reported, of four guns each, with Hindman's division, 
Johnson's and Hood's commands being without artillery. 
The brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys were ordered, 
with Hood's, to be used as a column of assault, by bri- 
gades, at a hundred paces interval. 

As the battle was ordered for daylight, it seemed too 
late to draw Buckner's divisions into reciprocal relations, 
and we had yet to find the right wing. As it was not in 
touch or sight, General Stewart was ordered to find it. 
He marched about half a mile to his right and found that 
he was nearly half a mile in advance of the right wing. His 
move made place for Hood's column, which was called to 
the line, and General Stewart broke his right to rear to 
guard that flank until the right wing could get to the 
front. The divisions were formed in two lines, two bri- 
gades on the front line, others of the second line in support, 
except Hood's five brigades in column. General McLaws 
and two of his brigades, two of Hood's, and Alexander's 
artillery were on the rails, speeding for the battle as fast 
as steam could carry them, but failed to reach it. When 
organized for battle the left wing stood about three hun- 
dred yards east of the Lafayette-Chattanooga dirt road. 
As the battle was ordered for wheel to the left on Pres- 
ton's division as pivot, his (Trigg's) brigade was echeloned 
on the left of Hindman's division. The purpose of the 
commander in ordering the wheel on the left as pivot was 
to push in, from the start, between the enemy and his new 
base at Chattanooga. 

No chief of artillery for the command reported, and a 
brief search failed to find one. The field, so far as it could 
be surveyed, however, was not a field, proper, but a heavy 
woodland, not adapted to the practice of artillery. The 
hour of battle was at hand, but the right wing was not 
yet organized. Some of the troops were without rations, 



LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA. 441 

their wagons, having lost the lines of march through the 
woodlands, failing to reach them until after daylight, when 
they were further delayed cooking their food. 

The right wing was formed of D. H. Hill's corps, Breck- 
enridge's and Cleburne's divisions, W. H. T. Walker's 
corps of Walker's and Liddell's divisions, Cheatham's 
division of Polk's corj^s, artillery battalions of Majors 
Melancthon Smith, T. R. Hotchkiss, and R. E. Groves, 
and batteries of Lieutenant R. T. Beauregard, Captain 
E. P. Howell, Captain W. H. Fowler, and Lieutenant 
Shannon. 

As it formed it stood with D. H. Hill's corps on the 
right, Brecker ridge's and Cleburne's divisions from right 
to left, Cheatham's division on the left of Cleburne's rear, 
and Walker's reserve corps behind Hill's corps ; but when 
arranged for battle it was about half a mile in rear of 
the line upon which the left wing was established. The 
Confederate commander rode early in the morning to hear 
the opening of the battle. As the sounds failed to reach 
him, he became anxious, sent orders of inquiry for the 
cause of delay, and rej^eated his orders for attack, and 
finally rode to his right wing and gave peremptory orders. 

Marching through the woods to line up on the left wing, 
the left of the right wing was found to overlap my di- 
vision on the right, yet our extreme right was found 
to overreach the left of the enemy's field-works by two 
brigades, and reconnoissance found the road between the 
enemy and Chattanooga open and free of obstructions or 
troops to defend it. On the right of Breckenridge's di- 
vision was Armstrong's division of cavalry dismounted, and 
beyond his right was Forrest's other division of cavalry, 
Pegram's. Some miles off from our left was Wheeler's 
division of cavalry, under Wharton and Martin. 

The Union army from left to right was : first the Four- 
teenth Corps, General George H. Thomas commanding, 
four divisions, — Baird's division on the left, then Reynolds's 



442 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

and Brannan's, the latter retired to position of reserve, and 
Negley's. (The last named had been left, on the night of 
the 19th, on guard near the Glen House, but was ordered 
early on the 20th to join General Thomas, and one of the 
brigades did move promptly under the order ; the other 
brigades (two) failed to receive the order.) Then the 
Twentieth Corps, three divisions, — Jefferson C. Davis's, R. 
W. Johnson's, and P. H. Sheridan's, — on the right. General 
A. McD. McCook commanding the corps. Next was the 
Twenty-first Corps, three divisions, — T. J. Wood's, J. M. 
Palmer's, and H. P. Van Cleve's, — General '^. L. Critten- 
den commanding the corps. It was in position on the east 
slope of Mission Ridge, ordered to be prepared to support 
the corps of the right or left, or both ; one of its brigades 
had been left to occupy Chattanooga. Wilder's mounted in- 
fantry, on the right of the Twentieth Corps, was ordered to 
report to the commander of that corps for the day's work. 
A reserve corps under General Gordon Granger was off the 
left of the Union army to cover the gap in Mission Ridge 
at Rossville and the road from the Union left to that gap. 
Minty's cavalry was with this corps, and posted at Mission 
Mills. General Granger had Steedman's division of two 
brigades and a brio;ade under Colonel D. McCook. General 
R. B. Mitchell, commanding Union cavalry, was on their 
right at Crawfish Springs, with orders to hold the 
crossings of the Chickamauga against the Confederate 
cavalry. 

It seems that parts of the Twentieth and Twenty-first 
Corps, Johnson's and Van Cleve's divisions, were under 
General Thomas in the fight of his left on the 19th, and 
remained with him on the 20th. The purpose of the post- 
ing of the Union army was to hold open its routes for 
Chattanooga by the Rossville and Dry Valley roads. As 
before stated, the Confederate commander's design was to 
push in between the Union army and Chattanooga, re- 
cover his lost ground, and cut the enemy's line of supplies. 



LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA. 443 

The commanders of the armies were on the field early 
on the 20th. The failure of the opening of the Confed- 
erates at daylight gave opjDortunity for a reconnoissance by 
light of day, by which it was learned that the road from 
the Union left was open, not guarded nor under close ob- 
servation ; but the commander ordered direct assault under 
the original plan, — his back to the river, the Union army 
backing on Mission Ridge. The Chickamauga River, 
rising from the mountains south, flows in its general 
course a little east of north to conflux with the Tennessee 
River. The Ridge runs nearly parallel with the river, and 
opens up a valley a mile wide. It is a bold outcropping 
of limestone about one hundred feet above the valley, 
with occasional passes, or gaps, that are strong points of 
guard for defence. Four miles northwest from the Union 
left was the gap at Rossville, called for the old Cherokee 
chief. On its right was the pass of the Dry Valley road, 
and immediately in its rear was the McFarland Gap. 
The line of the Lafayette road lies about parallel with 
the Ridge to within a mile of the Union left, when it bends 
westward and leads to the Rossville Gap. The Dry Val- 
ley road crosses the Chickamauga at Glass's Mills, courses 
along the east slope of the Ridge, crosses it, and joins 
on the west the road that crosses at the McFarland 
Gap. 

The Union left was east of the Chattanooga-Rossville 
road, but crossed the road to the west and formed in 
broken front. The left and right of Thomas's line was 
retired or broken to the rear. The Union commander 
rode over his lines on the afternoon of the 19th and 
ordered his front covered by such field-works as could 
be constructed during the night. 

General Thomas covered his lines by log and rail ob- 
structions. The corps of Rosecrans's right formed two 
lines of rail defences for infantry. The batteries had the 
ascending slopes of the Ridge for positions, and their field 



444 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

was more favorable otherwise for artillery practice than 
was that of the Confederates advancing from the valley 
and more densely timbered forests. They had two hun- 
dred and forty-six guns. The records do not give satis- 
factory accounts of the number of Confederate guns, but 
they probably numbered not less than two hundred. 



CHAPTEE XXXL 

BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 

Tactical Features — The Battle opened by Direct Attack on the Federals 
in the Early Morning of September 20 — Repeated and Determined 
Front Assaults — Brigadiers Helm killed and Adams wounded — The 
Union Commands lay behind Defences— Hood's Brigades surged 
through the Forest against the Covered Infantry and Artillery — 
Hood wounded— Longstreet suggests a Plan for Progressive Action — 
Halting Tactics at High Tide of Success — The Confederate Left 
fought a Separate Battle— General Thomas retreats— First Confed- 
erate Victory in the West, and one of the Bloodiest Battles of the 
War — Forces engaged — Losses. 

Satisfied that the opening of the battle was to be the 
attack against his left, the Union commander ordered 
Negley's division out from its position near the Glen 
House to report to General Thomas and assist in meeting 
the attack, but only Beattie's brigade was in time for that 
service, the other brigades waiting to be relieved from 
their positions in line. Meanwhile, Baird's left had been 
extended by Dodge's brigade of Johnson's division of the 
Twentieth Corj)s. 

Before the Confederate commander engaged his battle 
he found the road between the enemy's left and Chatta- 
nooga open, which gave him opportunity to interpose or 
force the enemy from his works to open battle to save his 
line. But he preferred his plan of direct attack as the 
armies stood, and opened his battle by attack of the right 
wing at 9.30 a.m. of the 20th. He was there, and put 
the corps under Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill to the 
work. Breckenridge's and Cleburne's divisions, Brecken- 
ridge on the right, overreached the enemy's left by two 
brigades, Stovall's and Adams's, but the other brigade. 
Helm's, was marched through the wood into front assault 
of the enemy behind his field-works. This brigade made 

445 



446 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

desperate repeated and gallant battle until the commander, 
Benjamin H. Helm, one of the most promising brigadiers, 
was killed, when its aggressive work was susi^ended. 

The other brigades crossed the Chattanooga road, 
changed front, and bore down against the enemy's left. 
This gave them favorable ground and position. They 
made resolute attack against Baird's left, threatening his 
rear, but he had troops at hand to meet them. They had 
a four-gun battery of Slocum's of the Washington Artil- 
lery,* and encountered Dodge's brigade and parts of Wil- 
lick's, Berry's, and Stanley's, and superior artillery. In 
the severe contention General Adams fell seriously hurt, 
and the brigades were eventually forced back to and across 
the road, leaving General Adams on the field. 

A separate attack was then made by Cleburne's division, 
the brigades of Polk and Wood assaulting the breast-works 
held by the divisions of Johnson and Palmer. These 
brigades, after severe fight, were repulsed, and their posi- 
tions were covered by Deshler's brigade. General Deshler 
received a mortal wound from a fragment of shell, leaving 
the brigade in the hands of the gallant Colonel Roger Q. 
Mills (our afterwards distinguished statesman). General 
Thomas called repeatedly for reinforcements, and received 
assurances that they were coming, even to include the 
army if necessary to hold the left. 

Johnson's brigade of Cheatham's division was ordered 
to support the brigade under Colonel Mills, and the re- 
serve corps under General W. H. T. Walker (Gist's and 
Liddell's divisions) was ordered into the Breckenridge 
battle, Gist's brigade against the left angle of the breast- 
works, and Walthall's to the place of Cleburne's division. 
The other brigade of Gist's division supported the battle 
of his own brigade, and General Liddell was ordered with 
Govan's brigade to advance, passing beyond the enemy's 

* That company did not go with the battalion to Virginia. 



BATTLE OF 

CHICKAMAUGA 

Sept. 19th and 20th, 
1863 




BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 447 

left to the Chattanooga road, and wheel to the left against 
his left rear. The troops, without exception, made a brave, 
desperate fight, but were unsuccessful, and forced to sus- 
pend aggressive work. 

As the grand wheel to the left did not progress, I sent, 
at eleven o'clock, to say to General Bragg that my column 
of attack could probably break the enemy's line if he 
cared to have it go in. Before answer came. General 
Stewart, commanding my right division, received a mes- 
sage from General Bragg to go in and attack by his divi- 
sion, and reported that the Confederate commander had 
sent similar orders to all division commanders. He ad- 
vanced, and by his severe battle caused the Union resei*ve 
division under General Brannan to be drawn to the sup- 
port of that front, and this attack, with that of the divisions 
of our right against those of Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and 
Beynolds, so disturbed General Thomas that other rein- 
forcements were called to support his defence. 

General Stewart was in hot engagement before word 
reached me that the battle had been put in the hands of 
division commanders ; but my orders reached General 
Hood in time to hold him and commanders on his left 
before he received notice from the commanding general, 
and the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys were or- 
dered nearer the rear of his column. The divisions of B. 
B. Johnson and Hindman were ordered to follow in close 
echelon on Hood's left. Buckner's pivoting division under 
Preston was left to the position to which the Confederate 
chief had assigned it. 

In our immediate front were the parts of the Twentieth 
and Twenty-first Corps in two lines covered by rail de- 
fences and well-posted batteries. At the early surging of 
his lines through the forest. General Hood came under 
the fire of this formidable array of artillery and infantry, 
and found his lines staggering under their galling missiles, 
and fast losing strength as the fire thickened. His lead- 



448 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

ing brigade was decimated, but his others pushed to the 
front to take and pursue the assault. The divisions of B. 
R. Johnson and Hindman were pressed hard on Hood's 
left, and the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys closed 
to his support, when a bold push gave us the first line of 
the enemy and a large number of his guns ; but General 
Hood was fearfully wounded, supposed to be fatally ; Gen- 
eral Benning, of his " Rock Brigade," lost his horse, and 
thought General Hood was killed. He cut a horse loose 
from a captured gun, mounted, and using part of a rope 
trace as his riding whip, rode to meet me and report 
disaster. He had lost his hat in the melee, and the bri- 
gade disappeared under the steady crushing fire so quickly 
that he was a little surprised. He reported, " General 
Hood killed, my horse killed, my brigade torn to pieces, 
and I haven't a man left." I asked if he didn't think he 
could find one man. The question or the manner seemed 
to quiet somewhat his apprehensions and brought affirma- 
tive answer, when he was told to collect his men and join 
us at the front ; that we had broken and carried the first 
line ; that Johnson's division, on his left, was then in the 
breach and pushing on, with Hindman on his left, spread- 
ing battle to the enemy's limits ; that Stewart's division 
would hold it on our right, and the brigades of Kershaw 
and Humphreys then on the quick step would be with us 
in a minute and help restore the battle to good organiza- 
tion. Just then these two brigades burst through the 
brush in cheerful, gallant march, and brought him back 
to his usual courageous, hojDeful confidence. 

As we approached a second line, Johnson's division hap- 
pened to strike it while in the act of changing position of 
some of the troops, charged upon and carried it, capturing 
some artillery, Hood's and Hindman's troops pressing in 
close connection. This attack forced the parts of the 
Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps from that part of the 
field, back over Missionary Ridge, in disordered retreat, 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 449 

and part of Negley's division of the Fourteenth Corps 
by the same imjDulsion. As our right wing had failed 
of the progress anticipated, and had become fixed by the 
firm holding of the enemy's left, we could find no prac- 
ticable field for our work except by a change of the order 
of battle from wheel to the left, to a swing to the right 
on my division under General Stewart. The fire of the 
enemy off my right readily drew Hood's brigades to that 
bearing. Johnson's and Hindman's divisions were called 
to a similar move, and Buckner's pivotal division under 
General Preston, but General Buckner objected to having 
his left " in the air." 

Presently a discouraging account came from General 
Hindman, that in the progress of his battle his left and 
rear had been struck by a formidable force of cavalry ; 
that Manigault's brigade was forced back in disorder, and 
his other brigades exposed on their open left could not be 
handled. I wrote him a note commending the brave 
work of his division, and encouraging renewed efforts ; 
urged him to have his brigades in hand, and bring them 
around to close connection on Johnson's left. 

On the most open parts of the Confederate side of the 
field one's vision could not reach farther than the length 
of a brigade. Trigg's brigade was ordered to the relief 
of Manigault's, which had been forced back to the La- 
fayette road, and the balance of Preston's division was 
ordered to follow, if necessary, to support that part of the 
field, and our cavalry far away from my left was called 
to clean it up and pursue the retreating columns. It 
seems that Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry had 
struck Manigault's left and put it back in disorder, and 
a brigade, or part of a brigade, of cavalry coming against 
the rear, increased the confusion and drove it back to the 
Lafayette road, when Trigg's brigade advanced to its re- 
lief. The two put the attacking forces back until they 
found it necessary to retire beyond the ridge and cover the 

29 



450 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

withdrawal of trains left exposed by the retreat of troops 
of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps. General Hind- 
man gathered his forces and marched for the left of John- 
son's division, and Preston's brigade under General Trigg 
was returned to the point of its first holding. 

Our front, cleared of opposing forces, was soon changed 
forward, and formed at right angle to its first line to seek 
the enemy's line standing against our right wing. Calls 
were repeated for the cavalry to ride in pursuit of the re- 
treating forces, and guard the gaps of the ridge behind 
the enemy standing in front of our right wing. In the 
new position of the left wing its extreme left encountered 
the enemy rallying in strong position that was heavily 
manned by field batteries. At the same time my left was 
approaching the line of fire of one of our batteries of the 
right wing. 

General Johnson thought that he had the key of the 
battle near Snodgrass Hill. It was a key, but a rough 
one. He was ordered to reorganize his own brigades and 
those of Hindman's division for renewed work ; to ad- 
vance a line of skirmishers, and give time to the trooj^s 
for refreshment, while I rode along the line to observe 
the enemy and find relations with our right wing. 

It was after one o'clock, and the hot and dry and dusty 
day made work fatiguing. My lunch was called up and 
ordered spread at some convenient point while I rode 
with General Buckner and the staffs to view the changed 
conditions of the battle. I could see but little of the 
enemy's line, and only knew of it by the occasional ex- 
change of fire between the lines of skirmishers, until we 
approached the angle of the lines. I passed the right 
of our skirmishers, and, thinking I had passed the 
enemy's, rode forward to be accurately assured, when I 
suddenly found myself under near fire of his sharp- 
shooters concealed behind the trees and under the 
brush. I saw enough, however, to mark the ground 



'^- 





BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 451 

line of his field-works as they were spread along the 
front of the right wing, and found that I was very for- 
tunate in having the forest to cover the ride back until 
out of reach of their fire. In the absence of a chief 
of artillery, General Buckner was asked to establish a 
twelve-gun battery on my right to enfilade the enemy's 
works and line standing before our right wing, and then 
I rode away to enjoy my spread of Nassau bacon and 
Georgia sweet potatoes. We were not accustomed to pota- 
toes of any kind in Virginia, and thought we had a luxury, 
but it was very dry, as the river was a mile and more from 
us, and other liquids were over the border. Then, before 
we had half finished, our pleasures were interrupted by a 
fragment of shell that came tearing through the woods, 
passed through a book in the hands of a courier who sat 
on his horse hard by reading, and struck down our chief 
of ordnance. Colonel P. T. Manning, gasping, as was sup- 
posed, in the struggles of death. Friends sprang forward 
to look for the wound and to give some aid and relief. 
In his hurry to enjoy and finish his lunch he had just 
taken a large bite of sweet potato, which seemed to be suf- 
focating him. I suggested that it would be well to first 
relieve him of the potato and give him a chance to 
breathe. This done, he revived, his breath came freer, 
and he was soon on his feet ready to be conveyed to the 
hospital. In a few days he was again on duty. 

After caring for and sending him off, and before we 
were through with our lunch, General Bragg sent for me. 
He was some little distance in rear of our new position. 
The change of the order of battle was explained, and the 
necessity under which it came to be made. We had taken 
some thirty or more field-pieces and a large number of 
small-arms, and thought that we had cut off and put to 
disorder the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps that had 
retreated through the pass of the Ridge by the Dry 
Valley road. He was informed of orders given General 



452 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Johnson for my left, and General Buckner for a battery 
on the right. I then offered as suggestion of the way to 
finish our work that he abandon the plan for battle by 
our right wing, or hold it to defence, draw off a force 
from that front that had rested since the left wing took 
up the battle, join them with the left wing, move swiftly 
down the Dry Valley road, pursue the retreating forces, 
occupy the gaps of the Kidge behind the enemy standing 
before our right, and call that force to its own relief. 

He was disturbed by the failure of his plan and the 
severe repulse of his right wing, and was little prepared 
to hear suggestions from subordinates for other moves 
or progressive work. His words, as I recall them, were : 
*' There is not a man in the right wing who has any 
fight in him." From accounts of his former operations 
I was prepared for halting work, but this, when the battle 
was at its tide and in partial success, was a little sur- 
prising. His humor, however, was such that his subor- 
dinate was at a loss for a reopening of the discussion. 
He did not wait, nor did he express approval or dis- 
approval of the operations of the left wing, but rode for 
his head-quarters at Reed's Bridge. 

There was nothing for the left wing to do but work 
along as best it could. The right wing ceased its active 
battle as the left forced the enemy's right centre, and the 
account of the commanding general was such as to give 
little hope of his active use of it in supporting us. After 
his lunch. General Johnson was ordered to make ready 
his own and Hindman's brigades, to see that those of 
Hood's were in just connection with his right, and await 
the o]3ening of our battery. Preston's division was pulled 
away from its mooring on the river bank to reinforce our 
worn battle.* The battery not opening as promptly as 
expected. General Johnson was finally ordered into strong, 

* This was my first meeting with the geuial, gallant, lovable William 
Preston. 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 453 

steady battle. He pushed through part of the woodland, 
drove back an array of artillery and the supporting in- 
fantry, and gained other elevated ground. The sound of 
battle in his rear, its fire drawing nearer, had attracted 
the attention of General Granger of the reserve corps, 
and warned him that it was the oi3portunity for his com- 
mand. He marched, without orders, towards the noise, 
and j)assed by the front of Forrest's cavalry and the 
front of our right wing, but no report of his march was 
sent us. Day was on the wane. Night was advancing. 
The sun dipped to the palisades of Lookout Mountain, 
when Lieutenant-Colonel Claiborne reported that the 
cavalry was not riding in response to my calls. He was 
asked to repeat the order in writing, and despatched as 

follows : 

''Battle-field, September 20, 1863, 5.09 p.m. 
'' General Wheeler : 

''Lieutenant- General Longstreet orders you to proceed down 
the road towards the enemy's right, and with your artillery en- 
deavor to enfilade his line, with celerity. 

"By order of Lieutenant-General Longstreet. 

"Thomas Claiborne, 
' ' lAeutenant- Colonel Cavalry, ' ' 

Then our foot-scouts rejoorted that there was nothing on 
the road taken by the enemy's retreating columns but 
squads of footmen. Another written order for the cav- 
alry was despatched at 5.30.* 

General Preston reinforced us by his brigade under 
Gracie, pushed beyond our battle, and gained a height 
and intervening dell before Snodgrass Hill, but the 
enemy's reserve was on the hill, and full of fight, even 
to the aggressive. We were pushed back through the 
valley and up the slope, until General Preston suc- 
ceeded in getting his brigade under Trigg to the sup- 
port. Our battery got up at last under Major Williams 

* Rebellion Record. 



454 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

and opened its destructive fire from eleven guns, which 
presently convinced General Thomas that his position 
was no longer tenable. He drew Keynolds's division 
from its trenches near the angle, for assignment as rear- 
guard. Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel, of the staff, reported 
this move, and was sent with orders to General Stewart 
to strike down against the enemy's moving forces. It 
seems that at the same time Liddell's division of the 
extreme right of our right wing was ordered against the 
march of the reserves. Stewart got into part of Key- 
nolds's line and took several hundred prisoners. Mean- 
while, Reynolds was used in meeting the attack and 
driving back the division of General Liddell. That ac- 
complished, he was ordered to position to cover the re- 
treat. As no reports came to the left from the com- 
manding general or from the right wing, the repulse of 
Liddell's division was thought to indicate the strong 
holding of the enemy along his intrenched front line, 
and I thought that we should wait to finish the battle on 
the morrow. 

The direct road to Chattanooga was practically closed. 
McFarland Gaj), the only debouche, was supposed to 
be occupied by the cavalry. Another blind road was at 
the base of the mountain on its east side. During the 
artillery practice the fire of some of the guns of our 
battery was turned to the contest at Snodgrass Hill, 
which disturbed part of our infantry fiercely struggling 
for that ground, and they complained, but the fire was 
effective. As the woods were full of the enemy, a shot 
would find a mark. 

The intrenched line was crumbling faster than we sup- 
posed, and their reserve was engaged in hot defensive 
battle to hold secure the Gap while yet there were two 
hours of daylight. Had the four brigades of Cheatham's 
division that had not been in action gone in at the same 
time as Liddell's division, it is hardly possible that the 



BATTLE OF CHICK AM AUGA. 455 

Confederate commander could have failed to find the 
enemy's empty lines along the front of his right wing, 
and called both wings into a grand final sweep of the 
field to the caj^ture of Thomas's command ; but he was 
not present, and the condition of affairs was embarrassing 
to the subordinate commanders. 

A reconnoissance made just before the first strokes of 
the morning engagement discovered an open way around 
the enemy's left by turning his intrenched line in reverse, 
which General Hill thought to utilize by change of tac- 
tics, but General Bragg present, and advised of the oppor- 
tunity, preferred his tactics, and urged j^rompt execution. 
At the later hour when Liddell's division was passed 
beyond the enemy's intrenchments to strike at his rein- 
forcing march under General Granger, the subordinate 
of the right wing could not see how he was to be justified 
in using a greater force in that direction, affairs of the 
wing being similar to those of the opening, while the re- 
lations of the right and left were in reverse of tactical 
orders ; but a vigilant chief present and caring for the 
weaker part of his battle, advised that the enemy was on 
his last legs, with his reserves could well have sprung the 
right wing into the opening beyond his right, securing 
crushing results. Earlier in the afternoon he did send an 
order for renewed efforts of the right wing under his plan 
of parallel assault, but the troops had tested the lines in 
their first battle, and were not in condition for a third 
effort, at parallel battle. 

The contention by our left wing was maintained as a 
separate and independent battle. The last of my re- 
serve, Trigg's brigade, gave us new strength, and Preston 
gained Snodgrass Hill. The trampled ground and bushy 
woods were left to those who were too much worn to es- 
cape the rapid strides of the heroic Confederates. The 
left wing swept forward, and the right sprang to the broad 
Chattanooga highway. Like magic the Union army had 



456 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

melted away in our presence. A few hundred prisoners 
were picked up by both wings as they met, to burst 
their throats in loud huzzas. The Army of Tennessee 
knew how to enjoy its first grand victory. The dews of 
twilight hung heavy about the trees as if to hold down 
the voice of victory ; but the two lines nearing as they 
advanced joined their continuous shouts in increasing 
volume, not as the burstings from the cannon's mouth, 
but in a tremendous swell of heroic harmony that seemed 
almost to lift from their roots the great trees of the forest. 

Before greetings and congratulations upon the success 
had passed it was night, and the mild beams of the quar- 
tering moon were more suggestive of Venus than of Mars. 
The haversacks and ammunition supplies were ordered re- 
j)lenished, and the Confederate army made its bivouac on 
the ground it had gained in the first pronounced victory 
in the West, and one of the most stubbornly contested 
battles of the war. 

Our cavalry had failed to close McFarland Gap, and 
through that General Thomas made his march for the 
stand at Kossville Gap. 

It has been stated that this retreat was made under the 
orders of the Union commander. General Thomas did, in 
fact, receive a message from his chief a little after four 
o'clock, saying that he was riding to Chattanooga to view 
the position there ; that he. General Thomas, was left in 
command of all of the organized forces, and should seek 
strong and threatening position at Rossville, and send the 
other men back to Chattanooga to be reorganized. This 
was a suggestion more than an order, given under the con- 
viction that the Confederates, having the Dry Valley road, 
would pass the ridge to the west side, cut General Thomas 
ofi!, and strike his rear at pleasure. The order to command 
of the troops in action, and the conditions referring to 
duties at Chattanooga, carried inferential discretion. That 
General Thomas so construed it was evidenced by his 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 457 

decision to hold " until nightfall if possible." But di- 
rectly, under the practice of our enfilading battery, he 
became convinced that it was not possible, changed his 
purpose, and at 5.30 gave orders for his commanders to 
prepare to retire, and called Reynolds's division from its 
trenches to be posted as rear-guard to cover the retreat. 

General Granger was then engaged in severe conten- 
tion against my left at Snodgrass Hill. His march along 
the front of our cavalry and right wing suggested the 
advance of Liddell's division to the Chattanooga road to 
try to check it. The withdrawal of Reynolds's division 
was in season to aid in driving Liddell's division back to 
its former ground. Reynolds was posted on eminent 
ground as rear-guard, and organized retreat followed. It 
was not until after sunset that Rosecrans's oi^der for re- 
treat was issued, as appears from the letter written from 
Rossville by General James A. Garfield, chief of staff, 
dated 8.40, three hours and more after the move was taken 
up, viz. : 

'' Your order to retire to this place was received a little after 
sunset and communicated to Generals Thomas and Granger. The 
troops are now moving back, and will be here in good shape and 
strong position before morning." * 

So events and the evidence seem conclusive that it was 
our artillery practice that made the confusion of Chicka- 
mauga forests unbearable, and enforced retreat before 
Rosecrans order was issued. 

The Union army and reserve had been fought, and by 
united efforts we held the position at Snodgrass Hill, which 
covered McFarland Gap and the retreat. There were 
yet five brigades of Confederates that had not been in 
active battle. The Confederate commander was not present, 
and his next in rank thought night pursuit without au- 
thority a heavy, unprofitable labor, while a flank move, 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxx. part i. p. 144. 



458 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

after a night's rest, seemed promising of more impor- 
tant results. The Confederate chief did not even know 
of his victory until the morning of the 21st, when, upon 
riding to his extreme right, he found his commander 
at that point seeking the enemy in his immediate front, 
and commended the officer upon his vigilance, — twelve 
hours after the retreat of the enemy's forces. 

The forces engaged and their respective casualties 
follow : 

General Bragg's returns of the 20th of August— the 
last of record — reported his aggregate of all arms . 43,866 

Reinforced from J. E. Johnston's army in August . . 9,000 

Reinforced from J. E. Johnston's army in September 

(Gregg and McNair) 2,500 

Reinforced from General Lee's army, September 18 
and 19 (a large estimate) 5,000 

Total 60,366 

Losses on the 18th and 19th 1,124 

Aggregate for battle on the 20th 59,242 



*■&& 



General Rosecrans's return of Sei^tember 20, 1863, 

showed : Aggregate of infantry, equipped 46,561 

Aggregate of cavalry, equipped 10,114 

Aggregate of artillery, equipped 4,192 

Total 60,867 

Confederate losses (estimated ; returns imperfect) .' . 17,800 
Union losses by returns (infantry, artillery, and cav- 
alry) 16,550 

The exceeding heaviness of these losses will be better 
understood, and the desperate and bloody character of the 
Chickamauga battle more fully appreciated, upon a little 
analysis. The battle, viewed from the stand-jDoint of the 
Union losses, was the fifth greatest of the war, Gettys- 
burg, Spottsylvania, the Wilderness, and Chancellors ville 
alone exceeding it, but each of these battles were of much 
longer time. Viewed by comparison of Confederate losses, 
Chickamauga occupies similar place — fifth — in the scale 
of magnitude among the battles of the war. 

But the sanguinary nature of the contention is best 



BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA. 459 

illustrated by a simple suggestion of proportions. Official 
reports show that on both sides the casualties — killed, 
wounded, and missing — embraced the enormous proportion 
of thirty-three per cent, of the troops actually engaged. 

On the Union side there were over a score of regiments 
in which the losses in this single fight exceeded 49.4 per 
cent., which was the heaviest loss sustained by a German 
regiment at any time during the Franco-German war. The 
"charge of the Light Brigade" at Balaklava has been 
made famous in song and history, yet there were thirty 
Union regiments that each lost ten per cent, more men at 
Chickamauga, and many Confederate regiments whose 
mortality exceeded this. 

Longstreet's command in less than two hours lost nearly 
forty-four per cent, of its strength, and of the troops op- 
posed to a portion of their splendid assaults, Steedman's 
and Brannan's commands lost respectively forty-nine and 
thirty-eight in less than four hours, and single regiments 
a far heavier percentage. 

Of the Confederate regiments sustaining the heaviest 
percentages of loss (in killed, wounded, and missing, — the 
last a scar-cely appreciable fraction) the leading ones were : 

Regiment. Per cent. 

Tenth Tennessee 68.0 

Fifth Georgia 61.1 

Second Tennessee 60.2 

Fifteenth and Thirty-seventli Tennessee 59.9 

Sixteenth Alabama 58.6 

Sixth and Ninth Tennessee 67.9 

Eighteenth Alabama 56.3 

Twenty-second Alabama 55.2 

Twenty-third Tennessee 54.1 

Twenty-ninth Mississippi 52.7 

Fifty-eighth Alabama 51.7 

Thirty-seventh Georgia , 50.1 

Sixty-third Tennessee 49.7 

Forty-first Alabama 48.6 

Thirty-second Tennessee 48.3 

Twentieth Tennessee 48.0 

First Arkansas 45.1 

Ninth Kentucky 44.3 



460 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

These are only a few of the cases in which it was pos- 
sible to compute percentages of casualties, the number of 
effectives taken into battle not having been mentioned, but 
they serve to illustrate the sanguinary severity of the fight 
and the heroism of the troops. 



CHAPTER XXXII. 

FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 

Loiigstreet differs with General Bragg as to Movements of Pursuit — 
The Confederates on Lookout Mountain — Federals gain Comfortable 
Positions around it — Superior Officers of Bragg's Command call for 
his Removal — Bragg seeks Scapegoats — President Davis visits the 
Army — Tests the I'emper of the Officers towards Bragg — He offers 
the Command to Longstreet — He declines — His Reasons — General 
Bragg ignores Signal-Service Reports and is surprised — General Joe 
Hooker's Advance — Night Attack beyond LookoutMountain — Colonel 
Bratton's Clever Work — Review of the Western Movement and Com- 
bination — It should have been effected in May instead of September — 
Inference as to Results had the First Proposition been promptly acted 
upon. 

About sunrise of the next morning, General Bragg 
rode to my bivouac, when rej)ort was made to him of 
orders of the night before, to replenish supplies and pre- 
pare to take up pursuit at daylight. He asked my views 
of the next step to be taken, explaining that there were 
some defensive works about Chattanooga to cover the 
enemy in that position. 

I knew nothing of the country except of its general 
geographical features, but the hunt was up and on the go, 
when any move towards his rear was safe, and a speedy 
one encouraging of great results. I suggested that we 
cross the Tennessee River north of Chattanooga and 
march against the line of the enemy's rear ; that if, after 
so threatening as to throw General Rosecrans to full 
retreat, we found it inconvenient to pursue him, we turn 
back with part of the army and capture or disperse the 
Union army in East Tennessee under General Burnside. 
He stated that he would follow that qpurse, ordered the 

^ 461 



462 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

right wing to march,* and the left wing to follow as 
soon as the way was clear, — the left to care for the dead 
and wounded during the wait. As it was night when the 
rear of the right wing stretched out on the road, my march 
was not taken up until the morning of the 22d. General 
McLaws joined me on the 21st with his other brigades, 
and General Jenkins joined Hood's division. Afterwards 
G. T. Anderson's brigade joined the latter. When our 
march reached General Bragg's head-quarters and re- 
ported on the 22d, he gave me orders to direct a division 
from the line of march to follow the enemy towards Chat- 
tanooga. 

When asked if he had abandoned the course upon 
which his march was ordered, he said the j^eople would be 
greatly gratified to know that his army was marching 
through the streets of Chattanooga with bands of music 
and salutations of the soldiers. I thought, and did not 
fail to say, that it would give them greater pleasure to 
know that he had passed the Tennessee E,iver, turned the 
enemy out of Chattanooga in eager flight, to save his rear- 
ward lines, whilst we marched hammering against the 
broken flanks of his columns. But the cavalry had re- 
ported that the enemy was in hurried and confused retreat, 
his trains crossing the river and 23assing over the nose of 
Lookout Mountain in disorder. 

The j^raise of the inhabitants of a city so recently aban- 
doned to the enemy, and a parade through its streets with 
bands of music and flaunting banners, were more alluring 
to a spirit eager for applause than was the tedious march 
for fruition of our heavy labors. 

General Rosecrans prepared, no doubt, to continue his 
retreat, anticipating our march towards his rear, but finding 



* In his ofHcial report of the battle, General Bragg denies that his 
march of the 21.st was for the crossing of the Tennessee River ; refers to 
the proposition as visionary, and says of the country, "Affording no 
subsistence for men or animals." — Rebellion Record. 



FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 463 

that we preferred to lay our lines in front of him, coi. - 
eluded that it would be more comfortable to rest at Chat- 
tanooga, reinforce, repair damages, and come to meet us 
when ready for a new trial. 

When General Bragg found that the enemy had changed 
his mind, and was not inclined to continue his rearward 
march, he stretched his army in a semicircle of six miles 
along the southeast front of Chattanooga, from the base 
of Lookout Mountain on his left, to his right resting on 
the Tennessee River, and ordered Alexander's batteries 
to the top of the mountain, my command, McLaws's, 
Hood's, and Walker's divisions, occupying the left of his 
line of investment. His plan was to shell the enemy 
from his works by field batteries, but the works grew 
stronger from day to day on all sides of the city. Our 
infantry was posted along the line, as supports for the 
batteries, with orders not to assault unless especially or- 
dered. 

The northern point of Lookout Mountain, upon which 
Alexander's batteries were posted, abuts upon the Ten- 
nessee E-iver. The city lies east of the abutment and 
nestles close under it. The base of the mountain has a 
steep, rugged grade of five hundred feet above the plateau, 
and from its height the mountain crops out into palisades 
of seven hundred feet. General Alexander managed to 
drop an occasional shell or shot about the enemy's lines 
by lifting the trails of his guns, but the fire of other bat- 
teries was not effective. 

At the end of a week's practice the Confederate com- 
mander found the enemy getting more comfortable in his 
works, and thought to break him up by a grand cavalry 
raid. On the 30th he ordered General Wheeler to or- 
ganize a force of his effective mounts, cross the river, and 
ride against the railway and such depots and supply- 
trains as he could reach. The cavalry destroyed some 
wagon-trains and supplies, and gave the enemy more 



464 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

trouble than the artillery practice, yet failed to convince 
him that it was time to abandon his position, but, on 
the contrary, satisfied him that he was safe from further 
serious trouble. 

At that time the shortest line of the enemy's haul of 
provisions from the depot at Stevenson was along the 
road on the north bank of the river. The Confederate 
chief conceived, as our cavalry ride had failed of effect, 
that a line of sharp-shooters along the river on our side 
could break up that line of travel, and ordered, on the 8th 
of October, a detail from my command for that purpose. 
As the line was over the mountain about seven miles beyond 
support, by a rugged road not practicable for artillery, I 
ordered a brigade of infantry detailed to go over and pro- 
tect the sharp-shooters from surprise or capture. The 
detail fell upon Law's brigade. The line for this practice 
extended from the east side of Lookout Creek some ten 
miles down the river. The effect of the fire was about 
like that of the cavalry raid. It simply put the enemy 
on shorter rations until he could open another route for 
his trains. 

But more to be deplored than these novel modes of in- 
vestment was the condition of the Confederate army. 
After moving from Virginia to try to relieve our comrades 
of the Army of Tennessee, we thought that we had cause 
to complain that the fruits of our labor had been lost, but 
it soon became manifest that the superior officers of that 
army themselves felt as much aggrieved as we at the halt- 
ing policy of their chief, and were calling in letters and 
petitions for his removal. A number of them came to 
have me write the President for them. As he had not 
called for my opinion on military affairs since the 
Johnston conference of 1862, I could not take that 
liberty, but promised to write to the Secretary of War 
and to General Lee, who I thought could excuse me 
under the strained condition of affairs. About the same 



FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 465 

time they framed and forwarded to the President a peti- 
tion praying for relief.'"' It was written by General D. H. 
Hill (as he informed me since the war). 

While the superior officers were asking for relief, the 
Confederate commander was busy looking along his lines 
for victims. Lieutenant-General Polk was put under 
charges for failing to open the battle of the 20th at day- 
light ; Major-General Hindman was relieved under 
charges for conduct before the battle, when his conduct 
of the battle with other commanders would have relieved 
him of any previous misconduct, according to the customs 
of war, and pursuit of others was getting warm. 

On the Union side the Washington authorities thought 
vindication important, and Major-Generals McCook and 
Crittenden, of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps, were 
relieved and went before a Court of Inquiry ; also one of 
the generals of division of the Fourteenth Corps. 

The President came to us on the 9th of October and 
called the commanders of the army to meet him at Gen- 
eral Bragg's office. After some talk, in the presence of 
General Bragg, he made known the object of the call, 
and asked the generals, in turn, their oj^inion of their 
commanding officer, beginning with myself. It seemed 
rather a stretch of authority, even with a President, and 
I gave an evasive answer and made an effort to turn the 
channel of thought, but he would not be satisfied, and 
got back to his question. The condition of the army was 
briefly referred to, and the failure to make an effort to 
get the fruits of our success, when the opinion was given, 
in substance, that our commander could be of greater 
service elsewhere than at the head of the Army of Ten- 
nessee. Major-General Buckner was called, and gave 
02)inion somewhat similar. So did Major-General Cheat- 
ham, who was then commanding the corps recently com- 



* Rebellion Record. 
30 



466 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

manded by Lieutenant-General Polk, and General D. H. 
Hill, who was called last, agreed with emphasis to the 
views expressed by others. 

The next morning the President called me to private 
conference, and had an all day talk. He thought to as- 
sign me to command, but the time had passed for hand- 
ling that army as an independent force. Regarding this 
question, as considered in Virginia, it was understood 
that the assignment would be made at once, and in time 
for opportunity to handle the army sufficiently to gain 
the confidence of the officers and soldiers before offering 
or accepting battle. The action was not taken, a battle 
had been made and won, the army was then seriously en- 
tangled in a quasi siege, the officers and soldiers were dis- 
aj)pointed, and disaffected in morale. General Grant was 
moving his army to reinforce against us, and an impor- 
tant part of the Union army of Virginia was moving to 
the same purpose. 

In my judgment our last opportunity was lost when we 
failed to follow the success at Chickamauga, and capture 
or disperse the Union army, and it could not be just to 
the service or myself to call me to a position of such re- 
sponsibility. The army was part of General Joseph E. 
Johnston's department, and could only be used in strong 
organization by him in combining its operations with his 
other forces in Alabama and Mississippi. I said that 
under him I could cheerfully work in any position.''' 
The suggestion of that name only served to increase his 
displeasure, and his severe rebuke. 

I recognized the authority of his high position, but 
called to his mind that neither his words nor his manner 
were so im^Dressive as the dissolving scenes that foreshad- 
owed the dreadful end. He referred to his worry and 
troubles with politicians and non-combatants. In that 

* Later on he offered the command to Lieutenant-General Hardee, 
who dechned it. 



FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 467 

connection, I suggested that all that the people asked for 
was success ; with that the talk of politicians would be as 
sjiiders' webs before him. And when restored to his usual 
gracious calm I asked to have my resignation accepted, 
to make place for some one who could better meet his 
ideas of the important service. He objected that my 
troops would not be satisfied with the change. I sug- 
gested a leave of absence, as winter was near, when I 
would go to the Trans-Mississippi Department, and after 
the troops were accustomed to their new commander, send 
in my written resignation, from Texas, but he was not 
minded to accept that solution of the premises. 

Finally, I asked his aid in putting the divisions that 
were with me in more efiicient working order, by assign- 
ing a major-general to command Hood's division. He 
had been so seriously crippled that he could not be in 
condition to take the field again even if he recovered, and 
a commander for the division was essential to its proper 
service. As he had no one, or failed to name any one, for 
the place, I suggested the promotion of the senior briga- 
dier then in command of it. General M. Jenkins, who 
was a bright, gallant, and efiicient ofiicer of more than 
two years' experience in active warfare, loved by his 
troops, and all acquaintances as well. He had been trans- 
ferred, recently, by the War Department to the division, 
upon application of General Hood, and in consequence 
there was some feeling of rivalry between him and Briga- 
dier-General Law, the next in rank, who had served with 
the division since its organization, and had commanded 
it at Gettysburg after General Hood was wounded, and 
after his taking off in the battle of Chickamauga. The 
President referred to the services of General Law with the 
division, but failed to indicate a preference. I thought 
it unwise and not military to choose a junior for assign- 
ment to command over his senior ofiicers, and prejudicial 
to the esprit de corps and morale of any army, except under 



468 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

most eminent services, and in this instance where service, 
high military character, and equipment were on the side 
of the senior it was more objectionable, but consented that 
it would be better to have General Law promoted, and 
the feeling of rivalry put at rest ; General Jenkins's 
heart was in the service, and could submit to anything that 
seemed best for its interests ; but the President was pleased 
to remain negative, and failed to assign a commander. 

The interview was exciting, at times warm, but con- 
tinued until Lookout Mountain lifted above the sun to 
excuse my taking leave. The President walked as far as 
the gate, gave his hand in his usual warm grasp, and 
dismissed me with his gracious smile ; but a bitter look 
lurking about its margin, and the ground-swell, admon- 
ished me that clouds were gathering about head-quarters 
of the First Corps even faster than those that told the 
doom of the Southern cause. 

A day or two after this interview the President called 
the commanders to meet him again at General Bragg's 
head-quarters. He exj^ressed desire to have the army pulled 
away from the lines around Chattanooga and put to active 
work in the field, and called for suggestions and plans by 
which that could be done, directing his appeal, apparently, 
to me as first to reply. 

I suggested a change of base to Pome, Georgia, a 
march of the army to the railway bridge of the Tennes- 
see Piver at Bridgeport, and the crossing of the river as 
an easy move, — one that would cut the enemy's rearward 
line, interrupt his supply train, put us between his army 
at Chattanooga and the reinforcements moving to join 
him, and force him to precipitate battle or retreat. 

General Bragg proposed that we march up and cross 
the river and swing around towards the enemy's rear and 
force him out by that means. No other plans were offered, 
nor did other officers express j)reference for either of the 
plans that were submitted. 



FAILUKE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 469 

Maps were called for and demonstrations given of the 
two plans, when the President ordered the move to be 
made by the change of base to Kome, and in a day or two 
took leave of us. He had brought General Pemberton 
with him to assign to the corps left by General Polk, but 
changed his mind. General D. H. Hill was relieved of 
duty ; after a time General Buckner took a leave of 
absence, and General Hardee relieved General Cheatham 
of command of the corps left to him by General Polk. 

About this time General Lee wrote me, alluding to the 
presence of the President, the questions under considera- 
tion, my proposition for him to leave the army in Virginia 
in other hands and come West to grander, more im- 
portant fields, to his purpose in sending me West to be 
assigned to command them, and expressing anticipation 
of my return to Virginia.* 

* " Camp Rappahannock, October 26, 1863. 

" My dear General, — I have received your three letters, September 
26, October 6, and October 11. The first was received just as I was 
about to make a move upon General Meade, to prevent his detaching 
reinforcements to Rosecrans. The second when I had gone as far as I 
thought I could advantageously go ; and the third since my return to 
this place. I have read them all with interest and pleasure, but have 
not had time to reply till now. 

"I rejoice at your great victory deeply. It seemed to me to have 
been complete. I wish it could have been followed up by the destruc- 
tion of the Federal army. As regards your proposition as to myself, I 
wish that I could feel that it was prompted by other reasons than kind 
feelings to myself. I think that you could do better than I could. It 
was with that view I urged your going. The President, being on the 
ground, I hope will do all that can be done. He has to take a broad 
view of the whole ground, and must order as he deems best. I will 
cheerfully do anything in my power. 

" In addition to other infirmities, I have been suffering so nauch from 
rheumatism in my back that I could scarcely get about. The first two 
days of our march I had to be hauled in a wagon, and subsequently 
every motion of my horse, and indeed of my body, gave much pain. I 
am rather better now, though I still suffer. We could not come up 
with Meade. "We had to take circuitous and by-roads, while he had 
broad and, passable routes on either side of the railroad. We struck 
his rear-guards three times, — the last at Bristoe, where Hill with his 
advance of two brigades fell too precipitately on one of his corps, — 
suffered a repulse and loss. He was finally driven beyond Bull Run. I 



470 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The President left the army more despondent than he 
found it. General Pemberton's misfortune at Vicksburg 
gave rise to severe prejudice of the people and the army, 
and when the troops heard of the purpose of the Presi- 
dent to assign him to command of Polk's corps, parts of 
the army were so near to mutiny that he concluded to call 
General Hardee to that command. A few days after he 
left us a severe season of rain set in, and our commander 
used the muddy roads to excuse his failure to execute the 
campaign that the President had ordered. 

Late on the 20th of September and during the 21st, 
General Rosecrans reported his condition deplorable, 
and expressed doubt of his holding at Chattanooga, and 
called to General Burnside in East Tennessee, to whom 
he looked for aid ; but finding only feeble efforts to fol- 
low our success he recovered hope, prepared defensive 
works, and was looking to renewal of his aggressive work 
when he was relieved. 

From accounts made public since the war it appears 
that his animals were so reduced from want of forage at 

saw he could easily get behind his intrenchments in front of Alexan- 
dria. Our men were dreadfully off for shoes, blankets, and clothes. 
One division alone had over a thousand barefooted men. We had failed 
to take any, and I fear had failed to manage as well as we might. The 
country was a perfect waste. A northeast storm broke upon us. There 
was neither shelter nor food for man or beast. I saw no real good I could 
accomplish by manoeuvring. The enemy had destroyed the bridge 
over the Rappahannock and blown up one of the piers. The freshet 
after we left the Rapidan carried away the railroad bridge over that 
river. I therefore withdrew to the Rappahannock, destroying the rail- 
road from Cub Run (this side Manassas Junction) to the Rappahannock 
River. 

"We inflicted some punishment upon the enemy, — captured upward 
of two thousand four hundred prisoners. 

"But I missed you dreadfully, and your brave corps. Your cheerful 
face and strong arms would have been invaluable. I hope you will 
soon return to me. I trust we may soon be together again. May God 
preserve you and all with you. 

" Very truly yours, 

"R. E. Lee. 

"General Longstreet." 



FAILUKE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 471 

the time of the October rains that General Kosecrans 
could not move his artillery over the muddy roads, which 
suggests mention that the campaign ordered by the Presi- 
dent for the change of base could have forced him from 
his works in his crippled condition, and given us com- 
fortable operations between him and his reinforcements 
coming from Virginia and Mississippi. 

In his official account, General Bragg said that the road 
on the south side wai left under my command, which is 
misleading. My command — three divisions — was on his 
line of investment, east of the city and of the mountain ; 
the road was west of the mountain from six to twenty 
miles from the command. We were in support of his bat- 
teries, to be ready for action at the moment his artillery 
practice called for it. We held nearly as much of his 
line as the other eight divisions. None of the com- 
manders had authority to move a man from the lines until 
the 8th of October, when he gave orders for posting the 
sharp-shooters west of the mountain. The exposure of 
this detachment was so serious that I took the liberty to 
send a brigade as a rallying force for it, and the exposure 
of these led me to inquire as to the assistance they could 
have from our cavalry force operating on the line from 
the mountain to Bridgeport, some eight or ten miles be- 
hind them. The cavalry was not found as watchful as 
the eyes of an army should be, and I reported them to 
the general, but he thought otherwise, assured me that his 
reports were regular, daily and sometimes oftener. 

Nevertheless, prudence suggested more careful guard, 
and I ordered Captain Manning, who brought from Vir- 
ginia part of my signal force, to establish a station in 
observation of Bridgeport and open its communication 
with my head-quarters. General Bragg denied all re- 
ports sent him of the enemy from my signal party, treated 
them with contempt, then reported that the road was 
under my command. 



472 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

His report is remarkable in that he failed to notice the 
conduct of his officers, except of the killed and wounded 
and one division commander whom he found at daylight 
of the 21st advancing his line of skirmishers in careful 
search of the enemy who had retreated at early twilight 
the evening before under shouts from the Confederate 
army that made the heavy wood reverberate with resound- 
ing shouts of victory. That officer he commended as the 
" ever vigilant." He gave due credit to his brave soldiers 
for their gallant execution of his orders to charge and 
continue to charge against the enemy's strongholds, as he 
knew that they would under his orders until their efforts 
were successful, but the conduct of the battle in all of its 
phases discredits this claim. When the right wing of 
his army stepped into the Lafayette-E,ossville road the 
enemy's forces were in full retreat through McFarland 
Gap, and all fighting and charging had ceased, except the 
parting blows of Preston's division with Granger's re- 
serve corps. A peculiar feature of the battle was the early 
ride of both commanders from the field, leaving the battle 
to their troops. General Eosecrans was generous enough 
to acknowledge that he left his battle in other hands. 
General Bragg claimed everything for himself, failing to 
mention that other hands were there. 

While General Hosecrans was opening a route beyond 
reach of our sharp-shooters, his chief engineer. General 
W. F. Smith, was busy upon a plan for opening the line 
of railway on the south side, and his first step was to 
break up the line of sharp-shooters. On the 19th he 
made a survey of the river below Chattanooga. On the 
same day General Rosecrans was superseded in command 
by General George H. Thomas. A day or two after that 
my signal party reported some stir about the enemy's 
camps near Bridgeport, and the cavalry reported a work- 
ing force at Nicojack Cave. 

The cavalry was put under my orders for a reconnois- 



FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 473 

sance, and I was ordered to send a brigade of infantry 
scouting for the working party. Nothing was found at 
the Cave or by the reconnoissance, and the cavalry ob- 
jected to my authority. On tlie 25th orders came to me 
to hold the mountain by a brigade of infantry. After 
ordering the brigade, I reported a division necessary to 
make possession secure, suggesting that the enemy's best 
move was from Bridgeport and along the mountain crest ; 
that we should assume that he would be wise enough to 
adopt it, unless we prepared against it. But our com- 
mander was disturbed by suggestions from subordinates, 
and thought them presumptuous when they ventured to 
report of the j)robable movements of the enemy. 

On the night of the 27th of October, General Smith 
moved to the execution of his plan against our line of 
sharp-shooters. He put fifty pontoon-boats and two flat- 
boats in the river at Chattanooga, the former to take 
twenty-five men each, the latter from forty to seventy- 
five, — the boats to float quietly down the river eight miles 
to Brown's Ferry, cross and land the troops. At the 
same time a sufficient force was to march by the highway 
to the same point, to be in readiness for the boats to carry 
them over to their comrades. The sharp-shooters had 
been posted for the sole purpose of breaking up the haul 
along the other bank, and not with a view of defending 
the line, nor was it defensible, while the enemy had every 
convenience for making a forced crossing and lodge- 
ment. 

The vigilant foe knew his opportunity, and only waited 
for its timely execution. It is needless to say that Gen- 
eral Smith had little trouble in establishing his point. 
He manned his boats, floated them down to the crossing, 
landed his men, and soon had the boats cross back for his 
other men, pushed them over, and put them at work in- 
trenching the strong ground selected for their holding. 
By daylight he was comfortably intrenched, and had his 



474 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

artillery on the other side in j)Osition to sweep along the 
front. 

The Confederate commander did not think well enough 
of his line when he had it to prepare to hold it, but when 
he found tliat the enemy proposed to use it, he thought to 
order his infantry down to recover the ground just demon- 
strated as indefensible, and ordered me to meet him on the 
mountain next morning to learn his plans and receive his 
instructions for the work. 

That afternoon the signal party reported the enemy ad- 
vancing from Bridgeport in force, — artillery and infantry. 
This despatch was forwarded to head-quarters, but was dis- 
credited. It was repeated about dark, and again forwarded 
and denied. 

On the morning of the 28th I reported as ordered. The 
general complained of my party sending up false alarms. 
The only answer that I could make was that they had 
been about two years in that service, and had not made 
such mistakes before. 

While laying his plans, sitting on the point of Lookout 
rock, the enemy threw some shells at us, and succeeded in 
bursting one about two hundred feet below us. That an- 
gered the general a little, and he ordered Alexander to 
drop some of his shells about their heads. As this little 
practice went on, a despatch messenger came bursting 
through the brushwood, asking for General Longstreet, 
and reported the enemy marching from Bridgeport along 
the base of the mountain, — artillery and infantry. Gen- 
eral Bragg denied the report, and rebuked the soldier for 
sensational alarms, but the soldier said, " General, if you 
will ride to a point on the west side of the mountain I 
will show them to you." We rode and saw the Eleventh 
and Twelfth Corps under General Hooker, from the Army 
of the Potomac, marching quietly along the valley towards 
Brown's Ferry. The general was surprised. So was I. 
But my surprise was that he did not march along the 



FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 475 

mountain top, instead of the valley. It could have been 
occupied with as little loss as he afterwards had and less 
danger. He had marched by our line of cavalry without 
their knowing, and General Bragg had but a brigade of 
infantry to meet him if he had chosen to march down 
along the top of the mountain, and that was posted 
twenty miles from support. 

My estimate of the force was five thousand. General 
Bragg thought it not so strong, and appearance from the 
elevation seemed to justify his estimate. Presently the 
rear-guard came in sight and made its bivouac imme- 
diately in front of the point upon which we stood. The 
latter force was estimated at fifteen hundred, and halted 
about three miles in rear of the main body. 

A plan was laid to capture the rear-guard by night at- 
tack. He proposed to send me McLaws's and Jenkins's 
divisions for the work, and ordered that it should be done 
in time for the divisions to withdraw to the point of the 
mountain before daylight, left me to arrange details for at- 
tack, and rode to give orders for the divisions, but changed 
his mind without giving me notice, and only ordered Jen- 
kins's division. After marching his command. General 
Jenkins rode to the top of the mountain and reported. 

The route over which the enemy had marched was 
along the western base of a series of lesser heights, offer- 
ing strong points for our troops to find positions of de- 
fence between his main force and his rear-guard. After 
giving instructions to General Jenkins, he was asked to 
explain the plan of operations to General McLaws in case 
the latter was not in time to view the position from the 
mountain before night. A point had been selected and 
ordered to be held by one of Jenkins's brigades supported 
by McLaws's division, while General Jenkins was to use 
his other brigades against the rear-guard, which rested in 
the edge of a woodland of fair field of approach. The 
point at which Law's brigade rested after being forced 



476 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

from its guard of the line of sharp-shooters was near the 
northern base of the mountain about a mile east of the 
route of the enemy's line of march. As General Law's 
detached service had given him 023portunity to learn some- 
thing of the country, his brigade was chosen as the brigade 
of position between the parts of the enemy's forces. Gen- 
eral Law was to move first, get into position by crossing 
the bridge over Lookout Creek, to be followed by Jen- 
kins's other brigades, when McLaws's division was to ad- 
vance to position in support of Law's brigade. 

I waited on the mountain, the only point from which 
the operations could be seen, until near midnight, when, 
seeing no indications of the movements, I rode to the 
point that had been assigned for their assembly, found the 
officers in wait discussing the movements, and, upon in- 
quiry, learned that McLaws's division had not been or- 
dered. Under the impression that the other division 
commander understood that the move had miscarried, I 
rode back to my head-quarters, failing to give counter- 
manding orders. 

The gallant Jenkins, however, decided that the plan 
should not be abandoned, and went to work in its execu- 
tion by his single division. To quiet the apprehensions 
of General Law he gave him Robertson's brigade to be 
posted with his own, and Benning's brigade as their sup- 
port, and ordered his own brigade under Colonel Bratton 
to move cautiously against the rear-guard, and make the 
attack if the opportunity was encouraging. 

As soon as Colonel Bratton engaged, the alarm spread, 
the enemy hastened to the relief of his rear, encountered 
the troops posted to receive them, and made swift, severe 
battle. General Law claimed that he drove off their fight, 
and, under the impression that Colonel Bratton had fin- 
ished his work and recrossed the bridge, withdrew his 
command, leaving Colonel Bratton at the tide of his en- 
gagement. General Jenkins and Colonel Bratton were 



FAILUEE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 477 

left to their own cool and gallant skill to extricate the 
brigade from the swoop of numbers accumulating against 
them, and, with the assistance of brave Benning's Rock 
brigade, brought the command safely over, Benning's bri- 
gade crossing as Bratton reached the bridge. 

The conduct of Bratton's forces was one of the cleverest 
pieces of work of the war, and the skill of its handling 
softened the blow that took so many of our gallant officers 
and soldiers. 

Colonel Bratton made clever disposition of his regi- 
ments, and handled them well. He met gallant resist- 
ance, and in one instance had ]3art of his command forced 
back, but renewed the attack, making his line stronger, 
and forced the enemy into crowded ranks and had him 
under converging circular fire, with fair prospects, when 
recalled under orders to hasten to the bridge. So urgent 
was the order that he left the dead and some of the 
wounded on the field. 

General Law lost of his own brigade (aggregate) ... 43 
General Robertson (1 wounded and 8 missing) .... 9 
Colonel Bratton lost (aggregate) 356 

Confederate loss 408 

Union loss (aggregate) 420 

It was an oversight of mine not to give definite orders 
for the troops to return to their camps before leaving 
them. 

General Jenkins was ordered to inquire into the con- 
duct of the brigades of position, and reported evidence 
that General Law had said that he did not care to win 
General Jenkins's spurs as a major-general. He was or- 
dered to prepare charges, but presently when we were 
ordered into active campaign in East Tennessee he asked 
to have the matter put off to more convenient time. 

We may pause here to reflect upon the result of the 
combination against Kosecrans's army in September, after 
our lines of transit were seriously disturbed, and after the 



478 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

severe losses in Pennsylvania, Mississippi, and Tennessee ; 
and to consider in contrast the probable result of the com- 
bination if effected in the early days of May, when it was 
first proposed (see strategic map). 

At that time General Grant was marching to lay siege 
upon Vicksburg. The campaign in Virginia had been 
settled, for the time, by the battle of Chancellorsville. 
Our railways were open and free from Virginia through 
East Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, to Central Missis- 
sippi. The armies of Rosecrans and Bragg were stand- 
ing near Murfreesboro' and Shelbyville, Tennessee. The 
Richmond authorities were trying to collect a force at 
Jackson, MississijDpi, to drive Grant's army from the siege. 
Two divisions of the First Corps of the Army of Northern 
Virginia were marching from Suffolk to join General 
Lee at Fredericksburg. Under these circumstances, posi- 
tions, and conditions, I proposed to Secretary Seddon, and 
afterwards to General Lee, as the only means of relief 
for Vicksburg, that Johnston should be ordered with his 
troops to join Bragg's army ; that the divisions marching 
for Fredericksburg should be ordered to meet Johnston's, 
the transit over converging lines would give speedy com- 
bination, and Johnston should be ordered to strike Rose- 
crans in overwhelming numbers and march on to the 
Ohio River. 

As the combination of September and battle of Chicka- 
mauga drew General Grant's army from its work in Mis- 
sissippi to protect the line through Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky, and two Federal corps from the Army of the 
Potomac, the inference is fair that the earlier, more pow- 
erful combination would have opened ways for grand 
results for the South, saved the eight thousand lost in 
defending the march for Vicksburg, the thirty-one thou- 
sand surrendered there. Port Hudson and its garrison 
of six thousand, and the splendid Army of Northern 
Virginia the twenty thousand lost at Gettysburg. And 



FAILUKE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS. 479 

who can say that with these sixty-five thousand soldiers 
saved, and in the ranks, the Southern cause would not 
have been on a grand ascending grade with its bayonets 
and batteries bristling on the banks of the Ohio River 
on the 4th day of July, 1863 ! 

The elections of 1862 were not in support of the 
Emancipation Proclamation. With the Mississippi River 
still closed, and the Southern army along the banks of 
the Ohio, the elections of 1864 would have been still 
more pronounced against the Federal policy, and a new 
administration could have found a solution of the politi- 
cal imbroglio. " Blood is thicker than water." 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 

THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 

General Bragg'S Infatuatiou — General Grant in Command of the Fed- 
eral Forces— Longstreet ordered into East Tennessee — His Plans for 
the Campaign — Poorly supported by his Superior — Foraging for Daily 
Rations — General Burnside's Forces — Advance upon Kuoxville — 
Affairs at Lenoir's and Campbell's Stations — Engagement near Knox- 
ville an Artillery Combat — Reprehensible Conduct of Officers — Allege- 
ment that One was actuated by Jealousy — Federals retire behind their 
Works— Laying the Confederate Lines about Knoxville. 

About the 1st of November it was rumored about camp 
that I was to be ordered into East Tennessee against Gen- 
eral Burnside's army. At the moment it seemed impos- 
sible that our commander, after rejecting a proposition for 
a similar move made just after his battle, when flushed 
with victory and the enemy discomfited, could now think 
of sending an important detachment so far, when he knew 
that, in addition to the reinforcements that had joined the 
Union army, another strong column was marching from 
Memphis under General Sherman, and must reach Chat- 
tanooga in fifteen or twenty days. But on second thoughts 
it occurred to me that it might, after all, be in keeping with 
his peculiarities, and then it occurred to me that there are 
many ways to compass a measure when the spirit leads. 
So I set to work to try to help his plans in case the report 
proved true. 

After a little reflection it seemed feasible that by with- 
drawing his army from its lines about Chattanooga to 
strong concentration behind the Chickamauga Biver, and 
recalling his detachment in East Tennessee (the latter to 
give the impression of a westward move), and at the mo- 
ment of concentration sending a strong force for swift 
march against General Burnside. — strong enough to crush 

480 



THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 481 

him, — and returning to Chattanooga before the army under 
General Sherman could reach there (or, if he thought 
better, let the detachment strike into Kentucky against the 
enemy's communications), something worth while could 
be effected. 

Presently I was called, with Lieutenant-General Hardee 
and Major-General Breckenridge, the other corps com- 
manders, to learn his plans and receive his orders. He 
announced his pur230se in general terms to send me into 
East Tennessee, then paused as if inviting the opinions 
of others, when I stated that the move could be made, 
but it would be hazardous to make a detachment strong 
enough for rapid work while his army was spread along 
a semicircle of six miles, with the enemy concentrated at 
the centre, whence he could move in two or three threat- 
ening columns, to hold his line to its extension, and give 
his real attack such power that it must break through by 
its weight. Then I suggested the operations herein just 
mentioned. 

He ordered the move to be made by my two divisions, 
Alexander's and Leydon's artillery, and Wheeler's cav- 
alry and horse artillery. We had the promise of a force, 
estimated from three to five thousand, that was to come 
from Southwest Virginia and meet us, but that com- 
mand was to start from a point two hundred miles from 
our starting, march south as we marched north, and meet 
us at Knoxville. General Bragg estimated General Burn- 
side's force south of Knoxville at fifteen thousand. I 
rejDcated the warning that the move as ordered was not 
such as to give assurances of rapid work, saying that my 
march and campaign against the enemy's well-guarded 
positions must be made with care, and that would consume 
so much time that General Grant's army would be up, 
when he would organize attack that must break through 
the line before I could return to him. His sardonic smile 
seemed to say that I knew little of his army or of himself 

31 



482 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

in assuming such a possibility. So confident was he of 
his position that I ventured to ask that my column should 
be increased to twenty thousand infantry and artillery, 
but he intimated that further talk was out of order. 

General Grant had in the mean time joined the army 
and assumed command on the 22d of October, and it was 
known that General Sherman was marching to join him. 

On the 20th of October General Burnside reported by 
letter * to General Grant an army of twenty-two thousand 
three hundred men, with ninety-odd guns, but his returns 
for November show a force of twenty-five thousand two 
hundred and ninety and over one hundred guns. Eight 
thousand of his men were on service north of Knoxville 
and about Cumberland Gap. 

To march, and capture or disperse this formidable force, 
fortified at points, I had McLaws's and Hood's divisions of 
infantry. Colonel Alexander's and Major Ley don's artil- 
lery, and four brigades of General Wheeler's cavalry. 
Kershaw's, Humphreys's, Wofford's, and Bryan's brigades 
constituted McLaws's division. Hood's division, which 
was commanded during the campaign by Brigadier-Gen- 
eral M. Jenkins, was made up of Jenkins's, Anderson's, 
Benning's, Law's, and Bobertson's brigades. General 
Wheeler's cavalry was organized into two divisions of two 
brigades each, — General John T. Morgan's Alabama and 
Colonel Cruse's Georgia brigades, under Major-General 
W. T. Martin ; Colonels G. G. Dibbrell's Tennessee and 
Thomas Harrison's Texas brigades, under Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Frank Armstrong. This made about fifteen thousand 
men, after deducting camp guards and foraging parties. 
The remote contingent that was to come from Southwest 
Virginia was an unknown quantity, not to be considered 
until it could report for service. 

As soon as the conference at head-quarters adjourned 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 680. 



THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 483 

orders were issued for Alexander's artillery to be with- 
drawn from Lookout Mountain, and General McLaws was 
ordered to withdraw his division from the general line 
after night. Both commands were ordered to Tyner's 
Station to take the cars for Sweetwater on the 4th. 

Control of the trains was under General Bragg's quar- 
termaster, who had orders for the cars to be ready to 
transport the trooj^s on their arrival, but the trains were 
not ready until the 5th. The brigades arrived at Sweet- 
water on the 6th, 7th, and 8th. Alexander's batteries 
were shipped as soon as cars were ready. To expedite 
matters, his horses and wagons were ordered forward by 
the dirt road ; the batteries found cars, the last battery 
getting to Sweetwater on the 10th. Jenkins's division 
and Leydon's batteries were drawn from the lines on the 
5th and ordered to meet the cars at the tunnel throusrh 
Missionary Ridge. They reached the station in due sea- 
son, but the cars were not there. After waiting some 
days, the battery horses and horses of mounted officers 
were ordered by the wagon road. Tired of the wait, I 
advised the troops to march along the road and find the 
cars where they might have the good fortune to meet 
them, the officers, whose horses had been sent forward, 
marching with the soldiers. 

General Bragg heard of the delay and its cause, but 
began to urge the importance of more rapid movements. 
His effort to make his paper record at my expense was 
not pleasing, but I tried to endure it with patience. He 
knew that trains and conductors were under his exclusive 
control, but he wanted paper's that would throw the respon- 
sibility of delay upon other shoulders. 

On the 8th and 9th the infantry marched as far as 
Cleveland, about thirty miles, where the train-masters 
gave notice that the trains could meet them, but it was 
not until the 12th that the last of the brigades reached 
Sweetwater. 



484 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

While waiting for transportation, I wrote some of my 
friends to excuse my failure to stop and say good-by. The 
letter written to General Buckner was returned to me 
some months after, endorsed by him as having important 
bearing upon events as they transpired, — viz. : 

'' Wednesday, November 5, 1863. 

''My dear General, — I start to-day for Tyner's Station, and 
expect .to get transportation to-morrow for Sweetwater. The 
weather is so bad, and I find myself so much occupied, that I 
shall not be able to see you to say good-by. 

"When I heard the report around camp that I was to go into 
East Tennessee, I set to work at once to try and plan the means 
for making the move with security and the hope of great results. 
As every other move had been proposed to the general and re- 
jected or put off until time had made them inconvenient, I came 
to the conclusion, as soon as the report reached me, that it was to 
be the fate of our army to wait until all good opportunities had 
passed, and then, in desperation, seize upon the least favorable 
movement. 

' ' As no one had proposed this East Tennessee campaign to the 
general, I thought it possible that we might accomplish some- 
thing by encouraging his own move, and proposed the following 
plan, — viz. : to withdraw from our present lines and our forces in 
East Tennessee (the latter to be done in order to give the impres- 
sion to the enemy that we were retiring from East Tennessee and 
concentrating near him for battle or for some other movement) 
and place our army in a strong concentrated position behind 
Chickamauga Eiver. The moment the army was together, to 
make a detachment of twenty thousand to move rapidly against 
Burnside and destroy him ; and by continued rapid movements to 
threaten the enemy's rear and his communications to the extent 
that might be necessary to draw him out from his present posi- 
tion. This, at best, is but a tedious process, but I thought it 
gave promise of some results, and was, therefore, better than 
being here destroying ourselves. The move, as I proposed it, 
would have left this army in a strong position and safe, and 
would have made sure the capture of Burnside, — that is, the 
army could spare twenty thousand, if it were in the position 
that I proposed, better than it can spare twelve, occupying the 
lines that it now does. Twenty thousand men, well handled, 
could surely have captured Burnside and his forces. Under 



THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 485 

present arrangements, however, the lines are to be held as they 
now are and the detachment is to be of twelve thousand. We 
thus expose both to failure, and really take no chance to our- 
selves of great results. The only notice my plan received was a 
remark that General Hardee was pleased to make, 'I don't think 
that that is a bad idea of Longstreet's.' I undertook to explain 
the danger of having such a long line under fire of the enemy's 
batteries, and he concentrated, as it were, right in our midst, and 
within twenty minutes' march of any portion of our line. But I 
was assured that he would not disturb us. I repeated my ideas, 
but they did not even receive notice. It was not till I had 
repeated them, however, that General Hardee noticed me. Have 
you any maps that you can give or lend me 1 I shall need every- 
thing of the kind. Do you know any reliable people, living near 
and east of Knoxville, from whom I might get information of the 
condition, strength, etc. , of the enemy 1 I have written in such 
hurry and confusion of packing and striking camp (in the rain 
and on the head of an emj^ty flour barrel) that I doubt if I have 
made myself understood. I remain 

"Sincerely your friend, 

"J. LONGSTREET, 

' ' Lieutenant- General. 
" To Major-General S. B. Buckner, 

" Commanding Division.^'' 

Three months thereafter General Buckner returned 
the letter with the following : 

(Endorsement.) 

" Morristown, Tenn., February 1, 1864. 
"General, — It seems to me, after reading this letter again, 
that its predictions are so full a vindication of your judgment 
of the movements then ordered, that it should remain in your 
possession, with a view that at some future day it may serve to 
'vindicate the truth of history.' I place it at your disposal with 
that view. 

" Truly your friend, 

"S. B. Buckner, 

' ' Major- General. 
"To Lieutenant- General J. Longstreet." 

I asked at general head-quarters for maps and informa- 
tion of the country through which I was to operate, for a 



486 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

quartermaster and commissary of subsistence who knew 
of the resources of the country, and for an engineer officer 
who had served with General Buckner when in command 
of that department. Neither of the staff-officers was sent, 
nor a map, except one of the topographical outlines of the 
country between the Hiawassee and Tennessee E-ivers, 
which was much in rear of the field of our proposed 
operations. General Buckner was good enough to send 
me a plot of the roads and streams between Loudon and 
Knoxville. 

We were again disappointed at Sweetwater. We were 
started from Chattanooga on short rations, but comforted 
by the assurance that produce was abundant at that point, 
and so it proved to be ; but General Stevenson, command- 
ing the outpost, reported his orders from the commanding 
general were" to ship all of his supplies to his army, and 
to retire with his own command and join him upon our 
arrival. In this connection it should be borne in mind 
that we were recently from Virginia, — coming at the 
heated season, — where we left most of our clothing and 
blankets and all of our wagon transportation ; and by this 
time, too, it was understood through the command that 
the Richmond authorities were holding thunder-clouds 
over the head of the commander, and that General Bragg 
was disposed to make them more portentous by his press- 
ing calls for urgency. 

Thus we found ourselves in a strange country, not as 
much as a day's rations on hand, with hardly enough land 
transportation for ordinary camp equipage, the enemy in 
front to be captured, and our friends in rear putting in 
their paper bullets. This sounds more like romance than 
war, but I appeal to the records for the facts, including 
reports of my chiefs of quartermaster and subsistence 
departments and General Alexander's account of the con- 
dition of some of the battery horses and ammunition. 

Our foraging parties were lively, and we lost but a day 



THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 487 

and part of another in gathering in rations for a start. 
Anticipating proper land transportation, plans were laid 
for march across the Little Tennessee above its confluence 
with the greater river, through Marysville to the heights 
above Knoxville on the east bank, by forced march. This 
would have brought the city close under fire of our field 
batteries and forced the enemy into open grounds. A 
guide had been secured who claimed to be familiar with 
the country, and was useful in laying our plans. But 
when our pontoon bridge came up it was without a train 
for hauling. So our plan must be changed. 

Fortunately, we found a point in a bend of the river 
near the railroad at which we could force a crossing^. At 
dark the cars were rolled up to that point by hand, and 
we learned that the Little Tennessee River above us was 
fordable for cavalry. General Wheeler had been ordered 
to have vedettes along the river from Loudon to some 
distance below Kingston, where a considerable body of 
Union troops occupied the north bank. He was ordered 
with his other troops to prepare for orders to cross the 
Little Tennessee at its fords, ride to Marysville, capture 
the enemy's cavalry outpost at that point, ride up the 
east side of the river to Knoxville, and seize the heights 
overlooking the city ; or, finding that not feasible, to 
endeavor to so threaten as to hold the enemy's forces there 
to their works, while we marched against the troops of the 
west side ; but when he found his service on that side 
ceased to be effective or co-operative with our movements, 
to cross the river and join the main column. 

As just now explained, the failure of wagons for our 
pontoon bridge forced us to cross at Loudon, and to make 
direct march upon Knoxville by that route. 

Weary of the continual calls of General Bragg for 
hurried movements, it seemed well to make cause for him 
to assign another commander or to move him to discontinue 
his work at a paper record ; so I wired to remind him that 



488 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

he assured me before sending me away that he was safe in 
his position, and that he was told before my leaving that 
the command was not strong enough to excuse any but a 
careful, proper campaign ; that he had since been informed 
that all delays of our movements were due to his ineffi- 
cient staff corps, and that we were dependent upon for- 
aging for our daily rations for men and animals. It began 
to look more like a camj^aign against Longstreet than 
against Burnside. 

As General Burnside's orders were to hold Knoxville, 
he decided to act on the defensive. Leaving the troops in 
the northern district of his department in observation of 
that field, he withdrew his division on the south side of 
Tennessee River as we marched for Loudon, took uj) his 
pontoon bridge, and broke up the railroad bridge. 

Orders were issued on the 12th for the general move of 
my cavalry by Marysville, the infantry and artillery along 
the railroad route. Pains were taken to have the bridge 
equipments carried by hand to the river, and skirmishing 
parties put in the boats and drifted to the opposite bank. 
The troops in rear were marched during the night to the 
vicinity of Loudon and held in readiness in case the 
enemy came to oppose our crossing. The bridge was laid 
under the supervision of General Alexander and Major 
Clark, our chief engineer, at Huff's Ferry, without serious 
resistance. 

A few miles east of Loudon the Holston * and Little 
Tennessee Rivers come together, making the Tennessee 
River, which flows from the confluence west to Kingston, 
where it resumes its general flow southwest. The Holston 
rises in the mountains north and flows south to the junction. 
The Little Tennessee rises in the mountains east and flows 
west to the junction. The railroad crosses the main river 
at Loudon, thirty miles from Knoxville, and runs about 

* Since those days the name of Holston has been changed to the Ten' 
nessee. 



THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 489 

parallel to the Holston River, and near its west bank. 
West of the railroad and parallel is a broken spur of the 
Clinch Mountain range, with occasional gaps or passes for 
vehicles, and some other blind wagon-roads and cattle- 
trails. West of this spu;, and near its base, is the main 
wagon-road to Knoxville, as far as Campbell Station, 
about seventeen miles, where it joins the Kingston road, 
passes a gap, and unites with the wagon-road that runs 
with the railroad east of the mountain spur at Camp- 
bell Station. South of this gap, about eleven miles, is 
another pass at Lenoir's Mill, and three miles south of 
that another pass, not used. 

A detail of sharp-shooters under Captain Foster, of 
Jenkins's brigade, manned the first boats and made a suc- 
cessful lodging, after an exchange of a few shots with the 
enemy's picket-guard on the north bank. They intended 
to surprise and capture the picket and thus secure quick 
and quiet passage, but in that they were not successful. 
The north bank was secured, however, without loss, and 
troops were passed rapidly over to hold it, putting out a 
good skirmish line in advance of the bridge-head. As we 
advanced towards Loudon, the part of General White's 
Union division that had been on the opposite bank of the 
river was withdrawn to Lenoir's Station. 

During the 13th and 14th the command was engaged 
in making substantial fastenings for the bridge and con- 
structing its defences. General Vaughn's regiments and 
a battery of Major Ley don's (with broken-down horses) 
were assigned to guard the bridge. 

On the afternoon of the 14th the enemy appeared on 
our front in strong force, drove our skirmish line back, 
and seemed prepared to give battle. As we were then 
waiting the return of our foraging wagons, we could only 
prepare to receive him. Some of the provisions looked 
for came in during the night, and we advanced on the 
15th, finding that the enemy had retired. The force that 



490 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

came back to meet us on tlie 15tli was part of White's di- 
vision (Chapin's brigade) sent by General Burnside, and 
General Potter, commanding the Ninth Corps, sent Gen- 
eral Ferrero with his division. The move was intended 
probably to delay our march. It was Chapin's brigade 
that made the advance against our skirmishers, and it prob- 
ably suffered some in the affair. We lost not a single man. 

General Wheeler crossed the Little Tennessee River at 
Motley's Ford at nightfall on the 13th, and marched to 
cut off the force at Marysville, He came upon the com- 
mand, only one regiment, the Eleventh Kentucky Cav- 
alry, that was advised in time to prepare for him. He 
attacked as soon as they came under fire, dispersed them 
into small parties that made good their escape, except one 
hundred and fifty taken by Dibbrell's brigade. Colonel 
Wolford brought up the balance of his brigade and made 
strong efforts to support his broken regiment, but was 
eventually forced back, and was followed by the Eighth 
and Eleventh Texas and Third Arkansas Cavalry and 
General John T. Morgan's brigade. The next day he 
encountered Sanders's division of cavalry and a battery, 
and, after a clean cavalry engagement of skilful manoeu- 
vres on both sides, succeeded in reaching the vicinity of 
the city of Knoxville, but found it too well guarded to 
admit of any very advantageous work. 

On the 15th our advance was cautiously made by Hood's 
division and Alexander's artillery leading ; McLaws's di- 
vision and Leydon's artillery following. All along the 
route of the railroad the valley between the mountain 
and the river is so narrow and rough that a few thousand 
men can find many points at which they can make success- 
ful stands against great odds. Our course was taken to 
turn all of those points by marching up the road on the 
west side of the mountain. A few miles out from our 
bridge we encountered a skirmishing party near the lower 
gap of the mountain, which, when pressed back, passed 



THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 491 

through the gap. General Jenkins continued his march — 
leaving a guard at the gap till it could be relieved by 
General McLaws — to Lenoir's Station. 

The enemy was looking for us lo follow through the 
lower gaps and attack his strong front, and was a little 
surprised to find us close on his right flank. He was well 
guarded there, however, against precipitate battle by the 
mountain range and narrow pass and the heavy, muddy 
roads through which our men and animals had to pull. 
Arrangements were made for a good day's work from 
early morning. 

Our guide promised to lead part of our men through a 
blind route during the night by which we could cut off the 
enemy's retreat, so that they would be securely hemmed 
in. Generals Jenkins and McLaws came up during the 
night. The former was ordered to advance part of his 
command to eligible points at midnight and hold them 
ready for use at daylight. The guide was sent with a 
brigade to the point which was to intercept the enemy's 
retreat. McLaws was held on the road, ready for use east 
or west of the ridge. Jenkins was ordered to have parties 
out during the night to watch that the enemy did not 
move, and report. As no report came from them, all 
things were thought to be properly adjusted, when we ad- 
vanced before daylight. In feeling our way through the 
weird gray of the morning, stumps seen on the road- 
side were taken to be sharp-shooters, but we were surprised 
that no one shot at us, when, behold ! before it was yet 
quite light, we came upon a park of eighty wagons, well 
loaded with food, camp equipage, and ammunition, with the 
ground well strewn with spades, picks, and axes.* The ani- 

* Writing of these operations since the war, General E. M. Law, in an 
article in the Philadelphia Weekly Press of July 18, 1888, said, — 

" During the night the sounds of retreat continued, and when day- 
light came the valley about Lenoir presented the scene of an encamp- 
ment deserted with ignominious haste." 

But he did not take the trouble to report the retreat until nearly 



492 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

mals liad been taken from the wagons to double their teams 
through the mud. General Potter had sent the division 
under General Hartranft back to the Campbell Station 
Pass to occuj)y the junction of his line of retreat with the 
Kingston road and the road upon which we were march- 
ing, and was well on the march with the balance of the 
Ninth Corps, Ferrero's division and his cavalry, before we 
knew that there was an opening by which he could escape. 

Our guide, who promised to post the brigade so as to 
command the road in rear of the enemy, so far missed his 
route as to lead the brigade out of hearing of the enemy's 
march during the night. 

Hart's cavalry brigade that was left in observation near 
Kingston had been called up, and with McLaws's division 
advanced on the roads to Campbell Station, while General 
Jenkins followed the direct line of retreat on double time, 
and right royally did his skirmishers move. He brought 
the rear to an occasional stand, but only leaving enough 
to require him to form line for advance, when the enemy 
again sped away on their rearward march at double time. 
General Jenkins made the march before noon, but the 
enemy had passed the gap and the junction of the roads, 
and was well posted in battle array in rear of them. 
General McLaws was not up. He was not ordered on 
double time, as it was thought to first bring the enemy to 
bay on the east road, when some of his infantry could be 
called over the mountain on the enemy's flank. General 
Ferrero, who covered the retreat, reported that it was 
necessary to attach from sixteen to twenty animals to a 
piece to make the haul through the mud. 

The retreat was very cleverly conducted, and was in 
time to cover the roads into Campbell's Station, forming 
into line of battle to meet us. Jenkins's division, being 
in advance, was deployed on the right with Alexander's 

tweny-five years after the war. Had he done so at the proper time 
the work at Campbell's Station would have been in better season. 



THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 493 

battalion. As soon as the line was organized the batteries 
opened practice in deliberate, well-timed combat, but Gen- 
eral Alexander had the sympathy of his audience. His 
shells often exploded before they reached the game, and 
at times as they passed from the muzzles of his guns, and 
no remedy could be applied that improved their fire. 

As General McLaws came up his division was put upon 
our left with the other batteries, and Hart's brigade of 
cavalry was assigned in that part to observe the enemy's, 
farther off. It was not yet past meridian. We had ample 
time to make a battle with confident hope of success, by 
direct advance and the pressing in on the enemy's right 
by McLaws's left, but our severe travel and labor after 
leaving Virginia were not to find an opj^ortunity to make 
a simply successful battle. As the rear of the enemy was 
open and could be covered, success would have been a 
simple victory, and the enemy could have escaped to his 
trenches at Knoxville, leaving us crippled and delayed ; 
whereas as he stood he was ours. How we failed to make 
good our claim we shall presently see. 

McLaws was ordered to use one of his brigades well 
out on his left as a diversion threatening the enemy's 
right, and to use Hart's cavalry for the same purpose, 
while General Jenkins was ordered to send two of his 
brigades through a well-covered way off our right to 
march out well past the enemy's left and strike down 
against that flank and rear. General Law, being his 
officer next in rank, was ordered in charge of his own 
and Anderson's brigades. General Jenkins rode with 
the command, and put it in such position that the left 
of this line would strike the left of the enemy's, thus 
throwing the weight of the two brigades past the enemy's 
rear. I rode near the brigades, to see that there could be 
no mismove or misconception of orders. After adjusting 
the line of the brigades, and giving their march the points 
of direction, General Jenkins rode to his brigades on the 



494 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

front to handle them in direct attack. I remained near 
the front of the flanking brigades for complete assurance 
of the adjustment of their march, and waited until they 
were so near that it was necessary to ride at speed, close 
under the enemy's line, to reach our main front, to time 
its advance with the flanking move. The ride was made 
alone, as less likely to draw the enemy's fire, the staff" 
riding around. 

As I approached the front, the men sprang forward 
without orders to open the charge, but were called to 
await the appearance of the flanking move of our right. 
But General Law had so changed direction as to bring his 
entire force in front instead of in the rear of the enemy's 
left. This gave him opportunity to change position to 
strong ground in rear, which made other movements 
necessary in view of the objective of the battle. There 
was yet time for successful battle, but it would have been 
a fruitless victory. Before other combinations suited to 
our purpose could be made it was night, and the enemy 
was away on his march to the fortified grounds about 
Knoxville. 

The demonstration of our left under General McLaws 
was successful in drawing the enemy's attention, and in 
causing him to change front of part of his command to 
meet the threatening. 

In his official account General Jenkins reported, — 

^' In a few minutes, greatly to my surprise, I received a mes- 
sage from General Law that in advancing his brigades he had 
obliqued so much to the left as to have gotten out of its line of 
attack. This careless and inexcusable movement lost us the few 
moments in which success from this point could be attained." * 

Apropos of this the following memorandum of a stafP- 
officer is interesting and informative : 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 526. 



THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN. 495 

^'I know at the time it was currently reported that General 
Law said he might have made the attack successfully, but that 
Jenkins would have reaped the credit of it, and hence he de- 
layed until the enemy got out of the way." 

This has been called a battle, by the other side, but it 
was only an artillery combat, little, very little, musket 
ammunition being burnt. The next day the enemy was 
safely behind his works about Knoxville, except his 
cavalry under General Sanders and his horse artillery left 
to delay our march. McLaws's division reached the 
suburbs of the city a little after noon, and was deployed 
from near the mouth of Third Creek as his right, the 
enemy holding a line of dismounted cavalry skirmishers 
about a thousand yards in advance of his line of works. 
Alexander's artillery was disposed near McLaws's deploy- 
ment. Jenkins got up before night and was ordered to 
deploy on McLaws's left as far as the Tazewell road, pre- 
ceded by Hart's cavalry, which was to extend the line 
north to the Holston River. General Wheeler came up 
later and was assigned to line with Colonel Hart. 

The city stands on the right bank of the Holston 
River, on a plateau about one and a half miles in width 
and extending some miles down south. At Knoxville 
the plateau is one hundred and twenty feet above the 
river, and there are little streams called First, Second, 
and Third Creeks, from the upper to the lower suburbs 
of the city, — First Creek between the city and East 
Knoxville, or Temperance Hill ; Second Creek between 
the city and College Hill ; Third Creek below and 
outside the enemy's lines of defence. The plateau 
slopes down to the valley through which the railway 
passes, and west of the valley it rises to the usual eleva- 
tion. The Confederates were posted on the second pla- 
teau, with their batteries of position. The line of the 
enemy's works, starting at its lower point on the west 
bank of the river, was just above the mouth of Second 



496 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Creek, lying at right angles to the river. It ran to a fort 
constructed by the Confederates, when occupied by them 
years before, called Fort Loudon, above the Kingston 
road, and about a thousand yards in front of the college. 
East from that j)oint it was about parallel with the river, 
reaching to Temperance Hill, to Mabry's Hill, and to the 
Holston, below the glass-works. An interior line ex- 
tended from Temperance Hill to Flint Hill on the east, 
and another on the west, between the outer line and Sec- 
ond Creek. Dams were built across First and Second 
Creeks, flooding and forming formidable wet ditches over 
extensive parts of the line. Abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and 
wire entanglements were placed where thought to be ad- 
vantageous for the defenders. 

The heights on the northeast across the river are much 
more elevated than the plateaux of the city side, and com- 
mand all points of the west bank. These were defended 
at some points by earthworks well manned. From the 
lower point of the enemy's line the Confederates extended 
to his right at the river, conforming to his defensive lines. 
The part of our line occupied by the cavalry was a mere 
watch-guard. 

Our move was hurried, and our transportation so lim- 
ited that we had only a few tools in the hands of small 
pioneer parties, and our wagons were so engaged in col- 
lecting daily rations that we found it necessary to send 
our cavalry down to Lenoir's for the tools captured there 
for use in making rifle-pits for our sharp-shooters. 

When General Burnside rode to the front to meet us 
at Lenoir's he left General Parke in command at Knox- 
ville, and he and Captain Poe, of the engineers, gave at- 
tention to his partially-constructed works. 

Upon laying our lines about Knoxville, the enemy's 
forces in the northeast of his department were withdrawn 
towards Cumberland Gap, but we had no information of 
the troops ordered to meet us from Southwest Virginia. 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 

BESIEGING KNOXVILLE. 

Closing on the Enemy's Lines— A Gallant Dash — The Federal Positions 
— Fort Loudon, later called Fort Sanders— Assault of the Fort care- 
fully planned — General McLaws advises Delay — The Order reiterated 
and emphasized — Gallant Effort by the Brigades of Generals WoflTord, 
Humphreys, and Bryan at the Appointed Time — A Recall ordered, 
because carrying the Works was reported impossible — General Long- 
street is ordered by the President to General Bragg's Relief— Losses 
during the Assault and the Campaign. 

The enemy's line of sharp-shooters and Fort Sanders 
stood in our direct line of advance, — the fort manned by 
the heaviest and best field guns. Benjamin's battery, an 
old familiar acquaintance who had given us many hard 
knocks in our Eastern service, opened upon us as soon as 
we were in its reach. It was not until night of the 17th 
that our line was well established, and then only so as to 
enclose the enemy's front, leaving the country across the 
river to be covered when the troops from Virginia should 
join us. 

When General McLaws advanced on the morning of 
the 18th he found the enemy's line of skirmishers — cav- 
alry dismounted — behind a line of heavy rail defences. 
General Alexander was ordered to knock the rails about 
them and drive them out, and was partially successful, but 
the enemy got back before our infantry could reach them, 
so we had to carry the line by assault. Part of our line 
drove up in fine style, and was measurably successful, but 
other parts, smarting under the stiff musket fire, hesitated 
and lay down under such slight shelter as they could find, 
but close under fire, — so close that to remain inactive would 
endanger repulse. Captain Winthrop, of Alexander's staff, 
appreciating the crisis, dashed forward on his horse and 
led the halting lines successfully over the works. In his 

32 497 



498 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

gallant ride he received a very severe hurt. Neither our 
numbers nor our condition were such as to warrant further 
aggressive action at the moment, nor, in fact, until the 
column from Virginia joined us. Our sharp-shooters 
were advanced from night to night and pitted before 
daylight, each line being held by new forces as the ad- 
vance was made. The first line occupied was a little 
inside of the rail piles. 

It seemed probable, upon first examination of the line 
along the northwest, that we might break through, and 
preparations were made for that effort, but, upon closer 
investigation, it was found to be too hazardous, and that 
the better plan was to await the approach of the other 
forces. 

When within six hundred yards of the enemy's works, 
our lines well pitted, it seemed safe to establish a battery 
on an elevated plateau on the east (or south) side of the 
river. Some of our troops were sent over in flat-boats, 
and the reconnoissance revealed an excellent point com- 
manding the city and the enemy's lines of works, though 
parts of his lines were beyond our range. Some of our 
best guns were put in position, and our captured pontoon 
bridges down at Lenoir's were sent for, to be hauled up 
along the river, but impassable rapids were found, and we 
were obliged to take part of our supply-train to haul them. 
They were brought up, and communication between the 
detachment and main force was made easy. The brigades 
of Law and Robertson were left on the east (or south) 
side as guard for that battery. 

The Union forces were posted from left to right, — the 
Ninth Corps, General K. ^. Potter commanding. Gen- 
eral Ferrero's division extended from the river to Second 
Creek ; General Hartranft's along part of the line be- 
tween Second and First Creeks ; Chapin's and Reilly's 
brigades over Temperance Hill to near Bell's house, and 
the brigades of Hoskins and Casement to the river. The 



,H 


o 


^ 


- 




o 


z 


fTl 




-i 


Q 




V S 

* 


-n 
m 
o 


c 


m 

2 


v. 


33 


^ 


Ml 




BESIEGING KNOXVILLE. 499 

interior line was held by regiments of loyal Tennesseeans 
recently recruited. The positions on the south (or east) 
side of the river were occupied by Cameron's brigade of 
Hascall's division and Shackelford's cavalry (dismounted), 
E-eilly's brigade in reserve, — two sections of Wilder's bat- 
tery and Konkle's battery of four three-inch rifle guns. 

The batteries of the enemy's front before the city were 
Romer's four three-inch rifles at the university, Benjamin's 
four twenty-pound Parrotts and Beecher's six twelve- 
pound Napoleons (at the fort), Gittings's four ten-pound 
Parrotts, Fifteenth Indiana Battery of six rifle guns 
(three-inch), James's (Indiana) Battery of six rifle guns, 
Henshaw's battery of two (James's) rifle guns and four 
six-pounders, Shields's battery of six twelve-pound Napo- 
leons, and one section of Wilder's three-inch rifle guns, 
extending the line from the fort to the river on the 
north. 

In his ofiicial account. General Burnside reported 
"about twelve thousand efifective men, exclusive of the 
recruits and loyal Tennesseeans." He had fifty-one guns 
of position, including eight on the southeast side. 

Fort Loudon, afterwards called for the gallant Sanders, 
who fell defending it, was a bastion earthwork, built upon 
an irregular quadrilateral. The sides were, south front, 
one hundred and fourteen yards ; west front, ninety-five 
yards ; north front, one hundred and twenty-five yards ; 
east front, eighty-five yards. The eastern front was open, 
intended to be closed by a stockade. The south front was 
about half finished ; the western front finished, except 
cutting the embrasures, and the north front nearly fin- 
ished. The bastion attacked was the only one that was 
finished. The ditch was twelve feet wide, and generally 
seven to eight feet deep. From the fort the ground sloped 
in a heavy grade, from which the trees had been cut and 
used as abatis, and wire net-work was stretched between 
the stumps. 



500 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

General Burnside reported, — 

" Many citizens and persons who had been driven in by the 
enemy volunteered to work on the trenches and did good service, 
while those who were not inclined from disloyalty to volunteer 
were pressed into service. The negroes were particularly efficient 
in their labors during the siege. On the 20th of November our 
line was in such condition as to inspire the entire command with 
confidence." 

General Poe reported, — 

'^The citizens of the town and all contrabands within reach 
were pressed into service and relieved the almost exhausted sol- 
diers, who had no rest for more than a hundred hours. Many of 
the citizens were Confederates and worked with a very poor grace, 
which blistered hands did not tend to improve." 

On the 22d, General McLaws thought his advance near 
enough the works to warrant assault. He was ordered 
to it with assaulting columns supported by the division. 
General Jenkins was also ordered up, and General 
Wheeler was ordered to jDush his troops and his horse 
artillery forward as McLaws's attack opened, so that the 
entire line would engage and hold to steady work till all 
the works were carried. After consulting his officers, 
General McLaws reported that they preferred to have 
daylight for their work. On the 23d reports came of a 
large force of the enemy at Kingston advancing. Gen- 
eral Wheeler was sent with his main force of cavalry to 
look after them. He engaged the enemy on the 24th, 
and after a skirmish withdrew. Soon afterwards, re- 
ceiving orders from General Bragg to join him, leaving 
his cavalry under command of Major-General Martin, he 
rode to find his commander. General Martin brought 
the brigades back and resumed position on our left. Colo- 
nel Hart, who was left at Kingston with his brigade, 
reported that there were but three regiments of cavalry 
and a field battery, that engaged General Wheeler on the 
24th. 



BESIEGING KNOXVILLE. 501 

On the night of the 24th the enemy made a sortie 
against a point of General Wofford's line which broke 
through, but was speedily driven back with a loss of some 
prisoners and a number of killed and wounded. General 
Wofford's loss was five wounded, two mortally. 

Our cavalry, except a brigade left at Kingston, resumed 
its position on the left of our line on the 26th. On the 
23d a telegram came from General Bragg to say that the 
enemy had moved out and attacked his troops at Chatta- 
nooga. Later in the day he announced the enemy still in 
front of him, but not engaging his forces. 

On the 25tli I had a telegram from General Bushrod 
R. Johnson at Loudon, who was marching with two bri- 
gades to reinforce us, saying that the enemy was throwing 
his cavalry forward towards Charleston. This, in connec- 
tion with the advance of the enemy towards General 
Bragg, reported by his despatch of the 23d, I took to be 
an effort to prevent reinforcements coming to us, or to cut 
in and delay their march. 

That night General Leadbetter, chief engineer of Gen- 
eral Bragg's army, reported at head-quarters with orders 
from General Bragg that we should attack at Knoxville, 
and very promptly. I asked him to make the reconnois- 
sance and designate the assailable points. At the same time 
he was asked to consider that the troops from Virginia were 
on the march and would join us in eight or ten days, when 
our investment could be made complete ; that the enemy 
was then on half rations, and would be obliged to surren- 
der in two weeks ; also whether we should assault fortifi- 
cations and have the chance of repulse, rather than wait 
for a surrender. From his first reconnoissance he pro- 
nounced Fort Sanders the assailable point, but, after riding 
around the lines with General Jenkins and General Alex- 
ander, he pronounced in favor of assault from our left at 
Mabry's Hill. On the 27th, after more thorough recon- 
noissance in company with my officers, he came back to 



502 PROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

his conclusion in favor of assault at Fort Sanders. I 
agreed with him that the field at Mabry's Hill was too wide, 
and the march under fire too long, to warrant attack at 
that point. He admitted that the true policy was to wait 
and reduce the place by complete investment, but claimed 
that the crisis was on, the time imperative, and that the 
assault must be tried. 

Meanwhile, rumors reached us, through the telegraph 
operator, of a battle at Chattanooga, but nothing official, 
though outside indications were corroborative. In the 
afternoon Colonel Giltner, of the command from Virginia, 
reported with his cavalry, and next day (28th) General 
W. E. Jones, of that command, reported with his cavalry. 
The brigades from Chattanooga under General B. R. 
Johnson were at hand, but not yet up. The artillery and 
infantry coming from Virginia were five or six days' 
march from us ; but General Leadbetter was impatient. 

General McLaws was ordered to double his force of 
sharp-shooters and their reserve, advance during the 
night and occuj^y the line of the enemy's j^ickets, and 
arrange for assault. The artillery was to open on the 
fort as soon as the weather cleared the view. After ten 
minutes' practice the assaulting column was to march, but 
the practice was to hold until the near approach of the 
storming party to the Fort. The assault was to be made 
by three of McLaws's brigades, his fourth, advancing on 
his right, to carry the line of works in its front as soon 
as the fort was taken. Three brigades of Jenkins's divi- 
sion were to follow in echelon on the left of McLaws's 
column, G. T. Anderson's, of his right, leading at two 
hundred yards' interval from McLaws's, Anderson to as- 
sault the line in his front, and upon entering to wheel to 
his left and sweep up that line, followed by Jenkins's 
and Benning's brigades ; but, in case of delay in Mc- 
Laws's assault, Anderson was to wheel to his right and 
take the fort through its rear opening, leaving the bri- 



BESIEGING KNOXVILLE. 503 

gades of Jenkins and Benning to follow the other move 
to their left. 

The ditch and parapets about the fort were objects of 
careful observation from the moment of placing our lines, 
and opinions coincided with those of reconnoitring officers 
that the former could be passed without ladders. General 
Alexander and I made frequent examinations of them 
within four hundred yards. 

After careful conference, General McLaws ordered, — 

'^ First. Wofford's Georgia and Humphreys's Mississippi bri- 
gades to make the assault, the first on the left, the second on the 
right, this latter followed closely by three regiments of Bryan's 
brigade ; the Sixteenth Georgia Regiment to lead the first and 
the Thirteenth Mississippi the second assaulting column. 

"Second. The brigades to be formed for the attack in columns 
of regiments. 

' ' TJiird. The assault to be made with fixed bayonets, and with- 
out firing a gun. 

"Fourth. Should be made against the northwest angle of Fort 
Loudon or Sanders. 

' ' Fifth. The men should be urged to the work with a determi- 
nation to succeed, and should rush to it without hallooing. 

"Sixth. The sharp-shooters to keep up a continuous fire into 
the embrasures of the enemy's works and along the fort, so as to 
prevent the use of the cannon, and distract, if not prevent, the 
fire of all arms." 

General B. R. Johnson was in time to follow the main 
attack by General McLaws with his own and Grade's 
brigades (two thousand six hundred and twenty-five ef- 
fectives) . 

The order was given for the 28tli, but the weather be- 
came so heavy and murky as to hide the fort from view 
of our artillery, so operations were put off until the 29th. 

On the 28th reports were brought of an advance of 
Union troops from the direction of Cumberland Gap. 
The cavalry under General W. E. Jones was sent to arrest 
their march pending operations ordered for the 29th, and 



504 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

he was authorized to call the artillery and infantry march- 
ing from Virginia to his assistance if the force proved 
formidable. 

After arranging his command, General McLaws wrote 
me as follows : 

''Head-quarters Division, 

''November 28, 1863. 

" General, — It seems to be a conceded fact that there has been 
a serious engagement between General Bragg' s forces and those 
of the enemy ; with what result is not known so far as I have 
heard. General Bragg may have maintained his position, may 
have repulsed the enemy, or may have been driven back. If the 
enemy has been beaten at Chattanooga, do we not gain by delay 
at this point ? If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, do we 
not risk our entire force by an assault here ? If we have been 
defeated at Chattanooga, our communications must be made with 
Virginia. We cannot combine again with General Bragg, even 
if we should be successful in our assault on Knoxville. If we 
should be defeated or unsuccessful here, and at the same time 
General Bragg should have been forced to retire, would we be in 
condition to force our way to the army in Virginia ! I present 
these considerations, and with the force they have on my mind I 
beg leave to say that I think we had better delay the assault until 
we hear the result of the battle of Chattanooga. The enemy may 
have cut our communication to prevent this army reinforcing 
General Bragg, as well as for the opposite reason, — viz., to pre- 
vent General Bragg from reinforcing us, and the attack at Chat- 
tanooga favors the first proposition.* 

"Very respectfully, 

"L. McLaws, 

' ' Major- General. ' ' 

In reply I wrote, — 

" Head-quarters, November 28, 1863. 
"Major-General McLaws: 

"General, — Your letter is received. I am not at all confi- 
dent that General Bragg has had a serious battle at Chattanooga, 
but there is a report that he has, and that he has fallen back to 
Tunnel Hill. Under this report I am entirely convinced that our 
only safety is in making the assault upon the enemy's position 
to-morrow at daylight, and it is the more important that I should 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxxi. part 1. p. 491. 



BESIEGING KNOXVILLE. 505 

have the entire support and co-operation of the officers in this 
connection ; and I do hope and trust that I may have your entire 
support and all the force you may be possessed of in the execu- 
tion of my views. It is a great mistake to suppose that there is 
any safety for us in going to Virginia if General Bragg has been 
defeated, for we leave him at the mercy of his victors, and with 
his army destroyed our own had better be, for we will be not 
only destroyed, but disgraced. There is neither safety nor honor 
in any other course than the one I have chosen and ordered. 
"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"James Longsteeet, 
' ' Lieutenant- General Comnumding. 

"P.S. — The assault must be made at the time appointed, and 
must be made with a determination which will insure success." 

After writing the letter it occurred to me to show it to 
General Leadbetter, who was stopping at our head-quar- 
ters, when he suggested the postscript which was added. 

The assault was made by the brigades of Generals Wof- 
ford, Humphreys, and Bryan at the appointed time and 
in admirable style. The orders were, that not a musket 
should be discharged except by the sharp-shooters, who 
should be vigilant and pick off every head that might 
appear above the parapets until the fort was carried. The 
troops marched steadily and formed regularly along the 
outside of the works around the ditch. I rode after them 
with the brigades under General B. R. Johnson until 
within five hundred yards of the fort, whence we could see 
our advance through the gray of the morning. A few 
men were coming back wounded. Major Goggin, of Gen- 
eral McLaws's staff, who had been at the fort, rode back, 
met me, and reported that it would be useless for us to go 
on ; that the enemy had so surrounded the fort with net- 
work of wire that it was impossible for the men to get in 
without axes, and that there was not an axe in the com- 
mand. Without a second thought I ordered the recall, 
and ordered General Johnson to march his brigades back 
to their camjos. He begged to be allowed to go on, but, 



506 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

giving full faith to the report, I forbade him. I had 
known Major Goggin many years. He was a class- 
mate at West Point, and had served with us in the field 
in practical experience, so that I had confidence in his 
judgment. 

Recall was promptly sent General Jenkins and his ad- 
vance brigade under General Anderson, but the latter, 
seeing tlie delay at the fort, changed his direction outside 
the enemy's works and marched along their front to the 
ditch, and was there some little time before he received 
the order. In his march and countermarch in front of 
the enemy's line he lost four killed and thirty-three 
wounded. 

As a diversion in favor of the assaulting columns, our 
troops on the south side were ordered to a simultaneous 
attack, and to get in on that side if the opportunity oc- 
curred. They were reinforced by Russell's brigade of 
Morgan's division of cavalry, and Harrison's brigade of 
Armstrong's division, dismounted. General Morgan com- 
manding. This demonstration had the effect anticipated 
in detaining troops to hold on that side that were intended 
as reserve for the fort. 

Just after the troops were ordered back it occurred to 
me that there must be some mistake about the wire net- 
work, for some of our men had been seen mounting and 
passing over the paraj)ets, but it was too late to reorganize 
and renew the attack, and I conceived that some of the 
regimental pioneers should have been at hand prepared 
to cut the wires, but all had been armed to help swell our 
ranks. 

Since reading the accounts of General Poe, the engineer 
in charge of the works, I am convinced that the wires 
were far from being the serious obstacle reported, and that 
we could have gone in without the use of axes ; and from 
other accounts it appears that most of the troops had re- 
tired from the fort, leaving about a hundred and fifty 



BESIEGING KNOXVILLE. 507 

infantry with Benjamin's battery. Our muskets from 
the outside of the parapet could have kept the infantry 
down, and the artillery practice, except the few hand- 
grenades, prepared at the time by the artillerists. John- 
son's brigades would have been at the ditch with me in 
ten minutes, when we would have passed over the works. 
Hence it seems conclusive that the failure was due to the ^ 
order of recall. It is not a part of my nature to listen to 
reports that always come when stunning blows are felt, 
but confidence in the conduct of the war was broken, and 
with it the tone and spirit for battle further impaired by 
the efforts of those in authority to damage, if not prevent, 
the success of work ordered in their own vital interest : 
a poor excuse for want of golden equipoise in one who 
presumes to hold the lives of his soldiers, but better than 
to look for ways to shift the responsibility of a wavering 
spirit that sometimes comes unawares. 

After the repulse. General Burnside was so considerate 
as to offer a " flag of truce" for time to remove our killed 
and wounded about his lines. 

About half an hour after the repulse, and while yet on 
the slope leading up to the fort, Major Branch, of Major- 
General Ransom's staff, came with a telegram from the 
President informing me that General Bragg had been 
forced back by superior numbers, and ordering me to 
proceed to co-operate with his army. 

Orders were issued at once for our trains to move south, 
and preparations were begun for a move of the troops 
after nightfall. In the afternoon word came from General 
Wheeler, authorized by General Bragg, that I should join 
him, if practicable, at Binggold. But our first step was 
to be relieved of the threatening from the direction of 
Cumberland Gap. General Martin was sent to reinforce 
General Jones, with orders to hurry his operations, and 
return in time to cover anticipated movements. His bri- 
gades which had done their clever work on the south side 



508 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

were withdrawn to go with him. When he came up with 
Jones, the latter was severely engaged, but it was then 
night, too late for other operations. 

Their arrangements were made during the night and 
battle renewed at early dawn and severely contested, the 
Union troops giving from point to point until they crossed 
the ford at Walker's and were beyond further threatening. 
They lost some fifty killed and wounded and one company 
captured at Colonel Graham's camp. 

Generals Martin and Jones joined us in good season 
after their affair of the morning. Their loss was slight, 
but not detailed in separate reports. 

Confederate loss in the assault 822 

Union loss in the assault 673 

Confederate losses during the campaign 1296 

Union losses during the campaign 1481 



CHAPTEK XXXV. 

CUT OFF FEOM EAST AND WEST. 

Impracticability of joining General Bragg — Wintering in East Tennes- 
see — General Longstreet given Discretionary Authority over the De- 
partment by President Davis — Short Rations— Minor Movements of 
Hide-and-Seek in the Mountains — Longstreet's Position was of Stra- 
tegic Importance— That Fact fully appreciated by President Lincoln, 
Secretary Stanton, and Generals Halleck and Grant — "Drive Long- 
street out of East Tennessee and keep him out" — Generals Robertson 
and McLaws — The Charges against them and Action taken — Honor- 
able Mention for Courage and Endurance — The Army finally fares 
sumptuously on the Fat Lands of the French Broad. 

As General Wheeler's note indicated doubt of the feasi- 
bility of the move towards General Bragg, it occurred to 
me that our better course was to hold our lines about 
Knoxville, and in that way cause General Grant to send 
to its relief, and thus so reduce his force as to stoj), for a 
time, pursuit of General Bragg. 

Under this impression, I ordered our trains back, and 
continued to hold our lines. The superior officers were 
called together and advised of affairs, and asked for sug- 
gestions. The impression seemed to be that it w^ould not 
be prudent to undertake to join General Bragg. At the 
same time reports came from him to inform me that he 
had retired as far as Dalton, and that I must depend upon 
my own resources. 

We were cut off from communication with the army at 
Dalton, except by an impracticable mountain route, and 
the raihvay to the north was broken up by the removal 
of bridges and rails for a distance of a hundred miles 
and more. 

Deciding to remain at Knoxville, I called on General 
Ransom to join us with his main force, to aid in reinvest- 
ing it, or to hold it while we could march against a suc- 

509 



510 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

coring force if the numbers should warrant. On the 1st 
of December, Colonel Giltner, commanding one of Gen- 
eral Ransom's cavalry brigades, reported that he had 
orders to join General Ransom with his brigade. On the 
same day a courier going from General Grant to General 
Burnside was captured, bearing an autograph letter for 
the latter, stating that three columns were advancing for 
his relief, — one by the south side under General Sherman, 
one by Decherd under General Elliott, the third by Cum- 
berland Gap under General Foster. 

When General Leadbetter left us on the 29th of Novem- 
ber, he was asked to look after affairs at Loudon, and to 
order General Vaughn to destroy such property as he 
could not haul off, and retire through the mountains to 
General Bragg's army. Finding that General Vaughn 
had not been moved, he was ordered on the 1st of Decem- 
ber to cross the river to our side with everything that he 
could move, and to be ready to destroy property that he 
must leave, and march to join us as soon as the pressure 
from General Sherman's force became serious. At the 
same time an order came from General Bragg that his 
cavalry be ordered back to his army. As I had relieved 
the pressure against him in his critical emergency, and 
affairs were getting a little comj^licated about my jjosition, 
I felt warranted in retaining the cavalry for the time. 

Reports coming at the same time of reinforcements 
for the enemy at Kingston, pressing towards General 
Vaughn at Loudon, he was ordered to join us. As he 
had no horses for the battery, he tumbled it from the 
bridge into the middle of the Tennessee River, burned 
the bridge, and marched. 

Under the circumstances there seemed but one move left 
for us, — to march around Knoxville to the north side, up 
the Holston, and try to find the column reported to be 
marching down from Cumberland Gap, the mountain 
ranges and valleys of that part of the State offering beau- 



CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST. 511 

tilul fields for the manoeuvre of small armies. The order 
was issued December 2. Trains were put in motion on the 
3d, and ordered up the railroad route under escort of Law's 
and Robertson's brigades and one of Alexander's bat- 
teries. On the night of the 4th the troops were marched 
from the southwest to the north side of the city, and took 
up the march along the west bank of the Holston. Gen- 
eral Martin, with his own and General W. E. Jones's 
cavalry, was left to guard the rear of our march and pick 
up weak men or stragglers. He was ordered to cross part 
of his cavalry to the east bank at Strawberry Plains and 
march up on that side, and General W. E. Jones to follow 
on our rear with his and the balance of Martin's corps. 
As we were not disturbed, we reached Blain's Cross-roads 
on the afternoon of the 5th, where we met General Ran- 
som with his infantry and the balance of his artillery. 
On the 6th we marched to Rutledge, halting two days 
to get food and look for the succoring column by Cum- 
berland Gap, which failed to appear. However, it was 
time for us to be looking for better fields of food for men 
and animals, who had not had comfortable rations for 
weeks. It seemed, too, that General Bragg's call for his 
cavalry could not be longer left in abeyance. To get 
away from convenient march of the enemy we went up 
the river as far as Rogersville, where we might hope to 
forage under reduced cavalry force. AVe marched on the 
8th, ordering our cavalry, except Giltner's brigade, across 
the Holston near Bean's Station, General Ransom's com- 
mand to cover our march. General Bragg's cavalry to go 
by an eastern route through the mountains to Georgia. 
We halted at Rogersville on the 9th, where we were en- 
couraged to hope for full rations for a few days, at least ; 
but to be sure of accumulating a few days' extra supply 
(the mills being only able to grind a full day's rations 
for us), every man and animal w^as put on short rations 
until we could get as much as three days' supply on hand. 



512 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

On the 7tli of December the Union army, under Major- 
General John G. Parke, took the field along the rear of 
our march, and reached Rutledge on the 9th, the enemy's 
cavalry advancing as far as Bean's Station. The object 
was supposed to be the securing of the forage and subsist- 
ence stores of the country ; but of these movements we 
were not fully advised until the 11th. On the 10th of 
December, General Morgan's brigade of cavalry was at- 
tacked at Russellville while engaged in foraging, but got 
force enough, and in time, to drive the enemy away. 

On the 10th a telegram from the President gave me 
discretionary authority over the movements of the troops 
of the dejiartment, and I ordered the recall of General 
Martin, and put his command between us and the enemy. 
On the 12th we had information that General Sherman 
had taken up his march for return to General Grant's 
army with the greater part of his troops. At the same 
time we had information of the force that had followed 
our march as far as Rutledge and Plain's Cross-roads, 
under General Parke, who had posted a large part of the 
force of artillery, cavalry, and infantry at Bean's Station, 
a point between the Clinch Mountain and the Holston 
River. The mountain there is very rugged, 'and was re- 
ported to be inaccessible, except at very rough passes. 
The valley between it and the river is about two miles 
wide, at some places less. 

I thought to cut off the advance force at Bean's Sta- 
tion by putting our main cavalry force east of the river, 
the other part west of the mountain (except Giltner's), so 
as to close the mountain pass on the west, and bar the 
enemy's retreat by my cavalry in his rear, — which was to 
cross the Holston behind him, — -then by marching the 
main column down the valley to capture this advance j^art 
of the command. My column, though complaining a little 
of short rations and very muddy roads, made its march 
in good season. So also did Jones on the west of the 



CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST. 513 

mountain, and Martin on the other side of the Holston ; 
but the latter encountered a brigade at May's Ford, which 
delayed him and gave time for the enemy to change to a 
position some four miles to his rear. 

As we approached the position in front of the Gap, 
Giltner's cavalry in advance, General B. R. Johnson met 
and engaged the enemy in a severe fight, but forced him 
back steadily. As we were looking for large capture 
more than fight, delay was unfortunate. I called Ker- 
shaw's brigade up to force contention till we could close 
the west end of the Gap. The movements were nicely 
executed by Johnson and Kershaw, but General Martin 
had not succeeded in gaining his position, so the rear 
was not closed, and the enemy retired. At night I 
thought the army was in position to get the benefit of 
the small force cut off at the Gap, as some reward for 
our very hard work. We received reports from General 
Jones, west of the mountain, that he was in position at 
his end of the Gap, and had captured several wagon-loads 
of good things. As his orders included the capture of the 
train, he had failed of full comjirehension of them, and 
after nightfall had withdrawn to comfortable watering- 
places to enjoy his large catch of sugar and coffee, and 
other things seldom seen in Confederate camps in those 
days. Thus the troops at the Gap got out during the 
night, some running over the huge rocks and heavy wood 
tangles along the crest, by torch-light, to their comrades, 
some going west by easier ways. So when I sent up in 
the morning, looking for their doleful surrender, my men 
found only emj^ty camp-kettles, mess-pans, tents, and 
a few abandoned guns, and twelve prisoners, while the 
Yankees were, no doubt, sitting around their camp-fires 
enjoying the joke with the comrades they had re- 
joined. 

During our march and wait at Rogersville, General 
Foster passed down to Knoxville by a more southern 

33 



514 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

route and relieved General Burnside of command of the 
department on the 12th. 

General Jenkins was ordered to follow down the valley 
to the new position of the enemy. His brigades under 
Generals Law and Robertson had been detached guarding 
trains. General Law, commanding them, had been or- 
dered to report to the division commander on the 13th, but 
at night of the 14th he was eight miles behind. Orders 
were sent him to join the division at the earliest practicable 
moment on the 15th. He reported to the division com- 
mander between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. 
If he started at the hour he should have marched, six 
A.M. at the latest, he was about eight hours making as 
many miles. 

Meanwhile, the enemy had been reinforced by a con- 
siderable body of infantry, and later it appeared that he 
was advancing to offer battle. General McLaws was or- 
dered to reinforce our front by a brigade. He sent word 
that his men had not yet received their bread rations. 
He sent Kershaw's brigade, however, that had captured 
rations the day before, but then it was night, and the 
appearance of General Martin's cavalry on or near the 
enemy's flank caused a change of his plans. During the 
night he retreated, and we occupied his trenches. I could 
have precipitated an affair of some moment, both at this 
point and at Bean's Station Gap, but my purpose was, 
when I fought, to fight for all that was on the field. The 
time was then for full and glorious victory ; a fruitless 
one we did not want. 

The enemy retired to Blain's Cross-roads, where Gen- 
eral Foster, after reinforcing by the Fourth Corps, de- 
cided to accept battle. He reported his force as twenty- 
six thousand, and credited the Confederates with equal 
numbers, but twenty thousand would have been an over- 
estimate for us. He assigned the true cause of our failure 
to follow up and find him : 



CUT OFF FEOM EAST AND WEST. 515 

'' General Longstreet, however, did not attack, in consequence, 
probably, of the very inclement weather, which then set in with 
such severity as to paralyze for a time the efforts of both armies." 

And now the weather grew very heavy, and the roads, 
already bad, became soft and im23racticable for trains and 
artillery. The men were brave, steady, patient. Occa- 
sionally they called pretty loudly for parched corn, but 
always in a bright, merry mood. There was never a time 
when we did not have enough of corn, and plenty of wood 
with which to keep us warm and parch our corn. At this 
distance it seems almost incredible that we got along as we 
did, but all were then so healthy and strong that we did 
not feel severely our really great hardships. Our serious 
trouble was in the matter of clothing and shoes. As 
winter had broken upon us in good earnest, it seemed 
necessary for us to give up the game of war for the time, 
seek some good place for shelter, and repair railroads and 
bridges, to open our way back towards Richmond. 

General Bragg had been relieved from command of the 
army at Dalton by Lieutenant-General W. J. Hardee, 
who declined, however, the part of permanent commander, 
to which, after a time, General Josejjh E. Johnston was 
assigned. 

On his return from Knoxville, General Sherman pro- 
posed to General Grant to strike at General Hardee and 
gain Rome and the line of the Oostenaula. He wrote, — 

" Of course we must fight if Hardee gives us battle, but he will 
not. Longstreet is off and cannot do harm for a month. Lee, in 
Virginia, is occupied, and Hardee is alone," 

But General Halleck was much concerned about the 
Confederate army in East Tennessee, the only strategic 
field then held by Southern troops. It was inconveniently 
near Kentucky and the Ohio River, and President Lin- 
coln and his War Secretary were as anxious as Halleck 



516 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

on account of its politico-strategic bearing. General 
Halleck impressed his views upon General Grant, and 
despatched General Foster that it was of first importance 
to " drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee and keep him 
out." General Grant ordered, " Drive Longstreet to the 
farthest point east that you can." And he reported to the 
authorities, — 

" If Longstreet is not driven out of the valley entirely and the 
road destroyed east of Abingdon, I do not think it unlikely that 
the last great battle of the war will be fought in East Tennessee. 
Reports of deserters and citizens show the army of Bragg to be 
too much demoralized and reduced by desertions to do anything 
this winter. I will get everything in order here in a few days 
and go to Nashville and Louisville, and, if there is still a chance 
of doing anything against Longstreet, to the scene of operations 
there. I am deeply interested in moving the enemy beyond Salt- 
ville this winter, so as to be able to select my own campaign in 
the spring, instead of having the enemy dictate it to me." 

Referring to his orders, General Foster reported his 
plan to intrench a line of infantry along Bull's Gap and 
Mulberry Ga]), and have his cavalry ready for the ride 
against Saltville, but the Confederates turned upon him, 
and he despatched General Grant on the 11th, — 

''Longstreet has taken the offensive against General Parke, 
who has fallen back to Blain's Cross-roads, where Granger is 
now concentrating his corps. I intend to fight them if Longstreet 
comes." 

The failure to follow has been explained. 

The summing up of the plans laid for General Hardee 
and Saltville is brief. Hardee was not disturbed. The 
ride towards Saltville, made about the last of the month, 
was followed by General W. E. Jones and came to grief, 
as will be elsewhere explained. 

Upon relinquishing command of his army. General 
Bragg was called to Richmond as commander-in-chief 
near the President. 



CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST. 517 

Before General Hood was so seriously hurt at the battle 
of Chickamauga, he made repeated complaints of want 
of conduct on the part of Brigadier-General J. B. Bob- 
ertson. After the fiasco in Lookout Valley on the night 
of the 28th of October, I reported to General Bragg of 
the representations made by General Hood, and of want 
of conduct on the part of General Bobertson in that night 
attack, when General Bragg ordered me to ask for a 
board of officers to examine into the merits of the case. 
The board was ordered, and General Bobertson was re- 
lieved from duty by orders from General Bragg's head- 
quarters, " while the proceedings and actions of the exam- 
ining board in his case were pending." 

On the 8th, without notice to my head-quarters. Gen- 
eral Bragg ordered, " Brigadier-General Bobertson will re- 
join his command until the board can renew its session." ^' 

On the 18th of December the division commander pre- 
ferred " charges and specifications" against Brigadier- 
General Bobertson, in which he accused him of calling 
the commanders of his Texas regiments to him and saying 
there were but 

' ' Three days' rations on hand, and God knows where more are 
to come from ; that he had no confidence in the campaign ; that 
whether we whipped the enemy in the immediate battle or not, we 
would be compelled to retreat, the enemy being believed by citi- 
zens and others to be moying around us, and that we were in dan- 
ger of losing a considerable part of our army ; that our men were in 
no condition for campaigning ; that General Longstreet had prom- 
ised shoes, but how could they be furnished % that we only had com- 
munication with Eichmond, and could only get a mail from there 
in three weeks ; that he was opposed to the movement ; would 
require written orders, and would obey under protest." 

General Bobertson was ordered to Bristol to await the 
action of the Bichmond authorities, who were asked for a 
court-martial to try the case. 

* Rebellion Record. 



518 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

On the 17th the following orders concerning General 
McLaws were issued : 

" Head -QUARTERS near Bean's Station, 

" December 17, 1863. 
"Special Orders No. 27. 

"Major-General L. McLaws is relieved from further duty with 
this army, and will proceed to Augusta, Georgia, from which place 
he will report by letter to the adjutant- and inspector-general. 
He will turn over the command of the division to the senior brig- 
adier present. 

"By command of Lieutenant- General Longstreet. 

" G. MoxLEY Sorrel, 
^^ Ldeutenant- Colonel and Assistant Adjutant- General. 
" Major- General McLaws, 

" Confederate States Army.^'' 

On the same day he wrote, — 

" Camp on Bean's Station Gap Road, 

"December 17, 1863. 
"Lieutenant- Colonel Sorrel, 

' ' Assistant Adjutant- General : 
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Special Or- 
ders No. 27, from your head-quarters, of this date, relieving me 
from further duty with this army. If there is no impropriety in 
making inquiry, and I cannot imagine there is, I respectfully re- 
quest to be informed of the particular reason for the order. 

" Very respectfully, 

"L. McLaws, 

' ' Major- General. ' ' 

In reply the following was sent : 

"Head-quarters near Bean's Station, 

"December 17, 1863. 
" Major- General McLaws, 

" Confederate States Army : 
"General, — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your note of to-day, asking for the particular reason for the issue 
of the order relieving you from duty with this army. In reply I 
am directed to say that throughout the campaign on which we are 
engaged you have exhibited a want of confidence in the efforts 
and plans which the commanding general has thought proper to 





-^^^^^^/^/^/^ 




Chief of Staff, First Corps; promoted to Brigadier-General, 1864, 



CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST. 519 

adopt, and he is apprehensive that this feeling will extend more 
or less to the troops under your command. Under these circum- 
stances the commanding general has felt that the interest of the 
public service would be advanced by your separation from him, 
and as he could not himself leave, he decided upon the issue of 
the order which you have received. 

''I have the honor to be, genei*al, with great respect, 

' ' G. MoxLEY Sorrel, 
" Lieutenant- Colonel and Assistant Adjutant- General.'''' 

On the 19tli, General Law handed in his resigna- 
tion at head-quarters, and asked leave of absence on it. 
This was cheerfully granted. Then he asked the privi- 
lege of taking the resignation with him to the adjutant- 
general at Richmond. This was a very unusual request, 
but the favor he was doing the service gave him some 
claim to unusual consideration, and his request was 
granted. 

The Law disaffection was having effect, or seemed to 
be, among some of the officers, but most of them and all 
of the soldiers were true and brave, even through all of 
the hardships of the severest winter of the four years of 
war. Marching and fighting had been almost daily occu- 
pation from the middle of January, 1863, when we left 
Fredericksburg to move down to Suffolk, Virginia, until 
the 16th of December, when we found bleak winter again 
breaking upon us, away from our friends, and dependent 
upon our own efforts for food and clothing. It is difficult 
for a soldier to find words that can express his high ap- 
preciation of conduct in officers and men who endured so 
bravely the severe trials they were called to encounter. 

Orders were given to cross the Holston River and 
march for the railroad, only a few miles away. Before 
quitting the fields of our arduous labors mention should 
be made of General Bushrod R. Johnson's clever march 
of sixteen miles, through deep mud, to Bean's Station on 
the 13th, when he and General Kershaw attacked and 
pushed the enemy back from his front at the Gap before 



520 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

he could get out of it. Honorable mention is also due 
General Jenkins for his equally clever pursuit of the 
enemy at Lenoir's Station ; Brigadier-General Humphreys 
and Bryan for their conduct at the storming assault; 
Colonel Ruff, who led WofPord's brigade, and died in the 
ditch ; Colonel McElroy, of the Thirteenth Mississippi 
Kegiment, and Colonel Thomas, of the Sixteenth Georgia, 
who also died in the ditch ; Lieutenant Gumming, adju- 
tant of the Sixteenth Georgia Regiment, who overcame 
all obstacles, crowned the paraj^et with ten or a dozen 
men, and, entering the fort through one of the embra- 
sures, was taken prisoner ; and Colonel Fiser, of the 
Eighteenth Mississippi, who lost an arm while on the 
parapet. Not the least of the gallant acts of the cam- 
paign was the dash of Captain Winthrop, who led our 
once halting lines over the rail defences at Knoxville. 

The transfer of the army to the east bank of the river 
was executed by diligent work and the use of such flat- 
boats and other means of crossing as we could collect and 
construct. We were over by the 20th, and before Christ- 
mas were in our camps along the railroad, near Morris- 
town. Blankets and clothes were very scarce, shoes more 
so, but all kncAV how to enjoy the beautiful country in 
which we found ourselves. The French Broad River and 
the Holston are confluent at Knoxville. The country be- 
tween and beyond them contains as fine farming lands and 
has as delightful a climate as can be found. Stock and 
grain were on all farms. Wheat and oats had been hidden 
away by our Union friends, but the fields were full of 
maize, still standing. The country about the French 
Broad had hardly been touched by the hands of foragers. 
Our wagons immediately on entering the fields were loaded 
to overflowing. Pumpkins were on the ground in places 
like apples under a tree. Cattle, sheep, and swine, poultry, 
vegetables, maple-sugar, honey, were all abundant for im- 
mediate wants of the troops. 



CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST. 521 

When the enemy found we had moved to the east 
bank, his cavalry followed to that side. They were almost 
as much in want of the beautiful foraging lands as we, 
but we were in advance of them, and left little for them. 
With all the plenitude of j)rovisions and many things 
which seemed at the time luxuries, we were not quite 
happy. Tattered blankets, garments, and shoes (the latter 
going — many gone) opened ways, on all sides, for piercing 
winter blasts. There were some hand-looms in the coun- 
try from which we occasionally picked up a piece of cloth, 
and here and there we received other comforts, some from 
kind and some from unwilling hands, which nevertheless 
could spare them. For shoes we were obliged to resort to 
the raw hides of beef cattle as temporary protection from 
the frozen ground. Then we began to find soldiers who 
could tan the hides of our beeves, some who could make 
shoes, some who could make shoe-pegs, some who could 
make shoe-lasts, so that it came about that the hides passed 
rapidly from the beeves to the feet of the soldiers in the 
form of comfortable shoes. Then came the opening of the 
railroad, and lo and behold ! a shipment of three thousand 
shoes from General Lawton, quartermaster-general ! Thus 
the most urgent needs were supplied, and the soldier's life 
seemed passably pleasant, — that is, in the infantry and ar- 
tillery. Our cavalry were looking at the enemy all of this 
while, and the enemy was looking at them, both frequently 
burning powder between their lines. 

General Sturgis had been assigned to the cavalry of the 
other side to relieve General Shackelford, and he seemed 
to think that the dead of winter was the time for cavalry 
work ; and our General Martin's orders were to have the 
enemy under his eye at all hours. Both were vigilant, 
active, and persevering. 

About the 20th of December a raid was made by Gen- 
eral Averill from West Virginia upon a suj^ply depot of 
General Sam Jones's department, at Salem, which was par- 



522 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

tially successful, when General Grant, under the impres- 
sion that the stores were for troops of East Tennessee, 
wired General Foster, December 25, " This will give you 
great advantage," and General Foster despatched General 
Parke, commanding his troops in the field, December 26, 
" Longstreet will feel a little timid now, and will bear a 
little pushing." 

Under the fierce operations of General Sturgis's cav- 
alry against General Martin's during the latter days of 
December, General W. E. Jones's cavalry was on guard 
for my right and rear towards Cumberland Gap. While 
Sturgis busied himself against our front and left, a 
raiding party rode from Cumberland Gap against the 
outposts of our far-off right, under Colonel Pridemore. 
As W. E. Jones was too far to support Martin's cavalry, 
he was called to closer threatenings against Cumberland 
Gap, that he might thus draw some of Sturgis's cavalry 
from our front to strengthen the forces at the Gap. Upon 
receipt of orders. General Jones crossed Clinch Piver in 
time to find the warm trail of the raiders who were fol- 
lowing Pridemore. He sent around to advise him of his 
ride in pursuit of his pursuers, and ordered Pridemore, 
upon hearing his guns, to turn and join in the attack upon 
them. 

The very cold season and severe march through the 
mountain fastnesses stretched Jones's line so that he was 
in poor condition for immediate attack when he found the 
enemy's camp at daylight on the 3d of January ; but he 
found a surprise : not even a picket guard out in their 
rear. He dashed in with his leading forces and got the 
enemy's battery, but the enemy quickly rallied and made 
battle, which recovered the artillery, and got into strong 
position about some farm-houses and defended with des- 
perate resolution. Finding the position too strong, Jones 
thought to so engage as to make the enemy use his bat- 
tery until his ammunition was exhausted, and then put in 



CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST. 523 

all of his forces in assault. Towards night the enemy 
found himself reduced to desperate straits and tried to 
secure cover of the mountains, but as quick as he got 
away from the farm-houses Jones put all of his forces in, 
capturing three pieces of artillery, three hundred and 
eighty prisoners, and twenty-seven wagons and teams of 
the Sixteenth Illinois Cavalry and Twenty-second Ohio 
Light Artillery. A number of the men got away through 
the mountains. 



CHAPTEE XXXVI. 

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 

Longstreet again considers Relief from Service — General Grant at 
Knoxville— Slioeless Soldiers leave Bloody Trails on Frozen Roads— 
A Confederate Advance — Affair at Dandridge — Federals retreat— Suc- 
cession of Small Engagements— General Grant urges General Foster's 
Army to the Offensive — General Foster relieved— General Schofleld in 
Command of Federals — General Grant's Orders— General Halleck's 
Estimate of East Tennessee as a Strategic Field — Affair of Cavalry — 
Advance towards Knoxville— Lougstreet's Command called back to 
Defensive for Want of Cavalry. 

During the last few days of the year 1863 the cold of 
the severest winter of the war came on, and constantly 
increased until the thermometer approached zero, and on 
New Year's dropped below, hanging near that figure for 
about two weeks. The severe season gave rest to every 
one. Even the cavalry had a little quiet, but it was cold 
comfort, for their orders were to keep the enemy in sight. 

The season seemed an appropriate one for making an- 
other effort to be relieved from service, — that service 
in which the authorities would not support my plans or 
labors, — for now during the lull in war they would have 
ample time to assign some one to whom they could give 
their confidence and aid. But this did not suit them, and 
the course of affairs prejudicial to order and discipline 
was continued. It was difficult under the circumstances 
to find apology for remaining in service. 

The President asked Congress to provide for another 
general officer when he had five on his rolls, — one of 
whom was not in command aj)propriate to his rank, — and 
appointed Lieutenant-General Smith, of the Trans-Mis- 
sissippi Department, of lower rank than mine, to hold 
rank above me. A soldier's honor is his all, and of 
that they would rob him and degrade him in the eyes of 

524 



STKATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 525 

his troops. The occasion seemed to demand resignation, 
but that would have been unsoldierly conduct. Dispas- 
sionate judgment suggested, as the proper rounding of the 
soldier's life, to stay and go down with faithful comrades 
of long and arduous service. 

On the other side of the picture affairs were bright and 
encouraging. The disaffected were away, and with them 
disappeared their influence. The little array was bright 
and cheerful and ready for any work to which it could be 
called. 

General Grant made his visit to Knoxville about New 
Year's, and remained until the 7tli. He found General 
Foster in the condition of the Confederates, — not properly 
supplied with clothing, especially in want of shoes. So 
he authorized a wait for the clothing, then in transit and 
looked for in a week ; and that little delay was a great 
lift for the Confederates. We were not timid, but were 
beginning to think ourselves comfortable and happy, and 
were expectant of even better condition. We were re- 
ceiving a hundred pairs of shoes a day of our own make, 
the hand-looms of the farmers were giving help towards 
clothing our men, promises from Richmond were encour- 
aging, and we were prepared to enjoy rest that we had 
not known for a twelvemonth. The medical inspector of 
the Cis-Mississippi District came to see us, and after care- 
ful inspection told us that the army was in better health 
and better heart than the other armies of the district. 

Before leaving General Foster, General Grant ordered 
him on the receipt of the clothing to advance and drive 
us " at least beyond Bull's Gap and Bed Bridge." And 
to prepare for that advance he ordered the Ninth and 
Twenty-third Corps to Mossy Creek, the Fourth Corps to 
Strawberry Plains, and the cavalry to Dandridge. 

The Union army — equipped — marched on the 14th and 
15th of January. 

The Confederate departments were not so prompt in 



526 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

filling our requisitions, but we had hopes. The bitter 
freeze of two weeks had made the rough angles of mud as 
firm and sharp as so many freshly-quarried rocks, and the 
poorly protected feet of our soldiers sometimes left bloody 
marks along the roads. 

General Sturgis rode in advance of the army, and occu- 
pied Dandridge by Elliott's, Wolford's, and Garrard's 
divisions of cavalry and Mott's brigade of infantry. The 
Fourth and Twenty-third Corps followed the cavalry, 
leaving the Ninth Corps to guard at Strawberry Plains. 

General Martin gave us prompt notice that the march 
was at Dandridge, and in force. The move was construed 
as a flanking proceeding, but it was more convenient to 
adopt the short march and meet it at Dandridge than to 
leave our shoe factory and winter huts and take up the 
tedious rearward move. The army was ordered under 
arms, the cavalry was ordered concentrated in front of 
General Sturgis, and the divisions of Jenkins and B. R. 
Johnson and Alexander's batteries were marched to join 
General Martin. McLaws's division under General 
WofFord, and Ransom's under General Carr, with such 
batteries as they could haul, were assigned to positions on 
the Morristown (Strawberry Plains) road, to strike for- 
ward or reinforce at Dandridge as plans developed. The 
men without shoes were ordered to remain as camp guards, 
but many preferred to march with their comrades. 

I rode in advance to be assured that our cavalry had 
not mistaken a strong cavalry move for one by the enemy. 
We found General Martin on the Bull's Gap road sharply 
engaged with the enemy, both sides on strong defensive 
grounds and using their horse batteries, but no infantry 
was in sight. General Martin was ordered to j^ush on, 
gain the opposing plateau, and force the enemy to show 
his infantry. 

He found the enemy in strong fight, but got the pla- 
teau, when the enemy deployed in stronger force ; but his 



STRATEGIC IMPOETANCE OF THE FIELD. 527 

infantry did not appear. When asked to take the next 
hill, he thought it could not be done without infantry, but 
my idea was to save the infantry the trying march, if pos- 
sible, and to that end it was necessary to push with the 
cavalry. He was called to send me a detachment of his 
troopers, and about six hundred came, — Harrison's bri- 
gade, as I remember. 

We rode away from the enemy's left, concealing our 
march under traverse of an elevated woodland, while 
General Martin engaged their front attention. At a se- 
cluded spot, a little beyond the enemy's left, the men dis- 
mounted, leaving their animals under guards, moved under 
cover to good position, deployed into single line, and 
marched for the second plateau. Part of the march was 
over a small opening, near a farm-house. The exposure 
brought us under fire of some sharp-shooters, but we 
hadn't time to stop and shoot. As our line marched, a 
chicken, dazed by the formidable appearance, crouched in 
the grass until it was kicked up, when it flew and tried to 
clear the line, but one of the troopers jumped up, knocked 
it down with the end of his gun, stooped, picked it up, 
put it in his haversack, and marched on without losing 
his place or step and without looking to his right or left, as 
though it was as proper and as much an every-day part of 
the exercise of war as shooting at the enemy. Presently we 
got up the hill, and General Martin advanced his mounts 
to meet us. We lost but two men, — wounded, — an officer 
and a soldier. The officer was at my side, and, hearing 
the thud of the blow, I turned and asked if he was much 
hurt. He said it was only a flesh-wound, and remained 
with his command until night. From that point we saw 
enough to tell that a formidable part of the army was be- 
fore us, and orders were sent for the command to speed 
their march as much as they could without severe trial. 

When General Martin made his bold advance General 
Sturgis thought to ride around by a considerable detour 



528 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

and strike at his rear, but in his ride was surprised to en- 
counter our marching cokimns of infantry, and still more 
surprised when he saw a thousand muskets levelled and 
sending whistling bullets about his men, and our batteries 
pre^^aring something worse for him. His troopers got 
back faster than they came. In trying by a rapid ride to 
find position for handling his men he lost a number of his 
staff, captured, and narrowly escaped himself. 

It was near night when the command got up skirmish- 
ers from the advance division, reinforced the cavalry, and 
pushed the enemy back nearer the town. 

Dandridge is on the right bank of the French Broad 
River, about thirty miles from Knoxville. Its tojDO- 
graphical features are bold and inviting of military work. 
Its other striking characteristic is the interesting character 
of its citizens. The Confederates — a unit in heart and 
spirit — were prepared to do their share towards making 
an effective battle, and our plans were so laid. 

At the time ordered for his advance. General Foster 
was suffering from an old wound, and General Parke be- 
came commander of the troops in the field. The latter 
delayed at Strawberry Plains in arranging that part of 
his command, and General Sheridan, marching with the 
advance, became commander, until superseded by the 
corps commander, General Gordon Granger. 

Our plans were laid before the army was all up. Our 
skirmish line was made stronger and relieved the cavalry 
of their dismounted service. A narrow unused road, 
practicable for artillery, was found, that opened a way for 
us to reach the enemy's rearward line of march. Sharp- 
shooters were organized and ordered forward by it, to be 
followed by our infantry columns. It was thought better 
to move the infantry alone, as the ringing of the iron 
axles of the guns might give notice of our purpose ; the 
artillery to be called as our sharp-shooters approached the 
junction of the roads. The head of the turning force 



STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 



529 



encountered a picket-guard, some of whom escaped with- 
out firing, but speedily gave notice of our feeling towards 
their rear. General Granger decided to retire, and was 
in time to leave our cross-road behind him, his rear-guard 
passing the point of intersection before my advance party 
reached it about midnight. 

The weather moderated before night, and after dark 
a mild, gentle rain began to fall. 

When I rode into Dandridge in the gray of the morn- 
ing the ground was thawing and hardly firm enough to 
bear the weight of a horse. When the cavalry came at 
sunrise the last crust of ice had melted, letting the animals 
down to their fetlocks in heavy limestone soil. The mud 
and want of a bridge to cross the Holston made pursuit 
by our heavy columns useless. The cavalry was ordered 
on, and the troops at Morristown, on the Strawberry 
Plains road, were ordered to try that route, but the latter 
proved to be too heavy for progress with artillery. 

While yet on the streets of Dandridge, giving directions 
for such pursuit as we could make, a lady came out upon 
the sidewalk and invited us into her parlors. When the 
orders for pursuit were given, I dismounted, and with 
some members of my staff walked in. After the compli- 
ments of the season were passed, we were asked to be 
seated, and she told us something of General Granger 
during the night before. She had never heard a person 
swear about another as General Granger did about me. 
Some of the ofiicers proposed to stop and make a battle, 
but General Granger swore and said it "was no use to 
stop and fight Longstreet. You can't whip him. It don't 
make any difference whether he has one man or a hundred 
thousand." Presently she brought out a flask that Gen- 
eral Granger had forgotten, and thought that I should 
have it. It had about two refreshing inches left in it. 
Though not left with compliments, it was accepted. Al- 
though the weather had moderated, it was very wet and 



34 



530 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

nasty, and as we had taken our coffee at three o'clock, it 
was resolved to call it noon and divide the spoils. Colonel 
Fairfax, who knew how to enjoy good things, thought the 
occasion called for a sentiment, and offered, " General 
Granger — ^may his shadow never grow less." 

The cavalry found the road and its side-ways so cut up 
that their pursuit was reduced to labored walk. The pre- 
vious hard service and exposure had so reduced the animals 
that they were not in trim for real effective cavalry service. 
They found some crippled battery forges and a little of 
other plunder, but the enemy passed the Holston and 
broke his bridges behind him. Our army returned to 
their huts and winter homes. 

Part of our cavalry was ordered to the south side of 
the French Broad, and General Martin was ordered to 
press close on the enemy's rear with the balance of his 
force. General Armstrong followed the line of retreat, 
and by the use of flat-boats passed his cavalry over the 
Holston and rode to the vicinity of Knoxville. He 
caught up with some stragglers, equipments, ammunition, 
and remains of some caissons, and at last made a grand 
haul of a herd of eight hundred beef cattle and thirty- 
one wagons. 

Upon getting his cavalry back to Knoxville, General 
Foster crossed them over the bridge at the city below the 
French Broad to foraging grounds about Louisville, and 
called his Dandridge march a foraging excursion, saying 
that he was building a bridge to cross to the south side 
when we bore down against him. But the strategy of his 
tedious march by our front to find a crossing point at 
Dandridge and build a bridge in our presence, when he 
could have crossed to the south side of the French Broad 
by his bridge at Knoxville and reached those foraging 
grounds unmolested, was not like Napoleon. He claimed 
that he recovered two hundred of the lost herd of beef 
cattle. In that our reports do not agree. It is possible 



STKATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 531 

that his officers may have confounded that adventure 
with another. My explanation of the discrepancy — from 
memory — is that another of our parties undertook to get 
in a herd of swine, with which there was a smaller herd 
of beef cattle ; that all of the latter herd were recov- 
ered, and the reports of the two adventures were con- 
founded. 

On the 14th, General Vance came down from the 
mountains of North Carolina on a raid towards Sevierville. 
He captured a number of wagons, but was promptly pur- 
sued by the enemy, his prize recovered, and he and a 
number of his staff were taken prisoners, with the loss of 
a hundred or more horses and equipments. They were 
not a part of my command, and failed to give us notice 
of their ride. The first intimation we had of them was 
of their unfortunate adventure. 

On the 21st orders came from Richmond to send Corse's 
brigade back to Petersburg, in Virginia. It was so or- 
dered, and Hodges's brigade was ordered to us from the 
department of West Virginia, in place of Corse's. 

To seek some of the fruits of our advantage at Dan- 
dridge, the roads being a little firmer, our leading division, 
under General Jenkins, was ordered on the 21st to pre- 
pare to march towards Strawberry Plains, and the Rich- 
mond authorities were asked to send us a pontoon bridge, 
tools of construction, and to hurry forward such shoes as 
they could send. 

On the 24th, as the Official Records show. General 
Grant sent word to General Halleck of our return to- 
wards Knoxville, that he had ordered General Foster to 
give battle, if necessary, and that he would send General 
Thomas with additional troops to insure that we would be 
driven from the State. He also directed General Thomas 
to go in person and take command, and said, " I want 
Longstreet routed and pursued beyond the limits of the 
State of Tennessee." And he ordered General Foster to 



532 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

put his cavalry on a raid from Cumberland Gap to cut in 
uj^on our rear. 

On the 26th we were advised of the advance of the 
enemy's cavalry up the south side of the French Broad 
to some of the fords above Dandridge. General Martin 
was ordered to cross in force below it, get in rear of the 
enemy, and endeavor to put him to confusion. He 
crossed with Morgan's division, and called Armstrong's 
to follow, but the enemy, finding opportunity to put his 
force against the division, advanced and made a severe 
battle on the 27th, which became desperate as developed 
until, in their successive gallant charges, our ranks were 
broken to confusion, when the enemy made a dash and 
got two of our guns and two hundred j)risoners, driving 
us towards the river. 

General Armstrong crossed pending these operations 
and received the enemy's attack on the 28th. General 
B, B. Johnson's infantry division had been ordered near 
Dandridge, and crossed while Armstrong's command held 
the enemy. The latter was caught in battle from which 
there was no escape but to fight it out. Johnson's in- 
fantry crossed in time to march towards the enemy's rear 
before he could dislodge Armstrong. I rode a little in 
advance of Johnson's command. The enemy, advised 
of the approach of infantry, made his final charge and 
retired south towards Marysville. In his last effort one 
of his most reckless troopers rode in upon head-quarters, 
but Colonel Fairfax put spurs into his horse, dashed up 
against him, had his pistol at his head, and called " sur- 
render" before the man could level his gun. The trooper 
was agreeably surprised to find it no worse. The enemy's 
move to Marysville left us in possession of the foraging 
grounds. 

On the 30th, General Grant urged General Foster's 
army to the offensive, and called for the cavalry raid 
through the Powell Biver Valley and Cumberland Gap 



STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 533 

towards our rear, and General Foster called on General 
Thomas for a force of ten thousand infantry and working 
details to repair the railroad and bridges between Knox- 
ville and Chattanooga. General Thomas was willing to 
respond to the call for troops, but asked timely notice so 
that he could call Sherman's forces from Mississippi to re- 
place those to be sent and make a co-operative move against 
General Johnston at Dalton. At the same time General 
Foster called for a pontoon bridge to make his crossing 
of the Holston at Strawberry Plains, which was ordered. 

General Sturgis could not approve the ride through 
Powell Piver Valley, and expressed preference for a 
route through the mountains of North Carolina towards 
Asheville, to find our rear. General Grant had suggested 
raids from both these points on the 24th of January, but 
General Foster decided against the raid from Cumberland 
Gap, explaining that General Jones was at Little War 
Gap to intercept a column that might ride from that point. 
He found, too, upon counting his effectives for the raid, 
that he could only mount fifteen hundred men, and that 
our guards at weak points had been doubled. 

Our railroad was in working order on the 26th of Janu- 
ary, and the part of the pontoon bridge ordered for us 
was on the road. General Jenkins was ordered with the 
leading division down towards Strawberry Plains to col- 
lect such material as he could, and be prepared to throw the 
bridge across the Holston as soon as it was up and ready for 
us. Notice was given General A. E. Jackson of indica- 
tions of raids ; to Captain Osborn, commanding scouts ; 
to General Wharton ; to Pucker's Cavalry Legion and 
Jones's cavalry ; and General Vaughn was ordered to col- 
lect his command at Pogersville, to be prepared to threaten 
Cumberland Gap if the forces there should be reduced. 

Due notice was sent our outlying parties and scouts to 
be on the watch for the reported raiding parties, and the 
guards of bridges in our rear were reinforced. 



534 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

On the 6tli of February, General Grant reported from 
Nashville, — 

"Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" Gencral-in- Chief : 
''I am making every effort to get supplies to Knoxville for the 
support of a large force — large enough to drive Longstreet out. 
The enemy have evidently fallen back with most of their force 
from General Thomas's front, some going to Mobile. Has there 
been any movement in that direction by our troops % 

"U. S. Grant, 
' ' Major- General, Commanding. ' ' 

"Major-General Thomas: 

"Eeports of scouts make it evident that Joe Johnston has re- 
moved most of his force from your front, two divisions going to 
Longstreet. Longstreet has been reinforced by troops from the 
East. This makes it evident the enemy intends to secure East 
Tennessee if they can, and I intend to drive them out or get 
whipped this month. For this purpose you will have to detach 
at least ten thousand men besides Stanley's division (more will be 
better). I can partly relieve the vacuum at Chattanooga by 
troops from Logan's command. It will not be necessary to take 
artillery or wagons to Knoxville, but all the serviceable artillery 
liorses should be taken to use on artillery there. Six mules to 
each two hundred men should also be taken, if you have them to 
spare. Let me know how soon you can start. 

"Grant, 
' ' Major- General. ' ' 

On the 9th, Major-General J. M. Schofield arrived at 
Knoxville, and assumed command of the Army of the 
Ohio. 

General Grant reported on the 11th, — 

"Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief : 
" I expect to get off from Chattanooga by Monday next a force 
to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee. It has been impossible 
heretofore to subsist the troops necessary for this work. 

"U. S. Grant, 

' ' Major- General. ' ' 



STEATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 535 

''Major-General J. M. Schofield, 

" Krwxville, Tenn. : 
''I deem it of the utmost importance to drive Longstreet out 
immediately, so as to furlough the balance of our veterans, and 
to prepare for a spring campaign of our own choosing, instead of 
permitting the enemy to dictate it for us. Thomas is ordered to 
start ten thousand men, besides the remainder of Granger's corps, 
at once. He will take no artillery, but will take his artillery 
horses, and three mules to one hundred men. He will probably 
start next Monday. 

"U.S.Grant, 

' ' Major- General. ' ' 

General Scliofield ordered j^reparations for the eastern 
raid continued, but to await further orders of execution, 
and reported that its execution would require all of his 
effective mounts, break his animals down, and leave him 
without cavalr3\ 

General Grant wired these several despatches from 
Nashville on February 12 : 

''Major- General Thomas: 

"Conversation with Major-General Foster has undecided me 
as to the jjropriety of the contemplated move against Longstreet. 
Schofield telegraphs the same views. I will take the matter into 
coDsideration during the day, after further talk with Foster, and 
give you the conclusion arrived at. If decided that you do not 
go I will instruct Schofield to let Granger send off his veterans at 
once. 

"Should you not be required to go into East Tennessee, could 
you not make a formidable reconnoissance towards Dalton, and, 
if successful in driving the enemy out, occupy that place and 
complete the railroad up to it this winter ? 

"Grant, 
' ' Major- General. ' ' 
"Major-General Thomas: 

" Logan's troops started yesterday morning. If I decide not 
to make the move at present into East Tennessee, I will send 
them back, unless you require them to aid in advance on Dalton. 
(See my telegram of this morning.) 

"Grant, 
' ' Major- General. ' ' 



536 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

^'Majoe-Geneeal J. M. Schofield : 

^'No movement will be made against Longstreet at present. 
Give your men and animals all the rest you can preparatory to 
early operations in tlie spring. Furlough all the veterans you 
deem it prudent to let go. 

^'U. S. Grant, 

'■ ' Major- General. ' ' 

''Major-General J. M. Schofield, 

'^ Knoxville, Tenn. : 
"You need not attempt the raid with the cavalry you now 
have. If that in Kentucky can recruit up it may do hereafter to 
send it on such an expedition. I have asked so often for a co- 
operative movement from the troops in "West Virginia that I 
hardly expect to see anything to help us from there. General 
Halleck says they have not got men enough. Crook, however, 
has gone there, and may undertake to strike the road about New 
Eiver. 

''U. S. Grant, 

' ^ Major- General. ' ' 

''Major-General Halleck, 

' ' General-iri- Chief, Washington : 

" General, — I have got General Thomas ready to move a force 
of about fourteen thousand infantry into East Tennessee to aid the 
force there in exijelling Longstreet from the State. He would 
have started on Monday night if I had not revoked the order. 
My reasons for doing this are these : General Foster, who is now 
here (or left this morning), says that our possession of the portion 
of East Tennessee is perfectly secure against all danger. The con- 
dition of the people within the rebel lines cannot be improved 
now after losing all they had. Longstreet, where he is, makes 
more secure other parts of our possessions. Our men, from scanty 
clothing and short rations, are not in good condition for an 
advance. There are but very few animals in East Tennessee in 
condition to move artillery or other stores. If we move against 
Longstreet with an overwhelming force he will simply fall back 
towards Virginia until he can be reinforced or take uj) an im- 
pregnable position. The country being exhausted, all our sup- 
plies will have to be carried from Knoxville the whole distance 
advanced. We would be obliged to advance rapidly and return 
soon whether the object of the expedition was accomplished or 
not. Longstreet could return with impunity on the heels of our 
returning column, at least as far down the valley as he can supply 



STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 537 

himself from the road in his rear. Schofield telegraphs to the 
same effect. All these seem to be good reasons for abandoning 
the movement, and I have therefore suspended it. E'ow that our 
men are ready for an advance, however, I have directed it to be 
made on Dalton, and hope to get possession of that place and hold 
it as a step towards a spring campaign. Our troops in East Ten- 
nessee are now clothed ; rations are also accumulating. When 
Foster left most of the troops had ten days' supplies, with five 
hundred barrels of flour and forty days' meat in store, and the 
quantity increasing daily. 

''I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

''U. S. Grant, 

' ' Major- General.^ ' 

Later despatches from General Grant and Commander- 
in-Cliief Halleck were as follows : 

''Nashville, Tenn., February 13, 1864. 
" Major- General H. W. Halleck, 

' '■ General-in- Chief : 
"Despatches just received from General Schofield and conver- 
sation with General Foster, who is now here, have determined me 
against moving immediately against Lougstreet. I will write 
more fully. No danger whatever to be apprehended in East 
Tennessee. 

'' U. S. Grant, 

' ' Major- General, ' ' 

''Knoxville, February 15, 1864, 6.30 p.m. 
"Major- General Thomas: 

''In consequence of Longstreet's movement in this direction I 
have ordered one division of Granger's corps to this place. I 
think Stanley should move up as far as Athens and Sweet Water 
so as to protect the railroad. Lougstreet has not advanced farther 
than Strawberry Plains. No further news from him to-day. 

"J. M. Schofield, 

' ' Major- General. ' ' 
"[Confidential.] 

"Washington, D. C, February 17, 1864. 
"Major- General Grant, 

' ' Nashville, Tenn. : 
"General, — Your letter of the 12th instant is just received. 
I fully concur with you in regard to the present condition of 



538 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

affairs in East Tennessee. It certainly is very mucli to be re- 
gretted that the fatal mistake of General Burnside has permitted 
Longstreet's army to winter in Tennessee. It is due to yourself 
that a full report of this matter should be placed on file, so that 
the responsibility may rest where it properly belongs. 

''H. W. Halleck, 

'^ General-in-Chief.^'' 

The raids ordered north and south of us were now given 
over. General Thomas made his advance towards Dal- 
ton, and retired, unsuccessful. 

General Halleck was right in his estimate of East Ten- 
nessee as a strategic field essential to the Union service, 
the gate-way to Kentucky, to the Union line of communi- 
cation, and the Ohio Kiver ; but General Grant found it 
so far from his lines of active operations that it could not 
be worked without interrupting plans of campaigns for 
the summer, and giving his adversary opportunity to dic- 
tate the work of the year. He thought it better to de- 
pend upon the conservative spirit that controlled at the 
South, to draw the army in East Tennessee off to meet 
threatenings in Virginia and Georgia, when he was pre- 
pared for them. 

On the 10th of February, General Jenkins was ordered 
with his division at Strawberry Plains to use the pontoon 
and flat-boats in bridging the Holston River. Other 
columns were ordered to approximate concentration, in- 
cluding Wharton's brigade from Bull's Gap, and Hodges's 
brigade coming from the Department of West Virginia. 
Kucker's cavalry was ordered to Blain's Cross-roads on 
the west bank, and outlying forces were advised of the 
advance. General Jenkins was ordered to put some of 
the cavalry over to be in observation towards Knoxville, 
and a brigade of infantry as supporting force ; batteries on 
the hither bank to cover the troops and the bridge in case 
the enemy was disposed to disjiute our crossing, and await 
my arrival and further orders. The army being ready 



STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 539 

for the crossing and move for Knoxville, inquiry was 
made of General Johnston as to the condition of affairs 
with the enemy at Chattanooga. In answer he said, — 

"Our scouts report that troops have been sent from Chatta- 
nooga to Loudon. They could not learn the number." 

On the 17th I asked the Richmond authorities for ten 
thousand additional men, and General Lee, approving our 
work, asked to have Pickett's division sent, and other de- 
tachments to make up the number. 

On the 19tli I was informed from General Johnston's 
head-quarters that " eight trains loaded with trooj^s went 
up from Chattanooga on the night of the 17th." A tele- 
gram came on the 19th from Richmond to say that the 
additional troops called for could not be sent, and on the 
same day a telegram from the President ordered me to 
send General Martin with his cavalry to General Johns- 
ton. In reply I reported that the order depriving me of 
the cavalry would force me to abandon the move, then in 
progress, against Knoxville, and draw the troops back to- 
wards Bristol. Then came other despatches from General 
Johnston that the enemy was still drawing forces from 
Chattanooga, but no authority came from Richmond au- 
thorizing me to retain the cavalry, so we were obliged to 
draw back to fields that could be guarded by smaller 
commands. 

Referring to the proposed advance, General Grant said, 
" Longstreet cannot afford to place his force between 
Knoxville and the Tennessee." It was not so intended, 
but to put the army alongside of Knoxville to hold the 
enemy to his intrenched lines, while the troops asked for 
would be employed in breaking the railroad and bridges 
between that point and Chattanooga. It was thought that 
the army at Chattanooga could not afford sufficient de- 
tachments to drive me from that work without exposing 
that position to danger from General Johnston at Dalton, 



540 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

but upon inquiry of General Johnston if he could avail 
himself of such oj^portunity, he replied that he was or- 
dered to reinforce General Polk, who was operating in 
Mississippi in front of General Sherman. Instead of re- 
inforcing General Polk, the latter should have been or- 
dered to General Johnston. That would have drawn 
General Sherman to General Thomas, but Polk, having 
interior lines of transit, could have been in time for 
Johnston to strike and break up the road and bridge be- 
hind Thomas before Sherman could reach him. The 
break could have forced Thomas to care for his own posi- 
tion, and the want of the bridge behind him might have 
forced him to abandon it, in search of safe communication 
with his supplies. But the authorities could not be in- 
duced to abandon the policy of placing detachments to 
defend points to which the enemy chose to call us. We 
had troops enough in Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and 
Mississippi, if allowed to use them in co-operative combi- 
nation, to break the entire front of the Federal forces and 
force them back into Kentucky before the opening of the 
spring campaign, when we might have found opportunity 
to *' dictate" their campaign. The enemy was in no con- 
dition for backward move at the time of my advance upon 
Knoxville, so simultaneous advance of our many columns 
could have given him serious trouble, if not confusion. 

The order for the return of Martin's cavalry to Geor- 
gia, and the notice that other troops could not be sent me, 
called for the withdrawal of the command east, where we 
could find safer lines of defence and good foraging. The 
order to retire was issued, and the march was taken up 
on the 22d of February, Jenkins's division and the cav- 
alry to cover the march. He was ordered to reship the 
pontoon-boats, destroy trestlings, flat-boats, the railroad 
bridge, and march in advance of the cavalry. He in- 
quired if he should cut the wires and crossings of small 
streams, but was ordered to leave them undisturbed, as the 



STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD. 541 

enemy would not be so likely to trouble us when he found 
we were disposed to be accommodating. 

The march was not seriously disturbed. The enemy's 
cavalry, reduced by severe winter service, was in poor 
condition to follow, and the roads we left behind us were 
too heavy for artillery. A good position was found be- 
hind Bull's Gap, and the army was deployed to comfort- 
able camps from the Holston River on the right to the 
Nolachucky on the left. 

The prime object of the second advance upon Knox- 
ville was to show the strategic strength of the field, and 
persuade the authorities that an army of twenty thou- 
sand in that zone could be of greater service than double 
that force on the enemy's front or elsewhere, but they 
could not or would not hear of plans that proposed to 
take them from the settled policy of meeting the enemy 
where he was prepared for us. 



CHAPTER XXXVII. 

LAST DAYS IN TENNESSEE. 

Longstreet's Army at Bull's Gap — U. S. Grant made Lieuten ant-Gen- 
eral — Richmond Authorities awake to the Gravity of the Situation — 
Longstreet's Proposition for Campaign— Approved by General Lee — 
Richmond Authorities fail to adopt it — General Bragg's Plan — A 
Memorable and Unpleasant Council at the Capital— Orders from 
President Davis — The Case of General Law— Longstreet ordered to 
the Army of Northern Virginia— Resolutions of Thanks from Con- 
federate Congress. 

It would be difficult to find a country more inviting in 
agriculture and horticulture than East Tennessee, and its 
mineral resources are as interesting, but for those whose 
mission was strategic, its geographical and toj^ographical 
features were more striking. Our position at Bull's Gap 
was covered by a spur of the mountains which shoots out 
from the south side of the Holston River towards the 
north bend of the Nolachucky, opening gaps that could 
be improved by the pick and shovel until the line became 
unassailable. In a few days our line was strong enough, 
and we looked for the enemy to come and try our metal, 
until we learned that he was as badly crippled of the cav- 
alry arm as we. General Martin was ordered with his 
division to General Johnston in Georgia, and Colonel 
Gary with his legion was ordered to South Carolina to 
be mounted for cavalry service. 

The armies under General Lee in Virginia and General 
Johnston in Georgia were in defensive positions, with little 
prospect of striking by their right or left flanks in search 
of a way to break their bounds, and the army in East 
Tennessee had been called back to the defensive for want 
of cavalry, but the latter still covered gate-ways through 
the mountains that offered routes to Kentucky for strategic 

542 



LAST DAYS IN TENNESSEE. 543 

manoeuvres. The Trans-Mississippi Department was an 
open field of vast ojoportunities, but was lying fallow. 

An officer of the Union service had worked his way 
during three years of severe field service from obscure 
130sition with a regiment, to command of armies, and had 
borne his banners in triumj)h through battle and siege, 
over the prejudice of higher officers, until President Lin- 
coln's good judgment told him that Grant was the man 
for the times. Congress provided the place, and the 
President sent his commission as lieutenant-general to the 
United States Senate, where it was prom^otly confirmed, 
and the lieutenant-general was j)resently assigned as com- 
mander over half a million of men, to the surprise of 
many, more than all to the bureau general-in-chief. He 
was soon at work arranging his combination for the cam- 
paign of the coming year. He was a West Point boy, 
and we had been together during three years of academic 
service, then two years in the United States Fourth Regi- 
ment of Infantry, and later in Worth's division in 
Mexico. 

Forced to extremities, the Richmond authorities began 
to realize the importance of finding a way out of our pent- 
up borders before the Union commander could complete 
his extensive arrangements to press on with his columns. 
They called upon General Lee, General Johnston, and 
myself for plans or suggestions that could anticipate the 
movements of the enemy, disconcert his plans, and move 
him to new combinations. In front of General Lee and 
on his right and left the country had been so often foraged 
by both Union and Confederate armies that it was denuded 
of supplies. Besides, a forced advance of Lee's army 
could only put the enemy back a few miles to his works 
about Washington. General Johnston's opportunities 
were no better, and in addition to other difficulties, he 
was working under the avowed displeasure of the authori- 
ties, more trying than his trouble with the enemy. 



544 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

I was under the impression that we could collect an 
army of twenty thousand men in South Carolina by strip- 
ping our forts and positions of all men not essential for 
defence ; that that army could be quietly moved north by 
rail through Greenville to the borders of North Carolina, 
and j)rom23tly marched by Abingdon, Virginia, through 
the mountain passes, while my command covered the 
move by its position in East Tennessee. That army 
passing the mountains, my command could drop off by 
the left to its rear and follow into Kentucky, — the whole 
to march against the enemy's only line of railway from 
Louisville, and force him to loose his hold against Gen- 
eral Johnston's front, and give the latter opportunity to 
advance his army and call all of his troops in Alabama 
and Mississippi to like advance, the grand junction of all 
of the columns to be made on or near the Ohio River, — 
General Beauregard to command the leading column, 
with orders not to make or accept battle until the grand 
junction was made. That General Johnston should have 
like orders against battle until he became satisfied of 
fruitful issues. The supplies and transportation for 
Beauregard to be collected at the head of the railroad, 
in advance of the movement of troops, under the osten- 
sible purpose of hauling for my command. The arrange- 
ments perfected, the commander of the leading column 
to put his troops on the rail at or near Charleston and 
march with them as they arrived at the head of the road. 

With this proposition I went to Virginia and submitted 
it to General Lee. He approved, and asked me to take 
it to the Richmond authorities. I objected that the mere 
fact of its coming from me would be enough to cause its 
rejection, and asked, if he approved, that he would take it 
and submit it as his own. He took me with him to Rich- 
mond, but went alone next morning to see the President. 
He met, besides the President, the Secretary of War and 
General Bragg. Conference was held during the fore- 



LAST DAYS IN TENNESSEE. 545 

noon, but was not conclusive. In the afternoon he called 
me with him for further deliberation. 

At the opening of the afternoon council it appeared 
that General Bragg had offered a plan for early spring 
campaign, and that it had received the approval of the 
President, — viz. : 

"General Johnston to marcli his army through the mountains 
of Georgia and East Tennessee to the head- waters of Little Ten- 
nessee River ; my command to march through the mountains east 
of Knoxville to join General Johnston. The commands united, 
to march west, cross the river into Middle Tennessee, and march 
for the enemy's line of supplies about Nashville." 

When asked an opinion of this, I inquired as to Gen- 
eral Johnston's attitude towards it, and was told that he 
objected ; that he thought the sparsely-settled country 
of the mountains through which he would move could not 
supply his army ; that he would consume all that he could 
haul before turning westward for the middle country, and 
would be forced to active foraging from his first step be- 
tween the two armies of the enemy. 

General Lee inquired if General Johnston had ma- 
turely considered the matter. I thought that he had, 
and that the objections of the officer who was to conduct 
the campaign were, of themselves, reasons for overruling 
it ; but its advocates were not ready to accept a summary 
disposal of their plans, and it began to transpire that the 
President had serious objections to General Beauregard 
as a commander for the field. 

But General Lee called us back to business by asking 
if there was anything more to be added than General 
Johnston's objections. I called attention to General 
Bragg's official account of the battle of Chickamauga, 
in which he reported that a similar move had been pro- 
posed for him through Middle Tennessee towards the 
enemy's line of communication at Nashville early on 

35 



546 FHOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the morning after the battle ; that he rejected it, reported 
it " visionary" ; said that it would leave his rear open to 
the enemy, and alluded to the country through which 
the march was proposed as " affording no subsistence to 
men or animals." This at harvest season, too ! the enemy 
demoralized by the late battle, and the Confederates in 
the vigor of success ! Now, after a winter of foraging by 
the Union armies, the country could not be so j)lethoric 
of sujDplies as to support us, while an active army was on 
each flank, better prej^ared to dispute our march. 

General Lee wore his beard full, but neatly trimmed. 
He pulled at it nervously, and more vigorously as time 
and silence grew, until at last his suppressed emotion was 
conquered. The profound quiet of a minute or more 
seemed an hour. When he spoke, it was of other matters, 
but the air was troubled by his efforts to surrender hopeful 
anticipations to the caprice of empirics. He rose to take 
leave of the august presence, gave his hand to the Presi- 
dent, and bowed himself out of the council chamber. 
His assistant went through the same forms, and no one 
approached the door to offer parting courtesy. 

I had seen the general under severe trial before, espe- 
cially on his Pennsylvania campaign when he found the 
cavalry under General Imboden had halted for rest at 
Hancock, at the opening of an aggressive movement. My 
similar experience with the President in the all-day talk, 
on Missionary Pidge, six months before, had better pre- 
pared me for the ordeal, and I drew some comfort from 
the reflection that others had their trials. General Lee 
took the next train for his army on the Papidan, and I 
that by the direct route to my command by the Southside 
Pailway. 

When ordered from Virginia in September my wife re- 
mained in Petersburg with her good friend Mrs. Dunn. 
On the 20th of October following a son was born, and 
christened Pobert Lee. After continuous field- service 



' LAST DAYS IN TENNESSEE. 547 

since the 1st of July, 1861, I thought to avail myself of 
the privilege as department commander to take a two 
days' leave of absence to see the precious woman and her 
infant boy. While there it occurred to me to write to the 
President, and try to soften the asperities of the Richmond 
council ; also to find a way to overcome the objections to 
General Beauregard. I suggested, too, that General Lee 
be sent to join us, and have command in Kentucky. In 
reply the President sent a rebuke of my delay. 

On my return to head-quarters at Greenville the other 
division of General Johnston's cavalry was ordered to him 
through the mountains. Just then a severe snow-storm 
came uj^on us and blocked all roads. Meanwhile, the 
enemy had mended his ways, secured munitions, and 
thought to march out from Mossy Creek as far as Morris- 
town. Orders were given for a march to meet him, but 
we found ourselves in need of forage, so we rested in posi- 
tion, and presently learned that the enemy had retired 
towards his works. 

Our reduced cavalry force made necessary a change of 
position behind the Holston River, where a small force 
could at least observe our flanks, and give notice of threat- 
enings on either side. 

A letter from the President under date of the 25th or- 
dered that we be prepared to march to meet General 
Johnston for the camj^aign through Middle Tennessee. 
He was informed that we were ready, only needing sup- 
plies for the march and his orders ; that I had cared for 
the bridges in that direction, so that there was no reason 
with us for delay. 

On the 7th of April I was ordered, with the part of my 
command that had originally served with the Army of 
Northern Virginia, back to service with General Lee on 
the Paj)idan. The move was made as soon as cars could 
be had to haul the troops, halting under orders at Char- 
lottesville to meet a grand flanking move then antici- 



548 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

pated. On the 22d we were ordered down as far as 
Mechanics ville, five miles west of Gordonsville, watching 
there for a lesser flank move. On the 29th, General Lee 
came out and reviewed the command. 

Referring to the general officers who had been put 
under charges while in East Tennessee, General Robert- 
son had been sentenced to suspension, and an excellent 
officer. General Gregg, had been sent to report, and was 
assigned to the Texas brigade. In the case of General 
McLaws, the court-martial ordered official rejorimand, 
but the President disapproved the proceedings, passing 
reprimand upon the court and the commanding general, 
and ordered the officer to be restored to duty, which was 
very gratifying to me, who could have taken several repri- 
mands to relieve a personal friend of embarrassing ]30si- 
tion. General McLaws was a classmate, and had been a 
warm personal friend from childhood. I had no desire to 
put charges against him, and should have failed to do so 
even under the directions of the authorities. I am hapj)y 
to say that our personal relations are as close and interest- 
ing as they have ever been, and that his heart was big 
enough to separate official duties and personal rela- 
tions. 

Charges had been preferred against Brigadier-General 
E. M. Law for surreptitiously disposing of an official 
communication to the War Department that had been 
intrusted to his care, in which was enclosed his pretended 
resignation from the Confederate army. The President 
refused to entertain the charges, and ordered the officer 
released from arrest and restored to his command. 

Of the paper that was improperly disposed of. General 
Cooper, adjutant and inspector-general of the army, re- 
ported, — 

^'The resignation witliin referred to never came to the office. 
It appears from inquiry at the War Department that it was pre- 
sented by a friend of General Law, unofficially, to the Secretary 



LAST DAYS IN TENNESSEE. 549 

of War, and never came througli the regular channels as an 
official paper." * 

General Lee wrote to the Department of the charges, — 

' ' I examined the charges against General Law and find them 
of a very grave character. I think it due to General Law, as well 
as to the interest of the service, that they should be investigated 
and his innocence or guilt should be declared by a court-martial. 
There have been instances of officers obtaining indulgences on not 
true grounds, which I think discreditable and prejudicial to 
military discipline, and should be stopped." f 

The indorsement of General Cooper shows that the 
paper was fraudulently handled. The letter of General 
Lee shows the offence a high crime and misdemeanor. 

General Lee wrote to inform me that the authorities at 
Richmond had ordered General Law to be restored to 
duty with his command. The limit of endurance had thus 
been reached and passed. I ordered the rearrest of Gen- 
eral Law upon his appearance within the limits of the 
command. To hold me at the head of the command while 
encouraging mutinous conduct in its ranks was beyond all 
laws and customs of war, and I wrote General Lee that 
my orders were out to have General Law again put under 
arrest, and that the case should be brought before a mili- 
tary tribunal, or I must be relieved of duty in the Con- 
federate States service. The authorities then thought to 
find their way by transferring me to another command, 
but on that point General Lee became impatient, and in- 
clined to serious thought and action. The commander of 
the army was involved as well as the commander of the 
First Corps, and both or neither must be relieved. The 
authorities halted, and that was the last that I heard of 
General Law until his newspaper articles began to appear, 
years after the surrender. 

The following vote of thanks given by the Congress at 

* Rebellion Record. f Ibid. 



550 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

this juncture affords a remarkable commentary upon the 
conduct of the authorities, as well as constituting a com- 
pliment most heartily appreciated by the recipients : 

"Thanks of the Confederate Congress to Lieutenant- 
General James Longstreet and his Command.* 

"No. 42. — Joint Eesolutions of thanks to Lieutenant-General 
Longstreet and the officers and men of his command. 

^^ Resolved by the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 
That the thanks of Congress are due, and hereby cordially ten- 
dered, to Lieutenant-General James Longstreet and the officers 
and men of his command, for their patriotic services and brilliant 
achievements in the present war, sharing as they have the ardu- 
ous fatigues and privations of many campaigns in Virginia, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Tennessee, and partici- 
pating in nearly every great battle fought in those States, the 
commanding general ever disi^laying great ability, skill, and pru- 
dence in command, and the officers and men the most heroic 
bravery, fortitude, and energy, in every duty they have been 
called upon to perform. 

' ' Besolved, That the President be requested to transmit a copy 
of the foregoing resolution to Lieutenant-General Longstreet for 
publication to his command. 

"Approved February 17, 1864." . 

* Rebellion Record, vol. xxxi. part i. p. 549. 



CHAPTER XXXVIII. 

BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 

Campaign of 1864— General Grant in the Field— Strength of the Armies— 
Their Positions— Description of the Wilderness — The Battle opened— A 
Brisk Day's Fighting— Longstreet's Command faces Hancock's on tlie 
Morning of the Second Day — An Effective Flank Movement— General 
Wadsworth mortally wounded— General Jenkins falls under Fire of 
Friends, and Longstreetis seriously wounded — Carried from the Field 
on a Litter— Tribute to General Jenkins— Criticism and Controversy. 

After reporting the return of my command to service 
with the Army of Northern Virginia, I took the earliest 
opportunity to suggest that the preliminaries of the cam- 
paign should be carefully confined to strategic manoeuvre 
until we could show better generalship. That accom- 
plished, I argued, the enemy's forces would lose confidence 
in the superiority of their leader's skill and prowess ; that 
both armies were composed of intelligent, experienced 
veterans, who were as quick to discover the better hand- 
ling of their ranks as trained generals ; that by such suc- 
cessful manoeuvres the Confederates would gain confidence 
and power as the enemy began to lose prestige ; that then 
we could begin to look for a favorable opportunity to call 
the enemy to aggressive work, while immediate aggression 
from us against his greater numbers must make our labors 
heavy and more or less doubtful ; that we should first 
show that the power of battle is in generalship more than 
in the number of soldiers, which, properly illustrated, 
would make the weaker numbers of the contention the 
stronger force. 

In this connection I refer to the policy of attrition 
which became a prominent feature during part of the 
campaign, and showed that the enemy put his faith in 
numbers more than in superior skill and generalship. 

551 



552 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

General Grant made his head-quarters near the Army 
of the Potomac, in Culpeper County, Virginia, com- 
manded by Major-General George G. Meade. It had 
been organized into three corps. Second, Fifth, and Sixth, 
commanded respectively by Major-General W. S. Han- 
cock, Major-General G. K. Warren, and Major-General 
John Sedgwick, all in cantonment near Culi^eper Court- 
House. The Ninth Corps was a distinct body reorganized 
under Major-General A. E. Burnside, and posted in co- 
operative position near the railroad bridge over the Rap- 
pahannock River. The aggregate of the two commands 
was about one hundred and thirty thousand men, classified 
as follows : 

Army of the Potomac : 

Infantry present for duty, equipped (aggregate) . . 73,390 

Cavalry (aggregate) 12,424 

Artillery and engineers 2,764 

Quartermaster's, subsistence, and medical depart- 
ments, extra-duty men, and engineer brigade . . 19,183 
Ninth Corps, present for duty, equipped 19,486 

Total 127,247 

But deducting extra-duty men, claimed as non-com- 
batants 19,183 

Leaves 108,064 

These figures are from Major-General A. A. Hum- 
phreys, chief of staff of the Army of the Potomac. But 
General Badeau, in his " Military History of U. S. Grant," 
p. 94, gives as the exact numbers put into battle (after 
deducting a division of colored troops, not then used for 
battle service) the following : 

Army of the Potomac 97,273 

Ninth Corps 22,708 

Total 119,981 

From which he deducts the division of colored troops 3,095 

Leaving 116,886 

The Army of Northern Virginia stood on the west side 
of Bapidan Biver, Mine Bun on its right, extending 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 553 

north, the left division, K. H. Anderson's, looking to- 
wards Madison Court-House ; the Second and Third 
Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-Generals R. S. Ewell 
and A. P. Hill ; two divisions and Alexander's artillery of 
Long-street's (First) corps being held at Mechanicsville. 

Colonel Taylor, chief of staff with the Army of North- 
ern Virginia, gives the strength of the army at the open- 
ing of the campaign, from the returns of April 20, the 
latest up to date, as follows : * 

Second Corps 17,093 

Third Corps 22,199 

Unattached commands, Maryland Line, etc 1,125 

"A liberal estimate," as he calls it, of my command . 10,000 

Total 50,417 

Cavalry 8,727 

Artillery corps 4,854 

. Making a total of 63,998 

But General Badeau objects, on authority of a letter 
from General Bragg to General Joseph E. Johnston, 
stating that I had fourteen thousand men in my command. 
If General Bragg's letter referred to my command in 
East Tennessee it was accurate enough. But Buckner's 
division of that command, the cavalry, and other detach- 
ments were left in East Tennessee. General Badeau 
claims, besides, six thousand furloughed men and con- 
scripts as joining the army between the 20th of Aj)ril and 
the 4th of May. Of this there is no official record, and it is 
more than probable that new cases of sick and furloughed 
men of that interval were as many at least as the frag- 
mentary parties that joined us. General Humphreys 
reported me as having fifteen thousand men. If he in- 
tended those figures as the strength of the First Corps, he 
is accurate enough, but Pickett's division of that corps 
was not with it, nor did it return to the Army of North- 
ern Virginia until late in the campaign. So I find no 

* "Four Years with General Lee." 



554 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

good reason for changing the figures of Colonel Taylor, 
except so far as to add Johnson's brigade of E-odes's di- 
vision, which is reported to have joined the Second Corps 
on the 6th of May, — estimated at 1500, which, added to 
63,998, would make the total 65,498. But General 
Ewell's official account of numbers on the morning of the 
6th of May puts his force at 15,500, which is better au- 
thority than Colonel Taylor's from the return of April 20, 
or General Badeau's computation. To these figures should 
be added Johnson's brigade, that reported later of the 
day, estimated by General Badeau at 1500, which makes 
the aggregate of the Second Corps 17,000, and brings 
that of the Army of Northern Virginia back to 65,405. 

However, the numerical strength of armies should not 
be considered as of exclusive bearing upon the merits of 
the campaign. The commanders had chosen their battle 
after mature deliberation. They knew of each other's 
numbers and resources before they laid their plans, and 
they had even known each other personally for more than 
twenty years. Each had the undivided support and confi- 
dence of his government and his army, and it was time 
now to leave the past and give attention to the future. 

General Lee had acquired fiime as a strategist in his 
two years' service in the Army of Northern Virginia, and 
General Grant, by his three years' service in the West, 
had come to be known as an all-round soldier, seldom if 
ever surpassed ; but the biggest part of him was his heart. 
They were equally pugnacious and plucky, — Grant the 
more deliberate. 

Six months before the opening of the impending cam- 
paign, in November, 1863, General Meade, essaying a 
blow at the Army of Northern Virginia, crossed the Rap- 
idan below General Lee's right, and deployed along the 
south side of Mine Bun, but found Lee's line so strong 
and so improved by field-works that he felt constrained to 
withdraw without making battle. 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 555 

As the purpose of this writing is to convey ideas of 
personal observations and experience, it will be confined, 
as far as practicable, to campaigns or parts of them with 
which I was directly or indirectly connected. So, w^hen 
participants and partisans have passed away, I shall 
have contributed my share towards putting the historian 
in possession of evidence which he can weigh with that 
of other actors in the great drama. 

At midnight of the 3d of May, 1864, the Army of the 
Potomac took its line of march for the lower crossings of 
the Rapidan River at Germania and Ely's Fords, the Fifth 
and Sixth Corps for the former, the Second for the latter, 
Wilson's division of cavalry leading the first, Gregg's the 
second column. The cavalry was to secure the crossings 
and lay bridges for the columns as they came up. Wilson's 
cavalry crossed at Germania ford, drove off the Confed- 
erate outpost, and began the construction of a bridge at 
daylight. Gregg also was successful, and the bridges were 
ready when the solid columns came. Warren's (Fifth 
Corps) crossed after Wilson's cavalry, marching westward 
as far as Wilderness Tavern. Sedgwick's corps followed 
and pitched camp near the crossing. Hancock's corps 
followed Gregg's cavalry, and made camp at Chancellors- 
ville. Generals Grant and Meade went over after War- 
ren's column and established head-quarters near the cross- 
ing. General Grant despatched for Burnside's corps to 
come and join him by night march. Sheridan was ex- 
pected to engage Stuart's cavalry at Hamilton's Crossing 
near Fredericksburg. 

General Grant had no fixed plan of campaign beyond 
the general idea to avoid the strong defensive line occu- 
pied by General Lee behind Mine Run, and find a way to 
draw him out to oj^en battle. 

The Wilderness is a forest land of about fifteen miles 
square, lying between and equidistant from Orange Court- 
House and Fredericksburg. It is broken occasionally by 



556 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

small farms and abandoned clearings, and two roads, — 
the Orange Plank road and the turnpike, which are 
cut at right angles by the Germania road, — in general 
course nearly j)arallel, open ways through it between 
Fredericksburg and the Court-House. The Germania 
Ford road joins the Brock road, the strategic line of 
the military zone, and crosses the turnpike at Wilderness 
Tavern and the Plank road about two miles south of 
that point. 

Though the march was set on foot at midnight it was 
soon made known to General Lee, and its full purport 
was revealed by noon of the 4th, and orders were sent the 
different commanders for their march to meet the enemy, 
— the Second Corps (Ewell's), consisting of E-odes's, 
Johnson's, and Early's divisions, by the Orange Turn- 
pike ; the Third (A. P. Hill's)— R. H. Anderson's, Heth's, 
and Wilcox's divisions — by the Orange Plank road. 

General Lee's signals were interpreted and sent to 
General Grant, who so far modified his plans as to pre- 
pare for immediate battle. The commands of the First 
Corps, Field's and Kershaw's divisions and Alexander's 
batteries, were stationed. Field's north of Gordonsville, 
where he had been j^osted on the 1st of May in anticipa- 
tion of a move around our left, the other commands near 
Mechanicsville. We were ordered forward by the Plank 
road to Parker's Store ; the order was received after one 
o'clock, and sent out for information of the commanders, 
who were ordered to prejmre and march. But I asked 
for and received authority to march by a shorter route 
that would at the same time relieve the Plank road of 
pressure of troops and trains (for we had been crowded 
off the road once before by putting too many troops upon 
a single track). By the same despatch I asked and 
subsequently obtained leave to go on to the Brock road, 
where we could look for and hope to intercept the enemy's 
march, and cause him to develop plans before he could 



BATTLE OF 

THE WILDERNESS, ya. 




BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 557 

get out of the Wilderness. We marclied at four o'clock 
by the Lawyer's road. Our chief quartermaster, Colonel 
Taylor, whose home was between Orange Court-House and 
the Wilderness, had been ordered to secure the services 
of the most competent guide to be found. We halted 
at Brock's Bridge for rest, and there Colonel Taylor 
brought up our guide, James Kobinson, who had been 
for several years the sheriff of the county, and whose 
whole life had been sjient in the Wilderness. The march 
was resumed, and continued with swinging stej), with 
occasional rests, until we reached Kichard's Shops, at five 
P.M. of the 5th. There we overtook Bosser's cavalry, 
engaged in severe encounter with jDart of Sheridan's. The 
enemy abar^doned the contest and rode away, leaving his 
dead with some of ours on the field. 

The distance of march was twenty-eight miles. Soon 
after my arrival at the shops. Colonel Venable, of general 
head-quarters staff, came with orders for a change of direc- 
tion of the column through the wood to unite with the 
troops of the Third Corps on the Plank road. The rear 
of my column closed up at dark, and orders were sent to 
prepare to resume march at twelve o'clock. The accounts 
we had of the day's work were favorable to the Confeder- 
ates ; but the change of direction of our march was not 
reassuring. 

In accordance with the general plan of turning the 
Confederate right without touching our intrenched line 
along Mine Bun, the Army of the Potomac had been put 
in motion early on the 5th, the Second Corps towards 
Shady Grove Church by the Todd's Tavern road, the 
Fifth by the dirt road towards Parker's Store on the 
Plank road, the Sixth on the right, to follow the Fifth 
as movements developed. General Warren moved with 
three divisions, leaving Griffin's on the turnpike. Pres- 
ently, after taking up his march towards Parker's Store, 
the Confederates were discovered on the Plank road, and 



558 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

General Meade ordered the coriDs made ready for battle. 
The Sixth, except Getty's division, was ordered to make 
connection on the right of the Fifth by wood roads, and 
prepare for the battle. Getty's division was ordered to 
the Plank road at the Brock road crossing, to hold that 
point at all hazards until the Second Corps could join it, 
the latter being recalled from Todd's Tavern for that 
holding and developments there indicated. 

At noon General Warren was prepared on the turn- 
pike and attacked with Griffin's and Wadsworth's di- 
visions. 

General Lee's orders were against a general engagement 
until his forces were in hand, but the troops had met and 
action could not wait. Warren's attack had some suc- 
cess, as by his orders General Ewell felt called upon to 
delay battle, but a sudden dash of the enemy broke into 
disorder his brigade under J. M. Jones, also Battle's bri- 
gade ; but other of his troops joined them, recovered his 
ground, drove off the attacking forces, taking two guns, 
and called Warren's corps to better concentration. The 
Sixth was to be with AVarren, but was delayed by the 
narrow, tangled roads till night. General Ewell pre- 
pared for the next day by intrenching his front. 

Meanwhile, General Hill had pushed the divisions 
under Heth and Wilcox along the Plank road until they 
were near the Brock road crossing, occupied by Getty's 
division of the Sixth Corps. 

General Getty was in time to drive back a few of our 
men who had reached the Brock road in observation, and 
Hancock's corps joined him at two p.m., fronting his di- 
visions — Birney's, Mott's, Gibbon's, and Barlow's — along 
the Brock road, on the left of Getty's. His artillery was 
massed on his left, near Barlow, except a battery nearer 
the Plank road, and one section at the crossing. He or- 
dered his line intrenched. 

As soon as he found his troops in hand at the cross- 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 559 

roads, General Meade ordered them into action. Getty's 
division, supported by the Second Corps, was to drive Hill 
back, occupy Parker's Store, and connect with AVarren's 
line. He afterwards learned of the repulse of Warren on 
the turnpike, but repeated his orders for the advance on 
the Plank road. At 4.15 Getty's division advanced, and 
met the divisions of Heth and Wilcox a few hundred 
yards in advance of their trenches. 

In the fierce engagement that followed, Birney's and 
Mott's divisions were engaged on Getty's left, and later 
the brigades of Carroll and Owen, of Gibbon's division. 
Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the Fifth 
Corps were put in to aid Getty's right. The combination 
forced H^th and Wilcox back about half a mile, when 
the battle rested for the night. Hancock reinforced his 
front by Webb's brigade of Gibbon's division, and was 
diligently employed at his lines during the night putting 
up field-works. 

About eleven o'clock in the night the guide reported 
from General Lee to conduct my command through the 
wood across to the Plank road, and at one o'clock the 
march was resumed. The road was overgrown by the 
bushes, except the side-tracks made by the dmft animals 
and the ruts of wheels which marked occasional lines in 
its course. After a time the wood became less dense, and 
the unused road was more difficult to follow, and presently 
the guide found that there was no road under him ; but 
no time was lost, as, by ordering the lines of the divisions 
doubled, they were ready when the trail was found, and 
the march continued in double line. At daylight we 
entered the Plank road, and filed down towards the field 
of strife of the afternoon of the 5th and daylight of 
the 6th. 

R. H. Anderson's division of the Third Corps, march- 
ing on the Plank road, had rested at Verdierville during 
the night, and was called to the front in the morning. 



560 FROM MANASSA.S TO APPOMATTOX. 

The divisions of Heth and Wilcox rested during the night 
of the 5th where the battle of that day ceased, but did 
not prepare ammunition nor strengthen their lines for 
defence, because informed that they were to be relieved 
from the front. Both the division commanders claim that 
they were to be relieved, and that they were ordered not 
to intrench or replenish supplies. So it seems that they 
were all night within hearing of the voices of Hancock's 
men, not even reorganizing their lines so as to offer a 
front of battle ! General Heth has stated that he proj)osed 
to arrange for battle, but was ordered to give his men 
rest. While Hancock was sending men to his advanced 
line during the night and intrenching there and on his 
second line, the Confederates were all night idle. 

Hancock advanced and struck the divisions before sun- 
rise, just as my command reported to General Lee. My 
line was formed on the right and left of the Plank road, 
Kershaw on the right, Field on the left. As the line 
deployed, the divisions of Heth and Wilcox came back 
upon us in disorder, more and more confused as their steps 
hurried under Hancock's musketry. As my ranks formed 
the men broke files to give free passage for their comrades 
to the rear. The advancing fire was getting brisk, but 
not a shot was fired in return by my trooj^s until the 
divisions were ready. Three of Field's brigades, the 
Texas, Alabama, and Benning's Georgia, were formed in 
line on the left of the road, and three of Kershaw's on 
the right. General Lee, appalled at the condition of 
affairs, thought to lead the Texas brigade alone into 
desperate charge, before my lines were well formed. The 
ordeal was trying, but the steady troops, seeing him off 
his balance, refused to follow, begged him to retire, and 
presently Colonel Venable, of his staff, rej^orted to me 
General Lee's efforts to lead the brigade, and suggested 
that I should try to call him from it. I asked that he 
would say, with my compliments, that his line would be 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 561 \ 

recovered in an hour if he would permit me to handle the ^ , 
troops, but if my services were not needed, I would like 
to ride to some place of safety, as it was not quite com- 
fortable where we were. 

As full lines of battle could not be handled through the 
thick wood, I ordered the advance of the six brigades by 
heavy skirmish lines, to be followed by stronger support- 
ing lines. Hancock's lines, thinned by their push through 
the wood, and somewhat by the fire of the disordered 
divisions, weaker than my line of fresh and more lively 
skirmishers, were checked by our first steady, rolling fire, 
and after a brisk fusillade were pushed back to their 
intrenched line, when the fight became steady and very 
firm, occasionally swinging j^arts of my line back and 
compelling the reserves to move forward and recover it. 

General Lee sent General M. L. Smith, of the engi- 
neers, to report to me. He was ordered through the wood 
on my right to the unfinished railroad to find a way 
around the left of the enemy's line, while we engaged his 
front. R. H. Anderson's division of the Third Corps 
came up about eight o'clock and was ordered to report to 
me. 

Hancock's early advance was under a general order in- 
cluding the Army of the Potomac. The Ninth Corps 
that had been called up reported to General Grant, and 
was ordered in between the Plank and Turnpike roads. 
At eight o'clock Hancock was reinforced by Stevenson's 
division of the Ninth, and Wadsworth of the Fifth was 
put under his orders. At nine o'clock he attacked with 
Wadsworth's, Birney's, Stevenson's, and Mott's divisions, 
and the brigades of Webb, Carroll, and Owen, of Gibbon's 
division, making as formidable battle as could be organ- 
ized in the wood, but the tangle thinned his lines and our 
fire held him in desperate engagement. 

Two divisions of the Ninth Corps, at the same time 
marching for Parker's Store, were encountered between 

3d 



562 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the Plank and Turnpike roads by our Second Corps 
(Ewell's). Under this combination the forces struggled 
an hour at the extreme tension of skill and valor. 

About ten o'clock General Smith returned and reported 
favorably of his reconnoissance : that the heavy woodland 
concealed the route of the proposed flank march, and that 
there was no force of the enemy in observation. Han- 
cock's left on the Brock road was in strong, well-guarded 
position, but there was room along its front for our troops 
to march near the unfinished railroad beyond view of that 
left on the Brock road. 

General Smith was then asked to take a small party 
and pass beyond the Brock road and find a way for turn- 
ing the extreme Union left on that road. There were two 
brigades of Field's division and one of Kershaw's not on 
the line of battle, but on flank march as supports, and 
R.. H. Anderson's division of the Third Corps. Colonel 
Sorrel, chief of staff", was ordered to conduct three 
brigades, G. T. Anderson's of Field's, Mahone's of B. H. 
Anderson's, and Woffbrd's of Kershaw's division, by the 
route recommended by General Smith, have them faced 
to the left, and marched down against Hancock's left. 
Davis's brigade of the Third Corps also got into this 
command. 

As soon as the troops struck Hancock his line began to 
break, first slowly, then rapidly. Somehow, as they 
retreated, a fire was accidentally started in the dry leaves, 
and began to spread as the Confederates advanced. 
Mahone's brigade approached the burning leaves and 
part of it broke off a little to get around, but the Twelfth 
Virginia was not obstructed by the blaze and moved 
directly on. At the Plank road Colonel Sorrel rode back 
to join us. All of the enemy's battle on the right of the 
Plank road was broken up, and General Field was fight- 
ing severely with his three brigades on the left against 
Wadsworth and Stevenson, pushing them a little. 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 563 

The Twelfth Virginia Regiment got to the Plank road 
some little time before the other regiments of the brigade, 
and, viewing the contention on the farther side between 
Field's and Wadsworth's divisions, dashed across and 
struck the left of Wadsworth's line. This relieved Field 
a little, and, under this concentrating push and fire, 
Wadsworth fell mortally wounded. In a little while fol- 
lowed the general break of the Union battle. The break 
of his left had relieved Kershaw's troops, and he was 
waiting for the time to advance, and Jenkins's brigade 
that had been held in reserve and that part of R. H. 
Anderson's division not in use were ready and anxious 
for opportunity to engage, and followed as our battle line 
pushed forward. 

General Smith then came and reported a way across 
the Brock road that would turn Hancock's extreme left. 
He was asked to conduct the flanking brigades and handle 
them as the ranking officer. He was a splendid tactician 
as well as skilful engineer, and gallant withal. He started, 
and, not to lose time or distance, moved by inversion, 
Woffbrd's left leading, Wofford's favorite manoeuvre. As 
Woffbrd's left stepped out, the other troops moved down 
the Plank road, Jenkins's brigade by the road, Kershaw's 
division alongside. I rode at the head of the column, 
Jenkins, Kershaw, and the staff with me. After discuss- 
ing the dispositions of their trooj)s for reopening battle, 
Jenkins rode closer to offer congratulations, saying, " I 
am happy ; I have felt despair of the cause for some 
months, but am relieved, and feel assured that we will put 
the enemy back across the Papidan before night." Little 
did he or I think these sanguine words were the last he 
would utter. 

When Wadsworth fell the Union battle broke up in 
hasty retreat. Field's brigades closed to fresh ranks, the 
flanking brigades drew into line near the Plank road, and 
with them the other regiments of Mahone's brigade ; but 



564 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

the Twelfth Regiment, some distance in advance of the 
others, had crossed the road to strike at Wadsworth's left 
before the other regiments were in sight, and was return- 
ing to find its place in line. The order for the flanking 
brigades to resume march by their left had not moved 
those brigades of the right. As the Twelfth Regiment 
marched back to find its j^lace on the other side of the 
Plank road, it was mistaken, in the wood, for an advance 
of the enemy, and fire was opened on it from the other 
regiments of the brigade. The men threw themselves to 
the ground to let the fire pass. Just then our party of 
officers was up and rode under the fire. General Jenkins 
had not finished the expressions of joyful congratulations 
which I have quoted when he fell mortally wounded. 

Captain Doby and the orderly, Bowen, of Kershaw's 
staff", were killed. General Kershaw turned to quiet the 
troops, when Jenkins's brigade with levelled guns were in 
the act of returning the fire of the supposed enemy con- 
cealed in the wood, but as Kershaw's clear voice called 
out " F-r-i-e-n-d-s r the arms were recovered, without a 
shot in return, and the men threw themselves down upon 
their faces. 

At the moment that Jenkins fell I received a severe 
shock from a minie ball passing through my throat and 
right shoulder. The blow lifted me from the saddle, and 
my right arm dropped to my side, but I settled back to my 
seat, and started to ride on, when in a minute the flow of 
blood admonished me that my work for the day was done. 
As I turned to ride back, members of the staff, seeing me 
about to fall, dismounted and lifted me to the ground. 

Orders were given General Field, the senior officer 
present, to push on before the enemy could have time to 
rally. The two lines marching along the Plank road, 
southward, in pursuit, and the flanking brigades to move 
in the other direction, were, for the moment, a little per- 
plexing, as he was not accurately advised of the combina- 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 565 

tions, but he grasped the situation. Before he was pre- 
pared, however, General R. H. Anderson came into com- 
mand as senior, and then General Lee came up. The 
plans, orders, and opportunity were explained to him, but 
the woods concealed everything except the lines of troops 
alongside the road. General Lee did not care to handle the 
troops in broken lines, and ordered formation in a general 
line for parallel battle. The change in the forest tangle 
consumed several hours of precious time, and gave General 
Hancock time to collect his men into battle order, post his 
heavy reinforcements, and improve his intrenchments. 

After several hours of work our new line was finally 
adjusted and ordered forward. It approached the enemy's 
stronghold (in ranks a little thinned by the march through 
the wood and the enemy's fire), made desperate and re- 
peated charges, and Jenkins's gallant brigade mounted 
their breastworks, but the solid ranks behind them threw 
it off, with the lines that essayed to give it support, and 
the whole were forced back from their fight. Thus the 
battle, lost and won three times during the day, wore 
itself out. 

General Ewell found opportunity before night to push 
some of his brigades around the enemy's right, and did 
clever work in taking a number of prisoners, — Generals 
Seymour and Shaler among them, — but it was too late in 
the day to follow his work with a strong fight. He han- 
dled his troops with skill and care, putting defensive works 
before them whenever they halted. 

Like attention by General Hancock may be noted ; 
while in marked contrast was the conduct of the Third 
Corps after their affair on the afternoon of the 5th. The 
commanders of the leading divisions of the Third had 
proposed to prepare their troops for the next day, but 
were ordered to give their men rest,* and told that they 

* General Heth's personal account. 



56Q FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

were to be relieved and withdrawn from the battle. Not 
even a line of battle was formed, so that they were in 
disorder when they were struck in the morning, and 
speedily fell into confusion. 

My command, less than ten thousand, had found the 
battle on the Plank road in retreat, little less than a 
panic. In a few hours we changed defeat to victory, 
the broken divisions of the Third Corps rallying in 
tlieir rear. 

As my litter was borne to the rear my hat was placed 
over my face, and soldiers by the road-side said, " He is 
dead, and they are telling us he is only wounded." Hear- 
ing this repeated from time to time, I raised my hat with 
my left hand, when the burst of voices and the flying of 
hats in the air eased my pains somewhat. 

But Micali Jenkins, who fell by the same fire, was no 
more. He was one of the most estimable characters of 
the army. His taste and talent were for military service. 
He was intelligent, quick, untiring, attentive, zealous in 
discharge of duty, truly faithful to official obligations, 
abreast with the foremost in battle, and withal a humble, 
noble Christian. In a moment of highest earthly hope 
he was transported to serenest heavenly joy ; to that life 
beyond that knows no bugle call, beat of drum, or clash 
of steel. May his beautiful spirit, through the mercy of 
God, rest in peace ! Amen ! 

" L'audace, Vaudace, toujours Vaudace^ An Ameri- 
canism which seems an appropriate substitute is, A level 
head, a level head, always a level head. With patience to 
wait ten minutes to see my flanking brigades stretched out 
on their march to retrieve my aplomb, we could have found 
a good battle against Hancock's strong left, while we broke 
over his confused front. Fearing another change of plan, 
I hurried on to execute before it could be ordered. 

There were twenty-two thousand men in the Third 
Corps. It is not claiming too much, therefore, to say that 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 567 

that corps, carefully prepared during the night of the 
5th, could have held Hancock's battle on the mornins: 
of the 6th until my attack of his left could have relieved 
them. 

Under that plan events support the claim that the 
Third Corps, intrenched in their advanced position, with 
fresh supplies and orders to hold their ground, could have 
received and held against Hancock's early battle until 
my command could have come in on his left rear and 
completed our strongly organized battle by which we 
could have carried the Wilderness, even down and into 
the classic Rapidan. 

General Field says in his account of the day, — 

" I was at Longstreet's side in a moment, and in answer to my 
anxious inquiry as to his condition, lie replied that he would be 
looked after by others, and directed me to take command of the. 
corps and push ahead. Though at this moment he could not have 
known the extent or character of his wounds (that they were 
severe was apparent), he seemed to forget himself in the absorbing 
interest of the movement he was making. 

'^ Had our advance not been suspended by this disaster, I have 
always believed that Grant would have been driven across the 
Eapidan before night ; but General Lee was present, and ordered 
that our line, which was nearly a right angle (my division being 
the base, and Kershaw's and the other flanking force the perpen- 
dicular), should first be straightened out. The difficulty of 
manoeuvring through the brush made this a tedious operation, so 
that when we did advance with large reinforcements from Ewell's 
corps placed under my orders, the enemy was found awaiting us 
behind new breastworks, thoroughly prepared." 

Colonel Fairfax says, — 

''On reaching the line of troops you were taken off the horse 
and propped against a tree. You blew the bloody foam from 
your mouth and said, ' Tell General Field to take command, and 
move forward with the whole force and gain the Brock road, ' but 
hours were lost." * 

* Letter to the writer. 



568 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

A Northern historian says, — 

"It seemed, indeed, tliat irretrievable disaster was upon us; 
but in the very torrent and tempest of the attack it suddenly 
ceased and all was still. What could cause this surcease of effort 
at the very height of success was then wholly unknown to us." * 

Some years after the affair on the Plank road, General 
Hancock said to me, — 

'' You rolled me up like a wet blanket, and it was some hours 
before I could reorganize for battle." 

He explained that reinforcements crowding up through 
the wood, the retreating troops, and confusion caused by 
mixing in with wagon-trains and horses, made a trouble- 
some tangle, but it was unravelled and his troops at rest 
when the final attack was made. He had sixty thousand 
men in hand. 

Bad as was being shot by some of our own troops in the 
battle of the Wilderness, — that was an honest mistake, one 
of the accidents of war, — being shot at, since the war, 
by many officers, was worse. Fitzhugh Lee wrote of me 
in the Southern Historical Society papers, vol. v., No. 4, 
April, 1878, saying, among other things, " He lost his 
way and reached the Wilderness twenty-four hours behind 
time." 

Now, from Mechanicsville to Parker's Store by our line 
of march was thirty-four miles, — by the Plank road, 
thirty-five ; from Parker's Store to the battle, three miles. 
From the time of our march to going into battle was thirty- 
six hours, including all of two nights. Deducting twenty- 
four hours alleged as lost leaves twelve hours, including 
all night of the 4th, for the march of thirty-seven miles ! 

His logic and method of injury remind one of the 
French teacher who, when out of patience with the boys, 
used to say, " I will give you zero and mark you absent." 

* Decisive Battles of the War, Swinton, p. 378. 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERlSrESS. 569 

Another report started by Fitzhugh Lee as coming from 
his cousin, G. W. C. Lee, was that General Lee said that 
he " sent an officer to Longs treet to stay with and show 
him the roads." 

This, like all other reported sayings of General Lee in 
regard to me, was not published until after General Lee's 
death. When it was first published I wrote General G. 
W. C. Lee for the name of the officer sent. He referred 
me to the members of General Lee's staff. Not one of 
them knew of the circumstance or the officer, but referred 
me to General Lee's engineers. After long search I found 
the engineers and aj^plied for information, but not one of 
them knew anything of the alleged fact. I had the letters 
published as an advertisement for the officer who was 
claimed as my guide. No resj^onse came. I inquired of 
the members of the staff, First Corps ; not one had seen or 
heard of such a person. The quartermaster. Colonel 
Taylor, who was ordered to secure a competent guide at 
the first moment of receipt of orders to march, reported 
of the matter thus : 

'^Meadow Faem, Orange Court-House, 

''July 1, 1879. 
''General James Longstreet: 

"Dear General,— Your favor of the 30th ultimo is this mo- 
ment to hand, and I reply at once. I think General Fitzhugh 
Lee entirely in error as to any engineer or other officer being sent 
to guide you in the spring of 1864 from your camp near Gordons- 
ville to the Wilderness. I well remember your sending for me, 
and directing me to procure a guide for you, which I did after 
some difficulty in the person of Mr. James Eobinson, the then 
sheriff of the county. I saw no such person, nor can I think 
that any such was at any time at our quarters before we broke 
camp. 

" Sincerely yours, 

"Erasmus Taylor." 

These efforts to secure one witness in support of the 
allegation, or rather to prove a negation, were all that oc- 



570 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

curred to me at the time, and now I can think of but one 
more chance, which is for Fitzhugh Lee to offer a liberal 
reward. It is not probable that he would fail to find a 
false witness who could answer for a time to sujDport the 
false charges. 

It may be added that the accounts of the march by 
other officers agree with mine, as already given. I 
present here a letter from General Alexander and an 
extract from one written me by Colonel Venable. The 
former says, — 

^'Augusta, Ga., June 12, 1879. 

" My dear General, — Absence xDre vented an earlier response 
to your favor of the 5th. My recollection of the events is as fol- 
lows : My command, the artillery, got orders to move about noon 
on May 4, 1864, being in camp near Mechanicsville, some four or 
five miles west of Gordonsville. We marched about four p. m. , and 
with only short rests all night and all next day till about five p. m. , 
when we halted to rest and bivouac at a point which I cannot re- 
member ; but our cavalry had had a skirmish there with the 
enemy's cavalry just before our arrival, and I remember seeing 
some killed and wounded of each side. Your whole corps, Hood's 
and McLaws's, and the artillery, I think, was concentrated at that 
point, and my recollection is that we had orders to move on 
during the night, or before daylight the next morning, to get on 
the enemy's left flank on the Brock road. 

"But whatever the orders were, I remember distinctly that 
during the night news of the fight on the Plank road came, and 
with it a change of orders, and that we marched at one a.m., 
or earlier, and turned to the left and struck the Plank road at 
Parker's Store, and pushed rapidly down it to where the battle 
had already begun. I remember, too, that the march was so hur- 
ried that at one point, the head of the leading division (I forget. 
which it was, however) having lost a little distance by taking the 
wrong road, the rear division was not allowed to halt, but pushed 
right on, so that it got abreast of the leading division, and the 
two came down the road side by side, filling the whole road and 
crowding the retreating men of the divisions which were being 
driven back into the woods on each side. 

"These are facts as I recollect them, and while I don't know 
what your orders were, I remember that there was a change in 
them during the night, according to my understanding, and that 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS. 571 

the change was as promptly and vigorously and successfully car- 
ried out as time and distance could possibly permit. There was 
certainly no loss of time from the moment we received orders to the 
moment we went under fire in the Wilderness, as the distance 
covered will show. 

"■ Very truly yours, 

^'E. P. Alexander. 
' ' General Longstreet. ' ' 

Colonel Yenable writes, — 

"July 25, 1879. 

''Dear General, — . . . Well, the morning came. The enemy 
attacked Wilcox and Heth before your arrival. Disaster seemed 
imminent. I was sent to meet you and hasten your march. I 
met your two divisions within less than half a mile of the battle- 
field coming up in parallel columns very rapidly (I was going to 
say in double-quick) on the Plank road, side by side, and that 
they came in grandly, forming line of battle, Kershaw on the 
right and Field on the left, restoring the battle. It was superb, 
and my heart beats quicker to think about it even at this distance 
of time. . . . 

''Yours, very truly, 

" Charles S. Yenable. 

' ' General Longstreet. ' ' 



CHAPTEE XXXIX. 

AGAIN IN FEONT OF RICHMOND. 

Longstreet absent on Leave, nursing his Wounds — Hears of the Death 
of Cavalry Leader J. E. B. Stuart — Returns to Virginia — Assigned to 
Command on the North Side of James River — Affair on the Wil- 
liamsburg Roatl — Lee's Apprehension of Grant's March into Rich- 
mond — Closing Scenes of the Campaign of 1864 about the Confederate 
Capital— General Benjamin F. Butler's Move against Fort Fisher — 
Remote Effects on the Situation in Virginia. 

Feom the Wilderness I was taken to the Meadow Farm 
home of my friend Erasmus Taylor, and carefully nursed 
by his charming wife until put on board of a train for 
Lynchburg and taken to my good kinswoman, Mrs. Car- 
oline Garland, who had lost her only son and child. Gen- 
eral Samuel Garland, killed two years before at South 
Mountain. From her hospitable home, when strong 
enough for a ride in the fresh air, I was taken to the 
home of a cherished friend. Colonel John D. Alexander, 
at Campbell Court-House. But a raiding j^arty rode 
through the village early one morning, which suggested a 
change, and I was taken to my kinsfolk, the Sibleys, at 
Augusta, Georgia, and after a time to other good friends, 
the Harts and Daniels, at and near Union Point, on the 
Georgia Railroad. 

Before I was strong enough to sit more than a few 
minutes news came of the change of commanders in the 
Army of Georgia, — the superseding of General Joseph E. 
Johnston by assignment of General J. B. Hood, and I 
was asked to take command of the corps left vacant by 
assignment of General Hood, Answer was made that 
when able for duty I would be prejDared to obey orders. 

Later came sadder news from Virginia announcing the 
fall of our Cavalier J. E. B. Stuart. The most famous 

572 







Chief-Quartermaster First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia. 



AGAIN IN FEONT OF KICHMOND. 573 

American rider fell mortally wounded on the ISth of 
May, 1864, near Yellow Tavern, in a cavalry engagement 
with General Sheridan, just then budding into fame. 
Stuart, endowed by nature with the gifts that go to make 
a perfect cavalryman, improved and cultivated through 
years of active warfare, experience, and discipline, was 
the embodiment of all that goes to make up the ideal sol- 
dierly character, — the bold, dashing dragoon. His death 
was possibly a greater loss to the Confederate army even 
than that of the swift-moving General " Stonewall" Jack- 
son. Through all the vicissitudes of war he held his 
troopers beside him peerless in prowess and discii^line. 
After his fall their decline came swifter than their up- 
building had been accomplished by his magic hand. 

In society he was gay, bright, and genial, abstemious to 
a degree. In idle hours of week-days he was fond of his 
banjo-player. Sweeny, but he was devout withal, and to 
him the grandest, sweetest music was *' Rock of Ages." 
To this day that sublime air never fails to bring before 
my mind's vision his noble figure. May his great spirit 
rest near " The Rock of Ages" always ! Amen ! 

About the 1st of October I was strong enough to ride 
horseback, and after a little practice, and having become 
weary of idle hours, took leave of wife and children, 
and travelled back to Richmond to find our great com- 
mander and his noble followers. 

The general seemed worn by past labor, besides suffer- 
ing at seasons from severe sciatica, while his work was 
accumulating and his troubles multiplying to proportions 
that should have employed half a dozen able men. The 
military staff of his head-quarters was made up of excel- 
lent, intelligent, active, zealous young men, more than 
anxious to anticipate his wants and to meet their official 
obligations, and it is a source of gratification to write that 
they were efficient, affectionate, admirable, and polite. 
But facts will not justify like commendation of the pur- 



574 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

veying department. Complaints had been made early in 
the war and continued of our inefficient subsistence de- 
partment at Richmond. The diminishing resources of 
the country called for exceptionally earnest, methodical, 
business faculties m these departments, especially that of 
subsistence, but, unfortunately, as our resources became 
more circumscribed, the officers, instead of putting forth 
stronger efforts in their business, seemed to lose the energy 
of their former service, and General Lee found himself 
called upon to feed as well as fight his army. Although 
anxious to assist in his severe trials, and relieve him of 
part of his work, I feared that he might think a cripple 
an additional incumbrance, and wrote the chief of staff, — 

"Eandolph's House, 
^'Neak Eichmond, Va., October 18, 1864. 
'^ Colonel W. H. Taylor, 

' ' Assistant Adjutant- General : 
'^ Sir, — I have not reported formally for duty, because I doubted 
the propriety of being assigned, in my crippled condition, to posi- 
tion now filled by officers of vigorous health. If I can be of service 
in any position, I prefer to go to duty. If there is nothing to 
which I can be assigned on this side of the Mississippi Eiver, 
without displacing an efficient officer, I will cheerfully accept 
service in the Trans Mississippi Department. 

"The doctors give me little reason to hope to recover the use 
of my arm even within a year ; hence my desire to be assigned 
for duty, or to have an extended leave of absence. 

"Very respectfullj^, your obedient servant, 

" J. LONGrSTREET, 

' ' Lieutenant- General. ' ' 

An order came assigning me to command on the north 
side of James River and Drury's Bluff, and Pickett's 
division on the south side, along Bermuda Hundred front 
as far as Swift Creek. On the north side were the local 
defence troops under Lieutenant-General Ewell, and 
Hoke's and Field's divisions and Gary's brigade of one 
thousand cavalry. 



AGAIN IN FRONT OF RICHMOND. 575 

There had been severe fighting on that side a few days 
previous, in an attack of the Federals upon Fort Harrison 
of our line, which resulted in the capture of the fort ; then 
a more desperate fight of the Confederates to recover it, 
which was not successful. The loss of Fort Harrison 
broke our line off a little near the river, and caused a 
new line to be taken from that point to our left, where it 
joined the line occupied in 1862, when General McClellan 
was against us. The line of the north side extended from 
Chapin's Bluff on the James Kiver, by Fort Gilmer, 
across north of White Oak Swamp to the vicinity of the 
Chickahominy at New Bridge. Hoke's and Field's 
divisions occupied the line from Fort Gilmer, covering 
Charles City road on the left, and Gary's cavalry had a 
strong picket force on the Nine Miles road, with vedettes, 
to guard and patrol the west side of the swamp and 
the south side of the Chickahominy. The crossings of 
the swamp were heavily obstructed by fallen timber. The 
batteries at Chapin's and Drury's Bluffs were manned by 
officers of the navy and sailors, and other organized artil- 
lery and infantry, and the local defence contingent lined 
out towards Fort Gilmer. My men had become experts 
in fortifying, so that parapets and dams along the front 
grew a]3ace. Our officers during their experience in East 
Tennessee had become skilled as foragers, and soon began 
to find in nooks and corners of Northern Virginia food 
and forage which relieved General Lee of the trouble of 
supplying the men on the north side, and my troops were 
beginning to feel comfortable. But there were more 
serious embarrassments on the south side, and desertions 
were becoming more numerous from day to day. 

Towards the latter part of October, General Grant con- 
ceived a plan by which he proposed to extend and advance 
his left, so as to get the Southside Kailroad and connect 
this new point with his line of intrenchments. At the 
same time he thought to have General Butler on his ex- 



576 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

treme right break through the lines on the north side into 
Kichmond. For his left attack he ordered the Second 
Corps, under Hancock, to be supported by parts of the 
Fifth and Ninth Corps. General Lee had his Third 
Corps (A. P. Hill's), Heth's and Wilcox's divisions and 
Mahone's in reserve. Hancock's advance was met by 
Mahone's division, and the entire march of the different 
commands was arrested after a severe rencounter, in which 
Mahone got a number of prisoners and some pieces of 
artillery, — the latter not brought off, as the enemy held 
the bridge. 

According to the reports of the Adjutant-General's Office 
the Federal losses were 1284. The Confederate losses 
were not accurately accounted for, but the Federal accounts 
claimed two hundred prisoners taken at one time, and 
other losses equal to their own. 

I was informed of troops crossing the bridge to the 
north side on the 25th, and that the crossings continued 
at intervals till after the night of the 26th. The plan of 
operations contemplated that General Butler should have 
" twenty thousand men north of the James where Long- 
street was now in command." * These were parts of the 
Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, commanded by Generals 
Terry and Weitzel. General Terry was to make a fierce 
demonstration against our front along the Darby and 
Charles City roads with the Tenth, while General Weitzel 
was to march the Eighteenth across White Oak Swamp 
and get in the unoccuj)ied lines on the Williamsburg road, 
or between that and Gary's cavalry on the Nine Miles 
road. 

Early on the 27th, General Terry moved out with the 
Tenth Corps and made demonstration for formidable at- 
tack, putting his infantry in sharp practice along the 
outer edge of our abatis, and his artillery in practice near 

* Military History of U. S. Grant. Badeau. 






^<^c^ 



AGAIN IN FRONT OF RICHMOND. 577 

the roads. Our sharp-shooters opened in reply from be- 
hind their breastworks and held a lively rattle of musketry 
for quite a time. The delay in making more serious work 
told me that some other was the point of danger, which 
must mean the unoccupied lines beyond White Oak 
Swamp. Field was ordered to pull his division out of 
the works and march for the Williamsburg road, Hoke to 
cover the line of Field by extending and doubling his 
sharp-shooters. 

When the head of General Field's column got to the 
Williamsburg road the enemy's skirmishers were deployed 
and half-way across the field approaching our line. Just 
behind the trenches was a growth of pines which con- 
cealed our troops until a line of sharp-shooters stepped 
into the works. Their fire surprised the enjemy somewhat, 
as they had seen nothing but part of Gary's cavalry, 
and their skirmish line gave up the field for their heavy 
infantry. 

The open in front of the breastworks was about six 
hundred yards wide and twelve hundred in length, ex- 
tending from the York River Railroad on the north to a 
ditch draining towards the head of White Oak Swamp on 
the south. About midway of the field is a slight depres- 
sion or swale of five or six feet depth. 

Quickly following the repulse of the skirmish line, and 
just as Field had adjusted the infantry and artillery to 
their trenches, came the Eighteenth Corps bursting into 
the open and deploying on both sides of the road in solid 
ranks. They were at once in fair canister range, and soon 
under the terrific fire of a solid line of infantry, — in- 
fantry so experienced that they were not likely to throw 
as much as one bullet without well-directed aim. At the 
first fire they began to drop, and they fell more rapidly 
until they reached the swale, when the entire line dropped 
to the ground. They had just enough cover there for 
their bodies as they spread themselves closely to the 

37 



578 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

ground, but not enough to permit them to load or rise to 
deliver fire without exposing their persons to our fire. 
To attempt to retreat would have been as disastrous as 
to advance ; so they were entrapped. 

General Gary reported that the field of the Nine Miles 
road was clear, and was ordered to come in on the flank 
of the entrapped infantry and order surrender ; but before 
he was there another report reached him of a formidable 
force advancing against his squadron on the Nine Miles 
road. He was sent on a gallop to meet this. Meanwhile, 
the troops hiding under the swell of ground found ways 
to drop off" on their right under the railroad cut, and 
many others got away down the dry ditch on their left, 
until Captain Lyle, of the Fifth South Carolina Regiment, 
got a force out on the flank and secured the surrender of 
the remainder. He picked up about six hundred pris- 
oners. 

General Gary's guard on the Nine Miles road held an 
open work by a section of artillery and a squadron of 
cavalry. The advance against it was so well executed, 
and our cavalry so interested in the operations on the Wil- 
liamsburg road, that the guard was taken by surprise and 
pushed away from its post by the first attack, losing its 
field-works and a piece of artillery. Gary soon made 
amends for the careless watch by dismounting his brigade 
and marching in line of battle at right angles to the line 
of the enemy, striking him in flank, recovering the lost 
cannon, and driving him back the way he came. Under 
cover of the night the Federals returned to their fortified 
lines, Avhere they were as strong as were the lines held by 
the Confederates in their front. 

The Confederates lost : Field's division, 45 ; Gary's 
cavalry, 8 ; artillery, 11 ; total, 64. Federal " losses, 
killed, wounded, and missing, 1103." * 



* Virginia Campaigns, 1864-65, by General A. A. Humphreys, Army 
of the Potomac. 



AGAIN IN FRONT OF RICHMOND. 579 

General Grant sent orders to have the positions gained 
by his left held and intrenched, but they were abandoned 
because they were weak in the too extended line. 

After the loss of Fort Harrison, General Lee became 
more anxious for his line on the north side, and rode out 
to witness the ojDerations on that front, under the threat- 
ening of Butler's forces ; and as our cavalry had made no 
report of the enemy crossing the swamp, he was not 
quite satisfied to have the troops moved over to the Wil- 
liamsburg road, but did not order them retained. His 
idea was that the north side was the easier route of Grant's 
triumphal march into Richmond, and that sooner or later 
he would make his effort there in great force. 

These were the closing scenes between the armies about 
Kichmond and Petersburg for the year 1864. The de- 
feat of General Early in the Valley of Virginia on the 
19th of October concluded active work in that quarter. 
Most of Sheridan's infantry was sent back to the Army 
of the Potomac, and the greater part of Early's to the 
Army of Northern Virginia. 

Kershaw's division of the First Corps had been left 
with General Early for his battle of the 19th of October. 
In his account of the battle. General Early alludes to its 
outcome and finality as a causeless panic started by the 
break of his left division under General Gordon, followed 
by Kershaw's and other troops. It is sufficient for this 
writing to say that the general called the rout " thorough 
and disgraceful, mortifying beyond measure : we had 
within our grasp a great and glorious victory, and lost it 
by the uncontrollable propensity of our men for jdIuu- 
der." * 

Kershaw's division was restored to duty with the First 
Corps in November. 

Late in December I was informed of a move of the 



* General Early's official account. 



580 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

enemy's land and naval forces against Fort Fisher in 
Wilmington harbor. The information was despatched to 
General Lee at Petersburg, and brought a midnight order 
for me to send Hoke's division to Wilmington. Hoke 
was relieved and on the move before daylight. General 
Bragg was relieved of duty at Richmond and ordered to 
Wilmington. 

General Butler was in command of the land forces and 
Admiral Porter of the navy. Between them, or under 
the direction of one or the other, was the steamer " Louis- 
iana," freighted with about two hundred and fifty tons of 
gunpowder intended to blow up Fort Fisher. But its only 
tangible effect was to relieve the commander of the land 
forces from further service in the field. 

In Georgia, General Hood led his army off from the 
front of General Sherman at Atlanta, and marched west 
and north, and the latter took up his line of march south 
for Savannah on the 16th of November. 

These moves brought Sherman's army into remote 
bearing upon our army at Bichmond, and as a matter of 
course it began to receive more careful attention from 
General Lee. In order to better guard our position on the 
north side, I ordered, in addition to the timber obstruc- 
tions over White Oak Swamp, the roads leading around 
towards our left to be broken up by subsoil ploughs, so as 
to make greater delay of any movements in that direction 
during the winter rains, and wrote to ask General Lee if 
he could not order the roads upon which General Grant 
would jDrobably march against the Southside Bailroad 
broken in the same way ; also suggesting that the roads 
in Georgia upon which General Sherman was marching 
could be obstructed in this and other ways so as to delay 
and annoy his march, with the possibility that it might 
eventually be broken u}). 

The pickets along our lines were in more or less prac- 
tice shooting at each other from their rifle-pits until I 



AGAIN IN FRONT OF RICHMOND. 581 

ordered it stopped on the north end of the line, as an an- 
noyance, and not a legitimate part of war to carry on the 
shooting of sentinels on guard duty. The example was 
soon followed by the army on our front, so that the men 
on the picket lines became friendly, and afterwards came 
to mutual agreements to give the other side notice, in case 
of battle, in time for the pickets to get to their j)its be- 
fore the batteries could open on them. Before the winter 
was half gone the pickets established quite a bartering 
trade, giving tobacco for sugar and coffee. 

Our foraging parties of the north side were fortunate 
in collecting supplies, and at times were in condition to 
aid our comrades of the south side. But the officers 
found that they could only get a small portion of the pro- 
duce by impressment or tax in kind. They were ordered 
to locate all supplies that they could not collect. 

The chief of staff of the First Corps, Colonel Sorrel, 
was appointed brigadier-general, and relieved of his duties 
by Colonel Osman Latrobe. 

The Army of Tennessee, under General Hood, pur- 
suing its march northward late in November and early in 
December, came upon the Federal forces under General 
Schofield at Franklin, and General Thomas at Nash- 
ville, Tennessee, where desperate battles were fought, 
until Hood's army was reduced to skeleton commands 
and forced to retreat. And thus with Sherman's pro- 
gressive movements in the extreme South, our own ill 
success in Virginia, and an apjDarent general strengthen- 
ing of the Federal cause, the year 1864 drew to a close 
with little of happy omen for the Confederacy. 



CHAPTER XL. 

TALK OF PEACE. 

Second Federal Move against Fort Fisher and Wilmington Harbor- 
Confederate Disaflfection — Act of Congress appointing a Supreme 
Commander of the Armies— Montgomery Blair's Peace Conference — 
Longstreethas a Meeting with General Ord, Commander of the Army 
of the James — Military Convention jjroposed — Correspondence be- 
tween General Grant and General Lee— Longstreet's Suggestions for 
Measures in the Critical Juncture near the Close of the War. 

The second expedition against Wilmington was sent in 
January, 1865, General Terry commanding the land and 
Rear- Admiral Porter the naval forces. After very des- 
perate work the fort and outworks were carried, the com- 
mander, General Whiting, being mortally and Colonel 
Lamb severely wounded. All points of the harbor were 
captured by the enemy, the Confederates losing, besides 
most of the armaments of the forts, about two thousand 
five hundred officers and men in killed, wounded, and 
prisoners. General Terry's loss was about five hundred. 
A remarkable success, — the storming of a position fortified 
during months and years of labor and by most approved 
engineering.* 

As the first months of 1865 passed, the Confederate 
Congress realized the extreme tension of affairs, and pro- 
vided, among other expedients, for the enrollment of 
negroes as Confederate soldiers. Other measures for 
giving confidence and strength to the cause were adopted. 

On the 21st of January the Confederate President was 
informed of disaffection in the Virginia Legislature, and, 

* One of our weeklies announced, upon learning that General Bragg 
was ordered there, "We understand that General Bragg is ordered to 
Wilmington. Good-by, Wilmington !" 

582 



TALK OF PEACE. 583 

what was more significant, in the Confederate Congress, 
where a resohition expressive of want of confidence in the 
Chief Executive was under informal consideration, and 
would undoubtedly pass by a large vote if introduced. 
At this critical juncture it seems that a compromise was 
effected. It was agreed that Congress should enact a 
law providing a supreme commander of the Confederate 
armies, this law to be approved by the President, who 
should then call General Lee to the exercise of the func- 
tions of that office. The intention was to invest him with 
dictatorial power. 

During the early days of February, Hon. Montgomery 
Blair visited Richmond upon a mission of peace, and 
brought about a meeting at Hampton Roads between 
President Lincoln and Secretary Seward and the Confed- 
erate Vice-President, Alexander H. Stephens, and the 
Hon. R. M. T. Hunter and Judge J. A. Campbell. Presi- 
dent Lincoln was firm for the surrender of the Confed- 
erate armies and the abolition of slavery, which the Con- 
federate President did not care to consider. 

About the 15th of February, Major-General J. C. 
Breckenridge was appointed Secretary of War, and Briga- 
dier-General F. M. St. John was appointed commissary- 
general of subsistence. 

General Ord, commanding the Army of the James, sent 
me a note on the 20th of February to say that the bar- 
tering between our troops on the picket lines was irregu- 
lar ; that he would be pleased to meet me and arrange to 
put a stop to such intimate intercourse. As a soldier he 
knew his orders would stop the business ; it was evident, 
therefore, that there was other matter he would intro- 
duce when the meeting could be had. I wrote in reply, 
appointing a time and j)lace between our lines. 

We met the next day, and presently he asked for a side 
interview. When he spoke of the purpose of the meeting, 
I mentioned a simple manner of correcting the matter, 



584 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

which he accepted without objection or amendment. Then 
he spoke of affairs military and political. 

Referring to the recent conference of the Confederates 
with President Lincoln at Hampton Roads, he said that 
the politicians of the North were afraid to touch the ques- 
tion of peace, and there was no way to open the subject 
except througli officers of the armies. On his side they 
thought the war had gone on long enough ; that we should 
come together as former comrades and friends and talk a 
little. He suggested that the work as belligerents should 
be suspended ; that General Grant and General Lee 
should meet and have a talk ; that my wife, who was an 
old acquaintance and friend of Mrs. Grant in their girl- 
hood days, should go into the Union lines and visit Mrs. 
Grant with as many Confederate officers as might choose 
to be with her. Then Mrs. Grant would return the call 
under escort of Union officers and visit Richmond ; that 
while General Lee and General Grant were arranging for 
better feeling between the armies, they could be aided by 
intercourse between the ladies and officers until terms 
honorable to both sides could be found. 

I told General Ord that I was not authorized to speak 
on the subject, but could re^^ort upon it to General Lee 
and the Confederate authorities, and would give notice in 
case a reply could be made. 

General Lee was called over to Richmond, and we met 
at night at the President's mansion. Secretary-of-War 
Breckenridge was there. The report was made, several 
hours were passed in discussing the matter, and finally it 
was agreed that favorable report should be made as soon 
as another meeting could be arranged with General Ord. 
Secretary Breckenridge expressed especial approval of the 
part assigned for the ladies. 

As we separated, I suggested to General Lee that he 
should name some irrelevant matter as the occasion of 
his call for the interview with General Grant, and that 



TALK OF PEACE. 585 

once they were together they could talk as they pleased. 
A telegram was sent my wife that night at Lynchburg 
calling her to Richmond, and the next day a' note was 
sent General Ord asking him to appoint a time for an- 
other meeting. 

The meeting was appointed for the day following, and 
the result of the conference was reported. General Ord 
asked to have General Lee write General Grant for an 
interview, stating that General Grant was prepared to 
receive the letter, and thought that a way could be 
found for a military convention, while old friends of 
the military service could get together and seek out ways 
to stop the flow of blood. He indicated a desire on the 
part of President Lincoln to devise some means or excuse 
for paying for the liberated slaves, which might be ar- 
ranged as a condition and part of the terms of the con- 
vention, and relieve the matter of political bearing ; but 
those details were in the form of remote probabilities to 
be discussed when the parties became advanced in their 
search for ways of settlement. 

On the 1st of March I wrote General Lee giving a 
report of the second interview, and on the 2d he wrote 
General Grant as follows : 

^'Head-quaetees Confederate States Armies, 

''March 2, 1865. 
'^ Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, 

'' Commanding United States Armies: 
'^ General, — Lieutenant- General Longstreet has informed me 
that, in a recent conversation between himself and Major-General 
Ord as to the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment 
of the present unhappy difficulties by means of a military con- 
vention. General Ord states that if I desired to have an interview 
with you on the subject you would not decline, provided I had 
authority to act. Sincerely desiring to leave nothing untried 
which may put an end to the calamities of war, I propose to meet 
you at such convenient time and place as you may designate, with 
the hope that upon an interchange of views it may be found 



586 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

practicable to submit the subjects of controversy between the 
belligerents to a convention of the kind mentioned. In such 
event I ajn authorized to do whatever the result of the pro- 
posed interview may render necessary or advisable. Should 
you accede to this proposition, I would suggest that, if agree- 
able to you, we meet at the place selected by Generals Ord 
and Longstreet for their interview, at eleven a.m. on Monday 
next. 

''Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"E. E. Lee, 
'' GeneraV^ 

The letter was sent to me open, with instructions to 
read, seal, and forward. I rode into Richmond to ask 
that some other business should be named as the cause of 
the call for the interview, but he was not disposed to ap- 
proach his 23urpose by dij^lomacy, and ordered the letter 
to be delivered. 

He sent another letter, however : 

''Head-quarters Confederate States Armies, 

"March 2, 1865. 
" Lieutenant- General U. S. Grant, 

" Commanding United States Armies: 
"General, — Lieutenant- General Longstreet has informed me 
that in an interview with Major-General Ord, that officer ex- 
pressed some apprehension lest the general terms used by you 
with reference to the exchange of political prisoners should be 
construed to include those charged with capital offences. 

" General Ord further stated that you did not intend to em- 
brace that class of cases in the agreement to exchange. I regret 
to learn that such is your interpretation, as I had hoped that by 
exchanging those held under charges by each party it would be 
possible to diminish, to some extent, the sufferings of both without 
detriment to their interests. Should you see proper to assent to 
the interview proposed in my letter of this date, I hope it may 
be found practicable to arrive at a more satisfactory understand- 
ing on this subject. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"E. E. Lee, 
" GeneraV^ 



TALK OF PEACE. 587 

To which General Grant replied, — 

" City Point, Virginia, 

''March 4, 1865. 
''General E. E. Lee, 

' ' Commanding Confederate States Armies : 

"Your two letters of the 2d instant were received yesterday. 
In regard to any apprehended misunderstanding in reference to 
the exchange of political prisoners, I think there need be none. 
General Ord and General Longstreet have probably misunder- 
stood what I said to the former on the subject, or I may have 
failed to make myself understood possibly. A few days before 
the interview between Generals Longstreet and Ord I had re- 
ceived a despatch from General Hoffman, Commissary- General of 
Prisoners, stating in substance that all prisoners of war who were 
or had been in close confinement or irons, whether under charges 
or sentence, had been ordered to City Point for exchange. I for- 
warded the substance of that despatch to Lieutenant- Colonel Mul- 
ford, Assistant Agent of Exchange, and presumed it probable 
that he had communicated it to Colonel Robert Ould. A day or 
two after, an officer who was neither a prisoner of war nor a 
political prisoner, was executed, after a fair and impartial trial, 
and in accordance with the laws of war and the usage of civilized 
nations. It was in explanation of this class of cases I told Gen- 
eral Ord to speak to General Longstreet. Reference to my letter 
of February 16 will show my understanding on the subject of re- 
leasing political or citizen prisoners. 

' ' In regard to meeting you on the 6th instant, I would state 
that I have no authority to accede to your proposition for a con- 
ference on the subject proposed. Such authority is vested in the 
President of the United States alone. General Ord could only 
have meant that I would not refuse an interview on any subject 
on which I have a right to act, which, of course, would be such 
as are purely of a military character, and on the subject of ex- 
changes which has been intrusted to me. 

(Signed) "U.S.Grant, 

' ' Lieutenant- General. ' ' 



Under the impression that General Lee would construe 
the act of Congress in its broad sense and proceed to 
handle the Confederate armies and affairs under his own 
good judgment, I wrote, begging that he would call Gen- 



588 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

eral Joseph E. Johnston back to service and command, 
and presently suggested and then wrote that I was credibly 
informed that there was plenty of produce in the country 
which the farmers would cheerfully deliver at Richmond 
or Petersburg if liberal prices in gold could be paid them ; 
that the authority given to impress bread and meat stuffs 
should be applied as including gold ; that right or wrong 
the emergency called for it, and that I would undertake 
to secure the gold upon his authority. I suggested that 
as Grant's combinations were looking to concentration 
against the Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond, 
we should use the railways for collecting and drawing de- 
tachments from southern points, calling cavalry by the 
dirt roads, while the farmers were bringing their produce 
by private conveyance. Furthermore, I cited the fact 
that there were eight or ten thousand non-combatants in 
Richmond who could be put in my trenches as conscripts, 
and officered by the officers of the department on duty 
there, and twelve hundred in Lynchburg that could be 
made similarly available ; and argued that using them in 
the trenches would enable him to draw the First Corps 
out for a movable force to meet flanking eflbrts of his 
adversary, and keep open his lines of communication. In 
that way, I continued, he could collect a hundred thou- 
sand men at Richmond, with a good supply of rations, 
while General Grant was drawing his two hundred thou- 
sand together to attack us ; that when concentrated Grant 
would find himself obliged to give speedy battle, as he 
could not long supply his large force ; that our interior 
lines would enable us to repel and break up the attack 
and relieve Richmond. 

The times were heavy of events. Executive authority 
intended to be suspended, and it seemed possible that the 
use of a little gold would so manifest its power as to 
induce our people to let cotton and tobacco go for foreign 
exchange which might put us on a gold basis for a 



TALK OF PEACE. 589 

twelvemonth. This was the expedient that offered light 
and hope for the future, and the times called either for 
heroic methods or the giving over of the forms of war. 

General Lee agreed that the provisions were in the 
country and would be delivered for gold, but did not 
think the gold could be found. He made his orders as- 
suming command of the armies, but instead of exercising 
authority on a scale commensurate with the views of Con- 
gress and the call of the crisis, applied to the Richmond 
authorities for instructions under the new assignment, and 
wrote that he would call General Johnston to command if 
he could be ordered to report to him for duty. 

General Johnston was so ordered, and was assigned to 
command of such fragments of troops as he could collect 
in the Carolinas. General Wade Hampton was relieved 
of duty as chief of cavalry in the Army of Northern 
Virginia and ordered to join General Johnston. After 
collecting such detachments as he could gather, General 
Johnston threw them from time to time along the flank 
of Sherman's march from Georgia for Virginia, and had 
some spirited affairs with that army, which was gathering 
strength along the seaboard as it marched. 



CHAPTEK XLI. 

BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 

Various Affairs of tlie Closing Campaign — Tlie Massing of Grant's 
Forces — Sortie against Fort Steadmau — Captured but quickly retal^en 
— General Grant's Move around the Confederate Right— General Lee 
anticipates with Aggressive Work — Slieridan makes Battle with his 
Whole Force at Five Forks — Desperate Situation of the Confederates 
— Disparity of Numbers — Splendid Stand and Battle of Generals 
Pickett and Ransom — Colonel Pegrani mortally wounded — W. H. F. 
Lee, the "Noble Son of a Noble Sire" — Corse's Division — Pickett's 
Generalship — Casualties. 

Meanwhile General Grant was drawing forces from 
the North and West to further strengthen his already 
overwhelming combinations against Kichmond. General 
Schofield was called from Tennessee to North Carolina to 
guard and join on, if necessary, the flank of Sherman's 
column. The cavalry and infantry of the Valley of Vir- 
ginia were brought down to the Union army about Kich- 
mond and Petersburg, — the latter by transports. 

General Sheridan marched his cavalry, ten thousand 
strong, from the Valley to ride across James River, through 
Lynchburg, to join the northward march of Sherman's 
column. His divisions were under Generals Custer and 
Devens ; General Wesley Merritt was his chief of cavalry. 
He was to destroy railroads, canals, bridges, and other 
works of value as he marched. At Staunton he decided 
to take in the balance of General Early's command near 
his route at Waynesboro'. He found that command posted 
behind field-works, but the line did not cover the left of 
the position near the river. After some preliminary 
dashes, General Custer found his way around General 
Early's left, and, with part of the cavalry dismounted, 
made a bold, simultaneous charge on the front and flank, 
breaking up the line and capturing most of the troops. 

590 



BATTLE OF FIVE FOKKS. 591 

Some of the Union commanders claimed that the Con- 
federates cheered them as they surrendered. This, how- 
ever, the Confederates deny. The affair is mentioned in 
the diary of Major J. Hoskiss, the engineer of the Con- 
federate army of the Valley, in not more creditable terms 
than General Early gave of his battle of Cedar Run. 

Pickett's division, Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, and other 
detachments were sent to Lynchburg to defend against 
Sheridan's ride ; but the high waters of James River and 
other obstacles turned Sheridan from his southern course 
to a sweep down the north side. 

Generals Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee were recalled and 
ordered to the north side to join me at Richmond for a 
march to intercept Sheridan's forces. General Pickett 
reported on the 13th, and we marched for Hanover on 
the 14th. I made requisition for a pontoon bridge, and 
was delayed a day waiting for it and for the cavalry. The 
bridge was not sent. As we marched towards the Pa- 
munkey River, General Sheridan heard of the move and 
crossed to the north bank with his main force, leaving a 
brigade to watch our march, but presently drew the bri- 
gade after him. 

General Rosser reported to me with five hundred cav- 
alry, one of the remnants of General Early's army not 
captured, and was ordered across the Pamunkey River to 
follow Sheridan's ride. Our artillery and infantry were 
delayed part of a day and night building a bridge from 
the timbers of an old barn that stood near the bank of the 
river, and part of the command crossed early in the morn- 
ing to find a cold cavalry trail, growing colder. As the 
23rospect of overhauling the march was not encouraging, 
we retraced our steps, returning to Richmond on the 18th, 
where Pickett's men rested until the 24th. 

As Sherman's army drew towards Richmond, General 
Grant gave up the thought of taking the city by attack 
of his strong columns on the north side, lest he should 



592 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

leave open the way of escape of the Confederate army, 
and give time for it to combine with Johnston's forces 
before he could overhaul it. He found, too, that the " at- 
trition" policy could not be made effective, even with his 
superior numbers, unless he could so manoeuvre as to call 
his adversary from his fortified grounds to make the work 
of attrition mutual. 

On the 14th of March he gave instructions of prepara- 
tion for a general move by his left, and on the 24th gave 
definite orders for the move to be made on the 29th. 

On the 24th, General Lee gave consent to the making 
of a sortie from his line at Hare's Hill, in front of Peters- 
burg, against Fort Steadman of the enemy's works. The 
distance between the lines at that point was one hundred 
and fifty yards, the distance between the picket lines fifty 
yards. Union officers had given out that deserters from 
the Confederate army were permitted to march into the 
Union lines with their arms. 

Under the circumstances it was conceived to be practica- 
ble to gain Fort Steadman by surprise, and the Confederate 
chief was led to believe that there were other forts to the 
rear of Steadman that could be carried and held until Gen- 
eral Grant could be forced to make a longer line to reach 
our southern communications, and give us time to find dry 
roads for our march away, or for reinforcements to join 
us. It was a hazardous adventure at best, but his brave 
heart usually went with a proposition for a bold fight. 

The Second Corps, under Major-General Gordon, was 
assigned for the sortie, to be reinforced by other troops to 
be called. Pickett's division of the First Corps, that 
had been resting on the north side since the 18th, was 
called to report to General Lee at Petersburg, without 
intimation of the service proposed, but all calls and orders 
of the times were looked upon as urgent. The quarter- 
master was despatched to Kichmond to have the transpor- 
tation at the station as soon as the troops could reach the 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 593 

dejwt, and the division was ordered to marcli in anticij^a- 
tion of due preparation for their transit. But the quar- 
termaster found that the railroad company coukl furnish 
transportation for three brigades only. General Lee was 
informed of the fact, and I suggested that his only way to 
be assured of the service of a division was to draw Ma- 
hone's from Bermuda Hundred and have Pickett's march 
to replace it. He preferred part of Pickett's division, — 
finding it could not be used as a division, as Pickett, the 
ranking officer, would be called to command the work 
during the early morning, for which he had no opj^ortunity 
to prepare. 

General Lee collected about eighteen thousand men 
near the sallying field, ordered men selected to cut away 
the fraise and abatis for the storming column that should 
advance with empty guns (to avoid premature alarms), 
and ordered a squadron of cavalry ready to dash across 
the lines to cut the wires about General Grant's lines. 

The Army of the Potomac, General Meade command- 
ing, was posted, — the Ninth CorjDS on the right from 
James River to Fort Howard, including Fort Steadman, 
General Parke commanding ; next, on Parke's left, was 
the Sixth Corps, under General Wright ; then General 
Humphreys with the Second Corps, General Warren with 
the Fifth ; General Sheridan's cavalry, armed with re- 
peating rifles, on the extreme left ; General Ord, com- 
manding the Army of the James, on the north side, 
Generals Gibbon and Weitzel commanding corps, — all 
officers of the highest attainments and veterans in service. 
The armies of the Potomac and the James and Sheridan's 
cavalry, constituting General Grant's immediate com- 
mand, numbered one hundred and eleven thousand 
soldiers.* Colonel W. H. Taylor, chief of staff with 
General Lee, reports, " Lee had at that time only 



* General Badeau's "Military History of U. S. Grant." 
38 



594 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

thirty-nine thousand eight hundred and ninety-seven 
available muskets for the defence of Richmond and 
Petersburg." * 

The storm ers advanced before daylight, gained quiet 
possession of the enemy's picket line, carried his works 
between Batteries 9 and 10, moved to the right and left, 
captured Fort Steadman and its garrison, and turned the 
guns there and at Battery 10 against the enemy. But the 
alarm spread and the enemy was afield, feeling his way 
towards the assailants, for it was not yet light enough to 
see and direct his artillery fire over his own men. Bat- 
teries 11 and 12 were taken, and guides sent to conduct 
the Confederate columns to forts reported to be in rear 
of Steadman were in search, but there were no forts 
there. Bedoubts constructed on the main line had 
commanding positions over Fort Steadman, and a sweep- 
ing fire along its lines, in anticipation of a surprise attack, 
but their fire was withheld for daylight to direct it. 

Light broke and the fire opened. General Parke called 
his field artillery under Tidball into practice from high 
ground over the Confederates, put the divisions of Hart- 
ranft and Wilcox against the Confederate fianks, and 
held them back near the troops crowding in along the 
breach, and called for a division from the Second Corps. 

The Confederate columns were strong enough to repel 
the attack of two divisions, — were put there for that pur- 
pose, — but so far from breaking up and pushing back the 
ninety thousand men in front of them, they were not so 
handled as to check two divisions long enough for the 
forces to get back to their lines. 

The artillery fire not only tore the Confederate ranks, 
but crossed fire in their rear, cutting off reinforcements 
and retreat. Our side was without artillery, excejot cap- 
tured guns, which were handled by infantry. As the 

* Four Years with General Lee. 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 595 

sortie was noised along the line, General Humphreys and 
General Wright advanced the Second and Sixth Corps 
against the Confederate lines along their fields to learn 
if troops had been drawn from their fronts to join the 
attack. Batteries 11 and 12 were recovered before eight 
o'clock, and General Parke ordered Hartranft's division 
to regain Fort Steadman and Battery 10, which was done 
with slight loss before nine o'clock. 

Many Confederates got back to their lines in disordered 
flight, but 1949 prisoners and nine stands of colors were 
taken by the Ninth Corps. 

The aggregate of Union losses was reported as 2107. 
Confederate losses are not reported in detail or in num- 
bers. General Meade's estimate of our loss was 5000. 

General Humphreys captured the intrenched picket 
line in front of him, but found the Confederate works in 
front well manned. General Wright got well in on the 
front of his line to favorable position, from which he as- 
saulted and carried the Confederate works on the 2d of 
April. 

Corse's and Terry's brigades of Pickett's division re- 
mained in wait under arms until a late hour of the 25th, 
but were not called to take part in the sortie.* 

The result calls for little comment upon the adventure. 
For an army of forty thousand veterans, without field 
batteries, to dislodge from their well-chosen and strongly- 
fortified lines an army of ninety thousand well-armed and 
thoroughly-appointed veterans was impossible. 

Pursuant to j^revious orders. General Grant started on 
his move around the Confederate right on the 27th. Gen- 
eral Ord was called to the south side with fourteen thou- 
sand men of the Army of the James, leaving General 
Weitzel with twenty thousand on the north side.f In 
front of that force we had ten thousand men of Field's 

* Diary of a member of Corse's brigade. 
t Estimated from^ returns. 



596 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

and Kershaw's divisions and G. W. C. Lee's division of 
local defence troops (not including Gary's cavalry, the 
sailors and marines) * holding the forts at Drury's and 
Chapin's farms. General Grant's orders were that his 
troops at all points should be ready to receive orders for 
assault. 

Duly informed of the enemy's movements, and under- 
standing his 25urpose, General Lee marched to his right 
on the 29th. Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was called in ad- 
vance to march for Five Forks. General Lee marched 
with fifteen thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry 
(including Fitzhugh Lee's division) , and a quota of artil- 
lery, along the White Oak road to his right. 

The purpose of the enemy was to overreach the forti- 
fied grounds and call the Confederates to field work, and 
General Lee thought to anticipate him by aggressive 
work as soon as he was in the open field, and ordered 
battle for the 31st. 

General Pickett, with three brigades of his division, 
two of B. R. Johnson's division (Ransom's and Wal- 
lace's), with the cavalry, was ordered to engage Sheridan's 
cavalry at Five Forks, while General Lee attacked, with 
McGowan's, Grade's, Hunton's, and Wise's brigades, the 
Fifth Army CorjDS, that was between Pickett and our 
line of fortifications. The opening of this part of the 
battle was in favor of the Confederates. General Lee 
drove back the advance division of the Fifth Corps to the 
next, and pushed the two back to concentration upon the 
third, where that part of the battle rested. 

General Pickett made his part of the battle by putting 
W. H. F. Lee's and Rosser's divisions of cavalry on his 
right, and following that leading by his infantry and ar- 
tillery, leaving Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry division, under 
General T. T. Mumford, along the right front of Sheri- 
dan's cavalry. He pressed his separate battle by his right 
advance until night, forcing Sheridan back to Dinwiddle 



BATTLE OF FIVE FOEKS. 597 

Court-House, where the latter reported to General Grant 
that the force in front of him was too strong, and asked 
for reinforcements. Pickett prepared to follow his success 
by early morning battle and rested for the night, but 
Miles's division of the Second Corps was put against the 
other end of the battle, and the Fifth Corps rallied and 
advanced against the brigades that were with General 
Lee. They were forced back to the White Oak road, 
then into their fortified lines, leaving an interval of five 
miles behind Pickett's left. 

Kesponding to General Sheridan's call. General Grant 
ordered the Fifth Corps, under General Warren, fifteen 
thousand * strong, and Mackenzie's cavalry division (six- 
teen hundred). The design was that the Fifth Corps 
should come in on Pickett's left rear and cut off his re- 
treat, but heavy rains of the 30th and morning of the 31st 
had so flooded the streams and roads that the night march 
was slow and fatiguing, and Pickett receiving notice 
during the night of the projected move against his rear, 
changed his orders for battle, and directed the troops 
withdrawn for Five Forks before daylight. His retro- 
grade was made in time to escape the Fifth Corps, and 
was followed by Sheridan's cavalry, but no serious effort 
was made to delay his movements. He made his march 
of five miles to Five Forks, put his troops in order of 
battle by nine o'clock of the morning of the 1st of April, 
and ordered his well-chosen line examined and put under 
construction of field-works. Corse's, Terry's, and Steu- 
art's brigades of Pickett's division, and Ransom's and Wal- 
lace's brigades of B. P. Johnson's division, were posted 
from right to left. Of Pegram's artillery, three guns 
were planted at the Forks, and three more near his right ; 
W. H. F. Lee's division of cavalry on his right ; Fitz- 
hugh Lee's division on his left, — General T. T. Mumford 

* Estimated from general return for March. 



598 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

commanding the latter ; Kosser's division in rear guarding 
trains. General Fitzhugh Lee was chief of cavalry. 

As soon as the infantry line was formed, the troops set 
to work intrenching the position. The line of battle was 
parallel to and lay along the White Oak road, the left 
broken smartly to the rear, the retired end in traverse 
and flanking defence. The extreme right of the infantry 
line was also refused, but not so much. Four miles east 
from Pickett's left was the right of the fortified lines of 
General Lee's army. On the right and outside of those 
lines was a detachment of cavalry under General Roberts. 
The division of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was ordered to 
cover the ground between Roberts's cavalry and Pickett's 
left by a line of vedettes, and his division was posted on 
that j)art of the field. 

W. H. F. Lee's cavalry held strong guard on the 
right, and had the benefit of some swamp lands. His 
lines formed and field-works under construction, General 
Pickett rode to the rear for his noon lunch, and was soon 
followed by the cavalry chief, 

Sheridan's cavalry followed close on Pickett's march, 
but did not attempt to seriously delay it. He made a 
dash about ten o'clock to measure the strength of the 
works under construction, and found them too strong to 
warrant fierce adventure. Delayed by the heavy roads 
and flooding streams, the Fifth Corps was not in position 
until four o'clock in the afternoon. 

General Sheridan planned for battle to have General 
Merritt display the cavalry divisions of Custer and 
Devens against the Confederate front and right, to convey 
the impression that that was the field from which his 
battle would be made, while he drew up and massed the 
Fifth Corps at the other end of the field for the real fight. 
The corps was arranged, Crawford's division in column on 
the right, Ayres's on Crawford's left. Griffin's division in 
support, Mackenzie's cavalry division on the right of the 



BATTLE OF FIVE FOKKS. 5'99 

infantry column, at the White Oak road. The Fifth 
Corps was to wheel in close connection and assault against 
the face of the return of Confederate works, while the 
cavalry divisions in front were to assail on that line and 
the right of the works. 

The march and wheel of the Fifth Corj)s were made 
in tactical order, and the lines advanced in courageous 
charge, but staggered and halted under the destructive 
infantry fire. The charge was repeated, but held in check 
until Crawford's division found a way under cover of a 
woodland beyond the Confederate works, and marched to 
that advantage. 

Ransom drew his brigade from the intrenched line to 
meet that march, but it was one brigade against three — 
and those supported by part of Griffin's division. 

Ransom's horse was killed, falling on him ; his adju- 
tant-general. Captain Gee, was killed, and the brigade 
was forced back. 

This formidable move by open field to Pickett's rear 
made his position untenable. Feeling this, the veteran 
soldiers of the left brigades realized that their battle was 
irretrievable. Those who could find escape from that end 
of the works fell back in broken ranks, while many others, 
finding the enemy closing in on their rear, thought it more 
soldierly to surrender to Ayres's brave assaulting columns, 
and not a few were the captives of Crawford's division. 

It was not until that period that General Pickett knew, 
by the noise of battle, that it was on. He rode through 
the fire to his command, but his cavalry chief, riding later, 
was cut off from the field and failed to take part in the 
action. When Pickett got to the Forks, Colonel Pegram, 
of the artillery, had been mortally wounded, the battery 
commander was killed, and many of the cannoneers killed 
or wounded. He found an artillery sergeant and enough 
men to man one gun, and used it with effect until the 
axle broke. 



600 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The brigades of Steuart and Terry changed front and 
received the rolling battle. The cavalry assailants of the 
front and right had no decided success, but the infantry 
columns pressing their march, the Confederate brigades 
were pushed back to their extreme right, where in turn 
Corse's brigade changed front to receive the march, leaving 
W. H. F. Lee's cavalry to look to his right. 

The Union cavalry essayed to charge the Confederate 
remnants to dismay, but the noble son of the noble sire 
seized opportunity to charge against the head of this 
threatening column before it could pass the swamp lands, 
drove back its head until Corse's brigade got back to cover 
of woodland, and night came to cover the disastrous 
field.^- 

The remnants of the command were collected as soon 
and as well as they could be in the dead of night and 
marched towards Exeter Mills, where Pickett proposed to 
cross the Appomattox and return to the army, but early 
movements of the next morning changed the face of the 
military zodiac. 

The position was not of General Pickett's choosing, but 
of his orders, and from his orders he assumed that he 
would be reinforced. His execution was all that a skilful 
commander could apply. He reported as to his position 
and the movements of the enemy threatening to cut his 
command from the army, but no force came to guard his 
right. The reinforcements joined him after night, when 
his battle had been lost and his command disorganized. 
The cavalry of his left was in neglect in failing to report 
the advance of the enemy, but that was not for want of 
proper orders from his head-quarters. Though taken by 
surprise, there was no panic in any part of the command ; 



* This account is gathered from the evidence of officers of both sides, 
given before the Warren Court of Inquiry, which vindicated Warren 
and Pickett, though the court was inclined to coquette with the 
lieutenant-general, who, at that late day, was in high authority. 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. 



601 



brigade after brigade changed front to tbe left and 
received the overwhelming battle as it rolled on, until 
crushed back to the next, before it could deploy out to aid 
the front, — or flank attack, — until the last right brigade 
of the brave Corse changed and stood alone on the left 
of W. H. F. Lee's cavalry, fronting at right angle against 
the enemy's cavalry columns. 

It is not claiming too much for that grand division to 
say that, aided by the brigades of Ransom and Wallace, 
they could not have been dislodged from their intrenched 
position by parallel battle even by the great odds against 
them. As it was, Ayres's division staggered under the 
pelting blows that it met, and Crawford's drifted off from 
the blows against it, until it thus found the key of the 
battle away beyond the Confederate limits. 

In generalship Pickett was not a bit below the " gay 
rider." His defensive battle was better organized, and 
it is possible that he would have gained the day if his 
cavalry had been diligent in giving information of the 
movements of the enemy.* 




The losses are not found in separate reports. Both 
sides suffered severely, Pickett losing two thousand. He 



* He reported that he could have gained the day if the cavalry of his 
left had been as eflQcient as that of his right. 



602 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

had nine thousand men of all arms. His adversary had 
twenty-six thousand. 

Keinforcements of Hunton's brigade, and Lieutenant- 
General R. H. Anderson with the other brigades of B. K. 
Johnson, were sent him too late, and a telegram came for 
me at Richmond to march a division to Petersburg to re- 
port to General Lee. The hour at which the telegram 
was received was not noted. As the operations at Five 
Forks were not decisive until after five o'clock, the tele- 
gram may have been received about seven p.m. Field's 
division was ordered to the railway station, and the quar- 
termaster was sent in advance to have the cars ready to 
move it. 

To give the troops the benefit of our limited transpor- 
tation I rode with the staff by the dirt road. 



CHAPTEE XLIL 

PETERSBURG. 

The Fierce Concerted Assault by the Federals— Death of A. P. Hill — 
General Lee announces to Richmond Authorities that he must retreat 
— Reception of the News by President Davis at Church Service — 
Federals take Forts Gregg and Whitworth— The Retreat harassed by 
Continuous Fighting — Longstreet saves High Bridge, a Vital Point— 
Ewell and Others compelled to surrender — General Mahone's Account 
of Interesting Scenes — Magnitude of the Disaster — " Is the Army dis- 
solving?"— General Reed mortally wounded— Panic occurs, but Order 
is restored — General Gregg and Part of his Cavalry Command captured 
by Rosser and Mumford. 

The darkness of night still covered us when we crossed 
over James Kiver by the pontoon bridge, but before long 
land and water batteries lifted their bombs over their lazy 
curves, screaming shells came through the freighted night 
to light our ride, and signal sky-rockets gave momentary 
illumination. Our noble beasts peered through the loaded 
air and sniffed the coming battle ; night-birds fluttered 
from their startled cover, and the solid pounding upon 
Mahone's defensive walls drove the foxes from their 
lairs. If tears and j)rayers could have put out the light 
it would not have passed Petersburg, — but it passed by 
twenty miles. A hundred guns and more added their 
lightning and thunder to the storm of war that carried 
consternation to thousands of long-apprehensive peo]3le. 

The cause was lost, but the end was not yet. The noble 
Army of Northern Virginia, once, twice conqueror of 
empire, must bite the dust before its formidable adversary. 

The impulse was to stop and guard Mahone, but some 
of his men had been called to assist in guarding else- 
where, which, with our im^^erative orders, admonished us 
that he must be left to his fate, and Weitzel's fire upon 
the lines we had just left told of his orders to be prepared 

603 



604 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

for the grand enveloping charge. But the order for 
WeitzeFs part in the general charge was afterwards sus- 
pended until enough troops could be sent to assure success. 
Had General Grant known that Field's division was with- 
drawn during the night, WeitzeFs assault would have 
gone in the general move of the morning of the 2d, and 
Richmond, with the Confederate authorities, would have 
been taken before noon. 

As morning approached the combat was heavier. The 
rolling thunder of the heavy metal reverberated along 
the line, and its bursting blaze spread afar to light the 
doom of the army once so proud to meet the foe, — match- 
less Army of Northern Virginia ! 

General Grant had ordered assault for four o'clock, but 
it was near five before there was light enough for the men 
to see their way across the line and over the works. Our 
night-ride was beyond range of the enemy's batteries. 
Crossing the Appomattox, we rode through the streets of 
Petersburg for General Lee's head-quarters, some miles 
farther west. As no part of the command had reached 
the station when we passed, orders were left for the de- 
tachments to march as soon as they landed. 

Before the first rays of morning we found general head- 
quarters. Some members of the staff were up and dressed, 
but the general was yet on his couch. When told of my 
presence, he called me to a seat at his bedside, and gave 
orders for our march to support the broken forces about 
Five Forks. He had no censure for any one, but men- 
tioned the great numbers of the enemy and the superior 
repeating rifles of his cavalry. He was ill, suffering from 
the rheumatic ailment that he had been afflicted with for 
years, but keener trouble of mind made him in a measure 
superior to the shooting pains of his disease. 

From the line gained by the Sixth Corps on the 25th 
it was a run of but two or three minutes across to the 
Confederate works. 



PETERSBUKG. 605 

At 4.45, General Wright advanced as the signal for 
general assault. General Lee was not through with his 
instructions for our march when a staff-officer came in and 
reported that the lines in front of his head-quarters were 
broken. Drawing his wrajDper about him, he walked with 
me to the front door and saw, as far as the eye could cover 
the field, a line of skirmishers in quiet march towards us. 
It was hardly light enough to distinguish the blue from 
the gray. 

General Wright drove in our picket line, and in des- 
perate charges crowned the Confederate works. General 
Gibbon followed the move with his divisions of the 
Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth Corps, one of his bri- 
gades (Harris's) carrying part of the Confederate works. 
The troops, weary of their all-night watch and early 
battle, halted to close their ranks and wait for the 
skirmish line to open up the field. General Lee appealed 
to have me interpose and stop the march, but not a man 
of my command was there, nor had we notice that any 
of them had reached the station at Petersburg. 

All staff-officers mounted and rode to find the j^arts of 
Heth's and Wilcox's divisions that had been forced from 
their lines. The display of officers riding in many di- 
rections seemed to admonish the skirmishers to delay 
under cover of an intervening swale. The alarm reached 
General A. P. Hill, of the Third Corps, who rode off to 
find his troops, but instead came suddenly upon the 
enemy's skirmishers in their concealment. He wheeled 
and made a dash to escape, but the Federal fire had deadly 
effect, the gallant general fell, and the Southern service 
lost a sword made bright by brave work upon many heavy 
fields. 

General Humphreys, of the Second, followed the move 
of the Sixth Corps, and General Parke assaulted on the 
Bermuda Hundred front and at Petersburg. He had 
partial success at the former, but was repulsed when he 



606 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

met Mahone's strong line. At Petersburg he had more 
success, capturing twelve guns. 

General Sheridan, reinforced by Miles's division, was 
ordered to follow up his work on the right bank. The 
reinforcements sent under Lieutenant-General Anderson 
joined General Pickett at night of the 1st, and the com- 
bined forces succeeded in getting out of the way of the 
Union infantry, and tliey gave the cavalry a severe trial 
a little before night at Amazon Creek, where the pursuit 
rested ; but the Union forces made some important cap- 
tures of artillery and prisoners. The divisions of Hetli 
and Wilcox moved to the right and left to collect their 
broken files. General Wright wheeled to the right and 
massed the Sixth Corps for its march to Petersburg, and 
was joined by General Gibbon. 

Not venturing to hoj^e, I looked towards Petersburg 
and saw General Benning, with his Pock brigade, winding 
in rapid march around the near hill. He had but six 
hundred of his men. I asked for two hundred, and led 
them ofP to the canal on our right, which was a weak 
point, threatened by a small body of skirmishers, and 
ordered the balance of his troops deployed as skirmishers 
in front of the enemy's main force. 

I rode then to Benning's line of skirmishers, and at the 
middle point turned and rode at a walk to the top of the 
hill, took out my glasses, and had a careful view of the 
enemy's formidable masses. I thought I recognized Gen- 
eral Gibbon, and raised my hat, but he was busy and did 
not see me. There were two forts at our line of works, — 
Gregg and Whitworth. General Grant rode over the 
captured works and ordered the forts taken. Upon with- 
drawing my glasses I looked to the right and left, and 
saw Benning's four hundred standing in even line with 
me, viewing the masses preparing for their march to 
meet us. 

During a few moments of quiet. General Lee despatched 



PETERSBURG. 607 

to Richmond of affairs at Petersburg, and to advise that 
our troops must abandon their lines and march in retreat 
as soon as night coukl cover the move. 

It was eleven o'clock of the morning when the despatch 
reached Richmond. It was the Sabbath-day. The city 
was at profound worship. The President was at St. 
Paul's Church. My wife was there (rest her spirit !) and 
heard the jDastor, Mr. Minnegerode, read, " The Lord is 
in his holy temple: let all the earth keep silence before 
himy The full congregation rose, and the air whispered 
silence. The solemnity was broken as a swift despatch- 
bearer entered the portals and walked with quiet but 
raj)id steps up the aisle to the chancel. He handed the 
President a sealed envelope. After reading, the Presi- 
dent took his hat and walked with dignity down the aisle. 
Service was resumed, but presently came another mes- 
senger for some of the ladies, then another, and still 
another, and in a few moments the congregation, followed 
by the minister, giving up the sacred service, passed out 
and to their homes to prepare, in silent resignation, for 
whatever was to come. 

The tragic scenes of the south side, in a different way, 
were as impressive as these. General Gibbon prepared 
his divisions under Foster and Turner for assault upon 
Forts Gregg and Whitworth, and when the Sixth Corps 
lined up with him, he ordered the divisions to their work. 
As they advanced the other brigades of Field's division 
came up, were aligned before the enemy's heavy massing 
forces, and ordered to intrench. General Foster found 
his work at Fort Gregg called for all the force and skill 
that he could apply. He made desperate assault, but was 
checked, and charged again and again, even to the bayonet, 
before he could mount the parapets and claim the fort. 
It had been manned by part of Harris's brigade (Twelfth 
Mississipj)i Regiment, under Captain J. H. Duncan, three 
hundred men of Mahone's division). Fifty-five dead 



608 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

were found in the fort ; two hundred and fifty, including 
wounded, were prisoners. 

General Turner attacked at Fort Whitworth, and had 
easier work. General Wilcox, thinking it a useless sac- 
rifice to try to hold it, ordered his troops withdrawn, and 
many got out in time to escape the heavy assault, but 
many were taken prisoners. General Gibbon lost ten offi- 
cers and one hundred and twelve men killed, twenty-seven 
officers and five hundred and sixty-five men wounded ; 
two pieces of artillery and several colors were captured. 

It was my time next. General Meade called Miles's 
division back to the Second Corps, and prepared to march 
down upon Petersburg, but General Grant thought that 
the work might prove hazardous of delay to his plans for 
the next day ; that General Lee was obliged to pull away 
from his lines during the night to find escape, and standing 
as he was he would have the start, while at Petersburg he 
would be behind him. He therefore ordered all things in 
readiness for his march westward at early light of the 
next morning. 

After A. P. Hill fell his staff and corps were assigned 
as part of my command. Heth's and Wilcox's divisions 
were much broken by the losses of the day. Mahone had 
repulsed the attack made upon his j^osition, and had his 
division in good order and spirits, except the regiment of 
Harris's brigade that was at Fort Gregg. 

General Lee's order for retreat was out in time to have 
the troops take up the march as soon as night came. The 
troops at Petersburg were to cross the Appomattox at the 
bridge there, Mahone's division to march to Chesterfield 
Court-House and cover the march of the troops from the 
north side. General Ewell, commanding on the north side, 
was to cross his divisions, one at the lower bridge, the 
other at Richmond. Lieutenant-General Anderson and 
Major-General Pickett, with the cavalry, were to march 
up the south bank of the Appomattox. 



PETERSBURG. 609 

Field's division and parts of Heth's and Wilcox's 
crossed the river soon after dark, and were followed by 
the Second Corps, which wrecked the bridge behind it. 
G. W. C Lee's division, including the garrison at Chapin's 
Bluff, crossed the James at the lower bridge, breaking it 
when they had passed. The sailors and marines at 
Drury's Bluff, on the south side, failed to receive orders, 
but, under advice from General Malione, got off in good 
season and marched through Chesterfield Court-House to 
join G. W. C. Lee's division in its after-march. General 
Kershaw crossed at Richmond. As the division came 
over the bridge the structure was fired (supposedly by an 
incendiary), and Kershaw had to go through the flames 
at double-quick time. E well's command was united near 
Manchester and pursued its march. General Mahone 
marched on his line just mentioned. 

After a tramp of sixteen miles through mud, my column 
halted for a short rest, and marched to Goode's Bridge on 
the 3d. Field's and Wilcox's divisions were put across 
the Appomattox to guard against threatening moves of 
cavalry. In the forenoon of the 4th, Mahone's division 
crossed, — also a part of Heth's that had been cut off, 
and had marched up on the south side, — and our march 
was continued to Amelia Court-House, the enemy's 
cavalry constantly threatening our left flank. At the 
Court-House the cavalry was more demonstrative and 
seemed ready to offer battle. Field, Heth, Wilcox, and 
the artillery were put in position and looked for oppor- 
tunity to strike the head of the enemy's column and 
delay his march. But it proved to be only the purpose 
of the cavalry to delay our march while the enemy was 
passing his heavier column by us to Jetersville. 

Orders had been sent for provisions to meet us at 
the Court-House, but they were not there, so we lost 
the greater part of a day gathering supplies from the 
farmers. 

39 



610 FEOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Our purpose had been to march through Burkeville to 
join our forces to those of General J. E. Johnston in 
North Carolina, but at Jetersville, on the 5th, we found 
the enemy square across the route in force and intrench- 
ing, where our cavalry under General W. H. F. Lee en- 
gaged him. General Field put out a strong line of skir- 
mishers to support the cavalry. Field's, Heth's, and 
Wilcox's divisions and artillery were prepared for action 
and awaited orders. General Meade was in front of us 
with the Second and Fifth Corps and Sheridan's cavalry, 
but his Sixth Corps was not up. General Fitzhugh Lee 
had been sent by the Painesville road with the balance of 
his cavalry to guard the trains raided by detachments of 
the enemy, which latter made some important captures. 

General Lee was with us at Jetersville, and, after care- 
ful reconnoissance, thought the enemy's position too strong 
to warrant aggressive battle. He sent for some of the 
farmers to get more definite information of the country 
and the strength of the position in front of us, but they 
knew nothing beyond the roads and by-roads from place 
to place. General Meade, finding that his Sixth Corps 
could not join him till a late hour, decided to wait till 
next morning for his attack. General Ord rested his 
column for the night at Burkeville. The enemy was quiet 
at Jetersville, except for a light exchange of cavalry fire. 
No orders came, the afternoon was passing, further delay 
seemed perilous. I drew the command off and filed to 
the right to cross Flat Creek to march for Farmville. 
The other infantry and trains and artillery followed and 
kept the march until a late hour, halting for a short rest 
before daylight. 

Early on the 6th, General Meade advanced for battle, 
and, not finding us at Jetersville, started towards Amelia 
Court-House to look for us, but General Humphreys, of 
his Second Corps, learned that our rear-guard was on 
the north side of Flat Creek on the westward march. 



PETERSBURG. 611 

General Griffin, of the Fifth Corps, also had informa- 
tion of troops in march west, and General Meade, there- 
fore, changed direction to pursue with his Second and 
Sixth Corps, putting the Fifth on the Painesville road. 
General Sheridan despatched General Ord that we had 
broken away from him and were marching direct for 
Burkeville. The latter prepared to receive us, but soon 
learned that we had taken another route. He had j^i^e- 
viously detached two regiments of infantry (five hundred 
men), under Colonel Washburn, with orders to make 
rapid march and burn High Bridge. To this force he 
afterwards sent eighty cavalrymen, under Brigadier- 
General Theodore Keed, of his staff, who conducted the 
column, and ]Dut his command in march to follow by 
the road through Bice's Station. 

After repairing the bridge at Flat Creek, General 
Humphreys marched in hot pursuit of our rear-guard, 
followed by the Sixth Corps, Merritt's and Crook's cav- 
alry moving on the left of our column as we marched. 
General Humphreys, in his account of the pursuit, says, — 

^^ A sharj) and running fight commenced at once with Gordon's 
corps which was continued over a distance of fourteen miles, dur- 
ing which several partially-intrenched positions were carried." * 

My column marched before daylight on the 6th. The 
design from the night we left Petersburg was that its 
service should be to head off and prevent the enemy's 
infantry columns passing us and standing across our 
march. 

At Sailor's Creek the road " forks," — one road to the 
High Bridge crossing of Appomattox River, the other by 
Bice's Station to Farmville. We had information of 
Ord's column moving towards Bice's Station, and I was 
ordered to that point to meet it, the other columns to 
follow the trains over the bridge. At Bice's Station the 

* Virginia Campaigns. 



612 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

command was prepared for action, — Field's division across 
the road of Ord's march, Wilcox on Field's right ; both 
ordered to intrench, artillery in battery. Heth's division 
was put in support of Wilcox, Mahone to support Field. 
Just then I learned that Ord's detachment of bridge- 
burners had passed out of sight when the head of my 
command arrived. I had no cavalry, and the head of 
Ord's command was approaching in sight ; but directly 
General Rosser reported with his division of cavalry. He 
was ordered to follow after the bridge-burners and capture 
or destroy the detachment, if it took the last man of his 
command to do it. General Ord came on and drove in 
my line of skirmishers, but I rode to meet them, marched 
them back to the line, with orders to hold it till called in. 
Ord's force proved to be the head of his column, and he 
was not prepared to press for general engagement. 

General T. T. Mumford reported with his cavalry and 
was ordered to follow E-osser, with similar directions. 
Gary's cavalry came and rej^orted to me. High Bridge 
was a vital point, for over it the trains were to pass, and 
I was under the impression that General Lee was there, 
passing with the rest of his army, but hearing our troops 
eno-asfed at Rice's Station, he had ridden to us and was 
waiting near Mahone's division. Ord's command was not 
up till near night, and he only engaged with desultory 
fire of skirmishers and occasional exchange of battery 
practice, arranging to make his attack the next morning. 

General Ewell's column was up when we left Amelia 
Court-House, and followed Anderson's by Amelia Springs, 
where he was detained some little time defending trains 
threatened by cavalry ; at the same time our rear-guard 
was near him, followed by the enemy. Near Deatonville 
Crook's cavalry got in on our trains and caused delay of 
several hours to Anderson's march. Crook was joined by 
part of Merritt's cavalry and repeated the attack on the 
trains, but Ewell was up in time to aid in repelling the 



PETEKSBURG. 613 

attack, and the march was resumed, the enemy's cavalry 
moving on their left flank. 

Anderson crossed Sailor's Creek, closely followed by 
Ewell. The route by which they were to march was by 
High Bridge, but they were on strange ground, without 
maps, or instructions, or commander. In the absence of 
orders Anderson thought to march for the noise of battle, 
at Rice's Station. They had no artillery or cavalry. 
The chief of cavalry was there, but his troopers were 
elsewhere, and he rode away, advising the force to follow 
him. The rear-guard came up rapidly and essayed to 
dej)loy for defence, but the close pursuit of Humphreys's 
corps forced its continued march for High Bridge, letting 
the pursuit in upon Ewell's'rear. As Anderson marched 
he found Merritt's cavalry square across his route. Hum- 
phreys was close U23on Ewell, but the former awaited 
battle for the arrival of the Sixth Corps. 

There was yet a way of escape from the closing clutches 
of the enemy by filing to their right and marching to the 
rear of the command at Rice's Station ; but they were 
true soldiers, and decided to fight, even to sacrifice their 
commands if necessary, to break or delay the pursuit until 
the trains and rear-guard could find safety beyond High 
Bridge. 

Ewell deployed his divisions, Kershaw's on the right, 
G. W. C. Lee's on the left. Their plan was, that An- 
derson should attack and open the way while Ewell de- 
fended the rear. As Anderson attacked, Wright's corps 
was up, Humphreys had matured his plans, and the at- 
tack of Anderson hastened that of the enemy upon the 
Confederate rear. Anderson had some success, and Ewell 
received the assaults with resolute coolness, and at one 
moment pushed his fight to aggressive return, but the 
enemy, finding that there was no artillery with the Con- 
federates, dashed their batteries into closer range, putting 
in artillery and infantry fire, front and flanks, until the 



614 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Confederate rear was crushed to fragments. General 
Ewell surrendered ; so also did General G. W. C. Lee with 
his division. General Kershaw advised such of his men 
as could to make their escape, and surrendered with his 
division. General Anderson got away with the greater 
part of B. R. Johnson's division, and Pickett with six 
hundred men. Generals Corse and Hunton and others 
of Pickett's men were captured. About two hundred of 
Kershaw's division got away. 

General P. S. Ewell and General P. H. Anderson are 
barely known in the retreat, but their stand and fight on 
that trying march were among the most soldier-like of 
the many noble deeds of the war. 

While waiting near my rear, General Lee received in- 
formation, through Colonel Venable, of his staff, as to the 
disaster at Sailor's Creek. He drew Mahone's division 
away, and took it back to find the field. General Mahone 
writes of the scenes that he witnessed as follows : 

"As we were moving up in line of battle, General Lee riding 
with me and remonstrating about the severity of my note in re- 
spect to Colonel Marshall's interference with my division the 
night before, u]) rode Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, and 
wanted to know if he, General Lee, had received his message. 
General Lee replied 'No,' when Colonel Venable informed him 
that the enemy had captured the wagon-trains at Sailor's Creek. 
General Lee exclaimed, ' Where is Anderson ? Where is Ewell ? 
It is strange I can't hear from them.' Then turning to me, he said, 
' General Mahone, I have no other troops, will you take your di- 
vision to Sailor's Creek f and I promptly gave the order by the 
left flank, and off we were for Sailor' s Creek, where the disaster had 
occurred. General Lee rode with me. Colonel Venable a little in 
the rear. On reaching the south crest of the high ground at the 
crossing of the river road overlooking Sailor's Creek, the disaster 
which had overtaken our army was in full view, and the scene 
beggars description, — hurrying teamsters with their teams and 
dangling traces (no wagons), retreating infantry without guns, 
many without hats, a harmless mob, with the massive columns 
of the enemy moving orderly on. At this spectacle General Lee 
straightened himself in his saddle, and, looking more the soldier 



PETEESBURG. 615 

than ever, exclaimed, as if talking to himself, ' My God ! has the 
army dissolved V As qnickly as I could control my own voice I 
replied, ^ No, general, here are troops ready to do their duty ;' 
when, in a mellowed voice, he replied, 'Yes, general, there are 
some true men left. Will you please keep those people back V 
As I was placing my division in position to ' keep those people 
back,' the retiring herd just referred to had crowded around 
General Lee while he sat on his horse with a Confederate battle- 
flag in his hand. I rode up and requested him to give me the 
flag, which he did. 

''It was near dusk, and he wanted to know of me how to get 
away. I replied, ' Let General Longstreet move by the river road 
to Farmville, and cross the river there, and I will go through the 
woods to the High Bridge (railroad bridge) and cross there.' To 
this he assented. I asked him then, after crossing at the High 
Bridge, what I should do, and his reply was, to exercise my judg- 
ment. I wanted to know what should be done with the bridge 
after crossing it. He said, 'Set fire to it,' and I replied that the 
destruction of a span would as well retard the enemy as the de- 
struction of the whole half mile of bridge, and asked him to call 
up Colonel Talcott, of the Engineers' Regiment, and personally 
direct him in the matter, which he did." 

General Malione withdrew at eleven o'clock at night 
through the wood, found the bridge, had the fragments of 
commands over before daylight, and crossed High Bridge. 
The parties called to fire the bridge failed to appear. He 
sent a brigade back to do the work, and had a sharp skir- 
mish in checking the enemy long enough to start the fire, 
after which he withdrew as far as Cumberland Church 
and deployed for battle, Poague's artillery on his right. 
General Rosser got up with the detachment sent to burn 
the bridge, and attacked. General Keed, seeing his ap- 
proach, found a defensive position, and arranged the 
command to receive battle. General Mumford got up 
and deployed his troopers, dismounted, on Kosser's left. 
Nothing daunted, General Reed received the attack, and 
in gallant fight made one or two counter-charges with his 
small cavalry force, but ere long he was mortally wounded, 
as was Colonel Washburn. Most of his cavalry officers 



616 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

and many of his infantry were killed or wounded, and the 
rest surrendered. E-eed's fight was as gallant and skilful 
as a soldier could make, and its noise in rear of Sailor's 
Creek may have served to increase the confusion there. 
The result shows the work of these remnants of Confed- 
erate veterans as skilful and worthy of their old chief who 
fell at Yellow Tavern. 

I heard nothing of the affair at Sailor's Creek, nor from 
General Lee, until next morning. Our work at Rice's 
Station was not very serious, but was continued until 
night, when we marched and crossed the Appomattox at 
Farmville without loss, some of Rosser's and Mumford's 
cavalry following. We crossed early in the morning and 
received two days' rations, — the first regular issue since 
we left Richmond, — halted our wagons, made fires, got 
out cooking utensils, and were just ready to prepare a good 
breakfast. We had not heard of the disasters on the other 
route and the hasty retreat, and were looking for a little 
quiet to prepare breakfast, when General Lee rode up and 
said that the bridges had been fired before his cavalry 
crossed, that part of that command was cut off and lost, 
and that the troops should hurry on to position at Cum- 
berland Church. 

I reminded him that there were fords over which his 
cavalry could cross, and that they knew of or would surely 
find them. Everything except the food was ordered back 
to the wagons and dumped in. 

Meanwhile, the alarm had spread, and our teamsters, 
frightened by reports of cavalry trouble and approaching 
fire of artillery, joined in the panic, put whips to their 
teams as quick as the camp-kettles were tumbled over the 
tail-boards of the wagons, and rushed through the woods 
to find a road somewhere in front of them. The com- 
mand was ordered under arms and put in quick march, 
but General Lee urged double-quick. Our cavalry was 
then engaged near Farmville, and presently came a reck- 



PETERSBURG. 617 

less cliarge of Gregg's troopers towards parts of Rosser's 
and Mumford's commands. Heth's division of infantry 
was sent to support them. As the balance of the command 
marched, General Lee took the head of the column and 
led it on the double-quick. 

I thought it better to let them pass me, and, to quiet 
their apprehensions a little, rode at a walk. General Ma- 
hone received the attack of part of the enemy's Second 
Corps, like Gregg's cavalry making reckless attack. The 
enemy seemed to think they had another Sailor's Creek 
affair, and part of their attack got in as far as Poague's 
battery, but Mahonc recovered it, and then drove off an 
attack against his front. General Gregg and a con- 
siderable part of his command were captured by E-osser 
and Mumford. At Cumberland Church the command 
deployed on the right of Poague's battery, but Malione 
reported a move by part of Miles's division to turn his 
left which might dislodge him. G. T. Anderson's bri- 
gade of Field's division was sent with orders to get 
around the threatening force and break it up. Mahone 
so directed them through a woodland that they succeeded 
in over-reaching the threatened march, and took in some 
three hundred prisoners,* the last of our trouble for the 
day. General Lee stopped at a cottage near my line, 
where I joined him after night ; the trains and other 
parts of his army had moved on towards Appomattox 
Court-House. 

* General Mahone claimed seven hundred in all. 



CHAPTER XLIIL 

APPOMATTOX. 

Some of General Lee's Officers say to him that "Further Resistance 
is Hopeless"— Longstreet does not approve — General Grant calls for 
Surrender — "Not yet" — The Confederate Chieftain asks Terms— His 
Response to his Officers as represented by General Pendleton — Corre- 
spondence of Generals Lee and Grant — Morning of April 9— General 
Lee rides to meet the Federal Commander, while Longstreet forms 
the Last Line of Battle— Longstreet endeavors to recall his Chief, 
hearing of a Break where the Confederate Troops could pass— Custer 
demands Surrender of Longstreet — Reminded of Irregularity, and 
that he was " in the Enemy's Lines"— Meeting with General Grant- 
Capitulation — Last Scenes. 

The beginning of the end was now at hand, — not per- 
haps necessarily, but, at least, as the sequence of cause and 
effect actually followed. 

" An event occurred on the 7th," says General Long, 
"which must not be omitted from the narrative. Per- 
ceiving the difficulties that surrounded the army, and be- 
lieving its extrication hopeless, a number of the princij^al 
officers, from a feeling of affection and sympathy for the 
commander-in-chief, and with a wish to lighten his re- 
sponsibility and soften the pain of defeat, volunteered to 
inform him that, in their opinion, the struggle had reached 
a point where further resistance was hopeless, and that the 
contest should be terminated and negotiations opened for 
a surrender of the army. The delivery of this opinion 
was confided to General Pendleton, who, both by his 
character and devotion to General Lee, was well qualified 
for such an office. The names of Longstreet and some 
others, who did not coincide in the opinion of their asso- 
ciates, did not appear in the list presented by Pendleton."* 

A little after nightfall a flag of truce appeared under 

* Memoirs of General Lee, A. L. Long. 
618 



APPOMATTOX. 619 

torchliglit in front of Mahone's line bearing a note to 
General Lee : 

^'Head-quarters Armies of the United States, 

''5 p.m., April 7, 1865. 
"General E. E. Lee, 

" Commanding Confederate States Army : 
"General, — The results of the last week must convince you 
of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army 
of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and 
regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any 
further effusion of blood by asking of you the surrender of that 
portion of tlie Confederate army known as the Army of Northern 
Virginia. 

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"U. S. Grant, 
^^ Lieutenant- General, Commanding Armies of the United States.'''' 

I was sitting at his side when the note was delivered. 
He read it and handed it to me without referring to its 
contents. After reading it I gave it back, saying, " Not 
yd." 

General Lee wrote in rejily, — 

" April 7, 1865. 
"General, — I have received your note of this day. Though 
not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of 
further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and 
therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you 
will offer on condition of its surrender. 

"E. E. Lee, 

" General. 
" Lieutenant- General Grant, 

" Commanding Armies of the United States.^ ^ 

I was not informed of the contents of the return note, 
but thought, from the orders of the night, it did not mean 
surrender. General Lee ordered my command from for- 
ward- to rear-guard, and his cavalry in rear of the march. 
The road was clear at eleven o'clock, and we marched at 
twelve. The enemy left us to a quiet day's march on the 



620 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Sth, nothing disturbing the rear-guard, and our left flank 
being but little annoyed, but our animals were worn and 
reduced in strength by the heavy haul through rain and 
mud during the march from Petersburg, and the troops 
of our broken columns were troubled and faint of heart. 

We passed abandoned wagons in flames, and limbers 
and caissons of artillery burning sometimes in the middle 
of the road. One of my battery commanders rejDorted 
his horses too weak to haul his guns. He was ordered to 
bury the guns and cover their burial-places with old leaves 
and brushwood. Many weary soldiers were picked up, 
and many came to the column from the woodlands, some 
with, many without, arms, — all asking for food. 

General Grant renewed efforts on the 8th to find a way 
to strike across the head of our march by his cavalry and 
the Army of the James, j^ursuing our rear-guard with the 
Second and Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac. 

In the forenoon. General Pendleton came to me and 
reported the ^proceedings of the self-constituted council 
of war of the night before, and stated that he had been 
requested to make the report and ask to have me bear 
it to General Lee, in the name of the members of the 
council. Much surprised, I turned and asked if he did 
not know that the Articles of War provided that officers 
or soldiers who asked commanding officers to surrender 
should be shot, and said, — 

''If General Lee doesn't know when to surrender until I tell 
Mm, he will never know." 

It seems that General Pendleton then went to General 
Lee and made the report. General Long's account of the 
interview, as reported by Pendleton, is as follows : 

" General Lee was lying on the ground. No others heard the 
conversation between him and myself. He received my commu- 
nication with the reply, ' Oh, no, I trust that it has not come to 
that,' and added, 'General, we have yet too many bold men to 
think of laying down our arms. The enemy do not fight with 



APPOMATTOX. 621 

spirit, while our boys still do. Besides, if I were to say a word 
to the Federal commander, he would regard it as such a confes- 
sion of weakness as to make it the condition of demanding an 
unconditional surrender, a proposal to which I will never listen. 
... I have never believed we could, against the gigantic com- 
bination for our subjugation, make good, in the long run, our 
independence, unless foreign powers should, directly or indi- 
rectly, assist us. . . . But such considerations really make with 
me no difference. We had, I was satisfied, sacred principles to 
maintain, and rights to defend, for which we were in duty bound 
to do our best, even if we perished in the endeavor.' 

' ' Such were, as nearly as I can recall them, the exact words of 
General Lee on that most critical occasion. You see in them the 
soul of the man. Where his conscience dictated and his judgment 
decided, there his heart was." * 

The delicate affection that promiited the knights of 
hxter days to offer to relieve our grand commander of his 
official obligations and take upon themselves responsibility 
to disarm us and turn us over to the enemy is somewhat 
pathetic, but when to it are aj^jDlied the stern rules of a 
soldier's duty upon a field of emergency, when the com- 
mander most needs steady hands and brave hearts, their 
proceeding would not stand the test of a military tri- 
bunal. The interesting part of the interview is that 
in it our great leader left a sufficient testimonial of his 
regard as a legacy to the soldiers of his column of the 
right. Though commanders of other columns were in 
mutinous conduct towards him, he had confidence that 
we were firm and steady in waiting to execute his last 
command. 

During the day General Grant wrote General Lee in 
reply to his note of the 7th inquiring as to terms of sur- 
render, — 

"Aprils, 1865. 
'^ General E. E. Lee, 

" Commanding Confederate States Army : 

"General, — Your note of last evening in reply to mine of the 
same date, asking the conditions on which I will accept surrender 

* Memoirs of Robert E. Lee, A. L. Long. 



622 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I 
would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one con- 
dition I would insist uj)on, — namely, that the men and ofScers 
surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against 
the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I 
will meet you^ or will designate officers to meet any officers you 
might name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, 
for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the 
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received. 

^'U. S. Grant, 

" Lieutenant- GeneraV 
111 reply, General Lee wrote, — 

"Aprils, 1865. 

" General, — I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In 
mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of 
the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your 
proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has 
arisen to call for the surrender of this army, but as the restora- 
tion of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know 
whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, there- 
fore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army of 
Northern Virginia ; but as far as your jiroposal may affect the 
Confederate States forces under my command and tend to the 
restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten a.m. 
to-morrow on the old stage road to Eichmond, between the picket 

lines of the two armies. 

"E. E. Lee, 

''GeneraV 

The enemy's movements of the day were impressive of 
his desire to get by our left flank and make a strong 
stand across the route of our head of column. At Pros- 
pect Station, General Sheridan was informed of four trains 
of cars at Api^omattox Station loaded with provisions for 
General Lee's army. He gave notice to Merritt's and 
Crook's cavalry, and rode twenty-eight miles in time for 
Custer's division to pass the station, cut ofP the trains, and 
drive back the guard advancing to protect them. He 
helped himself to the provisions, and caj^tured besides 
twenty-five pieces of artillery and a wagon and hospital 
train. 



APPOMATTOX. 623 

At night General Lee made his head-quarters near the 
rear-guard, and spread his couch about a hundred feet 
from the saddle and blanket that were my pillow and 
spread for the night. If he had a more comfortable bed 
than mine I do not know, but I think not. 

He sent for his cavalry commander, and gave orders for 
him to transfer his troopers from the rear to the advanced 
guard, and called General Gordon, commanding in front, 
for report and orders. The advance was then at Appo- 
mattox Court-House, Wallace's brigade resting in the 
village. His orders were to march at one o'clock in the 
morning, the trains and advanced forces to push through 
the village in time for my column to stand and prepare 
to defend at that point in case of close pursuit. General 
Gordon reported, as I remember, less than two thousand 
men. (General Fitzhugh Lee puts it at sixteen hundred, 
but he may have overlooked Wallace's brigade, which 
joined the advance on that day.) My column was about 
as it was when it marched from Petersburg. Parts of 
Swell's, Anderson's, and Pickett's commands not captured 
on the march were near us, and reported to me, except 
Wallace's brigade. 

On the 9th the rear-guard marched as ordered, but soon 
came upon standing trains of wagons in the road and 
still in park alongside. The command was halted, de- 
ployed into position, and ordered to intrench against the 
pursuing army. 

It was five o'clock when the advance commands moved, 
— four hours after the time ordered. To these General 
Long's batteries of thirty guns were attached. They met 
Sheridan's cavalry advancing across their route. The 
column was deployed, ^the cavalry on the right of the ar- 
tillery and infantry, as they advanced to clear the way. 
They reported some success, capturing two pieces of artil- 
lery, when General Ord's column came up. He had, 
besides his Army of the James, the Fifth Army Corps. 



624 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

These commands, with the cavalry, pushed the Confeder- 
ates back a little, while the two corps of the Army of the 
Potomac were advancing against my rear-guard. 

Of the early hours of this, the last day of active ex- 
istence of the Army of Northern Virginia, Colonel Ven- 
able, of General Lee's staff, wrote thus : 

*' At three o'clock on the morning of that fatal day, General 
Lee rode forward, still hoping that he might break through the 
countless hordes of the enemy, who hemmed us in. Halting a 
short distance in rear of our vanguard, he sent me on to General 
Gordon to ask him if he could break through the enemy. I found 
General Gordon and General Fitz Lee on their front line in the 
dim light of the morning, arranging our attack. Gordon's reply 
to the message (I give the expressive phrase of the gallant Geor- 
gian) was this : '■ Tell General Lee I have fought my corps to a 
frazzle, and I fear I can do nothing unless I am heavily supported 
by Longstreet's corps.' 

^'When I bore the message back to General Lee, he said, 
^ Then there is nothing left me but to go and see General Grant, 
and I would rather die a thousand deaths.' 

'' Convulsed with passionate grief, many were the wild words 
which we spoke as we stood around him. Said one, '■ Oh, gen- 
eral, what will history say of the surrender of the army in the 
field f 

"He replied, 'Yes, I know they will say hard things of us; 
they will not understand how we are overwhelmed by numbers. 
But that is not the question, colonel ; the question is, ' ' Is it right 
to surrender this army?" If it is right, then I will take all the 
responsibility !' " * 

Presently General Lee called to have me ride forward 
to him. He was dressed in a suit of new uniform, sword 
and sash, a handsomely embroidered belt, boots, and a 
pair of gold spurs. At first approach his compact figure 
appeared as a man in the flush vigor of forty summers, 
but as I drew near, the handsome apparel and brave 
bearing failed to conceal his profound depression. He 
stood near the embers of some burned rails, received me 

* Memoirs of Eobert E. Lee, A. L. Long. 



APPOMATTOX. 625 

with graceful salutation, and spoke at once of affairs in 
front and the loss of his subsistence stores. He remarked 
that the advanced columns stood against a very formidable 
force, which he could not break through, while General 
Meade was at my rear ready to call for all the work that 
the rear-guard could do, and, closing with the expression 
that it was not possible for him to get along, requested my 
view. I asked if the bloody sacrifice of his army could 
in any way help the cause in other quarters. He thought 
not. Then, I said, your situation speaks for itself. 

He called up General Mahone, and made to him a 
similar statement of affairs. The early morning was raw 
and damp. General Mahone was chilled standing in wait 
without fire. He pushed up the embers and said to the 
general he did not want him to think he was scared, he 
was only chilled. General Mahone sometimes liked to 
talk a little on questions of moment, and asked several 
questions. My attention was called to messages from the 
troops for a time, so that I failed to hear all of the con- 
versation, but I heard enough of it to know that General 
Mahone thought it time to see General Grant. Apj^eal 
was made to me to afiirm that judgment, and it was 
23romj)tly approved. 

General Grant had been riding with his column in our 
rear during the correspondence of the 7th and 8th. So 
General Lee, ujDon mounting Traveller, his favorite horse, 
rode to our rear to meet him, leaving his advanced forces 
engaged in a lively skirmish. He did not think to send 
them notice of his intended ride, nor did he authorize me 
to call a truce. He passed my rear under flag, but Gen- 
eral Grant's orders were that his correspondence with 
General Lee should not interrupt or delay the operations 
of any of his forces. Our advance troops were in action, 
and General Humphreys was up with the Second Corps 
of the Army of the Potomac, preparing for action against 
our rear-guard. The situation was embarrassing. It was 

40 



626 EKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

plain enough that I should attack the Second Corps be- 
fore others could be up and prejDare for action, though our 
truce forbade. It could not prevail, however, to call me 
to quiet while the enemy in plain view was preparing for 
attack, so we continued at our work constructing our best 
line of defence, and when strong enough I ordered parts 
of the rear-guard forward to support the advanced forces, 
and directed General Alexander to establish them with 
part of his batteries in the best position for supj^ort or 
rallying line in case the front lines were forced back. 
That was the last line of battle formed in the Army of 
Northern Virginia. 

While this formation was proceeding, report came from 
our front that a break had been found through which we 
could force passage. I called for a swift courier, but not 
one could be found. Colonel J. C. Haskell had a blooded 
mare that had been carefully led from Petersburg. Ap- 
preciating the signs of the times, he had ordered her sad- 
dled, intending a desperate ride to escape impending 
humiliation, but, learning my need of a swift courier, he 
came and offered his services and his mare. He was 
asked to take the information just brought in to General 
Lee, and as he mounted was told to kill his mare but 
bring General Lee back. He rode like the wind. 

General Lee had passed out and dismounted beyond a 
turn of the road, and was not seen until the gallant rider 
had dashed by him. The steed swept onward some dis- 
tance before the rider could pull up. As Colonel Haskell 
rode back. General Lee walked to meet him, exclaiming, 
" You have ruined your beautiful mare ! why did you do 
so ?" The swift despatch was too late. General Lee's note 
to General Grant asking an interview had gone beyond 
recall. 

As my troops marched to form the last line a message 
came from General Lee saying he had not thought to give 
notice of the intended ride to meet General Grant, and 



APPOMATTOX. 627 

asked to have me send his message to that effect to Gen- 
eral Gordon, and it was duly sent by Captain Sims, of the 
Third Corps staff, serving at my head-quarters since the 
fall of A. P. Hill. 

After delivering the message, Captain Sims, through 
some informality, was sent to call the truce. The firing 
ceased. General Custer rode to Captain Sims to know 
his authority, and, uj^on finding that he was, of my staff, 
asked to be conducted to my head-quarters, and down 
they came in fast gallop. General Custer's flaxen locks 
flowing over his shoulders, and in brusk, excited manner, 
he said, — 

" In the name of General Sheridan I demand the un- 
conditional surrender of this army." 

He was reminded that I was not the commander of the 
army, that he was within the lines of the enemy without 
authority, addressing a superior officer, and in disrespect 
to General Grant as well as myself; that if I was the 
commander of the army I would not receive the message 
of General Sheridan. 

He then became more moderate, saying it would be a 
pity to have more blood upon that field. Then I sug- 
gested that the truce be respected, and said, — 

" As you are now more reasonable, I will say that Gen- 
eral Lee has gone to meet General Grant, and it is for 
them to determine the future of the armies." 

He was satisfied, and rode back to his command. 

General Grant rode away from the Army of the Potomac 
on the morning of the 9th to join his troops near Ap- 
pomattox Court-House, so General Lee's note was sent 
around to him. When advised of the change. General 
Lee rode back to his front to await there the answer to 
his note. While waiting. General Lee expressed appre- 
hension that his refusal to meet General Grant's first 
proposition might cause him to demand harsh terms. 

I assured him that I knew General Grant well enough 



628 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

to say that the terms would be such as he would demand 
under similar circumstances, but he yet had doubts. The 
conversation continued in broken sentences until the 
bearer of the return despatch approached. As he still 
seemed apprehensive of humiliating demands, I suggested 
that in that event he should break off the interview and tell 
General Grant to do his worst. The thought of another 
round seemed to brace him, and he rode with Colonel 
Marshall, of his staff, to meet the Union commander. 

The status of affairs spread through the advance troops 
of the army, but the work of preparation on my rear line 
was continued. General Field inquired of a passing officer, 
" What's up ?" but, seeing arrangements going on for at- 
tack in our rear, he continued his work of preparation to 
receive it. 

General Grant was found prepared to offer as liberal 
terms as General Lee could expect, and, to obviate a col- 
lision between his army of the rear with ours, ordered an 
officer sent to give notice of the truce. A ride around the 
lines would consume time, and he asked to have the officer 
conducted through our lines. Colonel Fairfax was sent 
with him. When they reached our rear line it was still 
at work on the trenches. The officer expressed surprise 
at the work of preparation, as not proper under truce. 
Colonel Fairfax ordered the work discontinued, and 
claimed that a truce between belligerents can only be 
recognized by mutual consent. As the object of the ride 
was to make the first announcement of properly author- 
ized truce, the work of preparation between the lines was 
no violation of the usages of war, particularly when it 
was borne in mind that the orders of General Grant were 
that the correspondence should not delay or interrupt 
military operations. 

As General Lee rode back to his army the officers and 
soldiers of his troops about the front lines assembled in 
promiscuous crowds of all arms and grades in anxious 



APPOMATTOX. 629 

wait for their loved commander. From force of habit a 
burst of sahitations greeted him, but quieted as suddenly 
as they arose. The. road was packed by standing troops 
as he approached, the men with hats off, heads and hearts 
bowed down. As he passed they raised their heads and 
looked upon him with swimming eyes. Those who could 
find voice said good-by, those who could not speak, and 
were near, passed their hands gently over the sides of 
Traveller. He rode with his hat off, and had sufficient 
control to fix his eyes on a line between the ears of Trav- 
eller and look neither to right nor left until he reached 
a large white-oak tree, where he dismounted to make his 
last head-quarters, and finally talked a little. 

The shock was most severe upon Field's division. 
Seasoned by four years of battle triumphant, the veterans 
in that body stood at Appomattox when the sun rose on 
the 9th day of April, 1865, as invincible of valor as on 
the morning of the 31st of August, 1862, after breaking 
up the Union lines of the second field of Manassas. They 
had learned little of the disasters about Petersburg, less 
of that at Sailor's Creek, and surrender had not had 
time to enter their minds until it was announced accom- 
plished ! 

The reported opportunity to break through the enemy's 
lines proved a mistake. General Mumford, suspecting 
surrender from the sudden quiet of the front, made a 
dashing ride, and passed the enemy's lines with his di- 
vision of cavalry, and that caused the im23ression that 
we would be able to march on. 

Soon after General Lee's return ride his chief of ord- 
nance reported a large amount of United States currency 
in his possession. In doubt as to the j)i*oper disposition 
of the funds. General Lee sent the officer to ask my opin- 
ion. As it w^as not known or included in the conditions 
of capitulation, and was due (and ten times more) to the 
faithful troops, I suggested a pro rata distribution of it. 



630 FKOM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

The officer afterwards brought three hundred dollars as 
my part. I took one hundred, and asked to have the 
balance distributed among Field's division, — the troops 
most distant from their homes. 

The commissioners appointed to formulate details of the 
capitulation were assigned a room in the McLean resi- 
dence. The way to it led through the room occupied as 
General Grant's head-quarters. 

As I was passing through the room, as one of the com- 
missioners. General Grant looked uj), recognized me, rose, 
and with his old-time cheerful greeting gave me his hand, 
and after passing a few remarks offered a cigar, which was 
gratefully received. 

The first step under capitulation was to deliver to the 
Union army some fifteen hundred prisoners, taken since 
we left Petersburg, not all of them by my infantry, Ros- 
ser's and Mumford's cavalry having taken more than half 
of them. Besides these I delivered to General Grant all 
of the Confederate soldiers left under my care by General 
Lee, except about two hundred lost in the affairs about 
Petersburg, Amelia Court-House, Jetersville, Kice's Sta- 
tion, and Cumberland Church. None were rej^orted killed 
except the gallant officers Brigadier-General Dearing, of 
E-osser's cavalry, Colonel Bostan, of Mumford's cavalry, 
and Major Thompson, of Stuart's horse artillery, in the 
desperate and gallant fight to which they were ordered 
against the bridge-burning j)arty. 

General Grant's artillery prepared to fire a salute in 
honor of the surrender, but he ordered it stopped. 

As the world continues to look at and study the grand 
combinations and strategy of General Grant, the higher 
will be his award as a great soldier. Confederates should 
be foremost in crediting him with all that his admirers so 
justly claim, and ask at the same time that his great ad- 
versary be measured by the same high standards. 

On the 12th of April the Army of Northern Virginia 



APPOMATTOX. 631 

marched to the field in front of Appomattox Court-House, 
and by divisions and parts of divisions deployed into line, 
stacked their arms, folded their colors, and walked empty- 
handed to find their distant, blighted homes. 

There were " surrendered and paroled" on the last day 
of our military history over twenty-eight thousand officers 
and men, — viz. : 

General Lee and staff 15 

Longstreet's corps * 14,833 

Gordon's corps t 7,200 

Ewell's corps 287 

Cavalry corps 1,786 

Artillery 2,586 

Detachments 1,649 

Total 28,356 

In glancing backward over the period of the war, and 
the tremendous and terrible events with which it was 
fraught, the reflection irresistibly arises, that it might 
perhaps have been avoided and without dishonor. The 
flag and the fame of the nation could have suffered no re- 
proach had General Scott's advice, before the outbreak, 
been followed, — " Wayward sisters, dej3art in peace." The 
Southern States would have found their way back to the 
Union without war far earlier than they did by war. 
The reclaiming bonds would then have been those only 
of love, and the theory of government formulated by 
George Washington would have experienced no fracture. 
But the inflexible fiat of fate seemingly went forth for 
war ; and so for four long years the history of this great 
nation was written in the blood of its strong men. 

* Including the parts of the Third Corps attached after the fall of A. 
P. Hill, and about five thousand that reported on the 7th, 8th, and 9th 
in bands and squads from the columns broken up at Sailor's Creek. 

t Including five thousand two hundred of fragments dispersed at 
Petersburg and during the rearward march, that joined us in retreat. 



CHAPTER XLIV. 



POST-BELLUM PENDANT. 



Old Friends and their Kindness — General Grant — His Characteristic 
Letter of Introduction to President Johnson — In Business in New 
Orleans — Political Unfriendliness— Cause of Criticism of Military 
Career — Appointed Surveyor of Customs — The Old Nurse. 

Some weeks after the surrender the newspapers an- 
nounced that I was to visit Washington City. My old 
company commander, Bradford R. Alden, who had re- 
signed from the army some years before the war, came 
down from New York to meet me. Not finding me, he 
wrote to tell me of his trip, that he was anxious about 
me, lest I might be in need of assistance ; that in that 
event I should draw on him for such amount of money as 
I wanted. When ready to return his favor he was not in 
the country, and it was only through a mutual friend, 
General Alvord, that his address in Europe was found 
and the amount returned. A more noble, lovable char- 
acter never descended from the people of Plymouth Rock. 

About the 1st of November, 1865, business of personal 
nature called me to Washington. I stopped at the Met- 
ropolitan Hotel. Upon seeing the arrival in the morn- 
ing papers. General W. A. Nichols, of the United States 
army, called and insisted that my visit should be with 
him and his family. The request was declined with the 
suggestion that the war-feeling was too warm for an officer 
of the army to entertain a prominent Confederate, but he 
insisted and urged that his good wife would not be satis- 
fied unless the visit was made. So it was settled, and I 
became his guest. He was on duty at the time as assistant 
adjutant-general at the War Department. As I was stop- 
ping with an officer of the army, the usages of military 

632 



POST-BELLUM PENDANT. 633 

life required that I should call upon the commanding 
general. 

The next morning I walked with General Nichols to 
make an official call on General Grant. He recognized 
us as we entered his office, rose and w^alked to meet us. 
After the usual brief call, we rose to take leave, when he 
asked to have us call on his family during the evening. 
Most of those whom we met during the evening were old- 
time personal friends, especially the father-in-law, Mr. 
Dent. When leaving, after a pleasant evening. General 
Grant walked with us to the gate and asked if I cared to 
have my pardon. I pleaded not guilty of an offence that 
required pardon. He said that he meant amnesty, — that 
he wished to know if I cared to have it. I told him that 
I intended to live in the country, and would prefer to 
have the privileges of citizenshij). He told me to call at 
his office at noon next day ; that in the mean time he 
would see the Secretary of War and the President in 
regard to the matter. 

The next day he gave me a letter to the President, and 
said that he had seen him and thought the matter was ar- 
ranged ; that I should first see the Secretary of War, then 
the President. His strong and characteristic letter to the 
President was as follows : 

''Head-quarters Armies of the United States, 
''Washington, D. C, November 7, 1865. 
" His Excellency A. Johnson, 

' ' President : 
"Knowing that General Longstreet, late of the army which 
was in rebellion against the authority of the United States, is in 
the city, and presuming that he intends asking executive clem- 
ency before leaving, I beg to say a word in his favor. 

' ' General Longstreet comes under the third, fifth, and eighth 
exceptions made in your proclamation of the 29th of May, 1865. 
I believe I can safely say that there is nowhere among the excep- 
tions a more honorable class of men than those embraced in the 
fifth and eighth of these, nor a class that will more faithfully ob- 
serve any obligation which they may take upon themselves. 



634 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

General Longstreet, in my opinion, stands high among this class. 
I have known him well for more than twenty-six years, first as a 
cadet at West Point and afterwards as an officer of the army. 
For five years from my graduation we served together, a jjortion 
of the time in the same regiment. I speak of him, therefore, 
from actual personal acquaintance. 

"In the late rebellion, I think, not one single charge was ever 
brought against General Longstreet for persecution of prisoners 
of war or of persons for their political opinions. If such charges 
were ever made, I never heard them. I have no hesitation, 
therefore, in recommending General Longstreet to your Excel- 
lency for pardon. I will further state that my opinion of him is 
such that I shall feel it as a personal favor to myself if this par- 
don is granted. 

' ' Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"U. S. Grant, 
' ' Lieutenant- General. ' ' 

Supported by this generous endorsement, I called on 
the Secretary of War, who referred me to the President. 
After a lengthy interview the President asked to have 
the matter put off until next day, when I should call at 
noon. The next day he was still unprei^ared to make 
decision, but, after a long, pleasant talk, he said, — 

" There are three persons of the South who can never 
receive amnesty : Mr. Davis, General Lee, and yourself. 
You have given the Union cause too much trouble." 

I replied, " You know, Mr. President, that those who 
are forgiven most love the most." 

" Yes," he said, " you have very high authority for 
that, but you can't have amnesty." 

During a subsequent session of Congress, General Pope 
sent in a list of names from Georgia for whom he asked 
relief from their political disabilities. General Grant, 
after approving it, made request to one of his friends in 
Congress to have my name put on the list, and I was 
extended relief soon after it was given to General R. E. 
Lee. 

In January, 1866, I engaged in business in New Or- 



POST-BELLUM PENDANT. 635 

leans with the Owen brothers, — William, Miller, and 
Edward, old soldiers of the Washington Artillery, — as 
cotton factors, and speedily found fair prosperity. Before 
the year w^as out I was asked to take position in an insur- 
ance company, but declined, and repeated applications 
were refused under plea of limited business experience, 
but, under promise of ample and competent assistance, I 
accepted the place with a salary of five thousand dollars, 
and my affairs were more than prosperous until I was 
asked an opinion uj)on the political crisis of 18G7. 

As the whole animus of the latter-day adverse criti- 
cisms upon, and uncritical assertions in regard to, the 
commander of the First CorjDS of the Army of Northern 
Virginia had its origin in this matter of politics, a brief 
review of the circumstances is in order. 

As will be readily recalled by my older readers (while 
for the younger it is a matter of history) , President John- 
son, after the war, adopted a reconstruction policy of his 
own, and some of the States were reorganized under it 
with Democratic governors and legislatures, and all would 
have followed. But Congress, being largely Republican, 
was not satisfied, and enacted that the States could not be 
accepted unless they provided in their new constitutions for 
7iegro suffrage. In case they would not, the State govern- 
ments should be removed and the States placed in the 
hands of general officers of the army as military governors, 
who should see that the States were reorganized and re- 
stored to the Union under the laws. 

Under the severe ordeal one of the city papers of New 
Orleans called upon the generals of Confederate service to 
advise the people of the course that they should pursue, — 
naming the officers. I thought it better policy to hold 
the States, as they were organized, under the President's 
policy, shape their constitutions as directed by Congress, 
and have the States not yet reorganized follow the same 
course. My letter uj^on the subject was as follows : 



636 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

"New Orleans, La., June 3, 1867. 
"J. M. G. Parker, Esq. : 

" Dear Sir, — Your esteemed favor of the 15th ultimo was duly- 
received. 

'' I was much pleased to have the opportunity to hear Senator 
Wilson, and was agreeably surprised to meet such fairness and 
frankness from a politician whom I had been taught to believe 
harsh in his feelings towards the people of the South. 

' ' I have considered your suggestion to wisely unite in efforts 
to restore Louisiana to her former position in the Union ' through 
the party now in power.' My letter of the 6th of Af>ril, to which 
you refer, clearly indicates a desire for practical reconstruction 
and reconciliation. There is only one route left open, which 
practical men cannot fail to see. 

"The serious difficulty arises from want of that wisdom so im- 
portant for the great work in hand. Still, I will be happy to work 
in any harness that promises relief to our discomfited people and 
harmony to the nation, whether bearing the mantle of Mr. Davis 
or Mr. Sumner. 

" It is foir to assume that the strongest laws are those estab- 
lished by the sword. The ideas that divided political parties 
before the war — upon the rights of the States — were thoroughly 
discussed by our wisest statesmen, and eventually appealed to the 
arbitrament of the sword. The decision was in favor of the 
North, so that her construction becomes the law, and should be 
so accepted. 

"The military bill and amendments are the only peace-ofiferings 
they have for us, and should be accepted as the starting-point for 
future issues. 

"Like others of the South not previously connected with 
politics, I naturally acquiesced in the ways of Democracy, but, 
so far as I can judge, there is nothing tangible in them, beyond 
the issues that were put to test in the war and there lost. As 
there is nothing left to take hold of except prejudice, which can- 
not be worked for good for any one, it seems proper and right 
that we should seek some standing which may encourage hope 
for the future. 

"If I appreciate the issues of Democracy at this moment, they 
are the enfranchisement of the negro and the rights of Congress 
in the premises, but the acts have been passed, are parts of the 
laws of the land, and no ijower but Congress can remove them. 

" Besides, if we now accept the doctrine that the States only can 
legislate on suffrage, we will fix the negro vote ui^on us, for he is 



POST-BELLUM PENDANT. 637 

now a suffragan, and liis vote, with tlie vote that will go with 
him, will hold to his rights, while, by recognizing the acts of 
Congress, we may, after a fair trial, if negro suffrage proves a 
mistake, appeal and have Congress correct the error. It will 
accord better with wise policy to insist that the negro shall vote 
in the Northern as well as the Southern States. 

'^If every one will meet the crisis with proper appreciation of 
our condition and obligations, the sun will rise to-morrow on a 
happy people. Our fields will again begin to yield their increase, 
our railways and waters will teem with abundant commerce, our 
towns and cities will resound with the tumult of trade, and we 
will be reinvigorated by the blessings of Almighty God. 
"Very respectfully yours, 

"James Longsteeet." 

I might have added that not less forceful than the 
grounds I gave were the obligations under which we were 
placed by the terms of our paroles, — " To respect the laws 
of Congress," — but the letter was enough. 

The afternoon of the day upon which my letter was 
published the paper that had called for advice published 
a column of editorial calling me traitor ! deserter of my 
friends ! and accusing me of joining the enemy ! but did 
not publish a line of the letter upon which it based the 
charges ! Other paj^ers of the Democracy took up the 
garbled representation of this journal and spread it broad- 
cast, not even giving the letter upon which they based 
their evil attacks upon me. 

Up to that time the First Corps, in all of its parts, in 
all of its history, was above reproach. I was in successful 
business in New Orleans as cotton factor, with a salary 
from an insurance company of five thousand dollars per 
year. 

The day after the announcement old comrades passed 
me on the streets without speaking. Business began to 
grow dull. General Hood (the only one of my old com- 
rades who occasionally visited me) thought that he could 
save the insurance business, and in a few weeks I found 
myself at leisure. 



638 FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX. 

Two years after that period, on March 4, 1869, General 
Grant was inaugurated President of the United States, 
and in the bigness of his generous heart called me to 
Washington. Before I found opportunity to see him he 
sent my name to the Senate for confirmation as surveyor 
of customs at New Orleans. I was duly confirmed, and 
held the office until 1873, when I resigned. Since that 
time I have lived in New Orleans, Louisiana, and in 
Gainesville, Georgia, surrounded by a few of my old 
friends, and in occasional appreciative touch with others, 
South and North. 

Of all the j)eople alive I still know and meet, probably 
no one carries me farther back in recollections of my long 
life than does my " old nurse." Most of the family ser- 
vants were discharged after the war at Macon, Mississipj^i, 
where some of them still reside, among them this old 
man, Daniel, who still claims the family name, but at 
times uses another. He calls promptly when I visit Macon 
and looks for " something to remember you by." During 
my last visit he seemed more concerned for me than usual, 
and on one of his calls asked, — 

" Marse Jim, do you belong to any church ?" 

" Oh, yes," I said, " I try to be a good Christian." 

He laughed loud and long, and said, — 

" Something must have scared you mighty bad, to change 
you so from what you was when I had to care for you." 

In a recent letter he sent a message to say that he 
is getting to be a little feeble. 

Blessings on his brave heart ! 



APPENDIX. 



LETTERS OF GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE AND 
GENERAL LONGSTREET. 

I. 

Lee to Anderson on Conduct of the First Corps. 

August 26, 1864. 
Lieutenant- General E. H. Anderson, 

Commanding LongstreeVs Corps: 
General, — I take great pleasure in presenting to you my 
congratulations upon the conduct of the men of your corps. I 
believe that they will carry anything they are put against. We 
tried very hard to stop Pickett's men from capturing the breast- 
works of the enemy, but could not do it. I hope his loss has 
been small. 

I am, with respect, your obedient servant , 

E. E. Lee, 
General. 

II. 

Lee to Longstreet congratulating Mm on his Convalescence and 
anticipating Return. 

Camp Petersburg, August 29, 1864. 
General J. Longstreet : 

My dear General, — I received yesterday your letter of the 
23d, and am much gratified at your improvement. You will soon 
be as well as ever, and we shall all be rejoiced at your return. 
You must not, however, become impatient at the gradual progress 
you must necessarily make, but be content with the steady ad- 
vance you are making to health and strength. Your progress 
will be the more certain and your recovery more confirmed. Do 
not let Sherman capture you, and I will endeavor to hold Grant 
till you come. I am glad to hear such good accounts of my little 

639 



640 APPENDIX. 

namesake. Good lungs are a great blessing, and nothing expands 
them better than a full, hearty yell. I hope Mrs. Longstreet is 
well, and that she is enjoying the good peaches and melons of 
Georgia. We have but little enjoyment here. Our enemy is 
very cautious, and he has become so proficient in intrenching 
that he seems to march with a system already prepared. He 
threatens dreadful things every day, but, thank God, he has not 
expunged us yet. 

All your army friends inquire for you anxiously, and will be de- 
lighted to hear of your improvement. We shall not object to 
your chirography, so you must practise it often, and let me hear 
of your i^rogress and well-doing. Please present my kindest re- 
gards to Mrs. Longstreet, and love to my namesake. The gentle- 
men of my staff are very grateful for your remembrance, and 
unite with me in sincere wishes for your welfare and happiness. 
I am sure the rest of this army would join did they know of the 
opportunity. 

With great regard, very truly yours, 

E. E. Lee. 

III. 

Longstreet to Lee. 

Head-quaetees Aemy Corps, 
November 24, 1864. 
General E. E. Lee, 

Commanding : 

General, — From the report of scouts received yesterday, it 
seems that the Tenth Corps is still on this side, or if it went over 
to the south side, has returned. The information, too, seems to 
indicate the arrival of the Sixth Corps from the Valley. 

Under these circumstances it will be necessary for me to force 
the enemy to develop the extent of his move on this side before 
taking any more of my troops to the south side. This I shall do, 
of course, as rapidly as possible. I am going to have the roads 
leading from White Oak Swamp to the Williamsburg road well 
broken up with subsoil ploughs. I think that the enemy will then 
have to build a corduroy there as he moves. He surely will, if 
I can have a good gentle rain after the roads are thoroughly 
ploughed. Can't you apply this idea to advantage on your side 
on the roads that General Grant will be obliged to travel if he 
goes to Burkeville? I don't know, however, but that it would be 
better for us to go to Burkeville and block the roads behind him. 
If the roads that General Sherman must travel to get to Charleston 






'■(J-^ /CilX^ /{^y(,^t^Pt—-' , ^=r^- CLt-t^^^ rC^-L^^ ^-f-Z-T^i^ ^t, 



AX(CL-< E^^Ucy/ {fpyt^^Ut (tA^^^cX C'-C^ /.■v-t,-'Ct (>Uiyt^ </^/y( ^-^/^^^^ , 'tt^Jf ^^_J 

- fjjt^ 1 1^-r.yi AuA. Aci^ U^iP nAJ, ,__J__. Ixa cA. CtrU<.--{A^ x^x^ iCc^A^-i'^ i^^ ^O 



J-^OuU^ <-Z d^Ci^L Sa QycnxJ^y/ , (h-O n-L^ /.-tyXyCt /^Cci-y, CJi>t.oA- 



4'i olaJ>u.,ul^/) ,/^cc^v-v.- — zL-, u^i^ z^^J>C'u/?yi «c fxy,-±'<^..y^'iyt-i-^ 



■A- 






=::! a^^ 1-^ i^'? L.-iny/ 'U^^^LAyTj (^/^-vVi lyO 




LJ 



-tAy-'-^-^ ■ •>.^L-^•^-' 



APPENDIX. 641 

or Savannali can be thorouglily j)loughed and the trees felled over 
them, I think that General Sherman will not be able to get to his 
destination in fifty days, as the Northern papers expect ; and it is 
not thought to be possible that he can collect more than fifty days' 
rations before reaching the coast. If the parties are properly or- 
ganized, I think that they might destroy or injure all of the roads 
so as to break down General Sherman's animals, and result in the 
capture of most of his forces. 

I remain, very respectfully, yours most obediently, 

J. LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant- General. 
IV. 

Longstreet to Lee on Impressment of Gold and Measures for Final 

Campaign. 

[Confidential.] 

Headquarters, February 14, 1865. 
General E. E. Lee, 

Commanding : 
General, — Recent developments of the enemy's designs seem 
to indicate an early concentration of his armies against Richmond. 
This, of course, would involve a like concentration on our part, 
or the abandonment of our capital. The latter emergency would, 
I think, be almost fatal, — probably quite so, after our recent re- 
verses. To concentrate here in time to meet the movements of 
the enemy we will be obliged to use the little of our Southern rail- 
road that is left us in transporting our troops, so that we cannot 
haul provisions over that route. I fear, therefore, that we will not 
be able to feed our troops unless we adopt extraordinary efforts 
and measures. I think that there is enough of the necessaries 
of life left in Virginia and North Carolina to help us through our 
troubles if we can only reach them. Impressing officers, how- 
ever, nor collectors of taxes in kind, nor any other plan hereto- 
fore employed, is likely to get those supplies in time or in quan- 
tities to meet our necessities. The citizens will not give their 
supplies up and permit their families and servants to suffer for 
the necessaries of life without some strong inducement. For 
each one may naturally think that the little that he would supply 
by denying himself and family would go but little way where so 
much is needed. He does not want Confederate money, for his 
meat and bread will buy him clothes, etc., for his family more 
readily and in larger quantities than the money that the govern- 
ment would pay. The only thing that will insure our rations and 

41 



642 APPENDIX. 

national existence is gold. Send out the gold through Virginia 
and North Carolina and pay liberal prices, and my conviction is 
that we shall have no more distress for want of food. The winter 
is about over, and the families can and will subsist on molasses, 
bread, and vegetables for the balance of the year if they can get 
gold for their supplies. There is a great deal of meat and bread 
inside the enemy' s lines that our people would bring us for gold ; 
but they won't go to that trouble for Confederate money. They 
can keep gold so much safer than they can meat and bread, and it 
is always food and clothing. 

If the government has not the gold, it must impress it, or if 
there is no law for the impressment, the gold must be taken with- 
out the law. Necessity does not know or wait for law. If we 
stop to make laws in order that we may reach the gold it will dis- 
appear the day that the law is mentioned in Congress. To secure 
it no one should suspect that we are after it until we knock at the 
doors of the vaults that contain it, and we must then have guards 
to be sure that it is not made away with. 

It seems to my mind that our prospects will be brighter than 
they have been if we can only get food for our men ; and I think 
that the plan that I have proposed will secure the food. 

There seem to be many reasons for the opinion that the enemy 
deems our capital essential to him. To get the capital he will 
concentrate here everything that he has, and we will be better 
able to fight him when we shall have concentrated than when we 
are in detachments. The Army of the Mississippi will get new 
life and spirits as soon as it finds itself alongside of this, and we 
will feel more comfortable ourselves to know that all are under 
one eye and one head that is able to handle them. 

I remain, most respectfully and truly, your obedient servant, 

J. LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant- General. 



Lee to Longstreet on Plans for Campaign. 

[Confidential.] 

Head-quarters Confederate States Armies, 

February 22, 1865. 
Lieutenant-General J. Longstreet, 

Commanding, etc. : 
General, — Yom- letter of the 14th instant is received. It 
arrived during my absence in Eichmoud, and has not been over- 
looked. I agree with you entirely in believing that if we had 



APPENDIX. 643 

gold we could get sufficient supplies for our army, but the great 
difficulty is to obtain the gold. It is not in the coffers of the gov- 
ernment or the banks, but is principally hoarded by individuals 
throughout the country, and is inaccessible to us. I hope, under 
the reorganization of the commissary department, if we can 
maintain possession of our communications, that the army will 
be better supplied than heretofore, and that we can accumulate 
some provisions ahead. As regards the concentration of our 
troops near the capital, the effect would be to produce a like 
concentration of the enemy, and an increase of our difficulties in 
obtaining food and forage. But this, whether for good or evil, is 
now being accomplished by the enemy, who seems to be forcing 
Generals Beauregard and Bragg in this direction. If Sherman 
marches his army to Eichmond, as General Beauregard reports it 
is his intention to do, and General Schofield is able to unite with 
him, we shall have to abandon our j30sition on the James Eiver, 
as lamentable as it is on every account. The want of supplies 
alone would force us to withdraw when the enemy reaches the 
Eoanoke. Our line is so long, extending nearly from the Chicka- 
hominy to the I^ottoway, and the enemy is so close upon us, that 
if we are obliged to withdraw we cannot concentrate all our 
troops nearer than some point on the line of railroad between 
Eichmond and Danville. Should a necessity, therefore, arise, I 
propose to concentrate at or near Burkeville. The route for the 
troops north of James Eiver would have to be through Eichmond, 
on the road to Amelia Court- House, the cavalry passing up the 
north branch of the river, and crossing at some point above Eich- 
mond. Pickett's division would take the route through Chester- 
field Court- House, crossing the Appomattox at Goode's Bridge. 
With the army concentrated at or near BurkeviUe, our commu- 
nications north and south would be by that railroad, and west by 
the Southside Eailroad. We might also seize the opportunity of 
striking at Grant, should he pursue us rapidly, or at Sherman, 
before they could unite. I wish you to consider this subject, and 
give me your views. I desire you also to make every preparation 
to take the field at a moment's notice, and to accumulate all the 
supplies you can. General Grant seems to be preparing to move 
out by his left flank. He is accumulating near Hatcher's Eun 
depots of supplies, and apparently concentrating a strong force 
in that quarter. Yesterday and to-day trains have passed from 
his right to his left loaded with troops, which may be the body 
of eight thousand which you report having left Signal Hill yes- 
terday. I cannot tell whether it is his intention to maintain his 



644 APPENDIX. 

position until his other cohimns approach nearer, or to anticipate 
any movement by us which he might suppose would then become 
necessary. I wish you would watch closely his movements on 
the north side of the river, and try and ascertain whether he is 
diminishing his force. If he makes the move which appearances 
now indicate, he may draw out his whole force, abandoning his 
lines of defence, or hold them partially and move with the re- 
mainder of his trooj)S. 

I should like very much to confer with you on these subjects, 
but I fear it will be impossible for me to go north of James Eiver, 
and I do not know that it will be convenient for you to come 
here. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

E. E. Lee, 

General. 

P.S. — Can you not return Pickett's brigade to him in order 
that I may withdraw Grimes's brigade from his line, its division 
having been ordered to our right ? 

E. E. L. 

YI. 

Longstreet to Lee on Impressment of Men. 

[Confidential.] 

Head-quaktees, February 23, 1865. 
General E. E. Lee, 

Commanding, etc. : 

General, — Your letter of yesterday is received. I think you 
did not understand my letter of the 14th instant. My effort was 
to express conviction that Sherman's move was aimed at Eich- 
mond, and that Grant's concentration here would force us to do 
the same thing ; and, that we might be able to do so, it was neces- 
sary that we should have gold, by impressment, to purchase our 
produce supplies. I think that it is not too late yet. We can 
surely get the gold by sending impressing officers with guards to 
the vaults in which it is stored. 

I understand that there are twelve hundred men in Lynchburg 
already organized, and that we may get eight or ten thousand men 
in Eichmond by taking everybody who is able to bear arms. The 
staff- officers about Eichmond would be nearly enough to officer 
this force. If such a force can be raised and put in my lines, it 
can hold them, I think, and my corps can move down to the 
relief of Beauregard, or it may be moved over to our right, and 



APPENDIX. 645 

hold Grant in check, so that Sherman will be obliged to unite with 
him or seek a base at JSTew-Berne or at Wilmington. This would 
give Beauregard and Bragg time to unite their forces to meet 
Sherman and Schofield here or wherever they may appear. We 
shall lose more men by a move than by a battle. It is true that 
we may be compelled to move after the battle, but I think not. 
If we fight Sherman as I suggest, we shall surely drive him to the 
water for fresh supplies, even if we are not otherwise successful. 
Then we may have time to concentrate as soon as Grant, and re- 
open the line of communication with the South. 

The local and other troops that we may get from Eichmond and 
Lynchburg will have tolerably comfortable huts, and there will 
be enough old soldiers amongst them to teach them picket duty. 
There are also some cavalrymen who can aid them. 

I should think that Grant, if he moves, can only make a partial 
move, similar to his last, and that would not injure us very mate- 
rially. 

In preparing to take the field, in view of the abandonment of 
Eichmond, is it your desire to keep our wagons about our camps 
that we may move at once ? Our wagons are out all the time 
gathering supplies, and at times some distance ; so that a very 
sudden move would leave them behind. Shall we continue to 
send them or keep them with us *? . . . 

Your obedient servant, 

J. LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant- General. 
VII. 

Lee to Longstreet. 

Head-quartees, February 25, 1865. 
General, — I have received your letters of the 23d and 24th 
insts. I fear I did not entirely comprehend your views ex- 
pressed in your letter of the 14th. I think, however, my reply 
meets your supposition, in the event of concentration by the 
enemy. I shall in that case unite all the forces possible. I think 
you are misinformed as to the number of men in Lynchburg. At 
my last call ui^on General Colston, commissary there, he said he 
had not one hundred men, and they were unarmed. I am very 
glad to hear that General Ewell can get force enough from Eich- 
mond to man the lines north of James Eiver. I know him to be 
a brave old soldier, ready to attempt anything, but I do not know 
where he will find the men. Please see him and get a definite 
statements for if that can be done it will lighten our labor consid- 



646 APPENDIX. 

erably. You cannot afford to keep your wagons by you. They 
will liave to be kept collecting provisions, forage, etc., or you will 
starve. I am making great efforts to gather supplies, and send 
you some documents which will show what the commissary-gen- 
eral is doing in addition to the operations of the officers of his de- 
partment. It will be a grievous thing to be obliged to abandon our 
position, and I hope the necessity will never arise, but it would 
be more grievous to lose our army. I am fully alive to the benefits 
of procuring gold, but fear it cannot be obtained in the way you 
suggest ; still, I will try. I am much gratified by the earnestness 
and zeal you display in our operations ; and were our whole pop- 
ulation animated by the same spirit, we should be invincible. 
The last reports from S. C. indicated that Sherman was turning 
eastward. It may be to reach the Pedee in search of supplies. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

E. E. Lee, 

General. 
General Longsteeet, 

Commanding, etc. 

VIII. 

Longstreet to Lee on Impressment of Gold. 

Head-quarters First Corps, 

February 26, 1865. 
General E. E. Lee, 

Commanding : 

General, — I have just heard from General Ewell indirectly 
that he can raise force enough at Eichmond to hold the lines on 
this side, so that my corps may be withdrawn temporarily to your 
right, that is, if you can put a part of the Second Corps in place 
of Pickett's division. This arrangement will give you force 
enough to meet any move that the enemy may make upon your 
right. If he makes no move, then you can, when the proper mo- 
ment arrives, detach a force to the aid of General Beauregard, 
and if the enemy should then press you, you can abandon Peters- 
burg and hold your line here, and take up the line of the Apjjo- 
mattox. But I think that the enemy will be forced to move a 
force south the moment that he finds that you are reinforcing 
against Sherman, else he will encounter the risk of losing Sherman 
as well as Eichmond. There is some hazard in the plan, but 
nothing can be accomplished in war without risk. 

The other important question is provisions. We are doing 



APPENDIX. 647 

tolerably well by hauling from the country and paying market 
prices in Confederate money. If you would give us gold I have 
reason to believe that we could get an abundant supply for four 
months, and by that time we ought to be able to reopen our com- 
munication with the South. The gold is here, and we should 
take it. We have been impressing food and all of the necessaries 
of life from women and children, and have been the means of 
driving thousands from their homes in destitute conditions. 
Should we hesitate, then, about putting a few who have made im- 
mense fortunes at our expense to a little inconvenience by im- 
pressing their gold *? It is necessary for us, and I do not think 
that we should let our capital fall into the enemy's hands for fear 
of injuring the feelings or interests of a few individuals. We 
have expended too much of blood and treasure in holding it for 
the last four years to allow it to go now by default. I think that 
it may be saved. If it can, we should not leave any possible 
contingency untried. 

I think, however, that the enemy's positions are so well selected 
and fortified that we must either wait for an opportunity to draw 
him off from here or await his attack. For even a successful as- 
sault would cripple us so much that we could get no advantage 
commensurate with our loss. 

I remain with great respect, and truly, your obedient servant, 

J. LONGSTREET, 

Lieute7iant- General. 

IX. 

Longstreet to Lee on Ms '^ Peace' ^ Interview with General Ord. 

Head-quarters First Army Corps, 

March 1, 1865. 
General E. E. Lee, 

Commanding : 
General, — I had another interview with Major- General Ord 
yesterday, and expressed the opinions that were spoken of in our 
interview at the President's mansion on Sabbath last. He ac- 
ceded promptly to my proposition that the war must cease if we 
are to go to work to try to make peace, and to the proposal for a 
military convention. I further claimed that we could not go into 
convention upon any more favorable basis than an earnest desire 
to arrange plans for peace that should be equally honorable for 
both parties. To this also I understood him to give his unquali- 
fied consent. He says that General Grant has the authority to 
meet you if you have authority to appoint a military convention, 



648 APPENDIX. 

and proposed that you should indicate your desire to meet Gen- 
eral Grant, if you felt authorized to do so. As he made this 
X)roposition before mine, to the effect that General Grant should 
express his desire to meet you, and as the interview between 
General Ord and myself had been brought on at the request of 
General Ord, I did not feel that I could well do otherwise than 
promise to write to you of the disposition on their part to have 
the interview. If you think it worth your time to invite General 
Grant to an interview, it might be upon some other as the osten- 
sible grounds, and this matter might be brought up incidentally. 
I presume that General Grant's first proposition will be to go into 
convention upon the basis of reconstruction ; but if I have not 
misunderstood General Ord's conversation, General Grant will 
agree to take the matter up without requiring any principle as a 
basis further than the general principle of desiring to make peace 
upon terms that are equally honorable for both sides. I would 
suggest that the interview take place on this side, and at the 
place of meeting between General Ord and myself ; because there 
are several little points upon which you should be posted before 
the interview, and I do not see that I can well do that by writing. 
Besides, as '^the ice has already been broken" on this side, your 
interview would be relieved in a measure of the formality incident 
to such occasions. If it should be on this side, I hope that you 
will give me two or three days' notice. General Stevens is of the 
opinion that one thousand negro laborers on this line during this 
month will so strengthen our position that we will be able to 
spare a division, and I am satisfied that we can do so if we can 
have the work completed, and can get the aid that General Ewell 
promises us. 

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

J. LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant- General. 

X. 

Longstreet to Lee on Exchange of Political Prisoners. 

Head-quaetees First Army Corps, 

March 1, 1865. 
General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding : 
General, — I neglected to mention in my letter just finished 
that General Ord expressed some apprehension for General Grant 
lest there might be some misunderstanding in regard to the ex- 
change of political prisoners. The terms were general for the 



APPENDIX. 649 

exchange of this class of prisoners, but were not intended by him, 
he says, to include such as were under charges for capital oifences. 
General Grant desired that you should be advised of this con- 
struction of the terms. 

I remain, respectfully, your most obedient servant, 

J. LONGSTEEET, 

Lieutenant- General. 

XI. 

Lee to Longstreet on Interview with General Grant. 

Head quarters, 
March 2, 1865. 
General, — I have received to-day your letter of the 1st in- 
stant, and concluded to propose an interview to General Grant. 
As you desired to have two or three days' notice, I have appointed 
Monday next, 6th instant, at eleven a.m., at the point suggested 
by you. Will you send my letter to General Grant, and arrange 
"s^ith General Ord for the interview ■? If you will ride in to my 
quarters on Saturday next, 4th instant, by ten a.m., in Eichmond, 
I shall be happy to see you, when you can enlighten me on the 
points you referred to in your letter. 

I hope some good may result from the interview. 

Very truly yours, 

E. E. Lee, 

General. 
General J. Longstreet, 

Commanding, etc. : 

P.S, — Seal the letter to General Grant before transmitting. 

E. E. L. 



XII. 

Longstreet to Lee urging Use of Gold. 

Head-quarters First Army Corps, 

March 7, 1865. 
General E. E. Lee, 

Commanding : 

General, — I received a letter yesterday from a friend in the 

interior of North Carolina assuring me that there are large 

quantities of provisions in the State ; that many have two and 

three years' supply on hand, and that gold will bring anything 



650 APPENDIX. 

that we need to our armies. The gold is in the country, and most 
of it is lying idle. Let us take it at once and save Richmond, 
and end the war. If we hold Eichmond and keep our cotton, the 
war cannot last more than a year longer. If we give up Rich- 
mond we shall never be recognized by foreign powers until the 
government of the United States sees fit to recognize us. If we- 
hold Eichmond and let the enemy have our cotton, it seems to me 
that we shall furnish him the means to carry on the war against 
us. It looks to me as though the enemy had found that our policy 
of destroying the cotton rather than let it fall into their hands 
would break them down, and that it has forced them to the 
policy of sending on here to make a contract to feed and clothe 
our armies in order that they may get the means of carrying on 
the war of subjugation. If we will keep our cotton and use our 
gold our work will be comparatively easy. 

I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

J. LONGSTREET, 

Lieutenant- General. 



XIII. 

Longstreet to Lee on guarding the Danville Bailroad. 

Head-quarters First Army Corps, 

March 20, 1865. 
General E. E. Lee, • 

Commanding : 
General, — I presume that the enemy's next move will be to 
raid against the Danville Eailroad, and think that it would be well 
if we begin at once to make our arrangements to meet it. In order 
that we may get the troops that may be necessary to meet such a 
move, would suggest that we collect all the dismounted men of 
Generals Fitz Lee, Eosser, and Lomax, and put them behind our 
strongest lines, and draw out a corps of infantry and hold it in 
readiness for the raid. General W. H. F. Lee's dismounts might 
also be used behind our works to great advantage. With a cav- 
alry force of two or three thousand men to hold the enemy in 
check, I think that our infantry may be able to overtake the 
raiding column. If we can get a large cavalry force I think that 
we would surely be able to destroy the raiding force. 
I remain your obedient servant, 

J. Longstreet, 

Lieutenant- General. 



APPENDIX. 651 



XIV. 



Longstreet to Assistant Adjutant- General Taylor on Suppression of 

Desertion. 

Head-quarters First Army Corps, 
March 25, 1865. 
Lieutenant- Colonel W. H. Taylor, 

Assistant Adjutant- General : 
The impression prevails amongst the Georgia troops of this 
command that persons at home having authority to raise local 
organizations are writing and sending messages to the men in the 
ranks here, offering inducements to them to quit our ranks and go 
home and join the home organizations. The large and increasing 
number of desertions, particularly amongst the Georgia troo]3S, 
induces me to believe that some such outside influence must be 
operating upon our men. I^early all of the parties of deserters 
seem to go home, and it must be under the influence of some 
promise, such as being received in the local forces. I would sug- 
gest, therefore, the publication of a general order warning all 
of&cers or persons authorized to raise local organizations against 
receiving such deserters or in any way harboring them, and 
cautioning all such parties that they shall be punished for such 
crimes under the twenty-second and twenty-third Articles of 
War. It may be well to publish the articles in the order, and to 
send the order South to be published in all the Southern papers. 
If the order is published, I would suggest that copies be sent to 
the Southern papers by special messenger or by parties going 
South who will take pains to have it published, otherwise I fear 
it may miscarry or be delayed by our irregular mails. Another 
growing evil seems to trouble us now in the shape of applications 
to raise negro comi)anies, regiments, brigades, etc. The desire 
for i)romotion seems to have taken possession of our army, and it 
seems that nearly all the officers and men think that they could 
gain a grade or more if allowed to go home. I presume that 
many may try to go merely because they get furloughs. I would 
suggest, therefore, that some regulation be published upon this 
subject, and it seems to me that it should require the companies 
to be mustered in as non-commissioned officers and privates by 
the enrolling officers, and that all of the officers (general, field, 
and company) shall be selected from the officers, non-commis- 
sioned officers, and privates on duty with the armies of the Con- 



652 APPENDIX. 

federacy. If these matters are not speedily taken hold of by a 
firm hand, I fear that we shall be seriously damaged by them. 
I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 
(Signed) J. Longsteeet, 

Lieutenant- General. 

XV. 

Longstreet to Lee on Sheridan'' s Operations. 

Head-quaetees Fiest Abmy Coeps, 

March 28, 1865. 
Geneeal E. E. Lee, 

Commanding, etc. : 
Your telegram asking if we can spare General Pickett's di- 
vision as a supporting force to our cavalry is received. I sug- 
gested that it should be sent on that service because I was appre- 
hensive that our railroad would be in danger of being broken up 
behind us, leaving us without supplies sufficient to hold Eich- 
mond until our communications south could be re-established, or 
in case Sheridan went to N. C, his mounted force would be too 
formidable for that of General Johnston's, and that General 
Johnston would be in great danger if we shall not reinforce him. 
I do not think that we can well spare the division. But I think 
that we would choose a lesser risk by sparing it in case Sheri- 
dan's cavalry makes either of these moves contemplated than 
we would by holding him here to await the result of these opera- 
tions. The enemy seems now to count ui:>on taking Richmond by 
raiding uj)on our lines of communication, and not by attacking 
our lines of work. I think, therefore, we should endeavor to put 
a force in the field that can contend against that of the enemy. 
If Grant sends off his cavalry, he can hardly intend to make any 
general move of his main army until its return. In every aspect 
of affairs, so far as I am advised, I think that the greater danger 
is from keeping too close within our trenches. If we can remain 
where we are independently of the railroad, and if General 
Johnston would be safe with such a force as Sheridan's operating 
against him, in addition to Sherman's, we had better keep the 
division here. You know much more about all those points than 
I do, and are much better able to decide upon them. My supply 
train is in from Northern Neck, and starts back to-morrow for 
other i^rovisions. If there is any impropriety in sending it back, 
please telegraph me as soon as you receive this, that I may recall 
it. We have about one hundred thousand pounds of meat near 



APPENDIX. 653 

Dublin and eighteen thousand at New Boston. The C. S. com- 
plains that the railroad agents will not ship the meat unless it is 
boxed. This cannot always be done. If you can in any way aid 
us in this matter, we shall do very well for some time to come. 
I remain, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 
(Signed) J. Longstreet, 

lAeutenant- General. 



XVI. 

Longstreet to Adjutant- General Taylor on Policy towards New 
Organizations. 

Head-quarters First Army Corps, 

March 30, 1865. 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Taylor, 

Assistant Adjutant- General : 
Your letter expressing the views of the commander-in-chief in 
reference to the policy to be pursued in raising negro troops is re- 
ceived. I am apprehensive that we shall have applications and 
evidence enough to take from us more men than we can well spare 
at this critical moment in our affairs. It seems to me that any 
person who has the influence to raise a company or a regiment by 
going home could do so as well by letters to his friends at home. 
If I am right in this opinion, an order announcing that the offi- 
cers of the companies and regiments of colored troops would be 
appointed from the officers, non- commissioned officers, and pri- 
vates on duty with our armies would have the effect of bringing 
back more absentees than we should lose by making the appoint- 
ments. If we may judge of our future success in getting up new 
organizations by the past, we may rely upon it that many will 
furnish the necessary evidence, and go home and there remain for 
eight and ten and twelve months. I think it would be well to pub- 
lish a general order, explaining more clearly the policy indicated 
in your letter, in order that a better general understanding may 
exist amongst the parties who may desire to furnish evidence of 
their ability to get up new organizations. Otherwise I may adopt 
rules which would not be as favorable to the officers and men of 
this command as those of other commands. 

I remain very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
(Signed) J. Longstreet, 

Lieutenant- General. 



654 APPENDIX. 



XVII. 



Lee to Longstreet on Proposed Puhlication of a History of Virginia 

Campaigns. 

Lexington, Va,, January 19, 1866. 
General J. Longstreet : 

My dear General, — Upon my return from Eiclimond, where 
I have been for a week on business connected with Washington 
College, I found your letter of the 26th ultimo. I regret very 
much that you never received my first letter, as you might then, 
perhaps, have given me the information I desired, with more ease 
to yourself and with more expedition than now. I did not know 
how to address it, but sent it to a friend in Richmond, who gave 
it to one of our officers going south, who transferred it to another, 
etc., and after travelling many weary miles, has been recently 
returned to me. I start it again in pursuit of you, though you 
did not tell me how to address you. I have almost forgotten 
what it contained, but I hope it will inform you of my purpose in 
writing a history of the campaigns in Virginia, and of the object 
that I have in view, so that you may give me all the information 
in your power. I shall be in no hurry in publishing, and will not 
do so until I feel satisfied that I have got the true story, as my 
only object is to disseminate the truth. I am very sorry to hear 
that your records were destroj^ed too ; but I hope Sorrel and La- 
trobe will be able to supply you with all you require. I wish to 
relate the acts of all the corps of the Army of J^orthern Virginia 
wherever they did duty, and do not wish to omit so important a 
one as yours. I will therefore wait as long as I can. 

I shall be very glad to receive anything you may give to Mr. 
Washington McLean, as I know you recommend no one but those 
who deserve your good opinion. 

I am delighted to hear that your arm is still improving, and 
hope it will soon be restored. You are, however, becoming so ac- 
complished with your left hand as not to need it. You must re- 
member me very kindly to Mrs. Longstreet and all your children. 
I have not had an ojjportunity yet to return the compliment she 
paid me. I had, while in Richmond, a great many inquiries after 
you, and learned that you intended commencing business in 
!N'ew Orleans. If you become as good a merchant as you were a 
soldier, I shall be content. No one will then excel you, and no 
one can wish you more success and more happiness than I. My 



APPENDIX. 655 

interest and affection for you will never cease, and my prayers are 
always offered for your prosperity. 

I am most truly yours, 

E. E. Lee. 

XVIII. 

Lee to Long street — Congratulations. 

Lexington, Va., January 26, 1866. 

LONGSTREET, OWEN & Co., 

New Orleans : 

Gentlemen, — I am much obliged to you for your business card, 
and the pleasure it has afforded me to know that you have en- 
tered into partnership. I know you will do your work well, and 
please myself, therefore, with the prospect of your great success. 

I wrote to your senior a few days since, at Macon, Mississippi, 
and hope he will receive my letter. I do not consider my partner- 
ship with him yet dissolved, and shall not let go him during life. 

Wishing ,you all happiness and prosperity, I am, with great 
affection, your obedient servant, 

E. E. Lee. 

XIX. 

Lee to Longstreet, suggesting the Preparation of his Memoirs. 

Lexington, Va., March 9, 1866. 
General J. Longstreet : 

My dear General, — Your son Garland handed me a few days 
since your letter of the 15th of January, with the copies of your 
reports of operations in East Tennessee, Wilderness, Virginia, and 
of some of my ofi&cial letters to you. I hope you will be able to 
send me a report of your operations around Suffolk and Eich- 
mond previous to the evacuation of that city, and of any of my 
general orders which you may be able to collect. 

Can you not occupy your leisure time in preparing your memoirs 
of the war"? Every officer whose position and character would 
give weight to his statements ought to do so. It is the only way 
in which we may hope that fragments of truth will reach pos- 
terity. Mrs. Longstreet will act as your amanuensis. I am very 
sorry that your arm improves so slowly. I trust it will be eventu- 
ally restored to you. You must present my kindest regards to 
Mrs. Longstreet. I hope your home in New Orleans will be 



656 APPENDIX. 

happy ; tliat your life, wMch is dear to me, may be long and 
prosperous. 

Most truly yours, 

E. E. Lee. 

XX. 

Longstreet to Lee on Battle of Gaines's Mill. 

New Orleans, La., March 20, 1866. 
General E. E, Lee, 

Lexington, Va. : 
My dear General, — Your favor of the 9th instant is re- 
ceived. The papers or copies sent by Garland contain every- 
thing that I have or can get in the shape of your letters and 
orders. I shall be able to give you an account of movements, 
etc., connected with the Suffolk campaign and the siege of Eich- 
mond when I can get our diaries, — that is, Sorrel's, Latrobe's, 
and my own. But I fear that I shall not be able to do so in time 
to meet your desires. I shall send all that I can gather together 
to your house as soon as I can. I have sometimes thought that I 
would make the effort to write at some future time, but begin to 
despair of my arm. It is too much labor to write with my left 
hand, and it gives me inconvenience, indeed pain, to keep my right 
hand in the constrained position necessary in writing. Our busi- 
ness affairs occupy my days from nine till four p.m., so I am glad 
to give my arm rest after that time. Mrs. Longstreet would be 
rather a poor amanuensis in the evening, my only spare time, as 
her two little boys, Lee and Jim, occupy most of her time. She 
is trying to get a picture of Lee to send you. I delivered your 
message that you ' ' regretted that you had not been able to return 
the compliment." To go back to history and the war. There is 
one portion of our records as written that I should like cor- 
rected, — the battle of Gaines's Mill. Your report of that battle 
does not recognize the fact that the line in my front, that is, the 
enemy's line, was broken by the troops that were under my 
orders and handling. A part of Jackson's command, being astray, 
reported to me just as I was moving my column of attack for- 
ward, — Whiting's division, — and I put it in my column of attack, 
as stated in my report. I think that you must have overlooked 
my report on this point, and have been guided by Jackson's. 
Jackson knew nothing of the matter of my having his troops, I 
suppose, and merely made his report from riding over the ground 
after the battle. I presume that he was not within one mile of 



APPENDIX. 657 

the division when I put it in, and had no idea of its whereabouts. 
General Whiting reported to me that he had lost his way, and 
did not know where to find General Jackson, and ofifered his 
troops if I had use for them. I was then moving to assault, and 
put Whiting in a little behind Pickett's brigade. The commands 
made the assault together, and broke the enemy's line. Ander- 
son's brigade followed and secui'ed it, the assaulting columns 
being somewhat broken in making the charge. Just after break- 
ing his lines the enemy made a severe attack, and would have 
recovered his position, I think, but for the timely support of 
Anderson's and Kemper's brigades at this point. Another fact 
should not be lost sight of in this connection. A. P. Hill had 
made several formidable attacks at the same point, and had fought 
manfully against it for several hours, and though not entirely suc- 
cessful, he must have made a decided impression, and have injured 
the enemy as much as he was himself injured, and thus weakened 
the enemy's lines so as to enable us to break them. It is quite 
common to give those credit only who show results, but it fre- 
quently happens, as in this case, that there are others who merit 
as much who are not known by results, — that is, who are not seen 
by others than those on the ground. 

If you can come across my son when you have an idle moment, 
I hope that you will give him a few words of kindly advice and 
encouragement. He is taught to look uj) to you as superior to 
others. Mrs. Longstreet joins me in affectionate salutations. 

I remain very truly yours, 

J. LONGSTEEET. 

XXI. 

Lee to Longstreet — Situation and Prospects. 

Lexington, Va., May 25, 1866. 
Geneeal J. Longstreet : 

My deae, Geneeal, — I was very glad to receive your letter 
of the 18th, but you told me so little of yourself that I presume 
you intend writing to me again shortly. But what you did say 
was very satisfactory, and I am much pleased to know that your 
prospects in>a commercial point of view are good and progressive. 
I hope they may regularly and surely advance. I feel much 
obliged by your kind proposition as regards myself. For the 
present I must remain where I am. When I see that I have done 
all the good that I can accomplish for Washington College I may 
find it necessary to do something that will enable me to procure a 

42 



658 APPENDIX. 

competence for my family. I will then turn my hand to whatever 
may offer. For myself I want nothing but my food and clothes. 
I send in compliance with your request a number of autographs, 
enough, I should think, to last for all time ; but if they will be of 
any service to you I will send more. Mr. Lowe has not yet 
reached Lexington. It will give me pleasure to see him when he 
does, as he comes from you. As you did not mention your arm, 
I hope that is improving too. You must never omit to mention 
it, Mrs. Longstreet, and your children when you write. I see 
Garland very often in my walks, but very rarely at my house. . . 
All unite in kindest regards to yourself and family. 

Most truly yours, 

E. E. Lee. 



INDEX. 



Adams, General, wounded at Chicka- 
niauga, 446. 

Alden, Bradford R., at JefTerson Bar- 
racks, 17; friendliness of, to Long- 
street, 632. 

Alexander, General E. P., at Fred- 
ericksburg, 311, 316; at Gettysburg, 
389, 390, 391 ; notifies Pickett to ad- 
vance, 392 ; goes to Tennessee with 
Longstreet, 437 ; on Lookout Moun- 
tain, 463; at Campbell's Station, 
493 ; at Knoxville, 497 ; at Mechan- 
icsville (1864), 553; letter of, to 
Longstreet, on affairs at Wilderness, 
570, 571. 

Amazon Creek, engagement at, 606. 

Amusement of soldiers, 325, 326. 

Anderson, General G. B., at Seven 
Pines, 94 ; at South Mountain, 222 ; 
mortally wounded at Sharpsburg, 
249. 

Anderson, General G. T., at Sharps- 
burg, 242, 247; wounded at Get- 
tysburg, 372 ; brigade of, receives 
Farnsworth's cavalry charge, 395 ; in 
retreat from Gettysburg, 428 ; joins 
Hood's division in Tennessee, 462 ; 
in assault of Fort Sanders, 502, 503, 
505, 506 ; at "Wilderness, 562 ; cap- 
tures prisoners at Farmville, 617. 

Anderson, Lieutenant-General R. H., 
at Williamsburg, 72, 75, 76; at 
Seven Pines, 94 ; at Sharpsburg, 
247, 249 ; report of interview with 
General Lee at Gettysburg, 357 ; 
in fight at Little Round Top. 372; 
in command of left division on 
Kapidan (1864), 553; division of, in 



the Wilderness, 559, 562 ; succeeds 
Longstreet, wounded, 565 ; at Five 
Forks, 602 ; in engagement at Ama- 
zon Creek, 606 ; makes attack at 
Rice's Station, 613 ; letter to, from 
General Lee, 639. 

A ntietam, battle of. See Sharpsburg. 

Appendix, 639. 

Appomattox, surrender at, officers urge 
negotiations for surrender, 618 ; Gen- 
eral Grant asks surrender, 619 ; Gen- 
eral Lee replies, asking terms, 619 ; 
interview of General Pendleton with 
General Lee, 620, 621 ; General Grant 
states terms for surrender, 622 ; Gen- 
eral Lee proposes meeting with Gen- 
eral Grant, 622 ; Sheridan's decisive 
action, 622 ; General Lee gives orders 
for march to Appomattox Court- 
House, 628 ; an account of last 
scenes of activity, 624 ; General Lee 
confers with Longstreet and Mahone, 
624, 625 ; General Lee rides to meet 
General Grant, 625 ; Longstreet en- 
deavors to recall Lee, 626 ; General 
Custer's demand of surrender from 
Longstreet, 627 ; truce ordered, 628 ; 
sjnnpathy of soldiers for General Lee, 
629 ; Generals Grant and Longstreet 
meet, 630 ; details of capitulation ar- 
ranged, 630 ; number of troops sur- 
rendered and paroled, 631. 

Archer, General, at Shepherdstown, 
264 ; at Fredericksburg, 309 ; cap- 
tured at Gettysburg, 354, 389. 

Arista, General, in command of Mex- 
ican forces, 22. 

Armies. See Confederate, Federal, 
Army of the Potomac, Army of 
Northern Virginia. 

659 



660 



INDEX. 



Armistead, General, at Malvern Hill, 
143 ; killed beside Federal battery in 
Pickett's charge (Gettysburg), 394. 

Armstrong, General, at Chickamauga, 
441 ; makes great capture of cattle, 
530 ; in sharp engagement on the 
French Broad, 532. 

Army corps. See Corps. 

Army of Northern Virginia, losses of, 
in Maryland campaign, 266, 267 ; 
condition of, on entering Maryland, 
284 ; reorganized in October, 1862, 
290 ; strength of, at Fredericksburg, 
305 ; strength and organization of, 
at Fredericksburg, 317 et seq. ; di- 
vided into three corps, 332 ; in readi- 
ness for Gettysburg campaign, 334 ; 
organization of, in Gettysburg, 410 ; 
in retreat from Gettysburg, 426 et 
seq. ; strength of, in 1864, 552-554 ; 
capitulation of, at Appomattox, 631. 

Army of Observation, 18. 

Army of Occupation, 19. 

Army of the Potomac, organization of, 
in Maryland campaign, 209, 271 ; 
strength of, at Antietam, 265 ; losses 
of, at Antietam, 266 ; reorganized by 
General Burnside, 292; strength of, 
at Fredericksburg, 305 ; in false posi- 
tion at Fredericksburg, 323 ; before 
Gettysburg, 335 ; Meade succeeds 
Hooker in command of, 348 ; organ- 
ization of, at Gettysburg, 415 ; 
strength of, in 1864, 552 ; crosses the 
Kapidan, 555; posting of, at Five 
Forks, 593. 

Army of the Tennessee, first victory 
of the, 456 ; Longstreet offered com- 
mand of, 466 ; Hardee offered com- 
mand of, 466 (note). 

Army of Virginia organized, 153 ; 
strength of, 153, 157. 

"Attrition," policy of, 551. 

Averill, General, makes raid from West 
Virginia into East Tennessee, 521, 
522. 

Avery, Colonel, death of, at Gettys- 
burg, 375. 

Ayres, General, at Five Forks, 598, 
599, 601. 



B. 

Badeau, General, quoted on strength 
of Army of Potomac in 1864, 552, 
553. 

Baird, General, at Chickamauga, 441. 

Baker, E. D., 61. 

Ball's Bluff, engagement at, 61. 

Banks, General N. P., in command of 
Second Corps, Army of Virginia, 
153 ; his battle against Jackson at 
Slaughter Mountain, 157 

Barksdale, General, at Fredericksburg, 
301, 303; takes battery at Gettys- 
burg, 370 ; guiding spirit of the 
battle, 371 ; mortally v?ounded, 372. 

Barlow, General, at Antietam, 250 ; 
fall of, 252, 266; at Gettysburg, 
355. 

Baxter, Colonel, crosses the river at 
Fredericksburg under fire, 303. 

Beauregard, General G. T., at West 
Point, 16; at Manassas, 33, 35; in- 
structions to commanders, 36 ; order 
for battle, 44; order miscarries, 46; 
in charge of left, 49 ; brave charge 
by, 50 ; ordered West, 64 ; proposal 
to bring, into Gettysburg campaign, 
336; prejudice against, of Davis, 
432, 545 ; Longstreet writes Presi- 
dent Davis in favor of, 547. 

Beauregard, Lieutenant K. T., at 
Chickamauga, 441. 

Beaver Dam Creek. See Mechanics- 
ville. 

Bee, General Bernard E., at Manassas, 
46, 48; gives name of " Stonewall" 
to Jackson, 49. 

Bennings, General, at Gettysburg, 370, 
396 ; in retreat from Gettysburg, 431 ; 
at Chickamauga, 448 ; at Peters- 
burg, 606. 

Bermuda Hundred, Pickett's division 
assigned to, 574 ; assault on, by 
Parke (Petersburg), 605. 

Berry, General, at Fredericksburg, 309. 

Birney, General, at Fredericksburg, 
309 ; at Gettysburg, account of affair 
at Peach Orchard, 366 ; at Wilder- 
ness, 559. 



\ 



INDEX. 



661 



Blackburn's Pord, engagement at, 38. 
See Manassas, First. 

Blair, Hon. Montgomery, peace mission 
of, 583. 

Bonham, General M. S., at Manassas, 
52. 

Bostan, Colonel, killed, 630. 

Boteler's Ford, 264. See Shepherds- 
town. 

Bowen, Orderly, killed at "Wilderness, 
564. 

Bragg, General Braxton, at "West Point, 
17 ; threatening near Chattanooga, 
434, 436 ; Longstreet at head-quarters 
of, 438 ; plan of, for Chickamauga, 
439 ; gives orders to Longstreet's di- 
vision commanders, 447 ; disturbed by 
plan of battle, 452 ; absence of, from 
field, 455, 457 ; order for retreat, 456, 
457 ; did not know result of Chicka- 
mauga until next day, 458 ; receives 
report of battle from Longstreet, 461 ; 
refuses to pursue the enemy, 462, 
463 ; oflScers call for removal of, 464 ; 
puts Generals Polk and Hindman 
under charges, 465 ; inquiry in re- 
gard to, by President Davis, 465 ; on 
affairs subsequent to Chickamauga, 
471 ; criticism upon, 472 ; ignores 
signal service reports and is surprised, 
474, 475 ; plans to capture Hooker's 
rear-guard by night attack, 475; 
orders Longstreet into East Tennes- 
see, 481 ; urges Longstreet to make 
rapid movement, 483 ; orders speedy 
attack of Knoxville by Longstreet, 
501 ; orders Longstreet to co-opera- 
tion with his army after defeat at 
Chattanooga, 507 ; relieved of com- 
mand by General Hardee, 515 ; called 
to Kichmond as commander-in-chief, 
516 ; suggestions of, before authori- 
ties at Eichmond, 545 ; action of, 
after Chickamauga criticised by 
Longstreet before authorities at 
Eichmond, 546 ; ordered to Wil- 
mington, 580; comment on, by Con- 
federate newspaper, 582 (note). 

Branch, General L. O'B., report of, on 
march to Mechanicsville, 123. 



Brandy Station, cavalry engagement 
at, between Stuart and Pleasonton, 
338. 

Brannan, General, at Chickamauga, 
442. 

Bratton,- Colonel, in attack on Hooker's 
rear-guard near Lookout Mountain, 
476, 477. 

Breckenridge, Major-General J. C , at 
Chickamauga, 441 ; in assault, 445, 
446 ; appointed Secretary of "War, 
583, 584. 

Bristoe Station, engagement at^ between 
Ewell and Hooker, 170. 

Brockenbrough, General, at Fredericks- 
burg, 307 ; at Gettysburg, 354. 

Bryan, General, in assault on Fort 
Sanders, 505, 520. 

Buckner, General Simon, at Chicka- 
mauga, 439 ; gives opinion adverse 
to Bragg, 465 ; letter to, from Long- 
street, 484, 485. 

Buford, General, at Gettysburg, 351, 
352, 353. 

Bull Eun. See Manassas. 

Bull's Gap, Longstreet's army at, 542. 

Burnside, General A. E., ordered to 
Fredericksburg to aid Pope, 159 ; 
begins work at " Burnside's bridge," 
244 ; continuance of, 254, 256, 257, 
258; McClellan's orders to, for taking 
bridge, 258 ; effects crossing, 260 ; 
battle concentrates against, 261 ; 
his advance arrested, 262 ; assigned 
to command Army of the Potomac, 
291 ; reorganizes army in three 
"Grand Divisions," 292; submits 
plan to President Lincoln, 292; plan 
of, for crossing Eappahannock at 
Fredericksburg, 301 ; plan of, for bat- 
tle, 304; orders that Mar3'e's Hill 
must be carried before night, 312 ; 
orders of, to Franklin criticised, 315 ; 
memorandum of, for renewal of at- 
tack on Marye's Hill, captured, 316 ; 
abortive moves by, 322 et seq. ; in 
East Tennessee, 434, 436, 480, 481 ; 
has army of twenty-five thousand 
men north of Knoxville, 482 ; acts 
on defensive at Knoxville, 488 ; sends 



662 



INDEX. 



troops to Little Tennessee Eiver, 490 ; 
report of, on condition at Knox- 
ville, 499, 500 ; relieved of command 
at Knoxville by General Foster, 514 ; 
in command of Ninth Corps in Vir- 
ginia, 552. 

Burnside's bridge. See Burnside, Gen- 
eral A. E., and Sharpsburg. 

Butler, General Benjamin F., in front 
of Kichmond, 575, 576; move on 
Fort Fisher, 580. 



Campaign in far South, consideration 
of, 540. 

Campaign of 1864, 551 et seq. 

Campbell, Judge J. A., 583. 

Campbell's Station, engagement at, 
492, 494. 

Cannon-shots, remarkable, 254, 255. 

Capitulation. See Appomattox, surren- 
der at. 

Carr, General, at Dandridge, 526. 

Cashtown, Lee calls for concentration 
at, 848. 

Chambersburg, Confederates at, 351. 

Chancellorsville, losses at, 327 : criti- 
cism upon, 329, 330. 

Chantilly, battle of, 193; killing of 
Kearny and Stevens at, 194. 

Charles City Cross-Roads. See Fray- 
ser's Farm. 

Chattanooga, Federal army at, 462 et 
seq. 

Cheatham, General, at Chickamauga, 
441 ; gives opinion adverse to General 
Bragg, 465. 

Chester Gap, Longstreet's command at, 
in retreat from Gettysburg, 431. 

Chickahominy River, McClellan ad- 
vances to, 82 (see Seven Pines) ; 
fighting along the, in summer of 
1862, 120 et seq. ; McClellan changes 
base from, to James River, 132. 

Chickamauga, battle of [see Westward 
movement), Longstreet arrives at 
Bragg's head-quarters, 438 ; plan for, 
439 ; Confederate purpose to push 
between enemy and his base at 



Chattanooga, 440 ; Confederate posi- 
tions, 440, 441 ; Union positions, 
441, 442 ; General Bragg orders direct 
assault, 443, 445 ; battle opened by 
advance of General D. H. Hill's 
corps, 445; General Helm killed, 
446; attack by Cleburne, 446; 
Longstreet's troops assault, 447 ; 
wounding of General Hood, 448; 
Federals driven back, 448, 449 ; 
change in plan by Longstreet, 450 ; 
right wing ceases active battle, 452 ; 
contention by left wing as indepen- 
dent battle, 455 ; the Union army 
melts away, 455, 456; rejoicings of 
Confederates, 456 ; General Thomas 
marches for Rossville Gap, 456 ; 
retreat was made before issue of 
Rosecrans's order, 457 ; Confederates 
hold Snodgrass Hill, 457 ; losses, 
458 ; heavy losses by regiments, 459 ; 
Longstreet urges pursuit of the Fed- 
erals, 461 et seq. ; absence of both 
commanders from the field, 472 ; 
action of Bragg after close of, re- 
ferred to at Richmond by Longstreet, 
546. 

Cleburne, General, at Chickamauga, 
441, 446. 

Cobb, General, attacked by Franklin 
at Crampton's Pass, 229, 230; at 
Fredericksburg, 303 ; killing of, 311. 

Colgrove, Colonel Silas, finds Lee's 
"lost order," 213. 

Confederate army, organization and 
strength of, at Manassas (First), 57 ; 
strength of, at Sharpsburg, 265, 266 ; 
losses of, at Sharpsburg, 266 ; condi- 
tion of, on entering Maryland, 284 ; 
reorganized, 290 ; strength of, at 
Fredericksburg, 305 ; numbers and 
organization of, at Fredericksburg, 
S17 et seq. ; divided into three corps, 
332 ; ready for Gettysburg campaign, 
334 ; organization of, at Gettysburg, 
410 ; in retreat from Gettysburg, 426 
et seq. ; strength and losses of, at 
Chickamauga, 458 ; losses of, at 
Knoxville, 508; strength of, 1864, 
552 ; capitulation of, 630. 



INDEX. 



663 



Confederate flag. See Flag. 

Confederate soldier, tributes to, 200, 
288 ; amusement of, 325. 

Congress, Confederate, tenders vote of 
thanks to General Longstreet, 550 ; 
expresses want of confidence in Pres- 
ident Davis, 583 ; passes law for ap- 
pointment of commander-in-chief, 
583. 

Cooke, Colonel, at Sharpsburg, 250, 
267. 

Corps, army, two provisional, organized 
by McClellan on Chickahominy, 82 ; 
First (Confederate) , losses of, at Sharps- 
burg, 2G6 ; First (Confederate), firm- 
ness of, 834; Second (Confederate), 
leading on march into Pennsylvania, 
340; First (Confederate), on march 
into Pennsylvania, 341 ; Third (Con- 
federate), march of, to Gettysburg, 
344; First (Confederate), at Gettys- 
burg, 397 et seq. ; vote of thanks to 
First (Confederate), in Congress, 550 ; 
Ninth (Federal), under Burnside, 
552 ; General Lee on services of First 
(Confederate), 639. 

Corpus Christi, army concentrates at, 19. 

Ctirse, General, at Five Forks, 595, 
600, 601 ; captured, 614. 

Couch, General D. N., at Seven Pines, 
95, 98 ; at Harper's Ferry, 229, 232. 

Councils of war, at Richmond, April, 
1862, 66 ; Johnston's, before Seven 
Pines, 85, 86; by General G. W. 
Smith, at Seven Pines, 107 ; of Lee 
and his officers, June, 1862, 121 ; in 
spring of 1864, at Eichmond, 543- 
595. 

Cox, General J. D., with Pleasonton, 
opens battle of South Mountain, 
221, 223 ; at Burnside's bridge in 
command of Ninth Corps, 258. 

Crampton's Pass, description of, 206 ; 
General Franklin ordered to, by Mc- 
Clellan, 217 ; Hampton's cavalry at, 
229; Franklin and Cobb have engage- 
ment at, 229, 230. 

Crittenden, General T. L., at Chicka- 
mauga, 442 ; goes before court of 
inquiry, 465. 



Crook, General, at Burnside's bridge 
(Antietam), 259 ; attacks Confederate 
trains, 612. 

Cross, Colonel, at Antietam, 266. 

CuUen, J. S. D., letter of, to General 
Longstreet on second day at Gettys- 
burg, 383 (note). 

Cumberland Church, engagement at, 
615. 

Cumberland Gap, engagement at, 513. 

Cumming, Lieutenant, bravery of, at 
Fort Sanders, 520. 

Curtin, Andrew G., Governor of Penn- 
sylvania, letter of, -to General Mc- 
Clellan, 282. 

Custer, General, at Gettysburg, 396 ; 
defeats and captures most of Early's 
command at Waynesboro', 590; at 
Five Forks, 598 ; division of, at Ap- 
pomattox, 622 ; demands and is re- 
fused surrender of Longstreet, 627. 



Dandridge, affair at, 528 et seq. 

Danville Eailroad, Longstreet on guard- 
ing of, 650. 

Davis, Lieutenant-Colonel H., escapes 
with command from Harper's Ferry, 
231. 

Davis, Jefferson, President, in council, 
April, 1862, 66 ; high opinion of Mc- 
Clellan, 66 ; on battle-field (Frayser's 
Farm), 134; letter to, from General 
Lee, relative to peace proposition, 
204 ; prejudice of, against Johnston 
and Beauregard, 432 ; visits Army 
of Tennessee and makes inquiry as 
to General Bragg, 465 ; proffers com- 
mand to Longstreet, 466 ; urges pro- 
motion of General Law, 467 ; holds 
second conference with commanders 
at Bragg's head-quarters, 468 ; favors 
Longstreet's suggestion for change 
of base to Rome, Georgia, 469 ; leaves 
army more despondent than he 
found it, 470 ; orders Longstreet 
to march to Bragg's relief, 507 ; gives 
Longstreet discretionary authority 
over troops in the department, 511; 



664 



INDEX. 



orders Longstreet to send Martin's 
cavalry to Johnston, 539 ; in council 
with Generals Lee, Longstreet, and 
Bragg, 545, 546 ; want of confidence 
in, expressed by Congress, 583 ; re- 
ceives news of defeat at Petersburg 
in church at Kichmond, 607. 

Davis, General Jefferson C, at Chicka- 
mauga, 442. 

Dearing, General, killed, 630. 

Dent, Frederick, home of, 18. 

Dent, Miss Julia, meets Lieutenant 
Grant, 18. 

Dent, Marshall, maternal grandfather 
of author, 13. 

Dent, Mary Ann, mother of author, 14. 

Desertion, Longstreet on suppression 
of, 651. 

Deshler, General, mortally wounded 
at Chickamauga, 446. 

Devens, General, 590, 598. 

Doby, Captain, killed at Wilderness, 
564. 

Doubleday, General Abner, in engage- 
ment against Jackson at Groveton, 
176, 177 ; at Antietam, 241 ; at Fred- 
ericksburg, 309; in command of a 
corps at Gettysburg, 353, 355. 

Douglas, Colonel, killed at Sharpsburg, 
243. 

Dranesville, engagement at, 62. 

Duncan, Captain J. H., defends Fort 
Gregg (Petersburg), 607. 

Duryea, Colonel, charge of, at Burn- 
side's bridge (Antietam), 259. 

E. 

Early, General Jubal A., at Manassas, 
39 ; at Williamsburg, 78 ; at Sharps- 
burg, 242, 245; appointment of, us 
lieutenant-general , 332 ; on march 
to Gettysburg, 344 ; in battle, 874, 
375 ; charges of, against Longstreet 
and First Corps, 397; comment on, 
402 ; defeat in the Yalley, 579 ; com- 
mand of, captured by Custer at 
Waynesboro', 590. 

East Tennessee campaign, Longstreet 
ordered to, 480, 481 ; organization 



of Confederate command for, 482; 
move to Sweetwater, 483 ; transpor- 
tation under Bragg 's quartermaster, 
483 ; letter of General Longstreet to 
General Buckner on delays, etc., 
484, 485; Buckner's endorsement, 
485 ; on short rations, 486 ; orders to 
General Wheeler, 487 ; " looked like 
campaign against Longstreet instead 
of Burnside," 488; description of 
country, 488, 489 ; engagement on the 
Little Tennessee Kiver, 490 ; engage- 
ment at Campbell's Station, 492- 
495 ; Federals behind their works at 
Knoxville, 495 ; gallant assault on 
Fort Loudon repulsed, 497 ; Long- 
street reinforced by General Bushrod 
K. Johnson, 501 ; McLaws's orders 
to his command for assault of Fort 
Sanders, 503 ; McLavvs urges delaj^ 
because of report of Bragg 's defeat, 
504 ; reply to, by Longstreet, 504 ; 
the assault made, 505, 506 ; troops re- 
called on a misconception, 506, 507 ; 
Bragg orders Longstreet to co-operate 
with his army after defeat at Chatta- 
nooga, 507 ; losses at Knoxville, 508 ; 
Longstreet finds it impracticable to 
join Bragg, 509 ; columns advancing 
for relief of Burnside, 510 ; Long- 
street marches up the Holston Val- 
ley, 511 ; he is followed by General 
Parke, 512 ; engagement at Cumber- 
land Gap, 513 ; want of clothing and 
shoes, 515, 521 ; presence of Long- 
street causes concern to Federal 
authorities and General Grant, 515, 
516 ; charges against General Kobert- 
son, 517 ; General McLaws ordered 
relieved from duty, 518 ; General 
Law resigns under privilege, 519 ; 
honorable mention of ofiicers, 520 ; 
the army revels in plenty on the 
French Broad, 520, 521 ; brilliant 
achievement of General W. E. Jones 
at Cumberland Gap, 522, 523; 
strategic importance of the field, 524, 
538 ; Foster advances against Long- 
street, 525 ; Union army makes stand 
at Dandridge, 526 ; aifair at, 528 et 



INDEX. 



m5 



seq. ; Longstreet drinks to health of 
Granger, 529 ; General Foster calls 
Dandridge's expedition "a foraging 
excursion," 530; General Grant 
orders Foster to offensive against 
Longstreet, 532 ; despatches on Long- 
street from General Grant to Generals 
Halleck, Thomas, and Schofield, 535- 
538 ; Longstreet asks for ten thousand 
additional troops, 539 ; Longstreet's 
purpose towards close of campaign, 
539 ; withdrawal eastward of Long- 
street's command, 540; authorities 
would not support campaign, 541 ; 
Longstreet and his original command 
from Virginia rejoins General Lee on 
the Rapidan, 547 ; vote of thanks to 
General Longstreet and First Corps 
by Confederate Congress, 550. 

Edwards's Ferry. See Ball's Bluff. 

Elections of 1862, 1864, 479. 

Elzey, General, arrives at Manassas, 
49 ; succeeds Kirby Smith, 50. 

Emancipation Proclamation, issue of, 
made practicable by victory at Antie- 
tam, 288, 289 ; elections of 1862 not 
in support of, 479. 

Ewell, General R. S., at West Point, 
17 ; engagement of, with Hooker, at 
Bristoe Station, 170 ; loses a leg at 
Groveton, 177 ; appointed to com- 
mand of Second Corps on death of 
Jackson, 332; engages Milroy at 
Winchester, 339 ; march of, to Get- 
tysburg, 344 ; captures beeves and 
flour, 345 ; in iight on Cemetery Hill, 
355, 356 ; attacked by Ruger, 387 ; in 
retreat from Gettysburg, 481, 432; 
in command of Second Corps on 
Rapidan (1864), 553; becomes en- 
gaged in Wilderness, 558, 562 ; takes 
several officers prisoners, 565 ; in re- 
treat from Petersburg, 612, 613 ; 
brave stand and final surrender of, 
614. 

F. 

Fairfax, Colonel, at Sharpsburg, 250 ; 
takes scout to Longstreet, 345 ; letter 
from, to General Longstreet on in- 



terview with General Lee, " sunrise 
order," etc., 380, 381 (note) ; drinks 
with Longstreet to health of Gordon 
Granger, 530 ; captures a trooper on 
the French Broad, 532 ; on delay at 
Wilderness after wounding of Long- 
street, 567. 

Fair Oaks. See Seven Pines. 

Falling Waters, Confederates at, in re- 
treat from Gettysburg, 428, 429. 

Farmville, panic of Confederate team- 
stersat, 616 ; engagement at, 616,617. 

Farns worth. General, charge of, at Get- 
tysburg, 395 ; killed, 395. 

Federal army, organization and 
strength of, at Manassas (First) 57, 
58 ; strength and losses of, at Antie- 
tam, 265, 266 ; reorganized by Burn- 
side, 292 ; strength of, at Fredericks- 
burg, 305 ; in false position, 323 ; 
before Gettysburg, 335 ; Meade suc- 
ceeds Hooker in command of, 348 ; 
organization of, at Gettysburg, 415 ; 
strength and losses of, at Chicka- 
mauga, 458 ; losses of, at Knoxville, 
508 ; strength of, in 1864, 552 ; how 
posted at Five Forks, 593. 

Ferrero, General, at Burnside's Bridge 
(Antietam), 2-59 ; in East Tennessee 
campaign, 490 ; covers retreat, 492. 

Field, General, at Wilderness, 562- 
564 ; gives account of battle, 567 ; 
before Richmond, 577; division of, 
withdrawn, 604 ; division of, at 
Appomattox, 629. 

Fiser, Colonel, wounded in assault on 
Fort Sanders, 520. 

Fisher, Fort, move against, 580. 

Fitzhugh, Captain, captured and loses 
despatch, 160. 

Five Forks, battle of. General Grant's 
move around the Confederate right, 
595 ; General Lee endeavors to antici- 
pate, 596 ; opening of, favorable to 
Confederates, 596; General Grant 
orders Fifth Corps into battle, 597 ; 
Sheridan's strategic plan, 598; the 
battle irretrievable for Confederates, 
599 ; Pickett's battle, 599-602 ; losses, 
601, 602 ; General Lee on, 604. 



l^k> 



INDEX. 



FlAg. OiMifixlerate, oriarin of, 56. 

•• Foot Csvalry" of Virginia. 146. 

Forrest, G*neml. at Chiokamauira, 441. 

Fluster, General JohiiG., rM?&oh« Knox- 
ville and relieve;? Burnjide of com- 
mand at, 51S, 514 ; at Blain's CruKSS- 
Roads. 514 ; assigns tnie «»use for 
Longstr?et"s failure to follow, 515; 
plans to intrench at Bull's Gap, 516 ; 
anny of, advanci>s against lA^ngsireet, 
occupying Dandridge. 526 : suffering 
friHu an old wound, gives cv>mmand to 
Gt>neral Parke. 528 ; calls Dandridge 
expedition a "foraging excursion." 
530; urged to offensive by General 
Grant, 531, 532 ; assaults Fort Gregg 
(Petersburg), 607. 

Fovrler. Captain W. H.. at Cbicka- 
mauga, 441. 

Fra^nklin. William B.. given command 
of Sixth Corps, S2; encounters Jack- 
son at White Oak Swamp, 133 ; ar- 
rives at Centreville to reinforce Pojv. 
190 ; ordered by McClellan to Cramp- 
ton's Pass. 217; engages General 
Cobb of McLaws's command. 229. 
230, 232 : report by, 257 : placed in 
command of Left Grand Division 
Army of the Potomac. 292 ; arrives 
before Fredericksburg, 297 ; troops 
of. enter Fredericksburg. 304 : orders 
to. by Bumside. criticised. 315. 

Frayser's Farm, battle at. Longstreet 
encounters main force of McClellan"s 
army at, 133; President Davis has 
narrow escape on the field. 134 : Jen- 
kins capiur>?s Randols banery. pre- 
cipitating battle. 135 ; Heintxelman's 
report of fight. 135; McCall's report. 
136; General Holmes's account, 137: 
General Kearny's account. 137 ; cap- 
ture of General McCall, 138. 139. 

Frederick. Md.. Confederates in. 201. 
202, 205 : McClellan s army at, 213. 
See Maryland campaign. 

Frederioksbiirg, battle :uid campaign 
of, Bumside's plans for. submitted to 
President Lincoln, 292 ; Union army 
on mareh to. 293 ; General Sumner 
calls on civil authorities for surrender 



of town, 293 ; reply of the mayor. 
294-29l>; citizens of, move Ivvond 
danger. 296 ; description of field of, 
297-299 : signal for battle, 301 : plans 
of Federals for crvvssing the river. 
301, 302; work of General Himt and 
Colonel Hall, 302 ; Federals occupy 
eastern part of town. SO^i : Sumner's 
and Franklin's troops occupy city. 
304: plan of Feder:\l cvimiuander. 
304 : strength of the armies. 305 : 
mist veils the confivmting armies. 
306 ; Confederate positions. 307 : 
General Meade's advance, 308; the 
opening against the Confederate left, 
309; killing of General Cobb. 311 ; 
destructive work of artillery. 311 : 
desperate charges by Griffin and 
Humphreys, 312: before the stone 
wall on Marye's Hill. 313: comjvHri- 
s<.>n of chariT^ by Federals with th«>>e 
of Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble 
at Gettysburg, 814 : criticism of or- 
ders to Franklin, 315 : losses in battle, 
315, 316 ; Bumside plans to renew 
anack. 316; strength of armies in 
battle. 317 : organization of Confed- 
erate army. 317 ft seq. 

Fremantle. Lieutenant-Colonel, of the 
Coldstream Guards, as guest of Lee 
and Longstreet. 343 : congratulations 
of. to Longstreet on Pickett's charge, 
394. 

French, General William H., at Fred- 
ericksburg, 309, 310. 

G. 

Gaines's Mill, battle at. the Hills attack 
Fitz-John Porter. 126; L^nigstreet's 
reserve ensraijes, 127: Anderson. 
Pickett, and Hood's charges, 129 ; 
letter of Longstreet upon, to Gen- 
eral Lee, 656. 

Garfield. General James A., commu- 
nication of, on Rosecranss order u> 
retreat fiom Chickaraauga. 457. 

Garland, General Samuel, at Seven 
Pines. 94 ; killed at South Mountain, 
221 ; allusion to, 223. 



INDEX. 



667 



Gamett, R. B., at West Point, 16, 17 ; 
killed in Pickett's charge (Gettys- 
burg), 394. 

Gary, General, in affair on AVilliams- 
burg road, 578. 

Gee, Captain, killed at Five Forks, 
599. 

Generalship, power of battle in, rather 
than in numbers, 551. 

Getty, General, in opening of battle 
of Wilderness, 558 ; advance of, 559. 

Getty.sburg, battle and campaign of, 
first mentioned, 331, 334; Confeder- 
ate plan of campaign, 335, 336 ; 
Hooker discovers Federal withdrawal 
from Fredericksburg, 337 ; cavalry 
engagement in rear of the march, 
338 ; confusion in regard to cavalrj' 
orders, 342 ; municipal authorities of 
Gettysburg and York surrender to 
General John B. Gordon, 345 ; Long- 
street suggests change in direction of 
march, 347 ; Federal corps' locations, 
347, 348 ; General George G. Meade 
succeeds Hooker in command of 
Federals, 348; positions of armies 
June 30, 349, 350 ; Confederate cav- 
alry not at hand, 351 ; description 
of field, 352 et seq. ; preliminary 
fighting, 353, 354 ; the battle opens, 
354 ; General John F. Reynolds 
killed, 354 ; fight on Cemetery 
Hill, 855, 356; Federals retreat 
through town, 356 ; Howard forms 
new lines, 357 ; forces engaged (on 
first day), 357 ; Lee had not intended 
to deliver general battle, 358; Lee 
seriously affected by absence of cav- 
alry, 359 ; commands of Longstreet's 
corps hurried forward, 359 ; second 
day's battle, 362; front of Meade's 
position, 363 ; march of Sixth Corps 
(Federal), 364 ; position of Confeder- 
ates. 364 ; Lee settles on attack by his 
right, 365; advance of First Corps 
(Confederate), 366; time of reaching 
position, 366 ; Hood reports advan- 
tage of move to the right, 367 ; re- 
news appeal, 368; opportunity for 
Confederate right seen by Halleck in 



AVa.shington, 368; Barksdale of Mo- 
Laws's opens the fight and takes bat- 
terj-, 370 ; Little Round Top the cit- 
adel of the field, 371 ; fight at the 
hill and Brick Church, 371 ; many 
officers killed or wounded, 371, 372; 
Longstreet with Wofford's brigade on 
Little Round Top, 372 ; Meade rein- 
forces against Longstreet, 373 ; losses 
of Longstreet and Meade on second 
day, 373 ; late arrival of cavalrj', 373; 
Federals draw artillery from their 
right against Longstreet's battle, 
374 ; " man on the left who did not 
care to make battle win," 375; Gen- 
eral Pendleton on the order for ' ' bat- 
tle at sunrise," 377 et seq. ; refuta- 
tion of, 378-384 ; losses on second 
day, 376, 377 ; third day's battle, 385 
et seq. ; Lee's plans, 386 ; Ruger 
opens against Ewell, 387 ; Longstreet 
did not approve attack as made, 388, 
but he prepared carefully for the as- 
sault, 389, 390 ; Confederates on the 
left driven from their trenches, 391 ; 
Longstreet assents to Pickett's ad- 
vance, 392 ; Pickett's, Trimble's, and 
Pettigrew's charge, 394; Farns- 
worth's cavalry charge, 395; the 
Confederate First Corps, 397 ; Lee's 
acknowledgment of fault, 400 ; epit- 
ome of battle, 402 ; Cemetery Hill 
and Marj-e's Hill compared, 403 ; im- 
possibility of taking Cemetery Hill, 
404 ; forces engaged and losses in 
battle, 409 ; organization of Confed- 
erate army, 410 et seq. ; organization 
of Federal army, 415 et seq. ; Con- 
federate retreat, 426. 

Gibbon, General, in engagement with 
Jackson at Groveton, 176; at South 
Mountain, 224; at Antietam, 241, 
266 ; at Fredericksburg, 309 ; wound- 
ed in front of Pickett's charge (Get- 
tysburg), 394 ; on assaulting columns, 
on the 3d, at Gettysburg, 399 ; at the 
Wilderness, 558, 559 ; at Petersburg, 
606-608. 

Gist. General, at Chickamauga, 446. 

Glendale. See Fravser's Farm. 



668 



INDEX. 



Goggin, Major, reports taking of Fort 
Sanders impossible, 505, 506. 

Gold, price of, reaches 200, 317 ; Long- 
street advocates impressment of, 588, 
641, 646, 649. 

Gordon, General John B., authorities 
of Gettysburg and York surrender 
to, 345 ; corps of, assigned for sortie 
against Fort Steadman, 592; at Ap- 
pomattox, 623, 624. 

Goree, Colonel T. J., 47; on repulse 
of Pickett at Gettysburg, 400. 

" Grand Divisions," Army of the Poto- 
mac organized in, 292. 

Granger, General Gordon, covers gap 
in Mission Ridge at Chickaniauga, 
442 ; in severe contention against 
Longstreet's left, 457 ; in command 
of Federals at Dandridge, 528; on 
Longstreet, 529. 

Grant, General Ulysses S., at West 
Point, 17 ; joins Fourth Regiment in 
Missouri as lieutenant, 18 ; takes 
part in theatricals, 20 ; operations of, 
at Vicksburg, 478 ; assumes com- 
mand of armies in Tennessee, 482; 
orders Longstreet driven out of East 
Tennessee, 516 ; visits Knoxville, 
525; wants Longstreet driven from 
Tennessee, 531 ; urges General Foster 
to the oHensive, 532 ; despatches of, 
to Generals Halleck, Thomas, and 
Schofield, on plans to drive Long- 
street from Tennessee, 534-536 ; finds 
Longstreet too far from his line of 
operations to properly engage against, 
538 ; assigned as commander-in-chief, 
543 ; with Army of the Potomac, 552 ; 
had no general plan for campaign 
(May, 1864), 555; prepares for im- 
mediate battle ("Wilderness), 556; 
orders Ninth Corps into battle, 561 ; 
plan of, for left attack in front of 
Richmond, 575, 576 ; letters to, from 
General Lee, on military peace con- 
vention, 585, 586 ; draws from East 
and West to strengthen combination 
against, 590 et seq. {see Five Forks, 
battle of) ; gives up attack of Rich- 
mond by north side of James, 591 ; 



gives orders for grand move by his 
left, 592 ; number of troops in com- 
mand of, 593 ; movement by left be- 
gun, 595; purpose of the latter, 596; 
orders concerted assault at Peters- 
burg, 604 ; rides over captured works, 
606 ; asks surrender of General Lee, 
619; letter to, from General Lee, 
asking terms for surrender, 619; re- 
news efforts to strike across head 
of Confederate march, 620; writes 
General Lee as to terms of sur- 
render, 621, 622; letter to, from 
General Lee, proposing meeting, 622 ; 
arranges details of capitulation, 680 ; 
tribute to, 630 ; gives General Long- 
street letter to President Johnson, 
633 ; inaugurated President, 638 ; 
appoints Longstreet surveyor of cus- 
toms at New Orleans, 638 ; General 
Lee on interview with, 649. 

Grant, Mrs. Ulysses S., proposed meet- 
ing of, with Mrs. Longstreet to bring 
about peace, 584. 

Grapevine Bridge. See Mechanicsville. 

Greene, General George S., at Gettys- 
burg, 374. 

Gregg, Fort (Petersburg^, 606, 607. 

Gregg, General D. McM., at Gettys- 
burg, stubborn fight of, 396. 

Gregg, General Maxcy, killed at Fred- 
ericksburg, 309 ; captured with part 
of command by Rosser and Mum- 
ford, 617. 

Griffin, General, attack of, at Fred- 
ericksburg, 312. 

Groves, Major R. E., at Chickamauga, 
441. 

Groveton, engagement at, between 
Jackson and Pope's troops, 175. See 
Manassas, Second. 

Gunboats, McClellan's facetious re- 
mark concerning, 151. 

H. 

Hagerstown, Confederates at, on retreat 
from Gettysburg, 427, 428. 

Hall, Colonel Norman J., in command 
of troops attempting to cross river at 
Fredericksburg, 302 ; report of, 303. 



INDEX. 



669 



Halleck, General Henry "Wager, at 
West Point, 17 ; assumes command 
as general-in-chief of Federal armies, 
153 ; thinks the capital in peril, 214 ; 
letter to, on affairs in Maryland, 214- 
216; Meade communicates purpose 
to, 349 ; suggests to Meade that Lee 
may turn his left, 360 ; sees oppor- 
tunity for Confederate right at Gettys- 
burg, 368 ; concern of, over Long- 
street's presence in East Tennessee, 
515, 516 ; despatch to, from General 
Grant, on Longstreet, 534-536 ; de- 
spatch of, to General Grant, 537 ; 
right in estimate of strategic im- 
portance of Longstreet 's presence in 
Tennessee, 538. 

Hampton Roads conference, 583. 

Hampton, Wade, at Manassas, 48; 
wounded at Seven Pines, 98 ; at 
Crampton's Gap, 229 ; wounded at 
Gettysburg, 396 ; ordered to join 
Johnston in the Carolinas, 589. 

Hancock, Winfield Scott, takes two 
redoubts at Williamsburg, 77 ; chris- 
tened "The Superb," 80; takes 
command of Richardson's brigade 
at Antietam, 251 ; makes well-organ- 
ized advance at Fredericksburg, 310 ; 
assumes Federal command under 
special assignment on field of Gettys- 
burg (first day), 356; wounded in 
Pickett's charge, 394; on Meade's 
intentions on third day at Gettys- 
burg, 398 ; in command of Second 
Corps, Army of the Potomac, 552; 
intrenches at night along front in 
W^ilderness, 558 ; advance of, in morn- 
ing, 560 ; movement against left of, 
by Longstreet, 562 ; on Longstreet's 
advance, 668. 

Hardee, General, commissioned lieu- 
tenant-general, 290 ; offered and 
declines command of Army of Ten- 
nessee, 466 ; succeeds Cheatham in 
command of corps, 469. 

Hardie, General, at Fredericksburg, 
307. 

Harper's Ferry, capture of, proposed 
by Lee, 201 ; plan for movement 



against, 202 ; description of, 207 
situation at, 228 ; McLaws at, 231 
Colonel Davis escapes from, 231 
Colonel Miles' commandant of, mor- 
tally wounded, 232 ; surrendered by 
General White, 232 ; holding of, not 
of strategic value, 286 ; let alone in 
Gettysburg campaign, 287 ; aban- 
doned by Federals, 339. 

Harrison, Fort, captured by Federals, 
575. 

Harrison, scout, employed by Long- 
street, 324; sent out with secret 
orders, 333 ; makes report, 346. 

Harrison's Landing, McClellan's army 
at, 145. 

Hartranft, General, at Campbell Sta- 
tion, 492, 520; at Fort Steadman, 
594, 595. 

Haskell, Colonel J. C, rides to recall 
General Lee from meeting General 
Grant at Appomattox, 626. 

Hatton, General, killed at Seven Pines, 
98. 

Hayes, Rutherford B., wounded at 
South Mountain, 223 

Hays, General H. T., at Gettysburg, 
374. 

Hazlett, Captain, battery of, on Little 
Round Top, 371 ; killed, 372. 

Heintzelman, General, in command of 
left wing on Chickahominy, 84 ; re- 
port of, on Frayser's Farm fight, 135. 

Helm, General Benjamin H., killed at 
Chickamauga, 446. 

Heth, General, at Wilderness, 556, 558, 
660; on failure to intrench, 565; at 
Petersburg, 605, 609 ; at Farmville, 
617. 

Hill, Lieutenant-General A. P., pro- 
moted major-general, 85 ; at Me- 
chanicsville, 123 et seq. ; at Gaines's 
Mill, 126; intercepts orders of Gen- 
eral Pope, 172; at Harper's Ferry, 
231 ; arrives from Harper's Ferry in 
time to assist at Sharpsburg, 261 ; 
makes strong battle against Burnside, 
262 ; at Shepherdstown, 264 ; tacti- 
cal moves by, at Antietam, 266 ; 
appointed to command of Third 



670 



INDEX. 



Corps, 332 ; marches towards Gettys- 
burg, 350, 353; in fight, 355, 356; 
in retreat from Gettysburg, 431 ; in 
command of Third Corps on Eapidan 
(1864), 553 ; death of, at Petersburg, 
605. 

Hill, General D. H., at Williamsburg, 
74 ; asks permission to attack Han- 
cock's redoubts, 77 ; the movement 
made with heavy loss, 78 ; humor 
of, 113; letter to Longstreet deny- 
ing proposed abandonment of Eich- 
mond when Lee took command, 115, 
116 ; in conference with Lee on at- 
tacking McClellan, 121 ; at Mechan- 
icsville, 124; at Gaines's Mill, 126; 
at South Mountain, 221, 222, 224; 
explains to General Lee the situation 
at South Mountain, 227 ; at Sharps- 
burg, 241, 242, 251, 253; horse shot 
under, by a cannon-ball, 254 ; " like 
a game-cock" at Sharpsburg, 266; 
record of, 332 (note) ; at Chicka- 
mauga, in right wing, 441 ; opens 
battle by front assault, 445 ; urges 
change of tactics, 455 ; writes petition 
for relief from Bragg, 465 ; gives 
President Davis opinion adverse to 
Bragg, 466 ; relieved of duty, 469. 

Hindman, General T. C, in left wing 
at Chickamauga, 439 ; advance of, 
448 ; relieved under charges by 
Bragg, 465. 

Hoke, General, in front of Kichmond, 
574, 575 ; in affair on Williamsburg 
road, 577 ; sent to Wilmington, 580. 

Holmes, General, on fight at Frayser's 
Farm, 137 ; commissioned lieutenant- 
general, 290. 

Hood, General J. B , at Gaines's Mill, 
128, 129 ; report on fight at Frayser's 
Farm, 137 ; advance of, at Turkey 
Bridge, 139; at Second Manassas, 
188, 189; at South Mountain, 222; 
at Sharpsburg, 242, 266 ; at Freder- 
icksburg, 306, 317 ; march of, from 
Chambersburg to Gettysburg, 361 ; 
reports on advantage of move to the 
right (Gettysburg, second day), 
367 ; renews appeal, 368 ; seriously 



wounded, 370; division of, in third 
day's fight (Gettysburg), 393, 396; 
in retreat from Gettysburg, 431 ; 
division of, starts for Tennessee, 437 ; 
arrival at Chickamauga, 439 ; bri- 
gades of, in left wing, 439, 440 ; leads 
advance, 447 ; wounding of, 448 ; 
successor for, considered, 467 ; division 
of, in engagement on Little Tennes- 
see, 490 ; supersedes Johnston in 
command of Army of Georgia, 572 ; 
army of, reduced to a skeleton, 581. 

Hooker, General Joseph, at Williams- 
burg, 73, 75 ; at Frayser's Farm, 138 ; 
engagement of, with Ewell at Bris- 
toe Station, 170; at South Mountain, 
223 ; at Antietam, 241 ; heavy loss 
in troops of, 243 ; wounding of, 245 ; 
given command of Centre Grand Di- 
vision, Army of the Potomac, under 
Burnside, 292 ; arrives at Hartwood, 
near Fredericksburg, 297 ; marches 
for fords of the upper Kappahannock, 
326; at Chancellorsville, 328, 329; 
discovers abandonment of Fredericks- 
burg by Confederates, 337 ; succeeded 
by Meade, 348 ; in Tennessee, 474. 

Hoskiss, Major J., on capture of Early's 
command, 591. 

Hotchkiss, Major T. K., at Chicka- 
mauga, 441. 

Howard, General O. 0., at Fredericks- 
burg, 310 ; approach to Gettysburg, 
355 ; retreats to Cemetery Hill, 356 ; 
forms new lines after retreat, 357. 

Howell, Captain E. P., at Chicka- 
mauga, 441. 

Huger, General, Johnston's orders to, 
for Seven Pines, 89. 

Humphreys, Major-General A. A., 
desperate attack by, at Fredericks- 
burg, 312 ; account by, of fight before 
the stone wall, 313 ; at Gettysburg, 
367, 373; at Chickamauga, 440; 
spirited advance of, 448; in assault 
of Fort Sanders, 505; honorably 
mentioned, 520; as chief of staff 
gives strength of Army of the Po- 
tomac, 1864, 552; quoted on afijiir 
on Williamsburg road. 578 ; at Fort 



INDEX. 



671 



Steadman, 595; at Petersburg, 606; 

in pursuit of Confederates, 611 ; in 

engagement at Rice's Station, 614. 
Hunt, General, at Fredericksburg, 302. 
Hunter, Colonel David, wounded at 

Manassas, 46. 
Hunter, Hon. R. M. T., 583. 
Hunton, General, capture of, 614. 



Imboden's cavalry, halt of, at Hancock 
vexes General Lee, 359. 

Impressment of gold, urged by Long- 
street, 588, 641, 646; of men, urged 
by Longstreet, 644. 



Jackson, Lieutenant-General Thomas 
Jonathan, at Manassas, 46; chris- 
tened "Stonewall," 49; order to, 
from General Lee, June 11, 1862, for 
movement against McClellan, 114; 
reinforced by Lawton and Whiting 
for that purpose, 115; in conference 
with Lee and Longstreet, June, 1862, 
121 ; lateness of, at Meehanicsville, 
123; at Gaines's Mill, 126; encoun- 
ters Franklin at White Oak Swamp, 
133; ordered to follow McClellan 's 
retreat from Malvern Hill, 146; fails 
to support Magruder, 149, 150 ; en- 
gages with Pope's forces at Slaugh- 
ter Mountain, 156, 157 ; move of, on 
Manassas Junction, 167, 168 ; en- 
gages King's division at Groveton, 
175, 177; sustains attack at Manas- 
sas, 180, 182 ; in heavy battle with 
Fitz-John Porter, 187 ; some charac- 
teristics of, 191, 192; hard pressed by 
Stevens at Chantilly, 193; comment 
on move of, to Manassas Junction, 
197, 198 ; ordered by Lee to move 
against Harper's Ferry, 202, 231, 
232; leaves Harper's Ferry to rejoin 
Lee, 233 ; arrives on field of Sharps- 
burg, 236 ; division ot, receives attack 
of Hooker at Sharpsburg, 241 ; with- 



draws, 242 ; ordered by General Lee 
to turn Federal right, 257 ; com- 
missioned lieutenant-general, 290 ; 
called by Lee towards Fredericks- 
burg, 299, 309 ; loses opportunity for 
advance, 313 ; severely wounded at 
Chancellorsville, 828 ; death of, 332 ; 
comment on, at Sharpsburg, 401 
(note) ; comment on, in Chickahom- 
iny campaign, 406 ; at Second Manas- 
sas, 407. 

James River, Confederate troops on, in 
April, 1862, 67 ; McClellan changes 
base to, from the Chickahominy, 132 ; 
Longstreet assigned to command 
north of, 574. 

Jenkins, General Micah, at Seven 
Pines, 95, 100; at Frayser's Farm, 
135; at Fredericksburg, 311; ordered 
to Chambersburg with cavalry bri- 
gade, 340 ; brigade of, transferred to 
Hood's division and goes to Tennes- 
see, 437 ; joins Hood's division after 
battle of Chickamauga, 462 ; Long- 
street urges appointment of, to com- 
mand of Hood's division, 467 ; en- 
gages in attack on Hooker's rear- 
guard, 475-477 ; at Lenoir's Station, 
491 ; at Campbell's Station, 494 ; be- 
fore Knoxville, 495 ; at Dandridge, 
526 ; ordered to Strawberry Plains, 
531 ; ordered to bridge the Holston 
River, 538 ; takes part in flank move, 
563, and riding with Longstreet ex- 
presses high hopes, 563 ; mortally 
wounded, 564 ; tribute to, 566. 

Jetersville, Confederates halted at, 610. 

Johnson, General Bushrod R., at 
Chickamauga, 439 ; before Snodgrass 
Hill, 450 ; in assault on Fort Sanders, 
505 ; severely engages Federals at 
Cumberland Gap, 513 ; honorable 
mention of, for march to Bean Sta- 
tion, 519 ; in affair near Dandridge, 
532 ; at Five Forks, 596, 597 ; divi- 
sion of, mostly escapes in retreat from 
Petersburg, 614. 

Johnson, Major-General Edward, ad- 
\5ance at Gettysburg (evening of 
second day), 374. 387. 



e>n 



INDEX, 



Johnson, President, letter to, from 
G'.neral Grant on Longstreet, 633, 
6;;4 ; reconstruction policy of, 635. 

Johnson, General R. W., at Chicka- 
mpuga, 442. 

Johnston, General Joseph Eggleston, 
position of, before Manassas, 35, 41, 
43 ; forces arrive at Manassas, 44 ; on 
field, 49; called to Richmond for 
council with War Department, 65 ; at 
^^' illiamsburg, 79 ; compliment of, to 
L> ngstreet, 80 ; prepares to attack 
M. "Clellan before McDowell can 
re.ioh him, 85 ; calls council before 
Seven Pines, 85, 86 ; orders to Gen- 
erals Smith and Huger, 89 ; orders 
troops to sleep on their lines, 100 ; 
wounded at close of Seven Pines, 
KX); high regard for, in army, 112; 
President Davis jealous of, 432 ; 
phm for campaign of, suggested by 
General Bragg, 545; superseded by 
Hood, 572 ; Longstreet asks for re- 
call of, to service, 588 ; assigned to 
•f imand in the Carolinas, 589. 

..\r.ie.s, General D. R., at Savage Sta- 
tion, 132; at Antietam, 260; over- 
come by the killing of his brother-in- 
law. Colonel Kingsbury, 262. 

> n. , General J. M., at Gettysburg, 
V : ; in opening of Wilderness, 558. 
M.< 1, General J. R., wounded at 
Sharpsburg, 243. 

Ji,n'-s, General Samuel, raid against, at 
.S;i!em, by General Averill, 521, 522. 
,i'.^. General W. E., sent to arrest 
Union advance at Cumberland Gap, 
'I'-i; fights engagement at Walker's 
I' rd, 508; brilliant achievement of, 
. ', Cumberland Gap, 522, 523. 



K. 

Kearny, General Philip, at Williams- 
burg, 75 ; at Seven Pines, 96 ; report 
of. on battle, 99 ; report of, on fight at 
Krayser's Farm, 137 ; orders to, from 
P-^-pe, on C'c of Ma^^assa? (Second^. 
Vi^\ opens against Jackson's left at 



Manassas, 182 ; at Chantilly, 193 ; 
killed, 194. 

Kemper, General, wounded in Pickett's 
charge, 394. 

Kershaw, General, at Elk Ridge, 208 ; 
at Sharpsburg, 245 ; at Gettysburg 
(opening of second day), 370; at 
Chickamauga, 440 ; charge of, 448 ; 
at Cumberland Gap, 513 ; honorably 
mentioned, 519 ; in Wilderness, 563, 
564 ; with Early in the Valley, 579 ; 
crosses a fired bridge at Richmond, 
609 ; surrenders at Rice's Station, 
614. 

Keyes, General E. D,, on battle of 
Seven Pines, 110. 

Kilpatrick, General J., at Gettysburg, 
395, 396; follows Confederate retreat, 
427, 428, 430. 

Kingsbury, Colonel, killed at Burn- 
side's Bridge (Antietam), 259; kill- 
ing of, overcomes General D. R. 
Jones, his brother-in-law, 262. 

Knoxville, siege of, description of town 
and Federal works, 495 ; a gallant 
dash repulsed, 497 ; Federal posi- 
tions, 498, 499; Fort Loudon (or 
Sanders) described, 499 ; McLaws 
ordered to assault fort, 500 ; General 
Bushrod R, Johnson marches to re- 
inforce Longstreet, 501 ; McLaws's 
orders to his command for assault of 
Fort Sanders, 503 ; McLaws urges 
delay because of Bragg 's reported 
defeat, 504 ; Longstreet's answer 
thereto, 504, 505 ; the assault made, 
505, 506 ; troops recalled under a mis- 
conception, 506, 507 ; Bragg orders 
Longstreet to co-operate with his 
army, 507 ; losses in, 508. 



Lamb, Colonel, wounded at Fort 

Fisher, 582. 
Lane, General, at Fredericksburg, 309 ; 

succeeds Pickett in command of 

charge at Gettysburg, 394. 
T.atr«vf . Captain, killed on rtnnrt'sraid, 

111 



INDEX. 



673 



Latrobe, Colonel, at Fredericksburg, 
316. 

Law, General E. M., march of, to 
Gettysburg, 365; succeeds to com- 
mand of Hood's division at Gettys- 
burg, 370 ; in Chattanooga cam- 
paign, 464; claims of, for promotion, 
urged by President Davis, 467 ; takes 
part in night attack on Hooker's rear- 
guard, 476, 477 ; order for preferring 
charges against, 477 ; late report on 
Federal retreat from Lenoir's Station, 
491 (note); at Campbell's Station, 
494 ; charge against, that he withheld 
attack improperly, 495 ; slow march 
of, 514 ; resigns under privilege, 519 ; 
action of President Davis towards, 
548; rearrest ordered by General 
Longstreet, 549. 

Lawton, General, ordered by Lee to re- 
inforce Jackson, 115 ; wounded at 
Sharpsburg, 248. 

Leadbetter, General, makes reconnois- 
sance at Knoxville, 501 ; favors attack 
of Fort Sanders, 502 ; adds postscript 
to General Longstreet's letter urging 
determined assault of Fort Sanders, 
505. 

Lee, General Fitzhugh, left in com- 
mand of cavalry by Stuart, 160 ; 
failure to comply with instructions, 
160; consequences of that failure, 
196 ; attacked by Pleasonton at South 
Mountain, 229 ; on General K. E. 
Lee at Gettysburg, 401 ; on Long- 
street, 405 ; charges that Longstreet 
lost his way in Wilderness, 568, 569 ; 
recalled to join Longstreet at Kich- 
mond, 591 ; at Five Forks, 597, 598 ; 
in retreat from Petersburg, 610. 

Lee, General G. W. C, on Longstreet 
at "Wilderness, 569 ; at Five Forks, 
596; at Rice's Station, 613, 614. 

Lee, General Eobert E., assigned to 
command at Seven Pines, 109; im- 
pression of, in the army, 112, 113; 
established in confidence, 114; plans 
simultaneous attack on front and rear 
of McClellan, 115; adopts suggestion 
of Longstreet making change in 



plans against McClellan, 120 ; orders 
Longstreet's reserve into action at 
Gaines's Mill, 127 ; at Frayser's Farm 
with President Davis, 134 ; abandons 
his original plan at Malvern Hill, 
144 ; campaign of, against McClellan 
reviewed, 147 et seq. ; momentary 
facetious ness, 149 ; letter of, to Gen- 
eral Magruder, 150 ; original plan 
for pursuit of McClellan, 152 ; enjoys 
increased esteem of his army, 158 ; 
plans of, for striking Pope, 159 ; 
witnesses retreat of Pope, 162 ; on 
field of Manassas, 181, 182; decides 
to cross Bull Run and reach Pope's 
rear, 186 ; joins Longstreet on field 
and rides under fire, 189; injury to, 
in stampede, 192; letters of, to Gen- 
eral Pope on killing of Kearny, 194 ; 
decides to enter Maryland, 200; 
orders of, for Maryland campaign, 
203 ; address of, to people of Mary- 
land, 280 ; letter of, to Jefferson 
Davis, suggesting peace proposition, 
204 ; celebrated " lost order" of, 203, 
212, 213 ; receives information of 
Federal advance at South Mountain, 
219 ; prefers stand at Turner's Pass, 
220 ; orders withdrawal of troops 
from South Mountain, 228 ; with 
Longstreet and Hill on field at 
Sharpsburg, 254 ; orders flank move 
by Jackson, 257 ; sends for brigades 
left at Harper's Ferry, 261 ; calls 
Longstreet his old war-horse, 262 ; 
in contempt of Federal army disperses 
forces, 284 ; description of, 285 ; re- 
organizes army of Northern Virginia, 
290 ; on retirement of McClellan, 
291 ; advice of, to citizens of Fred- 
ericksburg, 299 ; orders of, at opening 
of battle, 308 ; narrowly escapes 
death or injury from a shell, 312; 
goes to Richmond, 317 ; orders Long- 
street to return from Suffolk, 326 ; 
grief of, over loss of Stonewall Jack- 
son, 328 ; his conduct of battle of 
Chancellorsville, 329 ; falls on plan 
of Northern invasion, 331 ; plans of, 
for Gettysburg, 335, 336 ; caution 



43 



674 



INDEX. 



of, in revealing plans to Richmond 
authorities, 336, 337 ; orders of, to 
cavalry chief, 341 ; issues orders for 
march of army to Harrisburg, 344 ; 
refuses to credit information of Scout 
Harrison, 347 ; changes direction of 
march, 348 ; order for concentration 
at Cashtown, 348, 351 ; mind dis- 
turbed by absence of cavalry, 351 ; 
calls Longstreet to ride with him 
towards Gettysburg, 351 ; expresses 
regret at absence of cavalry, 357 ; on 
field of Gettysburg at close of first 
day, 357 ; had not intended deliver- 
ing general battle, 358 ; gives discre- 
tionary order for Second Corps to 
attack Cemetery Hill, 359 ; olHcial 
report of, on first day's battle, 359 
(note) ; settles on making the open- 
ing (second day) by his right, 365; 
alleged order of, to Longstreet for bat- 
tle at sunrise, 377 et seq. ; excitement 
of, 384 ; on battle of Gettysburg, third 
day, 385 ; plans of, 386 ; claimed 
attack was not made early enough, 
388 ; on the field with the right, 395 ; 
ofiScial report of, on Longstreet's 
battle on the right, 397 ; acknowl- 
edges fault at Gettysburg, 399, 400 ; 
comments upon, 400, 401 ; on field 
and responsible for Gettysburg, 402, 
405 ; review of campaigns of, 406 ; 
review of orders of, for Gettysburg, 
407 et seq. ; ' ' harder to move than 
his lieutenant," 409; in the retreat 
from Gettysburg, 429, 430; desires 
retirement, 432 ; Longstreet mentions 
westward movement to, 434 ; goes 
to Richmond, 434 ; letter from, to 
Longstreet, 435 ; letter to, from 
Longstreet, 435 ; parting with Long- 
street, 437 ; letter from, to Long- 
street, 469, 470 (note) ; favors sending 
Pickett's division to Longstreet, 539 ; 
Longstreet's suggestion to, of plans 
for continuance of war, 544 ; goes 
to Richmond to confer with author- 
ities, 544 ; suppressed excitement of, 
in council with Richmond author- 
ities, 546 ; becomes impatient in 



Longstreet-Law aflTair, 549 ; com- 
pared with General Grant, 554 ; gives 
orders against general engagement, 
558 ; endeavors to lead a brigade in 
charge, 560 ; assumes command on 
field after Longstreet is wounded, 
565 ; delays advance, 565, 567 ; al- 
leged saying of, concerning Long- 
street, 569 ; hard labors of, 573 ; 
becomes anxious about line on north 
side of the James, 579 ; hears from 
Longstreet proposition of General 
Ord for peace meeting, 584 ; letters 
of, to General Grant on military 
peace convention, 585, 586 ; reply to, 
from General Grant, 587 ; consents 
to sortie against Fort Steadman, 592 ; 
strength of, for defence of Richmond, 
593, 594 ; endeavors to anticipate 
Grant's move around his right, 596 ; 
at Petersburg, 604, 605 ; gives orders 
for retreat, 608 ; at Jetersville, 610 ; 
realizes fulness of disaster at Rice's 
Station and Sailor's Creek, 614, 615; 
at Farmville, 616 ; urged by officers 
to negotiate for surrender, 618 ; letter 
to,, from General Grant, asking sur- 
render, 619 ; replies to, asking terms, 
619 ; letter to, from General Grant, 
stating terms of surrender, 621 ; 
writes General Grant, proposing 
meeting, 622 ; gives orders for ad- 
vance to Appomattox Court-House, 
623 ; still hopes to break through 
the Federal cordon, 624 ; confers with 
Longstreet and Mahone, 624, 625 ; 
rides to meet General Grant, 625, 
626, 628 ; sympathy for, of troops, 
629; letter of, to General R. H. 
Anderson, 639 ; letter of, to General 
Longstreet, congratulating him on 
convalescence, 639 ; letter to, from 
Longstreet, 640 ; letter to, from 
Longstreet, on impressment of gold, 
641 ; letter from, to Longstreet, 642 ; 
letter to, from Longstreet, on im- 
pressment of men, 644; letter from, 
to Longstreet, 645 ; letter to, from 
Longstreet, on impressment of gold, 
646 ; letter to, from Longstreet, on 



INDEX. 



675 



interview with General Ord, 647 ; 
letter to, from Longstreet, on ex- 
change of prisoners, 648 ; letter of, 
to Longstreet, on interview with 
General Grant, 649; letter to, from 
Longstreet, on use of gold, 649 ; 
letter to, from Longstreet, on guard- 
ing Danville Railroad, 650; letter 
to, from Longstreet, on Sheridan's 
operations, 652; letter of, to Long- 
street, on proposed history, 654 ; let- 
ter of, to Longstreet, suggesting prep- 
aration of memoirs, 656 ; letter to, 
from Longstreet, on battle of Gaines's 
Mill, 656 ; letter of, to Longstreet, 
on prospects, etc., 657. 

Lee, Lieutenant-Colonel S. D., at 
Sharpsburg, 248. 

Lee, General W. H. F., at Five Forks, 
596, 597, 598 ; in engagement at 
Jetersville, 610 

Leesburg, Confederate army at, on the 
way to Maryland, 201. 

Lenoir's Station, Federal retreat at, 
491. 

Letters. See Lee, Longstreet, Grant, 
etc. 

Lewinsville, J. E. B. Stuart disperses 
Federals at, 60. 

Liddell, General, at Chickamauga, 441, 
446. 

Lincoln, President, telegrams from, on 
Lee in Maryland, 209 ; letter to, from 
McClellan, on prospect in Maryland, 
214 ; issues emancipation proclama- 
tion, 288, 289 ; General Burnside sub- 
mits plans to, 292 ; humorous advice 
of, to Hooker, 329 ; position in Hamp- 
ton Eoads conference, 583; desire 
attributed to, for devising means for 
payment of slaves, 585. 

Long, General A. L., letter of, to Gen- 
eral Longstreet, on order for "battle 
at sunrise" (Gettysburg), 380 (note) ; 
gives account of appeal of Lee's offi- 
cers for surrender, 618 ; on interview 
of Generals Lee and Pendleton about 
surrender, 620. 

Longstreet, Lieutenant-General James, 
birth of, 13 ; appointed to West Point, 



15 ; assigned to duty as brevet lieu- 
tenant at Jeflerson Barracks, Mis- 
souri, 16; goes to Louisiana, 18; to 
Florida, 18; assigned lieutenant, 18; 
goes to Corpus Christi, 19 ; at Palo 
Alto, 25 ; at Resaca de la Palma, 27, 
28 ; at outbreak of civil war, 29 ; 
leaves Albuquerque, 30; arrives at 
Richmond, 32 ; appointed brigadier- 
general, 33 ; reports to Beauregard 
at Manassas Junction, 33; stays re- 
treat at Blackburn's Ford, 39; ad- 
vance of, at Manassas, 44 ; orders bat- 
teries to fire on Federal retreat, 62 ; 
criticism of, on McDowell, 54 ; on Ty- 
ler's reconnoissance, 55 ; on Beaure- 
gard, 56 ; invited to dine with the en- 
emy, 60; promoted major-general, 
61 ; marches to Culpeper Court-House, 

65 ; meets President Davis and Gen- 
eral Lee in war council at Richmond, 

66 ; on McClellan, 66 ; at "Williams- 
burg, 72, 74 ; opposes attack on Han- 
cock's redoubts, 77 ; estimates forces 
engaged at Williamsburg, 79 ; John- 
ston's testimonial to, 80 ; in command 
of right wing from James River to 
White Oak Swamp, 81 ; to strike 
against Federal right at Seven Pines, 
85; in council with Johnston, 86; 
ordered to Williamsburg road, 86 ; 
tactical handling there left to him, 
88 ; complaint against, by General 
Smith, 90; endeavors to harmonize 
with Huger, 92 ; his battle on the 
Williamsburg road, 96 ; plans for 
resuming battle of Seven Pines at 
daylight, 103 ; asks for reinforce- 
ments and a diversion, 108; makes 
appeal for ten thousand men to renew 
fight at Seven Pines, 109; meets 
General Lee, 112; suggests to Lee 
movement against McClellan's right 
flank, 114 ; letter to, from D. H. Hill, 
115, 116; suggestion of, for method 
of attack on McClellan adopted by 
Lee, 120; in conference with Lee 
and others, 121 ; at Mechanicsville, 
124; puts bis reserve into action at 
Gaines's Mill, 127 et seq. ; encounters 



676 



INDEX. 



main force of McClellan at Fray- 
ser's Parin, 133 ; on the field with 
President Davis and General Lee, 
134; at Malvern Hill, 142, 145; re- 
view by, of campaign, 147 ; ordered 
to Gordonsville with ten brigades, 
158; proposes move against Pope's 
right, 159 ; rides with Lee to Clarke's 
Mountain, 161 ; orders arrest of 
Toombs, 161, and release of, 166; 
reaches Thoroughfare Gap, en route 
for Manassas, 173; arrival on field 
of Manassas, 180 ; makes reconnois- 
sance and reports against attack, 182 ; 
right flank of, ordered attacked by 
Porter, 184 ; orders batteries to attack 
Porter, for Jackson's relief, 187 ; ar- 
rives on field of Chantilly, 194 ; ob- 
jects to movement against Harper's 
Ferry, 201, 202 ; orders to, for Mary- 
land campaign, 203 ; march of, 206 ; 
expresses to General Lee preference 
for concentration at Antietam rather 
than at Turner's Pass, 219 ; at South 
Mountain, 222 ; estimate of troops of, 
at South Mountain, 226 ; position of, 
in the line, preparatory to battle of 
Sharpsburg, 234 ; advance against 
his left by Hooker, 236 ; troops of, 
enter fight, 242 ; sustains strong at- 
tack of General Richardson, 249 ; 
ride of, with General Lee and D. H. 
Hill on field of Sharpsburg, 254 ; 
orders McLaws and Walker to pre- 
pare to assault, 256 ; called by General 
Lee his " old war-horse," 262; criti- 
cism of, on Mtiryland campaign, 279 
et seq. ; commissioned lieutenant- 
general ; 290 ; marches to Culpeper 
Court-House, 291 ; marches for Fred- 
ericksburg, 293 ; on the heights, 293 ; 
position of troops of, at Fredericks- 
burg, 305 ; views his lines preparatory 
to battle, 306 ; differs with General 
Jackson as to the enemy's purpose, 

323 ; covers route to Kichmond, 323 ; 
ordered to south side of James Kiver, 

324 ; employs one Harrison as scout, 
324 ; ordered to rejoin Lee, 326 ; 
criticism of, on battle of Chancellors- 



ville, 329, 330 ; proposes measures to 
General Lee for relief of Vicksburg, 
331 ; urges that campaign in Penn- 
sylvania should be one of defensive 
tactics, 331 ; sends Scout Harrison out 
with secret orders, 333 ; takes up 
march for Gettysburg, 337 ; direc- 
tions to Stuart for movement of cav- 
alry, 342 ; orders treated with con- 
tumely, 343 ; entertains Colonel Fre- 
mantie, 343 ; Harrison, the scout, re- 
ports to, 346 ; suggests, on information 
received, change of march eastward, 
347 ; rides with General Lee towards 
Gettysburg, 351 ; proposes to General 
Lee move around the Federal left, 
358 ; orders columns of First Corps 
hurried forward for battle, 359 ; ad- 
vances with command, 366 ; rides 
with Woflbrd's brigade into fight at 
Little Kound Top, 372 ; losses of (on 
second day), 373, 376, 377; alleged 
order to, for "battle at sunrise," 377 
ei seq. ; letter to, from Colonel Tay- 
lor, 379 ; letter to, from Colonel 
Venable, 379; letter to, from Gen- 
eral Long, 380 ; letter to, from 
Charles Marshall, 380; letter to, 
from Colonel Fairfax, 380, 381 ; letter 
to, from J. S. D. Cullen, 383, 384 ; 
losses of, on third day, 385 et seq. ; 
sends scouts to find way for striking 
the enemy's left, 385; interview with 
General Lee, 386 ; did not believe in 
attack as made, 388 ; carefully pre- 
pares for making assault, 389, 390 ; 
not advised of failure of Confederate 
left, 392; rides to batteries, 395; 
testimony to claims of, at Gettys- 
burg, 400; Fitzhugh Lee upon, 
403 ; Franco-German war affords 
parallel for suggestion of, for move 
around Federal left, 404; refuta- 
tion of the statement that he was 
"hard to move," 405 et seq.; re- 
sume of action of, at Gettysburg, 
407 et seq. ; in the retreat from 
Gettysburg, 429, 430; urges on Sec- 
retar}' of War Seddon a westward 
movement, 433, 434 ; mentions the 



INDEX. 



677 



matter to General Lee, 434 ; letter to, 
from General Lee, 435; letter from, 
to General Lee, 435 ; transportation 
ordered for movement of, to Tennes- 
see, 436 ; route of, on westward 
movement, 436, 437 ; parting with 
Lee, 437 ; reaches General Bragg's 
head-quarters, 438 ; placed in com- 
mand of General Bragg's left wing, 
439 ; orders to division commanders 
of, from General Bragg, 447 ; orders 
Hood's division to assault, 447 ; rides 
with General Buckner and comes 
under fire of the enemy, 450 ; lunches 
on the field, 451 ; reports to General 
Bragg on hattle of Chickamauga, 
and urges pursuit of enemy, 461 ; 
gives opinion to President Davis 
against Bragg, 465 ; declines assign- 
ment to command of Army of Ten- 
nessee, 466 ; offers resignation to 
President, who declines it, 467 ; urges 
appointment of General Micah Jen- 
kins to command of Hood's division, 
467 ; suggests change of base to 
Rome, Georgia, 468 ; letter to, from 
General Lee, 469, 470 (note) ; calls a 
signal force from Virginia to Tennes- 
see, 471 ; defends position, 472, 473 ; 
arranges night attack on Hooker's 
rear-guard, 475, 476 ; reviews effects 
and possibilities of Western move, 
478, 479 ; ordered on campaign in 
East Tennessee, 480, 481 ; organ- 
ization of command of, 482 ; letter 
of, to General Buckner on East Ten- 
nessee campaign, 484, 485 ; troops 
of, on short rations, 486 ; orders of, 
to General Wheeler, 487 ; command 
of, in engagement on Little Tennes- 
see, 490 ; orders McLaws to assault 
fort at Knoxville, 500 ; reinforced by 
General Bushrod R. Johnson, 501 ; 
ordered by Bragg to attack Knox- 
ville, 501 ; orders of, to McLaws for 
assault of Fort Sanders, 502 ; letter 
to, from McLaws, urging delay in at- 
tack on Fort Sanders, 504 ; answer 
of, thereto, 504 ; recalls troops and 
gives reasons for, 505-507 ; ordered 



by Bragg to co-operate with his 
army after defeat at Chattanooga, 
507 ; finds conformance to order im- 
practicable, 509 ; marches up the 
Holston Valley, 511 ; presence of, in 
East Tennessee causes concern to 
Lincoln, 515, and to Grant, 516 ; 
orders relief of General McLaws, 
518; makes honorable mention of 
officers, 520 ; renews effort to be re- 
lieved from service, 524 ; marches to 
Dandridge, 526 ; enters Dandridge 
and drinks to General Gordon Gran- 
ger, 529 ; General Grant gives orders 
that he be driven from Tennessee, 
531 ; Foster ordered to offensive 
against, 532 ; despatches concerning, 
from General Grant to Generals Hal- 
leck, Thomas, and Schofield, 535- 

537 ; orders concentration of forces, 

538 ; asks for ten thousand additional 
troops, 539 ; purpose of, in latter part 
of campaign, 539 ; on campaign in the 
far South, 540; withdrawal of com- 
mand eastward made necessary, 540 ; 
asked by Richmond authorities for 
suggestions, 543 ; ideas of, on prose- 
cution of the war, 544 ; goes to Vir- 
ginia and submits plans to General 
Lee, 544 ; criticism of, on Bragg be- 
fore Richmond authorities, 546 ; visits 
wife at Petersburg, 546 ; returns to 
Tennessee, 547 ; rejoins General Lee 
on the Rapidan, 547 ; receives vote 
of thanks in Congress, 550 ; in com- 
mand of First Corps on the Rapidan 
(1864), 553 ; takes short route of 
march to field of battle (Wilderness), 
556, 557, 559 ; troops of, form under 
fire, 560 ; repulses Hancock, 561 ; 
makes flanking movement on Han- 
cock's left, 562; rides with flanking 
party, 563 ; severely wounded, 564 ; 
borne to the rear, 566 ; Northern his- 
torian and General Hancock on ad- 
vance of, 568 ; Fitzhugh Lee upon, 
568 ; letter to, from Colonel Taylor 
on controversy as to guide at Wilder- 
ness, 569 ; letter to, from General 
Alexander on same subject, 570, 571 ; 



678 



INDEX. 



letter to, from Colonel Venable on 
same, 571 ; absent on leave, 572 ; 
again at front, and meets General Lee, 
573 ; letter of, to Colonel Taylor, 
574 ; assigned to command on north 
side of James River, 574 ; orders roads 
broken with ploughs, 580 ; puts stop 
to picket-firing, 581 ; meets General 
E. O. C. Ord and hears proposition 
for peace convention, 583, 584 ; dis- 
claims authoi-ity to speak on, 584 ; 
communicates proposition for meet- 
ing, to General Lee, 584 ; advocates 
impressment of gold and men, 588 ; 
starts in pursuit of Sheridan, 592 ; 
visits General Lee at Petersburg, 
604; receives A. P. Hill's corps as 
part of his command, 608 ; on retreat 
from Richmond, 609 ; marches for 
Farmville, pressed by the enemy, 
610; saves High Bridge, 612; crosses 
Appomattox at Earmville, 615; not 
among those of Lee's officers who 
urged surrender, 618; says "not 
yet" in regard to surrender, 619 ; re- 
fuses to bear to General Lee report 
of officers favoring surrender, 620 ; 
calls for interview with General 
Lee, 624 ; endeavors to recall General 
Lee from ride to General Grant, 626 ; 
forms last line of battle, 626 ; refuses 
to surrender to General Custer, 627 ; 
meets General Grant, 680 ; formally 
surrenders command, 630, 631 ; visits 
Washington, 632; calls on General 
Grant, 633 ; receives letter to Presi- 
dent Johnson, 633 ; interview of, 
with the President, 634 ; is relieved 
from political disabilities, 634 ; en- 
gages in business in New Orleans, 
634, 635 ; favors holding States under 
the President's reconstruction policy, 
635 ; letter of, on the subject to J. 
M. G. Parker, Esq., 636, 637; at- 
tacked by New Orleans press, 637 ; 
appointed surveyor of customs, 638 ; 
tribute of, to his old nurse, 638 ; letter 
to, from General Lee, congratulating 
on convalescence, 639; letter from, 
to General Lee, 640; letter of, to 



General Lee, on impressment of gold, 
641 ; letter to, from General Lee, on 
policy of campaign , 642 ; letter of, 
to General Lee, on impressment of 
men, 644 ; letter to, from General 
Lee, 645 ; letter of, to General Lee, 
on impressment of gold, 646 ; letter 
of, to General Lee, on "peace" in- 
terview with General Ord, 647 ; let- 
ter of, to General Lee, on exchange 
of political prisoners, 648 ; letter to, 
from General Lee, on interview with 
General Grant, 649 ; letter of, to 
General Lee, urging use of gold, 649 ; 
letter of, to General Lee, on guard- 
ing Danville Railroad, 650 ; letter of, 
to A. A. General Taylor, on suppres- 
sion of desertion, 651 ; letter of, to 
General Lee, on Sheridan's opera- 
tions, 652 ; letter of, to General Tay- 
lor, on policy towards new organiza- 
tions, 653 ; letter to, from General 
Lee, on proposed history, 654 ; letter 
of congratulation from General Lee, 
655 ; letter to, from General Lee, sug- 
gesting preparation of memoirs, 655 ; 
letter of, to General Lee, on battle 
of Gaines's Mill, 656 ; letter to, from 
General Lee, on prospects, etc., 657. 

Longstreet, Mrs. James, proposed meet- 
ing with Mrs. Grant to bring about 
peace, 584 ; in church at Richmond, 
hears news of defeat at Petersburg, 
607. 

Longstreet, Owen & Co., letter to, from 
General Lee, 655 

Longstreet, Richard, settles in America, 
13. 

Longstreet, Robert Lee (son of General 
Longstreet), birth of, 546. 

Longstreet, William, applies steam to 
navigation, 1787, 14 ; letter to Gov- 
ernor Telfair, 14. 

Lookout Mountain, Confederates upon, 
463 ; attack near, on Hooker's rear- 
guard, 476, 477. 

Lost orders, Lee's to Stuart, captured 
by Pope, 160,' 196; Lee's "General 
Order No. 191," in Maryland cam- 
paign, 203, 212, 282, 283. 



INDEX. 



679 



Loudon, Fort. See Sanders, Fort. 
Lubbock, Colonel, 48. 
Lyle, Captain, in affair on Williams- 
burg road, 578. 

M. 

McCall, General John A., joins Army 
of Potomac, 122 ; at Mechanicsville, 
124; at Gaines's Mill, 126; report 
of, on Frayser's Farm, 136 ; captured 
at close of battle (Frayser's Farm), 
138; his tenacity of battle, 139. 

McClellan, General George B., 61; 
called "the young Napoleon," 63 ; 
delay in marching against Johnston 
at Centreville, 64 ; concentrates army 
on the James River, 65 ; President 
Davis's high opinion of, 66 ; not on 
field of Williamsburg until late in 
the day, 80; at White House, 82; 
organizes two provisional army 
corps, 82 ; orders troops withdrawn 
from Mechanicsville, 125; orders 
change of base to James River, 132 ; 
main force of, encounters Longstreet 
at Frayser's Farm, 133 ; masterly 
retreat of, 132-140, 151 ; strength of 
his position at Malvern Hill, 141 ; 
shows himself well equipped in sci- 
ence of war, 151 ; on a gunboat on 
the James, 151 ; reaches Alexandria, 
171 ; marches in slow pursuit of Lee 
in Maryland, 208 ; report of, on 
march, 209; receives Lee's "lost 
order," 213; writes President Lin- 
coln of prospects in Maryland, 214 ; 
writes General Halleck on same, 214- 
216; "makes haste slowly" after 
receiving the "lost order," 216; 
orders for advance of commands, 
21 7 ; prisoners claimed by, at South 
Mountain, 225; army of, in position 
at Antietam, 234; on field with 
Hooker, 237 ; disapproves of attack 
by Franklin, 257; orders Burnside 
to take bridge oyer Antietam, 258; 
neither plan nor execution of, strong 
at Antietam, 267 ; letter to, from Gov- 
ernor Curtin, 282 ; slow march of, 



after Lee in Maryland, 282 ; his posi- 
tion at opening of Maryland cam- 
paign, 284, 285 ; opinion of, against 
holding Harper's Ferry, 286 ; de- 
scription of, 285 ; compared and con- 
trasted with Lee, 285 ; crosses the 
Potomac, south of the Blue Ridge, 
290; relieved from command, 291. 

McCook, General A. McD., at Chicka- 
mauga, 442 ; goes before court of 
inquiry, 465. 

McCook, Colonel D., at Chickamauga, 
442. 

McDowell, General Irvin, at West 
Point, 16; in the field, 35; at Cen- 
treville, 37; plan for battle at Ma- 
nassas, 43 ; pushes battle by artillery 
arm, 49; gallant effort of, to recover 
lost power, 50 ; criticism of, 54, 56 ; in 
command of Third Corps, Army of 
Virginia, 153; march of, to Manas- 
sas intercepted by Jackson, 176, 
177; at Manassas, 190. 

McElroy, Colonel, death of, 520. 

McLaws, Major-General L., at Wil- 
liamsburg, 70 ; at Seven Pines, 107, 
108 ; march of, in Maryland cam- 
paign, 207, 208; orders from, at 
Crampton's Pass, 230; at Maryland 
Heights, 231 ; arrives at Sharpsburg, 
244 ; brigades of, enter battle, 245, 
247 ; losses of Lee's army in, 266 ; 
at Fredericksburg, 307 et seq. ; at 
Gettysburg, 370, 393, 396, 397; in 
retreat from Gettysburg, 431 ; bri- 
gades of, start with Longstreet 's 
command for Tennessee, 437 ; two 
brigades of, arrive at Chickamauga, 
439 ; but commander and other bri- 
gades too late, 440; finally joins 
Longstreet, 462 ; posts army in semi- 
circle near Chattanooga, 463 ; en- 
gages in attack on Hooker's rear- 
guard, 476, 477 ; in engagement on 
Little Tennessee, 490 ; reaches Knox- 
ville, 495 ; advance of, 497 ; ordered 
to assault of fort, 500 ; again ordered 
to assault, 502 ; orders of, to com- 
mand for assault, 503 ; letter of, to 
General Longstreet, urging delay of 



680 



INDEX. 



assault, 504 ; letter to, from General 
Longstreet, 504 ; makes assault, 505, 
506 ; relief of, ordered by General 
Longstreet, 518 ; inquires cause there- 
for, 518 ; is restored to duty, 548. 

Magruder, Fort, at Williamsburg, 68 ; 
attack on, 73. 

Magruder, General J. B., 66; rein- 
forced by Huger and Early, 67 ; 
builds fortifications at Williamsburg, 
68; engages with Sumner at Allen's 
Farm and Savage Station, 132. 

Mahone, General William, in battle of 
Wilderness, 562 ; arrests advance of 
Hancock before Richmond, 576 ; at 
Petersburg, 606 ; describes General 
Lee's reception of disaster in retreat 
to Appomattox, 614, 615 ; fires High 
Bridge, 615 ; at Cumberland Church, 
615 ; at Farmville, 617 ; in confer- 
ence with General Lee at Appomat- 
tox, 625. 

Malvern Hill, battle of, 141 ; positions 
of troops on field of, 141, 142; Con- 
federates make poor use of artillery, 
143 ; General Lee abandons his origi- 
nal plan, 144 ; battle begun by ad- 
vance of the Confederate right, 144 ; 
Confederates repulsed, 144 ; Federals 
march to Harrison's Landing, 145 ; 
Jackson ordered to follow retreat, 
146 ; casualties, 151. 

Manassas (or Bull Eun), first battle of, 
field chosen by Beauregard, 33 ; de- 
scription of, 34 5 Beauregard's plan 
of battle, 36; McDowell's arrival, 
35, 37 ; opening of battle, 38, 46 ; 
forces available, 41 ; McDowell's ad- 
vance driven back, 46 ; Terry's and 
Lubbock's reconnoissance, 45, 48 ; 
fight assumes large proportions, 48 ; 
Jackson christened " Stonewall," 49 ; 
Beauregard in command on left, 49 ; 
Kirbj'' Smith's forces arrive, 50 ; Mc- 
Dowell makes eflbrt to recover lost 
power, 50 ; flight of Federals, 51 ; 
Longstreet's order to fire on retreat 
countermanded by General Bonham, 
52 ; pursuit revoked, 53 ; losses, 53 ; 
criticism of McDowell, 54, 56 ; Ty- 



ler's reconnoissance, 55 ; Confederate 
battle-flag, 56 ; organization of forces, 
57, 58. 

Manassas (or Bull Eun) , second battle 
of, making ready for, 163 et seq. ; 
strength of confronting armies, 169 ; 
advance of Pope to, 170 ; Jackson 
first on the field, 171 ; Pope reaches 
the Junction, 172 ; first passage of 
arms on field, 172 ; Longstreet at 
Thoroughfiire Gap, 173, 174 ; engage- 
ment at, 175, 176 ; Jackson attacks 
King's division at Groveton, 175, 
176; Pope's orders to Porter, 178, 
179; battle opened by Federals 
against Jackson's right, 180 ; posi- 
tions of troops, 181 ; Kearny opens 
against Jackson's left, 182 ; Long- 
street reports against attack, 182 ; Lee 
returns to first plan of battle, 183 ; 
Confederate advance anticipated by 
Federals, 184 ; Pope on his orders to 
Porter, 185 ; Pope mistakenly thinks 
Confederates retreating, 185, 186 ; 
Porter ordered against Jackson's 
front, 186 ; Longstreet orders batter- 
ies against Porter, 187 ; charge of 
Longstreet's troops, 187 ; Lee rides 
under fire, 189 ; action of United 
States regulars, 190; Federals retreat, 
190 ; Jackson and Stuart ordered in 
pursuit, 191 ; forces engaged, and 
losses, 195 ; retreat covered by Sum- 
ner, 196 ; review of campaign, 196, 
197. 

Manassas Junction, Longstreet reports 
at, to Beauregard, 33 ; raid on, by 
Stuart and Trimble, 167 ; engage- 
ment at, 169. 

Manning, Colonel P. T., wounded 
while lunching with Longstreet on 
field of Chickamauga, 451. 

Mansfield, Major-General Joseph K. 
F., crosses the Antietam prepara- 
tory to battle, 237 ; mortally wounded 
at Antietam, 242. 

Marshall, Colonel, letter of, to Gen- 
eral Longstreet, on alleged order by 
General Lee for battle " at sunrise," 
380 (note). 



INDEX. 



681 



Martin, Major-General, 441 ; super- 
sedes Wheeler in command of Con- 
federate cavalry at Knoxville, 500 ; 
operations against Sturgis's cavalry, 
522; in affair at Dandridge, 526, 
527 ; in affair near Dandridge, 532 ; 
President Davis orders cavalry of, 
sent to Johnston, 539 ; leaves Long- 
street for Georgia, 542. 

Marye, Captain, at Manassas, 40. 

Maryland campaign, the, 199 et seq. 
[see Harper's Ferry, Sharpsburg, 
etc.) ; review of, 279 et seq. 

Mason, George T., killed on the Rio 
Grande, 23. 

Matamoras, Taylor's army at, 22. 

May, Charles, heroism of, at Resaca de 
la Palma, 28. 

Meade, General George G , at South 
Mountain, 223-225; at Antietam, 
241 ; handsome advance of, at 
Fredericksburg, 308, 309 ; succeeds 
Hooker in command of the Army of 
the Potomac, 348 ; wires General 
Halleck of plans, 349 ; suggestion to, 
by General Halleck that Lee may 
turn his left, 360 ; position of, on 
second day at Gettysburg, 363 ; 
recognizes and fears move by Con- 
federate right, 368 ; holds council on 
night of second day, 376 ; not appre- 
hensive of Lee's left, 389 ; attempts 
to bring his left against Longstreet's 
battle, 396 ; on suggestion of Long- 
street to work towards his line of 
communications, 404 ; concentrates 
army at "Warrenton, 432; before 
the battle of the Wilderness, 552 ; 
orders his troops into action, 559 ; at 
Petersburg, 608 ; follows retreat, 
610, 611. 

Mechanicsville, battle of, attack by A. 
P. Hill, 123, 124; losses of first "day, 
124 ; McClellan orders withdrawal, 
125. 

Memoirs of General Longstreet, sug- 
gested by General Lee, 655. 

Merritt, General Wesley, Sheridan's 
chief of cavalry, 590, 598. 

Mexican war, beginning of, 18 ; pre- 



cipitated by movement to the Rio 
Grande, 21, 22; first hostilities, 23; 
Palo Alto, 25 ; Resaca de la Palma, 
26. 

Miles, Colonel Dixon H., mentioned by 
McClellan, 215; mortally wounded 
at Harper's Ferry, 232 ; orders to, 
from General Wool, 286. 

Miles, General, at Petersburg, 608. 

Miller, Captain, at Gettysburg, 395. 

Mills, Colonel Roger Q., commands 
brigade at Chickamauga, 446. 

Milroy, General, fights severe engage- 
ment with Ewell at Winchester, 339. 

Minnegerode, Rev., pastor of church in 
Richmond, 607. 

Mitchell, General R. B., at Chicka- 
mauga, 442. 

Moore, Colonel, killed at Seven Pines, 
99. 

Morgan, General John T., in engage- 
ment on Little Tennessee River, 490 ; 
in affair near Dandridge, 532. 

" Mud March," the, 323. 

Mumford, General T. T., at Five Forks, 
596, 597 ; ordered by Longstreet 
against Ord's bridge-burners, 612; 
at Cumberland Church, 615; cap- 
tures part of Gregg's cavalry, 617; 
at Appomattox, 629. 

N. 

Naglee, General, at Burnside's Bridge 
(Antietam), 2.59. 

Napoleon, quotation from, 405. 

Negley, General, at Chickamauga, 442. 

Negroes, Confederate Congress pro- 
vides for enrolment of, as soldiers, 
582 ; suffrage of, 636. 

Nichols, General W. A., at Gettysburg, 
374 ; extends hospitality to Long- 
street, 632, 633. 

North Carolina, Fifth Regiment, 
slaughter in ranks of, at Williams- 
burg, 78. 

Nurse, the old, 638. 

O. 

Ord, General E. 0. C.,62; meets Gen- 
eral Longstreet, 583 ; proposes meet- 



682 



INDEX. 



ing of commanders in interest of 
peace, 584 ; called by General Grant 
to south side of the James, 595 ; fol- 
lowing Confederate retreat from 
Petersburg, 610; orders burning of 
High Bridge, 611 ; at Appomattox, 
623, 624 ; interview with, described 
by Longstreet, 647. 

Orders, lost. See Lost orders. 

Owen, Edward, 635. 

Owen, Miller, 635. 

Owen, William, 635. 



Palmer, General J. M., at Chicka- 
mauga, 442. 

Palo Alto, 24. 

Parke, General John G. , in command 
at Knoxville, 496 ; takes the field 
along the rear of Longstreet's march, 
512 ; assumes command of Federals 
in- field on march to Dandridge, 528 ; 
at Fort Steadman, 594, 595; at 
Petersburg, 605, 606. 

Parker, J. M. G., letter to, from Gen- 
eral Longstreet, 636, 637. 

Patrick, General, at Antietam, 266 ; 
carries Sumner's demand for sur- 
render of Fredericksburg to civil 
authorities and General Longstreet, 
294 ; in attack, 309. 

Patterson, Robert, opposing Johnston 
in the Valley, 42, 53. 

Peace, propositions for, by General 
Lee, 204; to be secured because gold 
had gone up to 200, 317 ; talk 
of, 582 ; mission of Hon. Mont- 
gomery Blair, 583 ; proposition of 
General Ord to Longstreet for meet- 
ing of commanders in interest of, 
683, 584 ; proposed meeting of wives 
of Generals Grant and Longstreet 
in interest of, 584 ; correspondence 
of Generals Lee and Grant, 585, 586 ; 
General Grant disclaims authority to 
act upon, .587; Longstreet on inter- 
view with General Ord, 547. 

Pegram, Colonel, at Five Forks, 597 ; 
mortally wounded, 599. 



Pegram, General, at Chickamauga, 
441. 

Pemberton, General, commissioned 
lieutenant-general, 290 ; with Presi- 
dent Davis before Army of the Ten- 
nessee, 469 ; troops threaten mutiny 
when they hear Davis's purpose to 
assign him to command of Polk's 
corps, 470. 

Pender, General, at Shepherdstown, 
264; at Fredericksburg, 307; at 
Gettysburg, 354. 

Pendleton, General, at Shepherds- 
town, 264 ; saw opportunity for the 
right at Gettj'sburg, 368 ; charges 
of, against First Corps, 377 ; delivers 
to General Lee opinion of officers 
favorable to surrender, 618; inter- 
view with General Lee on proposi- 
tion for surrender, 620, 621. 

Peninsula, the, 68. 

Peninsular campaign [see Chicka- 
hominy, Seven Pines, Mechanics- 
ville, Gaines's Mill, Malvern Hill, 
etc.), losses in, 151. 

Pennsylvania, invasion of, 331, 334. 
See Gettysburg. 

Perry, General, at Gettysburg, 371. 

Petersburg, battle of. Confederates 
cross the James, 603 ; General 
Grant's concerted assault, 604 ; Gen- 
eral Wright makes opening assault, 
605 ; death of General A. P. Hill, 
605 ; General Grant rides over cap- 
tured works, 606 ; news of, received 
by President Davis in church at 
Richmond, 607 ; fierce assaults on 
Fort Gregg, 607 ; heavy losses at Fort 
Whitworth, 608; Lee gives orders 
for retreat, 608 ; Lee purposed to join 
Johnston in North Carolina, 610. 

Pettigrew, General, wounded and cap- 
tured at Seven Pines, 98 ; charge of, 
at Gettysburg, compared with those 
of Meade's divisions at Fredericks- 
burg, 314 ; at Gettysburg, 352 ; posi- 
tion of, on third day (Gettysburg), 
388 ; famous cbarge, 393 ; wounding 
of, 394 ; attacked by Kilpatrick in 
retreat from Gettysburg, 430. 



INDEX. 



683 



Pickett, General George E., at Seven 
Pines, 108; at Gaines's Mill, 127, 
128 ; at opening of Fredericksburg, 
309 ; his charge at Gettysburg com- 
pared with that of Meade's division 
at Fredericksburg, 314 ; position of, 
on third day, 388 ; Alexander gives 
notice to, and Longstreet affirms 
order for advance of, 392 ; General 
Lee favors sending division of, to 
Longstreet, in Tennessee, 539 ; re- 
called, to join Longstreet, 591 ; 
^ordered to join Lee at Petersburg, 
592 ; opens battle of Five Forks, 596, 
597 ; rides under fire to his command, 
599 ; position at Five Forits not of 
his choosing, 600 ; generalship of, 
601 ; reinforced too late, 599, 602 ; 
in engagement at Amazon Creek, 
606 ; escapes capture at Rice's Sta- 
tion, 614. 

Pleasonton, General Alfred, in Mary- 
land campaign, 209, 210; pushes 
Confederate cavalry back from the 
Maryland mountains, 216 ; opens 
battle of South Mountain, 221 ; 
crosses bridge No. 2 (Antietam), 252 ; 
in command of cavalry division 
under Burnside's reorganization, 292 ; 
engages Stuart's cavalry at Brandy 
Station, 338 ; drives Stuart back to 
Ashby's Gap, 341. 

Poe, Captain, constructs Federal earth- 
works at Knoxville, 496 ; report on 
work by citizens and contrabands, 
500. 

Political prisoners. General Lee upon 
exchange of, 586 ; General Grant 
upon, 587 ; Longstreet on exchange 
of, 648. 

Polk, General Leonidas (Bishop), com- 
missioned lieutenant-general, 290; 
in command of right wing at Chick- 
amauga, 439 ; put under charges by 
General Bragg, 465. 

Pope, Major-General John, in com- 
mand of Army of Virginia, 153; dis- 
plays bold front as a diversion, 154 ; 
injudicious orders of, 154; "General 
Orders No. 11," 155; his attitude 



towards non-combatants contrasted 
with Scott's in Mexico, 155, 156 ; 
engages with Jackson at Slaughter 
Mountain, 157; increases strength 
of his army, 159; captures one of 
Lee's orders and officers, 160 ; puts 
army in retreat across the Rappahan- 
nock, 160 ; head-quarters of, raided 
by Stuart, 165 ; forms plan to attack 
Lee, 166 ; concentrates Army of Vir- 
ginia at Warrenton, 168 ; orders for 
advance and concentration at Manas- 
sas, 171 ; reaches Manassas Junction, 
172; orders to Porter, 178, 179; 
orders for attack at Manassas, 180 ; 
orders Porter to attack Longstreet's 
right, 184; his report upon, 185; 
mistakenly supposes Confederates 
retreating, 185, 186 ; letter to, from 
General Lee, on death of Kearny, 
194; criticism of, in Manassas cam- 
paign, 197. 

Porter, Major-General Fitz-John, in 
command of Fifth Corps, 82 ; at 
Mechanicsville, 122; at Gaines's 
Mill, 126; at Malvern Hill, 141; 
ordered by Pope to Manassas, 171 ; 
march of, delayed, 171 ; Pope's orders 
to, for Manassas, 178 ; ordered to at- 
tack Longstreet's right flank, 184; 
receives order too late, 185; ordered 
to attack Jackson's front, 186; hard 
battle against, by Jackson and Long- 
street, 187, 188; at Antietam, 234; 
ordered ready to enter battle, 
252. 

Porter, Theoderic, in theatricals on 
Mexican frontier, 20 ; killed on the 
Rio Grande, 23. 

Potomac, Army of See Army of the 
Potomac. 

Potter, General R. D., in East Tennes- 
see campaign, 490, 492. 

Powell, William H., report of, on 
Second Manassas, 190. 

Preston, General William, at Chicka- 
mauga, 439, 450 (note) ; gains Snod- 
grass Hill, 455. 

Provisional Army Corps, two organized 
by McClellan, 82. 



684 



INDEX. 



Eains, General, leaves percussion shells 
at Williamsburg, 79. 

Ransom, General, at Fredericksburg, 
309, 310, 313; at Five Forks, 596, 
598 ; horse killed, 599. 

Reed, General Theodore, mortally 
wounded in engagement at Cum- 
berland Church, 615. 

Regulars, United States, at First Manas- 
sas, 37, 51 ; at Second Manassas, 189, 
190. 

Reno, General Jesse, division of, joins 
Pope at Culpeper, 159 ; captures 
signal station, 161 ; killed at South 
Mountain, 223. 

Resaca de la Palma, 26-28. 

Retreats, the great (McClellan's), 132- 
152 ; from Gettysburg, 426 et 
seq. 

Reynolds, General John F., at Me- 
chanicsville, 126 ; ordered to attack 
at Manassas (Second), 180; in com- 
mand of right wing of Union army 
at Gettysburg, 353 ; death of, 354. 

Reynolds, General, at Chickamauga, 
441. 

Rice's Station, Oil ; engagement at, 
613, 614. 

Richardson, General I. B., at Sharps- 
burg, 244, 247 ; brave advance of, 
against Confederate centre, 248, 250 ; 
occupies Piper House at Antietam, 
251 ; mortally wounded, 251. 

Richardson, Colonel John B., at Sec- 
ond Manassas, 188; at Sharpsburg, 
258, 269; at Fredericksburg, 319; 
at Gettysburg, 411. 

Richmond, apprehended advance on, 
64: practicable routes to, 64; D. H. 
Hill's denial of reported proposed 
abandonment of, when Lee assumed 
command, 115, 116; Burnside's 
march for, 293 ; route to, covered by 
Longstreet after Fredericksburg bat- 
tle, 323, 324; armies agani in front 
of, 572 et seq. [see Richmond, cam- 
paign of, in 1864) ; news of Peters- 
burg received at, 607. 



"Richmond authorities," forced to 
extremity, call for suggestions as to 
conduct of the war, 543 ; Lee and 
Longstreet confer with, 544. See 
Richmond, campaign against. 

Richmond, campaign against, in 1864, 
fall of General J. E. B. Stuart, 573 ; 
Longstreet assigned to command 
north of the James, 574 ; Confeder- 
ate positions, 575; General Grant 
conceives plan for left attack, 575, 
576 ; Mahone arrests advance of 
Hancock, 576 ; aft'air on the Wil- 
liamsburg road, 576-578 ; closing 
scenes of (1864), 579; Sherman's 
movements come into remote bearing 
upon affairs around the capital, 580; 
Longstreet orders roads broken up 
with ploughs, 580; General Grant 
strengthens combination against 
Richmond, 590 ; General Grant or- 
ders a grand move by his left, 592 ; 
General Lee gives consent to sortie 
against Fort Steadman, 592 ; posi- 
tions and strength of Federal army, 
593 ; General Lee's strength, 593, 
594 ; storming of Fort Steadman, 
594; losses at Fort Steadman, 595; 
General Grant begins movement 
around the Confederate right, 595 ; 
General Lee endeavors to anticipate 
the movement, 596 [see Five Forks, 
battle of, Petersburg, battle of, etc.) ; 
Longstreet in retreat marches for 
Farmville, 610; General Meade's 
pursuit, 610, 611; movements of 
Generals Ord and Longstreet, 611, 
612 ; High Bridge saved by Long- 
street, 612 ; engagement at Rice's 
Station, 613, 614; Confederate dis- 
aster, 614; General Lee's reception 
of the news described by General 
Mahone, 614, 615; engagement at 
Cumberland Church, 615; panic 
among Confederate teamsters at 
Farmville, 615; engagement at 
Farmville, 616, 617. See Appo- 
mattox, surrender at. 

Ridgely, Randolph, heroism of, at 
Resaca de la Palma, 27. 



INDEX. 



685 



Ripley, General, wounded at Sharps- 
burg, 243. 

Eobertson, General J. B., in engage- 
ment at Lookout Valley, 476, 477 ; 
charges and specifications against, 
517 ; sentenced to suspension, 548. 

Eobinson, James, Longstreet's guide 
in Wilderness, 548. 

"Rock Brigade," at Chickamauga, 
448 ; at Petersburg, 606. 

Rodes, General E. E., takes Federal 
redoubt and battery at Seven Pines, 
94; at South Mountain, 224; at 
Sharpsburg, 247 ; at Gettysburg, 355, 
374. 

Rosecrans, General W. S., threatening 
of, in Georgia, 433 ; understood 
Bragg's plan for Chickamauga, 439 ; 
rides along Union lines on eve of 
battle, 443 ; at Chattanooga, 463 ; 
reports condition of army deplora- 
ble, 470; superseded in command 
by General George H. Thomas, 472. 

Rosser, Colonel, on the Rappahannock, 
164, 218, 221 ; General, saves portion 
of Early's command and reports to 
Longstreet, 591 ; at Five Forks, 
596 ; ordered by Longstreet against 
Ord's bridge-burners, 612 ; at Cum- 
berland Church, 615 ; captures part 
df Gregg's cavalry, 617. 

Ruft', Colonel, honorablj' mentioned, 
and death of, 520. 

Ruger, General, opens against Ewell 
(Gettysburg, third day), 387, 388. 



Sailor's Creek, Confederate disaster at, 
613-615. 

St. John, Brigadier-General F. M., 
appointed commissary-general of sub- 
sistence, 583. 

Sanders, Fort, assault on, by General 
McLaws, 505, 506. 

Scales, General, wounded at Gettj'^s- 
burg, 389. 

Scammon, Colonel, at Burnside's Bridge 
(Antietam), 259. 



Schofield, General J. M., despatch to, 
from General Grant, on driving 
Longstreet out of Tennessee, 535, 
536 ; despatch of, to General Thomas, 
537. 

Schurz, General Carl, at Gettysburg, 
355. 

Scott, General Winfield, 37 ; treatment 
of non-combatants in Mexican war, 
156; advice of, as to "wayward sis- 
ters," 631. 

Scout Harrison employed by Long- 
street, 324 ; reports to Longstreet 
before Gettysburg, 346. 

Seddon , Secretary of War, sends scouts 
to Longstreet, 324 ; Longstreet calls 
on, and makes proposition to, for 
Western movement, 327, 409 ; West- 
ern movement again urged on, by 
Longstreet, 433, 434. 

Sedgwick, General, division of, leads 
Sumner's advance at Sharpsburg, 
244, 245 ; encounters heavy fire, 246 ; 
in command of Sixth Corps, 552. 

Semmes, General, at Gettysburg, 370; 
mortally wounded, 371. 

Seven Days' Retreat, "McClellan's, 132, 
152. 

Seven Pines (or Fair Oaks) , battle of, 81 ; 
new line of defence, 81 ; McClellan 
advances to the Chickahominy, 82 ; 
preliminary aifairs, 82 ; positions of 
the armies, 83, 84 ; Johnston seeks to 
strike McClellan before McDowell 
can reach him, 85 ; Johnston holds 
council, 85, 86 ; Longstreet ordered 
to Williamsburg road, 86 ; tactical 
handling there left to him, 88 ; ter- 
rific storm on eve of battle, 88 ; John- 
ston's orders for Generals Smith and 
Huger, 89 ; lack of harmony between 
Longstreet, Smith, and Huger, 90, 
92 ; hour of opening battle, 93 ; 
Garland and the two Andersons 
strongly engage, 94 ; Rodes takes 
Federal redoubt and battery, 94; 
Longstreet's battle on the Williams- 
burg road, 96 ; McClellan orders 
Sumner's corps to the fight, 97 ; 
Sumner's reports quoted, 98 ; Gen- 



686 



INDEX, 



eral Smith beaten, 98 ; General 
Johnston orders troops to sleep on 
their lines, 100 ; Johnston wounded, 
100 ; summary of forces and losses, 
101, 102; Longstreet plans for re- 
suming battle at daylight, 103 ; the 
second day's battle, 105 ; General 
Smith holds a council, 107 ; Long- 
street asks for reinforcements and a 
diversion, 108 ; Pickett's brave stand, 
108 ; losses, 110 ; criticism on General 
Smith, 110, 111; the battle should 
not have been lost by the Confeder- 
ates, 110; Keyes's corroboration, 110. 

Seward, Secretary, 583. 

Seymour, General, taken prisoner at 
Wilderness, 565. 

Shaler, General, captured at Wilder- 
ness, 565. 

Shannon, Lieutenant, at Chickamauga, 
441. 

Sharpsburg (or Antietam), battle of, 
preliminaries, 227 et seq. ; head of 
Lee's army reaches the Antietam, 
233 ; Union army on the field, 234 ; 
McClellan makes reconnoissance, 
234 ; description of the field, 235 ; 
Hooker advances against Longstreet, 
236 ; Jackson arrives from Harper's 
Ferry, 236 ; General Mansfield 
crosses the Antietam, 237 ; the 
- bloodiest single day of the war, 239 ; 
comparison with other battles, 240 ; 
battle opens, 241 ; fall of General 
Mansfield, 242; heavy losses in 
General Walker's, Hood's, and Hill's 
commands, 243; Federals in heavy 
columns cross the Antietam, 244 ; 
Sumner's advance, 245, 247 ; Rich- 
ardson's march against the Con- 
federate centre, 248 ; Longstreet's 
battle on the Hagerstown pike, 249 ; 
fall of G. B. Anderson, 249 ; Rich- 
ardson mortally wounded, 251 ; at- 
tack against Confederate centre re- 
duced to defensive, 252 ; Pleasonton 
crosses bridge No 2, 252 ; his threat- 
ening demonstration checked, 253 ; 
D. H. Hill's horse shot under him, 
254 ; Jackson ordered to turn Fed- 



eral right, 257 ; McClellan's orders 
to Burnside to take bridge, 258 ; 
charge of Colonel Duryea, 259 ; ad- 
vance against Longstreet's right, 
260; arrival of General A. P. Hill, 
261 ; Burnside's progress arrested, 
262 ; meeting of Lee and Longstreet 
after close of battle, 262 ; Lee with- 
draws across the Potomac, 263 [see 
Shepherdstown) ; strength of armies, 
265 ; losses, 266 ; McClellan's plan 
and execution not strong, 267 ; Con- 
federate troops engaged in, 267 ; 
Federal troops engaged in, 271 ; 
full significance of battle, 288 ; com- 
ments on Stonewall Jackson at, 401 
(note). 

Shepherdstown, Lee's army crosses 
Potomac at, 263 ; engagement at, 
264, 265. 

Sheridan, General P. H., at Chicka- 
mauga, 442 ; in command of Fed- 
erals of Foster's army on march to 
Dandridge, 528 ; in fight at Yellow 
Tavern, 573 ; marches cavalry from 
the valley to join Sherman, 590 ; in 
battle of Five Forks, 596, 597, 598 ; 
at Petersburg, 606 ; at Appomattox, 
622 ; Longstreet on operations of, 
652. 

Sherman, General William T., at West 
Point, 17; advance of, at Manassas, 
48 ; marching on Chattanooga, 480 ; 
proposes to strike Hardee, 615 ; move- 
ments of, come into remote bearing 
upon matters around Richmond, 580 ; 
progressive movements of, 581. 

Sickles, General Daniel, at Fredericks- 
burg, 309 ; in afftiir at the Peach 
Orchard (Gettysburg), 366, 371; 
wounded, 371. 

Sigel, General, in command of First 
Corps, Army of Virginia, 153 ; or- 
dered by Pope to attack at Manassas 
(Second), 180. 

Sims, Captain, at Appomattox, 627. 

Slaughter Mountain, battle at, 157. 

Slaughter, M., mayor of Fredericks- 
burg, reply of, to General Sumner's 
demand for surrender, 294-296. 



INDEX. 



687 



Slocum, General Henry W., at Cramp- 
ton's Pass, 229; at Gettysburg, 356. 

Smith, General E. K., commissioned 
lieutenant-general, 290. 

Smith, Major-General G. W., reports 
for duty with Army of Northern 
Virginia, 60 ; called to Kichmond for 
council with War Department, 65 ; 
Johnston's orders to, for Seven Pines, 
89 ; complaint of, against Longstreet, 
90 ; beaten at Seven Pines, 98 ; com- 
mand devolved upon, temporarily, 
after Johnston was wounded, lOU ; 
standing of, 103 ; holds council, 107 ; 
criticism upon, 110, 111 ; resignation 
of. 111. 

Smith, General Kirby, arrives on field 
of Manassas, 49 ; is wounded, 50. 

Smith, General M. L., in Wilderness, 
561 ; makes reconnoissance and leads 
flanking force, 562, 563. 

Smith, Major Melancthon, at Chicka- 
mauga, 441. 

Smith, General W. F., at Crampton's 
Pass, 229 ; opens line of railway on 
the Tennessee, 472 ; move of, against 
Confederate sharp-shooters, 473. 

Soldiers, the Confederate, tributes to, 
200, 288 ; amusement of, 325. 

Sorrel, Lieutenant-Colonel G. M., 47; 
goes with Longstreet to Chicka- 
mauga, 438 ; communicates to Gen- 
eral McLaws order of relief from 
General Longstreet, 518 ; leads divi- 
sions in flanking party in Wilderness, 
562; appointed brigadier, 581. 

South Mountain, description of, 218 ; 
advance of Union forces to, 219 ; 
battle of, opened by Generals Pleas- 
onton and Cox, 221 ; General Gar- 
land killed, 221 ; Federals in superior 
strength numerically, 222 ; General 
Keno killed, 223 ; the strong battle 
against General Rodes, 224 ; exhaus- 
tion of the troops, 225 ; losses, 225 ; 
Lee orders withdrawal of troops from, 
228. 

Staif of General Lee, 573. 

Steadman^ Fort, sortie against, 592 et 
seq. 



Steamboat invented by William Long- 
street, 14. 

Steedman, General, at Chickamauga, 
442. 

Stephens, Hon. Alex. H., 583. 

Steuart, General George H., marches 
through McConnellsburg and Car- 
lisle, 345 ; at Gettysburg, 374 ; at 
Five Forks, 600. 

Stevens, General I. I., at West Point, 
17 ; division of, joins Pope on Eap- 
pahannock, 161 ; at Manassas (Sec- 
ond), 182; killed at Chantilly, 194; 
tribute to, 195. 

Stewart, General, at Chickamauga, 
439 ; makes strong advance and 
assault, 447. 

Strawberry Plains. See Dandridge. 

Stribling's battery, captured at Suffolk, 
325. 

Stuart, General J. E. B., disperses 
Federals at Lewinsville, 60 ; at 
Dranesville, 62 ; opposes Hooker on 
the Hampton and Yorktown roads, 
68, 69 ; at Williamsburg, 75 ; recon- 
noissance by, around McClellan's 
army, 116-119; cuts off Stoneman's 
cavalry at Savage Station, 130 ; at 
Erlington Heights, 146 ; raids Gen- 
eral Pope's head-quarters, 165, 166; 
captures supplies, etc., at Manassas 
Junction, 167 ; cavalry of, in first 
passage of arms on field of Manassas, 
172; takes a map on the field, 183; 
in pursuit of Pope's retreat, 193 ; at 
Maryland Heights, 229 ; rides around 
Union army at Sharpsburg and Har- 
per's Ferry, 290 ; engages Pleason- 
ton's cavalry at Brandy Station, 338 ; 
orders to, from General Lee, for march 
to Pennsylvania, 340; driven by 
Pleasonton back to Ashby's Gap, 
341 ; directions to, from Longstreet. 
for movements by cavalry, 342 ; late 
arrival of, at Gettysburg, 373 ; stub- 
born fight of, on third day, 396 ; 
covering Confederate retreat from 
Gettysburg, 428 ; death of, at Yel- 
low Tavern, 572, 573; character of, 
573. 



688 



INDEX. 



Sturgis, General, at Burnside's Bridge 
(Antietam), 259 ; operations against 
Martin's cavalr^^, 521, 522; occupies 
Dandridge, 526 ; in aflair at Dan- 
dridge, 526 ; attempts to strike Mar- 
tin's rear, 527. 

Suffolk, General Longstreet's operations 
about, 324. 

Sumner, General E. V., in command 
of right on Chickahominy, 84 ; or- 
dered by McClellan into battle at 
Seven Pines, 97 ; reports of, 98 ; 
defeats Magruder at Savage Station, 
132 ; gallant covering of retreat from 
Second Manassas, 196; Lee's "lost 
order" found in camp of, 213; ad- 
vance of, at Sharpsburg, 245 ; eager- 
ness and bravery of, 247 ; in com- 
mand of Eight Grand Division Army 
of the Potomac, 292; calls for sur- 
render of Fredericksburg, 293 ; troops 
of, enter Fredericksburg, 304. 

"Sunrise order" for battle at Gettj'S- 
burg, 377 et seq. 

Surrender. See Appomattox, surrender 
at. 

Sykes, General, in command of United 
States regulars at Manassas, 51 ; at 
Second Manassas, 189; at Fredericks- 
burg, 313 ; corps of, at Little Bound 
Top, 371. 



Taliaferro, General, wounded at Grove- 
ton, 177; at Fredericksburg, 309. 

Taylor, Colonel Erasmus, on Lee's ac- 
knowledgment of fault at Gettys- 
burg, 400 ; takes guide to Longstreet 
in Wilderness, 557 ; letter of, to 
Longstreet, on controversy as to 
guide at Wilderness, 569. 

Taylor, General, mortally wounded at 
Manassas Junction, 170. 

Taylor, Assistant Adjutant-General W. 
H., letter of, to General Longstreet, 
on order for "battle at sunrise" 
(Gettysburg), 379 (note) ; on sup- 
porting Longstreet at Gettysburg, 
397 ; states strength of Army of 
Northern Virginia (May, 1864), 553 ; 



letter to, from Longstreet, 574; re- 
ports Lee's strength for defence of 
Kichmond, 593, 594 ; letter to, from 
Longstreet, 651 ; letter to, from 
Longstreet, on policy towards new 
organizations, 653. 

Taylor, General Zachary, in command 
of "army of observation" in Louisi- 
ana, 18 ; moves to the Bio Grande, 
21 ; calls for volunteers, 23 ; at Be- 
saca de la Palma, 27. 

Tennessee, Army of the. See Army of 
Tennessee. 

Tennessee campaign, 438 et seq. See 
Chick amauga, battle of, etc. 

Tennessee, East, campaign of. See East 
Tennessee campaign. 

Terry, Colonel, 48, 596. 

Terry, General, before Bichmond, 576 ; 
in second expedition against Wil- 
mington, 582; at Five Forks, 595, 
597, 600. 

Texas seeks annexation, 18. 

Thomas, Colonel, death of, 520. 

Thomas, General George H., at West 
Point, 17 ; commands four divisions 
of Bosecrans's army at Chicka- 
mauga, 441-443 ; calls for reinforce- 
ments, 446 ; supersedes General Bose- 
crans in command, 472 ; called on by 
General Foster for troops to aid in 
campaign against Longstreet, 538 ; 
despatch from General Grant to, on 
Longstreet, 534-537 ; despatch to, 
from General Schofield, 537. 

Thompson, Major, killed, 630. 

Thoroughfare Gap, Longstreet's ad- 
vance column at, 173 ; description of, 
174. See Manassas, Second. 

Tidball's artillery at Fort Steadman, 
594. 

Toombs, General Bobert, on the Chick- 
ahominy, 113 ; ordered under arrest 
by Longstreet, 161 ; released, 166 ; at 
Second Manassas, 189 ; gallantly de- 
fends bridge against Burnside, 257 ; 
forced to retire, 260. 

Triggs, General, at Chickamauga, 449. 

Trimble, General, in engagement on 
Bappahannock, 164; at Manassas 



INDEX. 



689 



Junction, 167 ; charge of, at Gettys- 
burg compared with that of Meade's 
men at Fredericksburg, 314 ; position 
of, at Gettysburg, third day, 388 ; 
in the famous charge, 393 ; wound- 
ing of, 394. 

Turner, General, at Petersburg, 607 ; 
assaults Fort Whitworth, 608. 

Tyler, General, reconnoissance of, at 
Manassas, 38, 55. 



Vance, General, captured by Federals, 
531. 

Van Cleve, General H. P., at Chicka- 
mauga, 442. 

Venable, Colonel Charles S., men- 
tioned, 363, 379 ; letter of, to General 
Longstreet on "battle at sunrise" 
order at Gettysburg, 379 (note) ; on 
putting Heth's division in assaulting 
columns, 398 ; takes order for change 
of direction to Longstreet in Wilder- 
ness, 557 ; letter of, to Longstreet, 
on movement of latter to the Wilder- 
ness, 571 ; gives account of last scenes 
and of General Lee, 624. 

Vincent, General, killed at Little 
Eound Top (Gettysburg), 372. 

Virginia " Foot Cavalry," 146. 

Vii^inia, "too much," 332. 

W. 

Wadsworth, General James S., at 
Gettysburg, 374 ; mortally wounded 
at Wilderness, 563. 

Wagner, Lieutenant, mortally wounded 
by remarkable cannon-shot, 255. 

Walker, General J. G., at Harper's 
Ferry, 231 ; at Sharpsburg, 242, 247. 

Walker, General W. H. T., at Chicka- 
mauga, 441, 446. 

Walton, Colonel, Longstreet's order to, 
390. 

War feeling in the South, 31. 

War, Mexican. See Mexican war. 

War, the general status of, on Con- 
federate side, 543 ; suggestions for 
conduct of, by Longstreet, 544. 



Warren, Major-General G. K., finds 
Little Eound Top the citadel of the 
field at Gettysburg, 371 ; testimony 
as to third day at Gettysburg, 398; 
in command of Fifth Corps (1864), 
552 ; makes opening attack in Wil- 
derness, 558 ; at Five Forks, 597. 

Washburn, Colonel, mortally wounded, 
615. 

Washington Artillery, the, at Manas- 
sas, 37, 40, 41, 49 ; at Second Manas- 
sas, 181, 186; at Sharpsburg, 233, 
236, 243, 249, 250, 261, 267; at 
Fredericksburg, 311 ; at Gettysburg, 
390 et seq. 

Weed, General, killed on Little Eound 
Top (Gettysburg), 372. 

Weitzel, General, before Eichmond, 
576, 595, 603, 604. 

West Point, distinguished men at, 16, 
17. 

Westward movement, first proposed to 
Secretary of War Seddon by Long- 
street, 327, 409 ; reverted to by Long- 
street, 433, 434 ; transportation or- 
dered for, 436 ; Longstreet reaches 
General Bragg's head -quarters, 438 
{see Chickamauga, battle of, etc.) ; 
difference between time proposed for 
and actual making of, 478, 479. 

Weymouth, Captain, at Fredericks- 
burg, 303. 

Wharton, General, 441. 

Wheeler, General, makes cavalry raid 
on Tennessee Eiver, 463 ; Long- 
street's orders to, in East Tennessee, 
487, 488 ; in engagement on Little 
Tennessee Eiver, 490 ; returns to Gen- 
eral Bragg, 500. 

White House, McClellan establishes his 
permanent depot at, 82. See Seven 
Pines. 

Whiting, Major, at Manassas, 52 ; Gen- 
eral, at Seven Pines, 105-107 ; de- 
sires to leave Fair Oaks, 113 ; rein- 
forces Jackson, 115 ; at Gaines's Mill, 
127, 128 ; mortally wounded at Fort 
Fisher, 582. 

Whittle, Colonel, wounded at Gettys- 
burg, 394. 



44 



690 



INDEX. 



Whitworth, Fort (Petersburg), 606- 
608. 

Wilcox, General, at Burnside's Bridge 
(Antietam), 259 ; at Gettysburg, 374; 
at Wilderness, 556, 558, 560 ; at Fort 
Steadman, 594 ; at Petersburg, 605, 
606, 608. 

Wilderness, the, battle of, General 
Grant with Army of the Potomac, 
552 ; strength of confronting armies, 
552-554 ; Army of the Potomac 
crosses the Kapidan, 555 ; General 
Grant had no fixed plan beyond 
avoiding Lee's defensive line, 555 ; 
Wilderness described, 555, 556; march 
of Longstreet's command, 556 ; re- 
ceives a guide, 557 ; troops meet and 
action cannot wait, 558 ; attack by 
General Warren, 558 ; Confederates 
fail to intrench at night, 560 ; Han- 
cock's advance in the morning, 560; 
Longstreet's troops form line under 
fire, 560, and repulse Hancock's ad- 
vance, 561 ; the Ninth Corps ordered 
in by General Grant, 561 ; Longstreet 
organizes flanking movement against 
Hancock's left, 562, 563 ; General 
Jenkins mortally and Longstreet se- 
verely wounded, 564 ; General Lee 
on the field in command, 565 ; value 
of a "level head," 566 ; the failure 
to intrench by Third Corps, 565- 
567 ; delay in advance after Long- 
street was disabled, 567 ; controversy 
as to Longstreet's march and guide, 
568, 571. 

Willard, General, killed at Gettys- 
burg, 371. 

Williamsburg, battle of, 72 ; advance 
of Hooker, 73 ; Longstreet orders 
Early to support the left, 74 ; Stuart's 
charge, 75 ; Anderson's concentrated 
movement on, and capture of guns, 
75 ; Anderson driven back by Hook- 
er's reinforcements, 76 ; Hancock 
takes two redoubts, 77 ; attack by 
D. H. Hill and Early, with great 



slaughter of the latter's troops be- 
cause of blunder, 78 ; forces engaged, 
79 ; casualties, 79 ; object of the bat- 
tle, 79 ; Hancock called " the Su- 
perb," 80. 

Williamsburg, engagement near, 68- 
70. 

Williamsburg road, affair on (1864), 
576-578. 

Williamsport, Confederates at, on re- 
treat from Gettysburg, 428, 429. 

Wilmington, first move against, 580; 
second expedition against, 582. 

Winchester, engagement at, between 
Ewell and Milroy, 339. 

Winder, General, mortallj- woUnded at 
Slaughter Mountain, 157. 

Winthrop, Captain, wounded at Knox- 
ville in leading assault, 497. 

Woftbrd, General, Longstreet rides 
with, to Little Round Top, 372; in 
retreat from Gettysburg, 431 ; in en- 
gagement on Little Tennessee River, 
490 ; in assault on Fort Sanders, 502, 
503, 505 ; at Dandridge, 526 ; at 
Wilderness, 562, 563. 

Wood, General T. J., at Chickamauga, 
442, 446. 

Woodhull, Major Alfred A., gives 
account of remarkable cannon-shot, 
255. 

Wool, General John E., orders to Col- 
onel Miles, in command of Harper's 
Ferry, 286. 

Worth, General, at Corpus Christi, 20. 

Wright, General, at Gettysburg, 871 ; 
makes assault at Petersburg, 605. 

Wrightsville, bridge at, burned, 345. 



Yellow Tavern, engagement at, be- 
tween Sheridan and Stuart, 573. 

York, authorities of, surrender to 
General John B. Gordon, 345. 

Yorktown, Confederates occupy, 67 ; 
intrenchments abandoned, 68. 



H iu;5 79 

THE END. 



H '05 



I R^r 








.T* A 



■• ^-^'^ '■ 




























\ 




,*"'..,." 



■"-^•5' •■i^sim't ■*..^^'' •'^^- """-%''■'* -'-^l.. 














••-■"^''- "t. o.*'' "" 




• •' A 


















.0' ^^ *,.^' ^ -^ 




•a. «<* "• 














<> *'7V«* 



















'^^^^ 






^^^"^ 



^^ FE B 79 

Tl. IWANUHtSiE.,, 
INDIANA 46962 








•f** < 

•^•o^ 



LIBRARY OI^-CONGRESS 







